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Abstract

The Border South states of Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, and Missouri spurned
secession in 1860-61, which has led scholars to conclude that these four slaveholding states were
safely ensconced in the Union column from the beginning of the crisis that drew the other
slaveholding states into the Confederacy. Historians have often simplified the secession crisis in
the Border South, minimizing the likelihood that these states with smaller concentrations of
enslaved persons and a more diversified economy and society than the Upper and Lower South
would ever leave the Union. This work seeks to add contingency to the story of the Border
South during the breakup of the Union and demonstrates that many of the region’s inhabitants
actually considered secession a viable option. The Border South remained in the Union not
because the region’s white citizenry shared an inherent attachment to the republic, but because
conservatives exhaustively labored to beat back the disunionists in their midst and prevent the
four states from joining in the secession experiment.

This study chronicles the Unionist

offensive that neutralized, offset, and frustrated Border South secessionists and by the beginning
of 1862 placed the region on solid Union ground. It demonstrates that keeping the Border South
in the Union was by no means a facile task or a foregone conclusion.
The Unionist offensive centered on protecting slavery, holding out hope that a
compromise settlement might avert war, and on maintaining an intersectional conservative
collaboration to counteract northern and southern radicals. This dissertation shows that although
in terms of raw numbers the institution of slavery had experienced a slow decline in the Border
South throughout the antebellum period, the region’s commitment to slavery’s perpetuity
remained robust in 1860-61. Moderates pointed to the Constitution and the Fugitive Slave Law
to convince their neighbors that only by remaining in the Union could they preserve slavery.
xi

The protection of the peculiar institution proved the most influential component of the Unionist
offensive in the Border South, which demonstrates that even on the brink of the Civil War the
region was no less committed to slavery than the eleven slaveholding states that seceded.

xii

Introduction
“Where Is the Great Statesman?”: Henry Clay’s Republic

On Independence Day, 1857, sunshine splashed down on the enormous crowd gathered at
the Lexington Cemetery, in the heart of Kentucky’s Bluegrass region. The cloudless blue sky
cast a fitting air over the assemblage, which had congregated not to mourn, but to celebrate the
life of Henry Clay, Kentucky’s famed statesman. Bunting draped from the windows of the
town’s houses and businesses; flowers and flags adorned several homes. In mid-morning, militia
companies and local fire brigades marched to the step of patriotic tunes from five separate brass
bands and led the throng to a large stage near Clay’s spartan gravesite. On the platform sat
Clay’s family and his political heirs. They had come to Lexington to lay the cornerstone of a
monument that not only would commemorate the life of the Bluegrass State’s favorite son, but
also provide the departed doyen with a resting place worthy of his lengthy and eminent political
career.1
Five years before Clay had been laid to rest in the cemetery after a lifetime of public
service to a nation that he saw grow from a string of former British colonies hugging the Atlantic
seaboard to a transcontinental colossus stretching to the Pacific Ocean. By the time of his death
in 1852 he had indelibly left his mark on the republic. Clay occupied several major political
positions, from speaker of the House of Representatives and long stints in the United States
Senate to secretary of state, during his long career, though his ambition to become president went
thrice unfulfilled. He had few equals as a political manager. As the architect of the Whig Party,
the major opponent to Andrew Jackson’s Democrats, Clay used his political acumen to build a

1

Report of the Ceremonies on the Fourth of July, 1857, at the Laying of the Corner Stone of a National
Monument, to be Erected near Lexington, Kentucky, to the Memory of Henry Clay; Together with the Oration
Delivered on the Occasion, by the Rev. Robert J. Breckinridge, D.D., L.L.D. (Lexington, KY: Clay Monument
Association, 1857), 3-6.

1

national organization that championed an improved American infrastructure, high tariffs to
augment domestic production and consumption, and financial growth managed by a national
bank. His conservative approach to America’s mounting concern with the spread of slavery and
his penchant for sectional compromise grew out of his unique geographic locus in the Border
South state of Kentucky, situated on the boundary between freedom and slavery. During his
career Clay witnessed a growing political estrangement between the northern free states and the
southern slaveholding states; on three occasions he had contributed significantly to cobbling
together sectional compromises that rescued the nation from the specter of division and possibly
civil war. “I know no South, no North, no East, no West, to which I owe my allegiance,” Clay
remarked on the floor of the Senate during one of those sectional crises. “My allegiance is to
this Union and to my own State.” His countrymen labeled Clay the Great Compromiser, and
scores of Border South conservatives considered his political outlook gospel.2
After laying the cornerstone, the crowd repaired to the Lexington fairgrounds where one
of Clay’s disciples, Robert Jefferson Breckinridge, delivered a stirring address in which he
admonished his fellow border southerners to follow the Great Compromiser’s example and strive
for national unity and the preservation of the Union. “Let us preserve [Clay’s republic] by every
mutual concession, and every proof of exalted forbearance,” Breckinridge intoned,
“remembering how poor and how low are all secondary considerations, when compared with the
peace, the freedom, the independence, the union, the glory of our country.”3
The crowd listened intently to his words, for the name Breckinridge carried as much
weight among Kentuckians as did Clay. Breckinridge’s father, a confidant of Thomas Jefferson
and James Madison, had come to Kentucky in 1793, held various state offices during the 1790s,
2

Robert V. Remini, Henry Clay: Statesman for the Union (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1991),
740 (quote), 781-785.
3
Report of the Ceremonies, 47-48.

2

introduced the famed Kentucky Resolution to the state legislature in 1799, and parlayed his
political success into a stint as Jefferson’s attorney general before passing away in 1806. Robert
inherited his father’s passion for politics, but after one term in the state legislature he opted to
enter the Presbyterian ministry. He rose to great heights in the denomination, pastoring a
congregation in Baltimore before returning to Lexington in 1847 to head the city’s First
Presbyterian Church.

During his career Breckinridge became a leader of the Old School

Presbyterians and accrued a reputation for his eloquent sermons and his thoughtful writings. In
1853 he left his pastorate, founded the Danville Theological Seminary some thirty-five miles
southwest of Lexington, and served the college as both a professor and a public intellectual.
Political moderation became Breckinridge’s watchword: he refused to believe that the Bible
sanctioned American slavery and thus called for its gradual elimination but, paradoxically, he
himself owned thirty-seven bondspersons in 1860.

The cries for immediate abolition that

emanated from northern rostrums and became louder throughout the antebellum period unnerved
the conservative Breckinridge, who worried that such a program would endanger the Union and
produce social anarchy in the South.4
Although few border southerners endorsed Breckinridge’s cry for gradual emancipation,
many agreed with two of his key political tenets which he had inherited from Henry Clay: his
attachment to the moderating influence of the Union and his conservative racial outlook. By the
time he delivered his oration in 1857, the widening sectional divide had left the Border South
states of Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, and Missouri in a most unenviable position. Most
inhabitants of the northernmost outpost of slavery had throughout the antebellum period relied

4

James C. Klotter, The Breckinridges of Kentucky, 1760-1981 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky,
1986), 39-91; Harold D. Tallant, Evil Necessity: Slavery and Political Culture in Antebellum Kentucky (Lexington:
University Press of Kentucky, 2003); Luke E. Harlow, “Religion, Race, and Robert J. Breckinridge: The Ideology of
an Antislavery Slaveholder, 1830-1860,” Ohio Valley History 6 (Fall 2006), 1-24.

3

upon conservatives like Henry Clay to reach out to moderates across the nation, smother the fires
of sectional discord, and preserve the Union and the South’s peculiar institution. Since Clay’s
death, ominous signs of another crisis loomed. The Whig Party foundered shortly after its
architect passed away; the Republican Party, a northern political organization devoted to
strangling the peculiar institution by preventing its spread into the western territories, had arisen
in its stead. The slavery question also placed inordinate strain on the Democratic Party, which
by 1857 had split into sectional wings over the issue of slavery in Kansas. A South Carolinian
had caned a Massachusetts politician on the floor of the Senate; on the plains of Kansas
antislavery and proslavery forces literally battled for the future of the territory; and the Supreme
Court only emboldened the Republicans when in an attempt to extinguish the major political
issue plaguing the nation it decided that Congress could not legislate on slavery in the
territories.5
Breckinridge, though enthusiastic about the future of Henry Clay’s republic, knew the
worsening political climate required statesmanship on par with that of the Great Compromiser.
As he scanned the line of public functionaries who joined him in laying the cornerstone,
Breckinridge assuredly believed that someone would step into the void left by the departure of
Clay. On that Independence Day he shared the stage with several laudable candidates. Three

5

For works that have shaped my understanding of the turbulent 1850s, see Avery Craven, The Coming of
the Civil War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942); Roy Franklin Nichols, The Disruption of American
Democracy (New York: Macmillan Company, 1948); David M. Potter, The Impending Crisis, 1848-1861,
completed and edited by Don E. Fehrenbacher (New York: Harper & Row, 1976); William J. Cooper, Jr., The South
and the Politics of Slavery, 1828-1856 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1978); Michael F. Holt, The
Political Crisis of the 1850s (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1978); Don E. Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case: Its
Significance in American Law and Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978); William W. Freehling, The
Road to Disunion, 2 volumes (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990-2007); Kenneth M. Stampp, America in
1857: A Nation on the Brink (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Bruce Levine, Half Slave and Half Free:
The Roots of the Civil War (New York: Hill and Wang, 1992); Michael A. Morrison, Slavery and the American
West: The Eclipse of Manifest Destiny and the Coming of the Civil War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1997); Brian Schoen, The Fragile Fabric of the Union: Cotton, Federal Politics, and the Global Origins of
the Civil War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009); and John Ashworth, The Republic in Crisis, 18481861 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
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stood out among the rest: his own nephew, John C. Breckinridge, vice president and a leader of
the southern Democrats; James Guthrie, a Democratic railroad magnate and one-time secretary
of the treasury; and, most eminently, John Jordan Crittenden, an aged statesman and devoted
Whig whom Henry Clay had groomed to take on his role. “And where is the great statesman, for
whom is now in store, the great glory of doing for us once what he thrice accomplished?”
Breckinridge queried as he reached the crescendo of his speech. Nearly every border southerner
pondered the same question in the late-1850s, albeit with varying degrees of optimism.6
***
Conditions in the United States rapidly deteriorated in the two years following the Lexington
Independence Day ceremony honoring Henry Clay. By December of 1860, the nation had
become enveloped in a full-fledged crisis. In the aftermath of Republican Abraham Lincoln’s
election in November, South Carolina took the bold step of seceding from the Union; in the
subsequent two months the other six slaveholding states of the Lower South joined the Palmetto
State in the experiment of disunion and created their own government in Montgomery, Alabama.
The rash decision of the Deep South states left the inhabitants of the other eight slaveholding
states in a momentous predicament: should they too sever their ties to the Union and join the
newly minted Confederate States of America, or should they work to secure a compromise that
would produce a final settlement of the malignant slavery issue and bring the wayward states of
the Cotton South back into the Union?7

6

Report of the Ceremonies, 4, 49 (quote).
The term Lower South refers to the seven states that seceded prior to Abraham Lincoln’s inauguration:
South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas. Throughout this work, the terms
Deep South, Cotton South, and Gulf South are used interchangeably with Lower South and refer to the same seven
states. The term Upper South refers to the four slaveholding states that seceded after the April 1861 firing on Fort
Sumter and Lincoln’s Proclamation for 75,000 troops to quell the rebellion: Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee,
and Arkansas. The term Border South refers to the four slaveholding states that remained in the Union: Delaware,
Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri. Contemporary observers often lumped the Upper South states with those of the
Border South and labeled them the border states. For this reason I have chosen the label Border South and have
7

5

The strain of the fractured nation squeezed the people of the Border South. The overall
percentage of enslaved persons to the total population in the Border South paled in comparison
to the eleven states that eventually made up the Confederacy, yet the comparative frailty of the
peculiar institution produced among border southerners anything but a willfulness to depart with
their bondspersons. Unionists in the region exerted all of their energy during the months
following Lincoln’s election to convince their neighbors and colleagues that secession would
place slavery on an accelerated route to extinction whereas maintaining an allegiance to the old
flag, with all of the constitutional and legal protections it afforded to slaveholders, would best
preserve the status quo. Time and again Border South Unionists pointed out that disunion would
forfeit the Fugitive Slave Law, the authority of the Supreme Court, and southern power in
Congress. Unionist Francis Thomas, a former governor of Maryland, announced to his fellow
citizens that through secession the eleven states of the Lower and Upper South had “abandoned
every position, every safeguard in the Government that had been thrown around this institution,
by deserting their posts in the Senate and in the House of Representatives.” “The very men who
clamored against the contraction of the limits of slavery,” Thomas continued, “have themselves
destroyed all those safeguards.”8
Border South Unionists viewed Henry Clay’s conciliatory precedent as a blueprint for
action in the secession crisis. They sought to preserve Clay’s republic, where moderation and
throughout the narrative noted when an observer applied the term border states to more than the four states under
study in this dissertation.
8
“Speech of Francis Thomas at the Front Street Theater, in Baltimore, Md., October 29, 1861,” in Frank
Moore, ed., The Rebellion Record: A Diary of American Events, with Documents, Narratives, Illustrative Incidents,
Poetry, Etc., 11 volumes (New York: D. Van Norstrand Publisher, 1861-1868), 3:250. For a similar viewpoint from
a transplanted Kentuckian, see William Clark to Dear Son [James Clark], Jan. 22, 1861, Clark-Strater-Watson
Family Papers, 1850-1970, Filson Historical Society, Louisville, Kentucky. For the Union’s protection of slavery,
see Leonard L. Richards, The Slave Power: The Free North and Southern Domination, 1780-1860 (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 2000); Don E. Fehrenbacher, The Slaveholding Republic: An Account of the
United States Government’s Relations to Slavery, completed and edited by Ward M. McAfee (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2001); David Waldstreicher, Slavery’s Constitution: From Revolution to Ratification (New York:
Hill and Wang, 2009); and George William Van Cleve, A Slaveholders’ Union: Slavery, Politics, and the
Constitution in the Early American Republic (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010).
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sober reflection overawed extremism from either quarter. “We occupy the middle ground,” a
Kentucky Unionist informed Abraham Lincoln in 1860, “and generally we are as much opposed
to the fire eating southern disunion gang as we are to the Ultra abolitionists in the North[.]” 9 For
several generations conservative Unionism had been the foundation of Border South political
thought, and during the crisis that began with John Brown’s October 1859 raid on Harpers Ferry,
Virginia, and culminated in a civil war of unforeseen proportions, Unionists employed every
means available to convince their neighbors that Clay’s legacy would again rescue the nation
from the brink of disaster.10 They worked assiduously to secure a compromise settlement; they
called on the help of their conservative allies in the North; they utilized the stump, legislative
legerdemain, and outright political chicanery when they deemed it essential. In sum, Border
South Unionists by the end of 1861 had fought and won a pitched battle in which victory was
neither preordained nor facile. As 1862 dawned the prospects of compromise had scattered, but
border country Unionists had convinced a majority of the region’s populace that the federal
government waged war to preserve the Union, not to “overthrow and destroy their domestic
institutions upon which their very existence depends.”11
Border South Unionists managed to link the perpetuity of the Union to the permanence of
slavery, though often during the twenty-seven months from October 1859 to the end of 1861 the
9

Samuel Haycraft to Abraham Lincoln, Oct. 26, 1860, Abraham Lincoln Papers, Manuscript Division,
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C, available at http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/alhtml/alhome.html, hereinafter
cited as Lincoln Papers, LOC.
10
For the importance of this conservative brand of Unionism, see especially John V. Mering, “The SlaveState Constitutional Unionists and the Politics of Consensus,” Journal of Southern History 43 (August 1977), 395410; George B. Forgie, Patricide in the House Divided: A Psychological Interpretation of Lincoln and His Age
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1979); Daniel W. Crofts, Reluctant Confederates: Upper South Unionists in
the Secession Crisis (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989); Peter B. Knupfer, The Union As It Is:
Constitutional Unionism and Sectional Compromise, 1787-1861 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1991); Edward L. Ayers, In the Presence of Mine Enemies: War in the Heart of America, 1859-1863 (New York:
W.W. Norton and Company, 2003); William A. Link, Roots of Secession: Slavery and Politics in Antebellum
Virginia (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003); and William J. Cooper, Jr., We Have the War
Upon Us: The Onset of the Civil War, November 1860 – April 1861 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2012).
11
Speech of Lazarus Powell, Jan. 22, 1861, Congressional Globe, 36th Congress, 2nd Session, Appendix,
95. All references to the Congressional Globe hereinafter will be cited as CG.
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likelihood of their success seemed dubious. Contemporaries from across America persistently
observed that even with the strident efforts of moderate Unionists, the four states of the Border
South stood on the verge of joining in the secession movement.

“A strong conservative

sentiment tends them [the Upper and Border South] to the Union; a natural sympathy with the
seceding States draws them in an opposite direction,” Massachusetts intellectual Edward Everett
discerned in February 1861. Everett claimed that “if the Border States are drawn into the
Southern Confederacy the fate of the country is sealed.”12 Some ardent secessionists across the
Lower South felt assured that the four states of the Border South would add their names to the
roster of the Confederacy. Judah Benjamin of Louisiana predicted in the spring of 1861 that by
the end of the year tiny Delaware would sever its ties to the Union and join the Confederate
States of America. Although Benjamin’s prophecy failed to materialize, many Confederates
refused to give up on the secession of the Border South. Even in early 1862, after federal troops
had occupied each of the four Border South states, a Lower South propagandist believed the
region’s latent sympathy for the seceded states would with a gentle nudge from the Confederacy
ferment into a powerful tonic of disunion. “Give to the loyal men of the border arms and
munitions of war, give them material aid to repel the intervention of the invader,” he advised,
“and we believe they will crush out the pestilent toryism now daily growing into more
formidable proportions under the shadow of federal power.”13

12

Philadelphia Inquirer, Feb. 9, 1861.
Judah Benjamin to James A. Bayard, Mar. 19, 1861, Callery Collection of Bayard Family Papers,
Accession 78.25, Delaware Historical Society, Wilmington, Delaware; R.R. Welford, “The Loyalty of the Border
States,” DeBow’s Review 32 (January – February 1862), 87. Confederate Robert A. Toombs shared Welford’s
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5, 1861, Robert Augustus Toombs Correspondence, Special Collections, Perkins Library, Duke University, Durham,
North Carolina. For a similar outlook from Delawarean Thomas F. Bayard, see Thomas F. Bayard to Rodmond
Gibbons, Feb. 24, 1861, Rodmond Gibbons Papers, Delaware Historical Society, Wilmington, Delaware. Many
Lower South secessionists hoped to achieve unity among all fifteen slaves states during the disunion experiment and
appealed to the Border South to join in their movement; see Robert E. Bonner, Mastering America: Southern
Slaveholders and the Crisis of American Nationhood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 231-236.
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Contemporary onlookers compared the Border South to a fulcrum between the Union and
the Confederacy which might very likely decide the fate of the fractured nation. Most politically
attuned inhabitants of the once-United States well knew that the secession of the Border South
would alter unquestionably the balance sheet of both of the warring factions. Nearly 2.6 million
white persons lived in the four border country states in 1860, which equaled almost half of the
white population of the eleven Confederate states.

The region boasted the large cities of

Baltimore and St. Louis, which operated as critical hubs of commerce, manufacturing, and
industrial production, and served as a home to a heterogeneous population comprised of free
blacks, enslaved persons, German and Irish Roman Catholics, and a large working class.
Agricultural and mineral resources, including an abundance of grain and livestock, gave the
Border South a more diverse economic complexion that its sister slave states to the south. Few
policy makers in either American government failed to assess the value of the Border South.14
In spite of the grave concerns expressed about the future of the Border South by historical
actors, historians of the secession crisis have rarely investigated the region as a corporate entity.
Hindsight has reduced the importance of the region during the crisis of the Union in the eyes of
some scholars. Looking backward from the vista of 1865, Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, and
Missouri all eventually staved off secession and became essential contributors to the Union war
effort. From the vantage point of 1859 through 1861, however, the future of the Border South
appeared nebulous at best. Louisville editor George Prentice in late 1860 captured the palpable
angst of border southerners: “Let the Border States but stand firm in this trial, and we believe the
Union, fast anchored by their calm wisdom and unshaken patriotism, will ride out triumphantly

14

William E. Gienapp, “Abraham Lincoln and the Border States,” Journal of the Abraham Lincoln
Association 13 (1992), 13-15; William W. Freehling, The South vs. The South: How Anti-Confederate Southerners
Shaped the Course of the Civil War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 23; Frank Towers, The Urban
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the tempest of fanaticism and of treason now sweeping widely across the public mind. Let them
falter, and the Union freighted not only with their happiness and glory but with the richest
earthly hope of the race, will certainly go down, beyond the reach of diving-bell or plummet.”15
The voluminous historiography of the secession crisis does not include a study that
focuses solely on the four states of the Border South. Edward Conrad Smith’s The Borderland in
the Civil War, an outdated book published over eighty years ago, provides a decent synopsis of
the secession movement and the call for armed neutrality in Missouri and Kentucky, but the
study focuses upon the trans-Alleghany border country and does not include Maryland and
Delaware. William C. Wright’s The Secession Movement in the Middle Atlantic States covers
Maryland and Delaware, along with New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and New York, but his work
suffers from inexact definitions of Unionism, disunionism, and pro-southern sentiment, which
prevents a thorough analysis of the subject.16

Two recent studies shed new light on the

importance of the Border South in the larger framework of Civil War-era politics, though neither
one centers solely on the secession crisis. Stanley Harrold’s Border War: Fighting over Slavery
before the Civil War rightfully places enslaved persons and abolitionists along the sectional
border at the forefront of the crisis leading to war in the decades before 1861, but his study
devotes scant attention to the secession crisis.

Moreover, in his attempt to illuminate the

intermittent episodes of antebellum violence that border northerners and southerners witnessed,
Harrold diminishes the strong desire for sectional cooperation and moderation that most of the
region’s inhabitants shared. William C. Harris’s Lincoln and the Border States: Preserving the
Union also adds nuance to the story of the Border South, but his main concern is the sixteenth
15

Louisville Daily Journal, Dec. 24, 1860.
Edward Conrad Smith, The Borderland in the Civil War (New York: MacMillan, 1927); William C.
Wright, The Secession Movement in the Middle Atlantic States (Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University
Press, 1973). See also James A. Rawley, Turning Points of the Civil War (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press,
1966), 9-45.
16
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president’s deft handling of the region throughout all four years of the Civil War, not simply the
onset of the war.17
Daniel Crofts’s impressive investigation of the secession crisis in the Upper South,
entitled Reluctant Confederates: Upper South Unionists in the Secession Crisis, provides an
excellent formula for studying the Border South as a corporate whole. Written over twenty years
ago, Crofts even suggests that a comparative study of the border region would fill a crucial void
in the historiography of the secession crisis.18 The following study seeks to answer Crofts’s call
by weaving the response to the crisis of the Union in each of the four Border South states into a
single narrative. A large body of work on each of the individual Border South states provides a
useful backdrop for this study. A diverse array of scholarship offers numerous explications –
including the legacy of Henry Clay’s nationalism, vibrant two-party competition, economic and
social ties with the North and Midwest, the beneficent appeal of armed neutrality, and extralegal
maneuvering by Lincoln and the federal government – for each state’s decision to remain in the
Union.19

Viewing the secession crisis from a region-wide vista, however, illuminates the

17
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importance of interstate cooperation among Unionists, the lengths to which those Unionists went
to keep their states true to the federal government, and, most importantly, the vital importance of
both the peculiar institution and compromise to the region’s inhabitants. This work adds to the
recent literature on slavery in the Border South which demonstrates that although the region’s
inhabitants did not generally operate large plantation units or accumulate massive slaveholdings
as did their brethren in the Upper and Lower South, they actively sought ways to ensure the
institution’s longevity.20 Moreover, the pages that follow will hopefully demonstrate that for a
large contingent of Americans, and especially border southerners, compromise remained a very
real, though extremely thorny, alternative in 1860-61.21

and Mark Geiger, Financial Fraud and Guerrilla Violence in Missouri’s Civil War, 1861-1865 (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2010). In addition to these monographs, scholars have contributed scores of articles to journals in
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20
See especially Patience Essah, A House Divided: Slavery and Emancipation in Delaware, 1638-1865
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1996); Diane Mutti Burke, On Slavery’s Border: Missouri’s SmallSlaveholding Households, 1815-1865 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2010); Max Grivno, Gleanings of
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This study seeks to capture the pervasive apprehension that clouded over the Border
South during the crucial interval from John Brown’s raid in October 1859 through the end of
1861. The story proceeds chronologically and covers the political battles that unfolded across all
four Border South states. In addition to political episodes within the region, particular attention
is devoted to Congress, where conservative Unionists made an impressive, albeit fruitless,
attempt to resurrect the ghost of Henry Clay and attain another sectional compromise. During
the course of the period under scrutiny, Unionists employed an array of tactics to keep the
Border South in the orbit of the old republic. Those tactics, some more successful than others,
are investigated closely. The future of slavery in the West, sectional identity and allegiances,
partisanship, urbanization, immigration, economic growth and diversification, and the
modernization of the borderland’s infrastructure had all become salient political issues during the
1850s and cropped up during the crisis of the Union. These forces tugged the Border South in
contradictory directions during the secession predicament, but their argument for protecting the
institution of slavery provides the critical key to understanding how Unionists finally triumphed
over the region’s disunionists.
The tacticians upon whom this examination focuses were overwhelmingly white, male,
and elite in terms of property ownership. Politics, however, never occurs within a vacuum and
thus offers a window into the social, economic, and cultural worlds that all Americans - white or
black, slaveholder or nonslaveholder, planter or yeoman, farmer or mechanic, native- or foreignborn, free or enslaved, male or female – inhabited. The debate over the Border South’s future
operated within a political framework, but those political actors certainly understood that their
choices affected every person in the region. Thus, the story that follows seeks to place political

Crofts, Reluctant Confederates; Russell McClintock, Lincoln and the Decision for War: The Northern Response to
Secession (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008); and Cooper, We Have the War Upon Us.
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decisions within the context of the larger society. While following the blueprint of a traditional
political study, the ensuing story blends census data and quantitative material with manuscript
collections, newspapers, national and state government records, the voices of male and female
participants, and the actions of both free and enslaved persons in an attempt to capture the
complexity of the secession crisis in the Border South.22 A democratic political culture thrives
upon debate, discussion, and dissent, and the crisis of the Union in the Border South illuminates
both the positive and negative aspects of Civil War-era politics.23
Many contemporaries considered Virginia one of the border states, and the course of the
Old Dominion exerted a powerful influence over all of the Border and Upper South states.
Unionists and secessionists in the Border South made many key alliances with Virginians; those
coalitions receive a fair share of attention in the present work. Since many fine scholars have
covered the secession crisis and intrastate divisions in the Old Dominion, however, the state has
not been placed in extended comparative perspective with Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, and
Missouri. The formation of West Virginia, which antedated the crisis of the Union and extended
beyond 1861, has been covered elsewhere and serves as a point of reference rather than a topic of
inquiry for this study.24
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Finally, a word on terms used throughout the narrative. Radical, often freighted with
multiple meanings and anything but impartiality, refers to contemporaries who sought to achieve
political objectives outside of mainstream conventions of the period. Thus, those who advocated
secession have been termed radicals, as have abolitionists who sought to eradicate slavery
immediately and without compensation to slaveholders. It remains one of the great ironies of the
secession crisis and the Civil War that by 1865 these two groups with radical objectives both
accomplished their goals, albeit in a most divergent manner and with far different results than
either one had envisioned before the outbreak of war. The term fire-eater refers to secessionists;
not all fire-eaters prescribed the same means to bring about disunion, and the varying strands of
fire-eater sentiment are discussed in greater detail in Chapter Four. Likewise, the term Unionist
and Unionism had many different meanings, especially in the Border South. Unionists in the
region expressed a desire for their state to stay in the old republic, but their degree of
commitment to the Union varied along a spectrum that ranged from conditionalists, who would
endorse secession in the absence of a compromise settlement or if the federal government
attempted to coerce the seceded states back into the Union, to unconditionalists, who vowed to
stand by the old flag at all costs. The spectrum of Border South Unionism also receives greater
attention in Chapter Four. The term hardliner relates to political actors who rigidly refused to
compromise during the session crisis. An influential group of Republicans adopted a hardline
stance during the months after Lincoln’s election, and their intractable approach had far-reaching
implications for the inhabitants of the Border South.

Lastly, the labels conservative and

moderate are used interchangeably throughout the narrative and assigned to Americans from all

Shade, Democratizing the Old Dominion: Virginia and the Second Party System, 1824-1861 (Charlottesville:
University of Virginia Press, 1996); and Link, Roots of Secession. For the formation of West Virginia consult
Richard Orr Curry, A House Divided: A Study of Statehood Politics and the Copperhead Movement in West Virginia
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1964).
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regional and partisan backgrounds who sought a compromise settlement during the crisis. In
essence, conservatives and moderates operated as the antithesis of hardliners. Each of these
groups shaped and shifted the contours of Henry Clay’s republic from 1859 to 1861. The battles
that occurred in the Border South illuminate the intricacy of antebellum American politics and
are chronicled herein.
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Chapter 1
“A Representation of Almost Every Interest and Pursuit in the Union”: The Border South on the
Eve of the Secession Crisis

The election of Abraham Lincoln on November 6, 1860, provoked an array of
spontaneous reactions across the United States. In the North, partisans of the Republican Party
gathered in city streets and on the steps of sleepy country courthouses to celebrate their hour of
triumph. As the telegraph tapped off the results of Lincoln’s victory, bands sounded patriotic
airs and local electioneering clubs staffed with youthful male Republican adherents, known as
Wide Awakes, marched with exuberant confidence. Caught up in the euphoria of victory, many
Republicans believed the election of Lincoln had once and for all crushed the Slave Power that in
their view had over the last thirty years consumed the Democratic Party and gnawed at the vitals
of the federal government. “The space is now clear for the establishment of the policy of
Freedom on safe & firm grounds,” Republican Salmon Chase forecasted.

Sullen northern

Democrats and Constitutional Unionists saw not an occasion for revelry, but one for great
concern. Far from ascribing to Chase’s upbeat projection of solid ground, these conservatives
predicted that the success of the purely sectional Republican organization would destabilize the
republic. The cacophony of the Republican victors, however, muffled the foreboding of northern
conservatives in the immediate aftermath of the election.1
Far to the south, the election of 1860 produced a different type of merriment. Fire-eaters,
who had labored unsuccessfully during the previous decade to push the South out of the Union,
believed the electoral conquest of the Republicans actually tipped the balance in favor of the
southern radicals. These disunionists crowed that the time for action had arrived. One needed

1
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only to study the election returns, they argued. Lincoln, whom the fire-eaters painted as the
leader of a fanatical abolition organization, had captured but thirty-nine percent of the popular
vote yet handily defeated his opponents in the electoral college. What future did the South have
in a Union under the thumb of the Republicans, who would in no short time eradicate the
institution of slavery? How could the long-venerated Union protect the South when northern
numerical superiority ensured southern defeat in this and every subsequent presidential election?
Did the voters of the South need any further evidence that they no longer had a voice in national
politics? While the fire-eaters prognosticated doom from the stump, they inwardly smiled at the
Republican victory because it forced many moderate southerners to concede that secession
provided the only remedy to the boldest attack in a perceived abolitionist ambush.2
While Republicans in the North raised their glasses to the prospect of a new Union shorn
of the Slave Power and fire-eaters in the Lower South toasted a bright future of autonomy and an
escape from Yankee domination, millions of citizens in the middle section of the United States
felt the arresting strain of these two countervailing forces. No other region of the country
experienced as much tension as did the Border South states of Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland,
and Missouri. John Pendleton Kennedy, a former Whig politician and prolific writer from
Baltimore, acted as did most Border South residents: although dismayed, he calmly and carefully
deliberated the crisis. Five days after the contest Kennedy closeted himself in his study to make
preparations for “a tract or discourse directed to the consideration of the present alarming state of
affairs in the country.”

Kennedy mused and scribbled for just over a month, taking the

occasional break for a game of billiards or to entertain visitors to his parlor. In mid-December he
sent his completed manuscript to three conservative newspapers, his political confidants John

2
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Jordan Crittenden of Kentucky and Alexander Boteler of Virginia, and the governors of the
border states.3
Kennedy’s tract revealed the precarious position of the Border South, perched on the
boundary between slavery and freedom and stretched thin by affiliations with both the North and
the South. Kennedy, however, proclaimed that the Border South would not be cowed by the
demagogues of the Republican Party or the fire-eating radicals in the Lower South. Like all
Border South Unionists, Kennedy pleaded for all Union-loving persons across the nation to
respond to the crisis with studied contemplation. Rather than falling victim to “the wickedness
of Northern fanaticism, and the intemperate zeal of secession,” the author advocated a
convention of the Border South states to discuss possible terms of conciliation and compromise.4
While preparing his pamphlet Kennedy spent a great deal of time analyzing data about
the Border South’s economy and society. Unlike the Lower South, which he labeled “one vast
cotton field,” Kennedy presented the Border South as a region marked by great economic
diversity. “The Border States exhibit within their area a representation of almost every interest
and pursuit in the Union,” Kennedy postulated. Commerce and industry flourished alongside
agriculture because of rich mineral wealth, a vigorous population, and teeming urban areas. If a
convention of the border states proved unable to settle past grievances between the North and the

3
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South, Kennedy went so far as to proclaim his region had all the materials to create its own
nation free from the “disorders and distractions of the time.”5
A brief investigation of the society, economy, and politics of the Border South in the
1850s illustrates a flaw in Kennedy’s logic.

Although his essay accurately reflected the

prevailing desire of many border southerners to stay aloof from the raging sectional crisis,
Kennedy overstated the likelihood of noninvolvement and underestimated how the events of the
past decade had inescapably sewn the region into the conflict. Despite sporting a diverse
socioeconomic composition and a robust two-party political system, the presence of slavery in
the Border South forged strong bonds with the rest of the slaveholding states. The cloud of
slavery cast a shadow over the socioeconomic and political life of the Border South in the 1850s,
albeit in a different fashion than the eleven states that eventually made up the Confederacy.
Even in the four southern states with the lowest concentrations of persons held in bondage, the
tentacles of slavery conditioned the way southerners on the border thought about politics and
their response to the secession crisis. The very fact that Kennedy felt compelled to compose an
essay designed to illuminate the merits of the Union for other border southerners indicates that
by the winter of 1860-1861 a notable secessionist element had infiltrated this erstwhile bastion of
Unionism.
***
Situated at the very heart of the nation, the four states of the Border South found
themselves pitched into the middle of the sectional crisis during the turbulent 1850s. Throughout
the heated political debates over the extension of slavery into the western territories and the
enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Law, however, most Border South citizens espoused a
remarkably restrained approach to the deepening divide between the sections.
5

Ibid., 230-231.
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Periodic

outbreaks of violence occurred along the great border that encompassed the Mason-Dixon Line,
Ohio River, and the western border between Missouri and Kansas, an area where escaped slaves
sought safe haven and masters and slave catchers hunted their fleeing chattel. Small-scale
hostility at times erupted into significant violence in the region, which has led some scholars to
paint the Border South as a crucible of unrelenting conflict during the 1850s.

Historians

searching for the roots of the Civil War point to the riot in Christiana, Pennsylvania, in
September 1851, brought on when a Maryland slaveholder and federal agents attempted to
reclaim a group of fugitive slaves, or the bloody clash along the Missouri-Kansas border
provoked by the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act in 1854 and conflicting free- and slavestate visions for the future of the West, as evidence of the growing animus between the sections
that led unalterably to armed conflict in April 1861.6
Despite the many documented cases of fugitive slaves escaping to the North and the
occasional outbreak of armed hostilities in the 1850s, inhabitants of the Border South much more
often than not experienced amicable relations with their neighbors across the Ohio River or
Mason and Dixon’s Line. Violent episodes received plenty of newspaper print because partisan
editors could utilize them as political capital. Sensational accounts of violence often overstated
or misrepresented daily life in most of the Border South. Of the entire Border South region, only
Missouri’s western border experienced almost continuous violence during the last five years of
the 1850s. Scholars have shown that even along the Kansas-Missouri border newspaper editors
often sensationalized or exaggerated their reports for political gain.7
6
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Family members, friends, and business associates often populated the northern bank of
the Ohio River, southern Pennsylvania, or the portion of southern Illinois bounded by the
confluence of the Ohio and Mississippi rivers.8

Population figures from the 1860 census

illustrate the ties between the Border South and the free states and territories adjoining them. By
1860, 3.59 percent of the native-born population in the states of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio,
Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, and the territory of Kansas had been born in one of the Border South
states. This percentage may seem small, but one must consider that 61.08 percent of the
population in the Lower North had been born in the state or territory which they currently
resided. Therefore, 9.22 percent or nearly one out of every ten persons native to the United
States but not born in the Lower North state in which they resided in 1860 had been born in one
of the Border South states. Furthermore, it stands to reason that the more southerly counties in
these free states included higher concentrations of natives of the Border South. According to the
1860 census natives of Delaware, Kentucky, and Maryland most often migrated to either the
Lower North states or Missouri. Missourians usually moved farther westward to California or
Texas, but the third largest group leaving the state in the 1850s went to Illinois. While the border
witnessed violence during the decade preceding the Civil War, it also saw the building and
strengthening of intersectional kinship and economic networks. The people of the Border South
and the Lower North normally sought the construction of harmonious relationships, devoid of
sensationalism and rife with the unspectacular normalcy of everyday life. At the end of the
decade the editor of a strongly pro-southern newspaper, the Louisville Daily Courier, proclaimed
simply wanted a means to make a living and were drawn into conflict because they feared a potential loss of liberty.
See Etcheson, Bleeding Kansas, 4-6, 37-45.
8
For the prevalence of amicable border relations prior to the Civil War, see Edward Conrad Smith, The
Borderland in the Civil War (New York: Macmillan Company, 1927) & Nicole Etcheson, The Emerging Midwest:
Upland Southerners and the Political Culture of the Old Northwest, 1787-1861 (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1996). Edward L. Ayers traces similar pre-war relations between southern Pennsylvania and the Virginia
Shenandoah Valley in his magnificent In the Presence of Mine Enemies: War in the Heart of America, 1859-1863
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003).
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that Indiana, Ohio, and Kentucky “have really no conflicting interests. There should be no
rivalry between them, but a generous emulation as to which shall outstrip [the others] in the race
of glory and greatness, as to which shall excel in virtue and intelligence.”9
Commercial relationships helped to buttress the pervasive inclination toward amity
between the Border South and the Lower North. The economic hinterland of large Border South
cities such as Baltimore, Louisville, St. Louis, and Wilmington, stretched across the sectional
divide. Baltimore drew in business from both central Maryland and southern Pennsylvania, and
St. Louis attracted commerce from central Missouri and southern Illinois. Likewise, large cities
in the Lower North such as Cincinnati and Philadelphia had a similar intersectional effect; both
of these urban areas operated as economic sponges for Kentucky and Delaware. By 1860,
several railroads connected the Border South to the Lower North, and both regions shared a
resolute yearning to keep the Ohio and Mississippi rivers open to commercial traffic. 10 One
historian claims that the rail connections between the two adjacent regions produced a
fundamental shift away from southerly river-borne commerce and reoriented the Border South’s
export economy to the North and East. Though difficult to prove and no doubt overstated, the
assertion does have some merit in that the transportation revolution energized trade relations
between the Border South and the Lower North in the 1850s.11

9

These figures were compiled from Joseph C.G. Kennedy, Population of the United States in 1860;
Compiled from Original Returns of the Eighth Census, under the Direction of the Secretary of the Interior
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1864), xxxiv, 104, 130, 156, 166, 398, 439; Louisville Daily Courier,
January 26, 1860.
10
On the importance of the transportation revolution and the creation of interregional economic networks,
see Paul F. Paskoff, Troubled Waters: Steamboat Disasters, River Improvements, and American Public Policy,
1821-1860 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2007), 69-73.
11
For a stimulating discussion of Baltimore and St. Louis, see Frank Towers, The Urban South and the
Coming of the Civil War (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2004), especially Chapter 2. The bold claim
about a reorientation of trade is found in Smith, Borderland in the Civil War, 22-24. Smith tends to underestimate
the vitality of river trade and discounts one of the most important trade connections between the Border South and
the rest of the South, the interstate slave trade.
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Table 1 - Largest Cities in the Border South, Lower North, and Confederate South (1860)

Lower North

Border South

City

Rank in United States

Average Population

Baltimore, Maryland

212,418

4^

St. Louis, Missouri

160,773

8

Louisville, Kentucky

68,033

Average for
12 Border South

Wilmington, Delaware

21,258

43

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

565,529

2

Cincinnati, Ohio

161,044

7

Chicago, Illinois

109,260

Newark, New Jersey

71,941

9 Average for
11 Lower North

Indianapolis, Indiana

18,611

48

Dubuque, Iowa

13,000

73

New Orleans, Louisiana

Confederate South

Population

168,675

6

Charleston, South Carolina

40,522

22

Richmond, Virginia

37,910

25

Mobile, Alabama

29,528

27

Memphis, Tennessee

22,623

38

Savannah, Georgia

22,292

41

Wilmington, North Carolina

9,522

100

San Antonio, Texas

8,235

not ranked

Natchez, Mississippi

6,612

not ranked

Little Rock, Arkansas

3,727

not ranked

Pensacola, Florida

2,876

not ranked

Average for
Confederate
South

115,620.5

156,564.2

32,025.6

Sources: US Census Bureau, "Rank by Population of the 100 Largest Urban Places, Listed Alphabetically by State: 1790-1990,"
http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0027/tab01.txt; Kennedy, Population of the US in 1860 , passim .
^ T hese rankings delineated New York City & Brooklyn as separate cities; some historians combine the two and thus would rank Baltimore
as the third largest city in the United States in 1860.

The metropolises of Baltimore and St. Louis, along with less populous Louisville and
Wilmington, gave the Border South an urban complexion which on the surface made the region
appear more like the Lower North than the rest of the South. Table 1 provides population data
for the largest city in each state in three regions: the Border South, the Lower North, and the
states that seceded and formed the Confederacy. The average population of the largest cities in
the Border South, 115,621, dwarfs the mean population of 32,026 for the Confederate region and
comes nearer to the Lower North in terms of metropolitan size. The Border South included the
fourth and eighth largest cities in the entire Union, and the Lower North contained the second,
seventh, and ninth largest cities in the United States. Aside from New Orleans, the sixth largest
28

municipality in the United States, the largest urban center in the future Confederate states,
Charleston, South Carolina, ranked twenty-second on the list of most populous cities in 1860.
These large cities in the Border South, however, should not distort the full panorama of the
region’s landscape.

Frank Towers notes that the South’s largest cities were “glaring

multicultural and industrial contrasts to the homogeneity of rural life.” He points out that fewer
than 9,000 persons lived in the second most populous towns of Maryland and Missouri, whereas
the secondary cities in the North often accommodated at least 20,000 inhabitants.12
Nonetheless, the presence of these immense metropolitan areas had an impact on the
economies and societies of the Border South.

While recent scholarship corrects the long

standing assumption that the South experienced little industrial or commercial growth prior to
the Civil War, as a whole the eleven states that formed the Confederacy lagged behind the rest of
the nation in these categories.13 Baltimore and St. Louis, and to a lesser extent Louisville and
Wilmington, provided the Border South with large hubs of industrial production and commerce,
and supplied a more diverse labor pool than the rest of the South. By the onset of the Civil War,
large-scale industry had become dominant in the large cities of the Border South. Baltimore’s
largest industrial concerns, in terms of numbers employed, included clothing enterprises, meat
and seafood packers, and shoemakers. Machinery plants, brick making concerns, and clothing
industries employed the most people in St. Louis. Clothing manufacturers, meatpackers, and
12

Towers, Urban South and the Coming of the Civil War, 22.
Scholarship that portrays a more dynamic antebellum southern economy than once conceded include
David R. Goldfield, Urban Growth in the Age of Sectionalism: Virginia, 1847-1861 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1977); J. Mills Thornton III, Politics and Power in a Slave Society: Alabama, 1800-1860 ( Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1978); Lacy K. Ford, Jr., Origins of Southern Radicalism: The South
Carolina Upcountry, 1800-1860 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); Mary A. DeCredico, Patriotism for
Profit: Georgia’s Urban Entrepreneurs and the Confederate War Effort (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1990); Jonathan Daniel Wells, The Origins of the Southern Middle Class: 1800-1861 (Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press, 2004); Brian Schoen, The Fragile Fabric of Union: Cotton, Federal Politics, and the
Global Origins of the Civil War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009); L. Diane Barnes, Brian Schoen,
& Frank Towers, eds., The Old South’s Modern Worlds: Slavery, Region, and Nation in the Age of Progress (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2011).
13
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machinery plants hired the most workers in Louisville, while textile plants, shipbuilders, and
carriage manufactories employed the most industrial laborers in Wilmington.14
Table 2 - Free Foreign Born Population
Year
Region

%
Increase/
Decrease

1850

1860

Border South

164,474

307,304

87%

Upper South

32,690

63,182

93%

Lower South

116,148

170,273

47%

Entire South

313,312

540,489

73%

Entire North

1,921,290

3,537,557

84%

United States^

2,234,602

4,078,046

82%

Sources: Census of 1850 & 1860, University of Virginia Historical
Census Browser
^ T he national data only includes information for the 33 states in
1860. T he territories of 1860 are excluded from national data, and
the 1850 Census had no data for Oregon.

The existence of large-scale industrial concerns influenced the demographic composition
of the Border South. The foreign-born population residing in the Border South numbered
307,034 in 1860, and natives of other countries comprised 9.79 percent of the total Border South
population. The number of Border South inhabitants born outside of the United States nearly
doubled in the decade of the 1850s, which placed the region in unison with national trends but
ahead of the pace of increase in the rest of the South. Tables 2 and 3 illustrate the demographic
impact of the foreign-born in the South. Nearly 57 percent of all foreign-born residents in the
entire South in 1860 lived in Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, and Missouri; of the eleven future
Confederate states only Louisiana, with its cosmopolitan population in New Orleans and the
southern portion of the state, came close to having a foreign-born element as sizable as the

14

Department of the Interior, Manufactures of the United States in 1860; Compiled from the Original
Returns of the Eighth Census, under the Direction of the Secretary of the Interior (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1865), 53-54, 178-180, 220-222, 310-312.
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Border South.15 Baltimore and St. Louis both attracted thousands of immigrants from Germany
and Ireland during the antebellum period, and particularly in St. Louis German settlers carved
out an important cultural and political space. The presence of these considerable blocs of
German and Irish inhabitants, many of whom practiced Catholicism, resulted in an upsurge in
nativist political thought and its antebellum handmaiden, mob violence. The Know Nothing or
American Party had a strong and lasting presence in each Border South metropolis, and these
cities, like urban areas across the North, seldom escaped election day violence when Democrats
and Americans collided at the ballot box. Border South ethnic tensions boiled over in one of the
deadliest political riots of the antebellum period when in August 1855 nativists, Germans, and
Irish clashed in the streets of Louisville. After a vicious campaign in which Democrats and
Americans relentlessly insulted one another, scattered altercations at the polls escalated into a
full-scale riot which ended with considerable property destruction and twenty-two deaths.
Baltimore and St. Louis endured similar, though not as destructive, disturbances in the 1850s,
which set a dangerous precedent for the heated political atmosphere of the secession crisis.16
This resonant nativist impulse surely seemed quite unfamiliar to onlookers from areas further
southward with more homogenous populations.17

15

Data compiled from the Census of 1860, University of Virginia Historical Census Browser, retrieved
May 30, 2012, University of Virginia Geospatial and Statistical Data Center, Charlottesville, Virginia, available at
http://mapserver.lib.virginia.edu/collections/.
16
David Grimstead, American Mobbing, 1828-1861: Toward Civil War (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1998), 232-234; William Preston Johnston to Mrs. Susan P. Christy, Aug. 4, 1859, Preston Family Papers –
Joyes Collection, 1780-1963, Filson Historical Society, Louisville, Kentucky.
17
For the impact of the German and Irish populations on these Border South cities, see Towers, The Urban
South and the Coming of the Civil War; Louis S. Gerteis, Civil War St. Louis (Lawrence: University Press of
Kansas, 2001); & Adam Arenson, The Great Heart of the Republic: St. Louis and the Cultural Civil War
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011). The best studies of the political impact of nativism in the 1850s are
Michael F. Holt, The Political Crisis of the 1850s (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1978) & Tyler Anbinder,
Nativism & Slavery: The Northern Know Nothings and the Politics of the 1850s (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1992).
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Table 3 - Percentage of Total Population Foreign Born
Year
1850

1860

Delaware

State or Region

5.74%

8.17%

10-Year Change
2.43%

Kentucky

3.20%

5.17%

1.98%

Maryland

8.78%

11.28%

2.50%

Missouri

11.23%

13.58%

2.35%

Border South

7.03%

9.09%

2.76%

Upper South

0.93%

1.53%

0.60%

Lower South

3.08%

3.43%

0.35%

Entire South

3.26%

4.42%

1.16%

Entire North

14.29%

18.82%

4.52%

9.69%

13.14%

3.44%

United States^

Sources: Census of 1850 & 1860, University of Virginia Historical Census
Browser
^ T he national data only includes information for the 33 states in 1860. T he
territories of 1860 are excluded from national data, and the 1850 Census had
no data for Oregon.

In addition to attracting a sizable contingent of people born abroad, the Border South
contained the largest proportions of free blacks in the nation. In the aftermath of the American
Revolution the manumission of slaves occurred more frequently in the four Border South states
than in areas farther south and provided a solid foundation for the large free black population that
had settled in the region by the middle of the nineteenth century.18 Industrial trades and service
occupations in these cities provided economic opportunity for free blacks, who faced bleak
economic prospects in other areas of the South. While free blacks endured second-class status in
the nation and especially in the South, where racial slavery stigmatized all non-white persons as
social and political outcasts, the lure of available jobs and familial networks pointed to an
increase in the total number of free blacks in the Border South during the decade preceding the
Civil War. By the onset of the secession crisis 118,027 free blacks lived in the Border South;
they accounted for 47 percent of all free blacks in the South and 25 percent of all free blacks in
the United States. More free blacks lived in Maryland than in any other state in the Union, and

18

For this process see Lacy K. Ford, Deliver Us from Evil: The Slavery Question in the Old South (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 19-77.
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free blacks comprised 17.7 percent of Delaware’s total population and 12.2 percent of
Maryland’s total population.19
Over the decade of the 1850s the proportion of free blacks to the whole Border South
population dipped by 0.7 percent, a figure that meshes with the general trend in the South. Free
African Americans faced a proscriptive onslaught during the decade as white southerners tried to
fortify their slave society. Even in the Border South, state legislatures flirted with the idea of
expelling or enslaving free blacks, who white southerners feared might incite slaves to rebel or
harbor and assist fugitive slaves. During the antebellum period the legislatures of Delaware and
Maryland required free blacks to sign annual labor contracts in an effort to control the African
American community. Some free African Americans fled northward only to find conditions no
better than those they left behind, while others left the United States entirely. The overall
proportion of free blacks saw a slight decline during the decade, yet the fact that more free blacks
did not leave the Border South points to a striking reality. Legislation passed in several free
states prevented African Americans from settling there or required them to post a bond before
settlement and effectively left free blacks with no reasonable alternatives.

Few African

Americans had the financial means to go abroad and even though life in the Border South
presented many difficulties for free blacks, it afforded a modest improvement over life in the
eleven states that formed the Confederacy.20
The vast majority of the Border South’s free blacks were clustered in the Chesapeake
states of Delaware and Maryland. Very few free blacks populated Kentucky and Missouri,
19

Census of 1850 & 1860, University of Virginia Historical Census Browser.
Ibid; Ira Berlin, Generations of Captivity: A History of African-American Slaves (Cambridge: The
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003), 225. For a fascinating account of the many hardships free blacks
in the South faced, see Michael P. Johnson and James L. Roark, Black Masters: A Free Family of Color in the Old
South (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1984). The many obstacles free blacks had to overcome in the
antebellum South are traced in Ira Berlin, Slaves Without Masters: The Free Negro in the Antebellum South (New
York: Pantheon Books, 1974). For the North, consult Leon F. Litwack, North of Slavery: The Negro in the Free
States, 1790-1860 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961).
20
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where the proportion mirrored the rest of the South at less than one percent of the total
population. The western border states of Kentucky and Missouri had been organized long after
the initial settlement of the eastern seaboard and following the American Revolution. Thus,
settlers brought slaves with them to these western outposts with the express intention of utilizing
them in agricultural pursuits. The long process of manumission experienced in the Chesapeake
Border South, where many farmers had long before transformed staple tobacco operations into
cereal production requiring less slave labor, had not taken root on the western border. In the
decade of the 1850s, acres of unimproved land in farms shrank by 2.1 percent in Delaware and
0.2 percent in Maryland, whereas unimproved acreage increased by 4.9 percent in Kentucky and
an astonishing 102.2 percent in Missouri. These numbers indicate that a great deal of farmland
remained untapped in the newer regions of the Border South, whereas agriculturalists in older
areas of the Border South had for generations dealt with the prospects of exhausted lands by
liquidating excess slaves, either through manumission or the interstate slave trade. Many of the
manumitted slaves in Maryland and Delaware settled in Baltimore or Wilmington, but a similar
process had not occurred in Kentucky or Missouri. Thus, St. Louis had yet to establish a free
black community on the same scale as Baltimore. Legal proscriptions on free black settlement in
Missouri also stalled the growth of a free African American community in the state.21
These teeming metropolises with polyglot populations certainly gave the Border South a
northern feel, a fact that did not go unnoticed by some sectional zealots in the South. Sectional

21

Agricultural Schedules, Census of 1850 & 1860, University of Virginia Historical Browser; Towers,
Urban South and the Coming of the Civil War, 46-47; Litwack, North of Slavery, 34-39; Robert Pierce Forbes, The
Missouri Compromise and Its Aftermath (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 106-118. My
thinking on this point has been influenced largely by Ford, Deliver Us from Evil; Barbara Jeanne Fields, Slavery and
Freedom on the Middle Ground: Maryland during the Nineteenth Century (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1985); R. Douglas Hurt, Agriculture and Slavery in Missouri’s Little Dixie (Columbia: University of Missouri Press,
1992); Patience Essah, A House Divided: Slavery and Emancipation in Delaware, 1638-1865 (Charlottesville:
University of Virginia Press, 1996); & Philip D. Morgan, Slave Counterpoint: Black Culture in the EighteenthCentury Chesapeake and Lowcountry (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998).
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radicals like Georgia’s Henry L. Benning called slavery a “doomed institution” in the Border
South. He believed most Border South slaveholders, enduring the front-line of an abolitionist
offensive from the North, wished to get rid of slavery as quickly as possible. In time, Benning
feared, the Border South would fall into the orbit of the free states and place the remaining slave
states in an even more subordinate position in the Union. These observations have led some
scholars to conclude that the border slave states had undertaken a northward sectional trajectory
during the late antebellum period. Before the outbreak of the Civil War, historian William
Freehling contends, the conditions of location, climate, and economy guided the Border South
down a path that he posits would ultimately end with a free labor society that mimicked the
Lower North. The outbreak of the Civil War worked to quicken the pace of this process. Too
often, however, historians have allowed the urban experience, the qualms of southern
nationalists, and the Civil War’s disruptive impact on slavery in the region to overshadow a more
balanced view of the Border South.22
Fire-eaters nervous about the loyalty of the Border South and arch-Unionist John
Pendleton Kennedy together utilized similar regional stereotypes to make vastly dissimilar
points. Kennedy sought to preserve the Union while fire-eaters plotted to dismantle it, but both
characterized an enormous chasm that “divided [the Border South and the Lower South] from
each other by nature and incompatible conditions.”

The Lower South represented an

undiversified economy wholly dependent upon slavery and staple production for its wealth; the
Border South, by contrast, extended “over a broad domain studded with flourishing inland
22

William W. Freehling, The Road to Disunion, Vol. 1, Secessionists at Bay, 1776-1854 (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1990), 23-24. The slave drain theory is also a central component of Freehling’s argument
in both Road to Disunion, Vol. 2, Secessionists Triumphant, 1854-1861 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007)
& The South vs. The South: How Anti-Confederate Southerners Shaped the Course of the Civil War (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2001). Georgia sent Henry L. Benning to speak at the Virginia Secession Convention on
behalf of disunion in February 1861. For his observations on the Border South, see George H. Reese, ed.,
Proceedings of the Virginia State Convention of 1861, 4 vols. (Richmond: Virginia State Library, 1965), 1:65-66.
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towns” and included “the best indications of the progress of a State to wealth and power”
because of its economic diversity. In short, Kennedy and the fire-eaters often disproportionately
relied upon the urban experience when depicting the Border South. A gaze beyond the outskirts
of Baltimore, St. Louis, Louisville, and Wilmington presents a region that appeared to differ very
little from the rest of the Upper South. This suggests that many of the sectional radicals like
Henry Benning who espoused fears about a withering South fell into the same trap as did
Kennedy.23
Most inhabitants of the Border South made their living off the land. Data culled from the
federal census of 1860 indicates that 47.3 percent of all free persons in the Border South who
provided occupational information listed farming (either as farmer, planter, or farm laborer) as
their primary means of employment. The census takers did not include slaves and children in
these calculations, but it stands to reason that had they been included the number would far
exceed a majority of the working population in these states. Laborers comprised the second
largest single occupational category in the Border South, and they accounted for 12.1 percent of
the free working population.24 Table 4, which provides figures for the percentage of the total
area of the Border South taken up by both improved and unimproved farmland, further illustrates
the overwhelmingly rural nature of the Border South. Total acreage has been converted to
square mileage for this purpose.

In a region that reached from the worn-out soil of the

Chesapeake to the rocky hills of the Ozarks in southwestern Missouri and included pockets of
especially fecund areas such as the Kentucky Bluegrass and Missouri’s Boon’s Lick in between,
farmland comprised 58.6 percent of the Border South’s total square mileage. This percentage
23

Kennedy, “The Border States,” in Wakelyn, ed., Southern Pamphlets on Secession, 234, 230.
Kennedy, Population of the United States in 1860, 48-49, 186-187, 216-217, 302-303. Aggregate
grouping of the data might lead to a category like professionals, comprised of doctors, lawyers, teachers, and so
forth, surpassing the single category of laborer, but these groupings would not come close to the percentage of
workers involved in agriculture.
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meshes with figures for the rest of the South. If the data for Florida and Texas, two states with
massive quantities of land that remained predominantly unsettled in 1860, are removed,
southerners dedicated 61.3 percent of all land to farming. The similarity of these numbers
implies that the Border South did not differ greatly from the rest of the South in terms of its rural
complexion. In the decade of the 1850s, the number of farms in the Border South increased by
29.8 percent, a number that outstripped farm growth in the Upper South (17.8 percent) and the
Lower South (23.0 percent). Only the Upper Midwest states of Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, and
Wisconsin witnessed a greater percentage increase in farms in a sub-region than the Upper South
between 1850 and 1860.25
Table 4 - Percentage of Land in Farms in 1860
Region

Sq. Mileage in
Total Area (Sq.
Farms (Improved
Miles)
& Unimproved)

% of Total Area in
Farms

Border South

70,293.65

119,883.64

58.6%

Upper South

133,004.49

205,416.59

64.7%

Lower South

180,239.80

543,203.16

33.2%

Lower South without Florida & Texas

136,076.90

228,346.69

59.6%

Entire South

383,537.94

868,503.39

44.2%

Entire South without Florida & Texas

339,375.04

553,646.92

61.3%

Sources: Agricultural Schedules, Census of 1860, Univeristy of Virginia Historical Census Browser; Square mileage
attained from www.quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/index.html

The variety of the crops produced and the size of farms in the Border South distinguished
the region from the staple crop economies farther south. Farmers in the border country planted
crops such as tobacco and hemp, but these staples did not dominate overall agricultural output.
In 1860 Kentucky trailed only Virginia in pounds of tobacco produced, while Maryland placed
fourth and Missouri seventh in terms of tobacco production in the nation. The Border South
produced 39.5 percent of all the tobacco in the United States in 1860, which indicates the yellow
25

Agricultural Schedules, Census of 1850 & 1860, University of Virginia Historical Census Browser. The
data for the Far West states of California and Oregon suggests a percentage increase for that region of over 2,000%
but has been excluded since the Census of 1850 did not have any information for Oregon.
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leaf’s significance to the agricultural economy of these states.26 Kentucky and Missouri farmers
grew the most hemp in the United States, a crop normally manufactured into ropes and bagging.
Farmers and planters in the Lower South often relied on hemp bagging to gather their cotton
crop, which reinforced intraregional economic ties. The scale of hemp operations paled in
comparison to the outfits of cotton barons in the Lower South, but it represented a major cog in
the western Border South agricultural wheel.27 In addition to tobacco and hemp, Border South
farmers also cultivated a great deal of wheat and other cereal grains. Kentucky stood tenth and
Maryland eleventh in terms of bushels of wheat produced, while Missouri followed closely at
fifteenth. All four states of the Border South experienced an increase in the total number of
bushels of wheat produced during the 1850s. Of all fifteen southern states, only Virginia
produced more wheat than Kentucky.28

Bounteous yields of corn, potatoes, and livestock

supplemented tobacco, hemp, and cereal grain output and allowed for an agricultural base of
greater diversity and stability in the Border South in comparison to the agricultural economies of
the Lower South dominated by cotton, rice, and sugar cultivation.29
Farmers operated on a smaller scale in the Border South than did their brethren in the
Upper and Lower South. Table 5 provides the average size of farms in the South and shows that
as one traveled northward from the Gulf of Mexico, the grip of large-scale staple agriculture
relaxed and farm size decreased. Tobacco and hemp cultivation did not require enormous tracts

26

Joseph C.G. Kennedy, Agriculture of the United States in 1860; Compiled from the Original Returns of
the Eighth Census (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1864), xcvi.
27
Hurt, Agriculture and Slavery in Missouri’s Little Dixie, 100-102; E. Merton Coulter, The Civil War and
Readjustment in Kentucky (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1926), 9; J. Winston Coleman, Slavery
Times in Kentucky (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1940), 42-44; Diane Mutti Burke, On Slavery’s
Border: Missouri’s Small-Slaveholding Households, 1815-1865 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2010), 100.
28
Kennedy, Agriculture of the United States, xxix-xxx.
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The long-range implications of overreliance on a single staple crop is explored in Gavin Wright, The
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of land as did sugar, rice, and large-scale cotton farming. The data suggests that the diverse
agricultural output, accompanied by the labor demands of the crops grown, led to smaller farms
in the Border South. On average, Border South farms were half as large as Lower South farms
and one hundred acres smaller than those in the Upper South.
Table 5 - Average Size of Southern Farms in 1860
State/Region

Average Size of Farms (Acres)

Delaware

152.44

Kentucky

228.98

Maryland

191.55

Missouri

225.68

Border South

220.45

Upper South

321.92

Lower South

500.53

Entire South

351.19

Source: Agricultural Schedules, Census of 1860, University of Virginia
Historical Census Browser

The people living and working on the land of the Border South overwhelmingly hailed
from the South, which strengthened intraregional bonds. Tables 6 through 9 provide information
on the place of birth for the free population of each of the four Border South states. An analysis
of the data reveals that most free persons living in the Border South had been born in the South.
Native southerners comprised 89.1 percent of Kentucky’s free population and 88.4 percent of the
Bluegrass State’s inhabitants were born in the Border or Upper South. Missouri had the lowest
percentage of native southerners; only 70.2 percent of its inhabitants hailed from the South and
68.8 percent were born in the Border or Upper South. The statistics for Delaware (81.7 percent
born in the South; 81.5 percent born in Border or Upper South) and Maryland (82.4 percent born
in the South; 82.3 percent born in the Border or Upper South) closely resembled one another.
Kinship and business ties fortified the connections both within the region and between the
Border South and the Upper South in much the same manner as those that fused the Border
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South to the Lower North. Inhabitants of the Border South positively understood these important
associations.

A delegate to the state convention called in the spring of 1861 to consider

Missouri’s place in the Union employed familial imagery when he declared Kentucky “the
mother of Missouri, and Virginia, her grandmother.” Throughout the secession crisis, several
border southerners commented on the powerful connections between the Border South and the
Upper South and predicted their states would follow the course that Virginia and the rest of the
Upper South pursued.30
Table 6 - Nativity of the Free Population of Delaware in 1860
% of Free Native
State/Region/Country % of Total Free
State
Population not
of Birth
Population
Born in Delaware
Delaware
76.9%

Delaware

Border South

81.5%

31.3%

Upper South

0.2%

1.2%

Lower South

0.0%

0.3%

Total South

81.7%

32.8%

Border North

9.4%

63.2%

Upper Midwest

0.0%

0.1%

New England

0.4%

2.4%

Far West

0.0%

0.0%

Total North

9.7%

65.7%

Total Native Born

91.7%

Germany

1.1%

Ireland

5.3%

Total Foreign Born

8.3%

Source: Kennedy, Population of the United States in 1860 , 48.
Note: Percentages for persons born in US T erritories and federal property were not computed, but
they represent a miniscule proportion of the total free population.
For T ables 6-9, regions are comprised of the following:
Border North: Illinois, Indiana, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania
Upper Midwest: Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Wisconsin
New England: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont
Far West: California, Oregon
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Table 7 - Nativity of the Free Population of Kentucky in 1860
% of Free Native
State/Region/Country % of Total Free
State
Population not
of Birth
Population
Born in Kentucky
Kentucky
77.6%

Kentucky

Border South

78.4%

4.9%

Upper South

10.0%

62.8%

Lower South

0.7%

4.1%

Total South

89.1%

71.8%

Border North

4.1%

25.5%

Upper Midwest

0.1%

0.6%

New England

0.3%

1.6%

Far West

0.0%

0.0%

Total North

4.4%

27.7%

Total Native Born

93.6%

Germany

2.9%

Ireland

2.4%

Total Foreign Born

6.4%

Source: Kennedy, Population of the United States in 1860 , 185.
Note: Percentages for persons born in US T erritories and federal property were not computed, but
they represent a miniscule proportion of the total free population.

Table 8 - Nativity of the Free Population of Maryland in 1860
% of Free Native
State/Region/Country % of Total Free
State
Population not
of Birth
Population
Born in Maryland
Maryland
80.2%

Maryland

Border South

81.0%

12.0%

Upper South

1.3%

19.2%

Lower South

0.1%

1.5%

Total South

82.4%

32.7%

Border North

3.8%

55.7%

Upper Midwest

0.0%

0.2%

New England

0.4%

5.4%

Far West

0.0%

0.0%

Total North

4.2%

61.3%

Total Native Born

87.1%

Germany

7.3%

Ireland

4.1%

Total Foreign Born

12.9%

Source: Kennedy, Population of the United States in 1860 , 215.
Note: Percentages for persons born in US T erritories and federal property were not computed, but
they represent a miniscule proportion of the total free population.
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Table 9 - Nativity of the Free Population of Missouri in 1860
% of Free Native
State/Region/Country % of Total Free
State
Population not
of Birth
Population
Born in Missouri
Missouri
44.5%

Missouri

Border South

54.5%

24.7%

Upper South

14.3%

35.3%

Lower South

1.4%

3.6%

Total South

70.2%

63.6%

Border North

12.2%

30.3%

Upper Midwest

1.2%

3.1%

New England

0.8%

1.9%

Far West

0.0%

0.1%

Total North

14.3%

35.3%

Total Native Born

85.0%

Germany

8.3%

Ireland

4.1%

Total Foreign Born

15.0%

Source: Kennedy, Population of the United States in 1860 , 301.
Note: Percentages for persons born in US T erritories and federal property were not computed, but
they represent a miniscule proportion of the total free population.

Deeper scrutiny of the nativity figures for the Border South reveals how the region found
itself straddling the gulf between the North and the South. Large portions of the native born
population in Delaware, Kentucky, and Maryland had been born in the state in which they
currently resided, ranging from 76.9 percent of the free population in Delaware to 80.2 percent of
the free population in Maryland. Missouri, the last Border South state admitted to the Union and
the westernmost border slave state, demonstrates how the lure of the West attracted optimistic
settlers born farther east. Only 44.5 percent of Missouri’s free born population had been born
there. Tables 6 through 9 also include percentages of the free native born population without
including persons who had been born in each of the respective states. Removal of the in-state
native born population unearths intriguing population trends. Under this formula, more persons
born in the North, and especially the Border North states of Illinois, Indiana, New Jersey, New
York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, lived in Delaware (65.7 percent) and Maryland (61.3 percent) in

42

1860 than those born in the South. On the other hand, Kentucky (71.8 percent) and Missouri
(63.6 percent) contained more people born in the South than in the North. This suggests a large
flow of people from North to South in the eastern states of Delaware and Maryland and the
opposite in the western states of Kentucky and Missouri. These figures shed light on the tangled
skein of Unionism and southern sympathies that Border South natives tried to navigate during
the secession crisis.
Regardless of the multifarious nativities of border country inhabitants, the institution of
slavery generated a southern identity for the great majority of white people living in the Border
South on the eve of the secession crisis. Slavery undergirded the society, economy, and culture
of the Border South, and the peculiar institution conditioned the political climate of the southern
border region up to and through the secession crisis. Although the Border South held fewer
slaves than its more southerly neighbors, this made border southerners no less adamant than their
southern brethren in the insistence that the federal government had to protect slavery and that the
future of the institution lay in their own hands, not the hands of far-off abolitionists and sectional
hotspurs. In an observation about Kentucky that could apply equally to the rest of the Border
South in 1860, the Louisville Daily Courier noted, “Kentucky is a slave state...Slavery is
interwoven with all her institutions, and laws, and customs, and social habits. Her people could
not do without it if they would, and they would not if it were practicable. Slave property is a
leading element of wealth, as it is of the greatness, of Kentucky.”31
Table 10 provides data on slavery in the South during the decade of the 1850s. The slave
population of the Border South increased by nearly 10 percent over the decade, which comes
close to the 15.4 percent enlargement in the Upper South but lags far behind the 31.3 percent
increase in the Lower South. Missouri saw the most significant gain in the number of slaves of
31

Louisville Daily Courier, January 25, 1860.
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all the Border South states, but the figures for Delaware and Maryland sounded the alarm for
southern nationalists who worried that abolitionism had made inroads in the exposed border
region. Both of the Chesapeake states lost slaves during the 1850s; no other slave state in the
entire South experienced an overall decline in slave population during the same interval. The
influx of free persons far outpaced the growth of the slave population in the Border South, too.
The overall percentage of slaves to the total population diminished more greatly in the Border
South than the rest of the South, a fact not lost on nervous southern radicals.32
Table 10 - Slave Population of the South
State/Region

% Increase/
Decrease

Slave Population
1850

% of Total Population Enslaved

1860

1850

10-Year
Change

1860

Delaware

2,290

1,798

-21.5%

2.5%

1.6%

-0.9%

Kentucky

210,891

225,483

6.9%

21.5%

19.5%

-2.0%

Maryland

90,368

87,189

-3.5%

15.5%

12.7%

-2.8%

Missouri

87,422

114,931

31.5%

12.8%

9.7%

-3.1%

Border South

390,971

429,401

9.8%

16.7%

13.7%

-3.0%

Upper South

1,047,635

1,208,758

15.4%

29.9%

29.2%

-0.7%

Lower South

1,761,668

2,312,352

31.3%

46.7%

46.5%

-0.2%

Entire South

3,200,274

3,950,511

23.4%

33.3%

32.3%

-1.0%

Sources: Census of 1850 & 1860, University of Virginia Historical Census Browser

No doubt, the development of anti-southernism in northern politics probably stoked the
exaggerated fears of southern nationalists. The startling growth of the Republican Party in the
1850s, which promised to restrict slavery from entering the territories if it gained ascendancy, led
some nervous southerners to conclude the enemy had crossed the Ohio River and infected the
political thinking of the most northerly outposts of slavery. Historians have pointed to the fact
that discussions about emancipation advanced further in the Border South than the eleven states
that formed the Confederacy for evidence of slavery’s shaky foundation in the border area. The
Maryland legislature established a state-funded colonization experiment in the 1830s; members

32

Census of 1850 and 1860, University of Virginia Historical Census Browser.
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of the Kentucky Constitutional Convention of 1849 debated enacting provisions for phased
emancipation; Missourians Thomas Hart Benton and Frank Blair Jr. in the 1850s called for free
soil in the American territories; and a small but boisterous antislavery element led by Kentucky’s
Cassius Clay had established itself in the Border South.33
These examples, arrayed against the deafening silence on manumission emanating from
the Lower South, paints a picture worthy of southern radicals’ apprehension. Yet just as the
Border South urban experience blinded fire-eaters and scholars to the rural realities of the region,
these debates have produced a similar effect on the actualities of the political trajectory of the
slaveholding border states. The 1850s actually witnessed a period of political entrenchment on
the peculiar institution in the Border South. A brief synopsis of how people inside each of the
four Border South states handled the slavery issue in the 1850s exposes a region-wide inclination
to shield the peculiar institution from external attacks.
Aside from Delaware and Maryland, no other slaveholding state experienced a loss in the
number of enslaved persons during the 1850s. The trend seemed almost natural in Delaware,
where the total slave population numbered fewer than 2,300 in 1850. The decline in Maryland, a
state with more slaves than Arkansas, Florida, Missouri, and Texas in 1850, aroused the concern
of proslavery sectional radicals. Marylanders, however, did not sit on their hands during the
decade and allow this process to go unchallenged. Rather, politicians in the Old Line State
sought ways to fortify and even perpetuate the peculiar institution during the 1850s. Prior to
1851, the state’s constitution included a provision that allowed the legislature to enact a
statewide emancipation program if both houses of the general assembly unanimously agreed to
such a policy in two different sessions. Even this tangled path to emancipation seemed unsafe to
33

Ford, Deliver Us from Evil, 387-388; Freehling, Road to Disunion, 1:462-473, 537-544; Freehling, Road
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the people of Maryland. A new state constitution written in 1851 and approved by 61 percent of
Maryland’s voters outright forbade the state legislature from abolishing slavery. The new
constitution also counted slaves as whole persons for legislative apportionment, giving the
densest slave areas more political power. The state’s new constitution signaled a resolve to
perpetuate, rather than extinguish, the institution of slavery in Maryland.34
During the decade the conservative American Party, made up primarily of Old Whigs,
faced stiff challenges from the resurgent Democrats in Maryland, some of whom sounded no less
vociferous about protecting the peculiar institution and its racial protocol than strong-willed
southern Democrats in the Gulf South. By the end of the decade Democrats had unseated the
traditionally dominant American/Old Whig coalition and controlled both houses of the state
legislature.

Democrat Curtis W. Jacobs, who held twenty-one slaves on his substantial

Worcester County farm and chaired the Committee on the Colored Population in the House of
Delegates, in 1860 crafted legislation forbidding individual manumission and requiring the
state’s free blacks to hire themselves out on a renewable basis. All observers realized Jacobs’
legislation would render Maryland’s hefty free African American population virtual slaves. The
House of Delegates debated the Jacobs Bill and altered it slightly: it kept the prohibition on
personal manumission and replaced the blanket hiring out provision with terms that gave free
blacks over eighteen years of age the alternative to return voluntarily to slavery rather than to
sign an annual labor contract. The legislature also applied the bill to eleven counties in southern
Maryland and on the Eastern Shore rather than the entire state and subjected its ratification to a
popular referendum. The bill passed the House by a tally of 38-14, but failed miserably in the
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popular vote. That such a measure could get through the state legislature so easily indicates a
powerful proslavery element existed in Maryland politics on the eve of the secession crisis. The
citizens of Maryland’s densest slave counties refused to swallow medicine this strong, though,
which signaled the Border South electorate’s preference for more temperate responses to the
slavery question than those advocated by proslavery politicians like Curtis Jacobs.35
Kentuckians also took constitutional and legislative steps to protect the peculiar
institution during the 1850s. The delegates to the Kentucky Constitutional Convention in late
1849 who hoped to place the state on an antislavery course found their wishes dashed. Contrary
to the designs of those who desired to eliminate gradually the peculiar institution in the
Bluegrass State, the convention instead included a provision that prevented the legislature from
taking direct action on slavery. In effect, the new constitution made slavery a “permanent
fixture” in Kentucky and according to historian Harold Tallant led to a near disappearance of
“mainstream antislavery politics and public debate on emancipation” in the state during the
1850s. Prior to the meeting of the constitutional convention, the Kentucky legislature showed its
hand when in February 1849 it overturned a law passed in 1833 that prohibited the importation
of slaves into the state. This legislation attested to the desire of some Kentuckians to expand
their slaveholdings through purchase rather than natural increase. Ever fearful of the deleterious
influence recently freed slaves might have on the rest of the enslaved population, the legislature
by 1851 mandated that all manumitted slaves had to leave the state.

The actions of the

legislature and the convention in the early 1850s suggest that politicians in Kentucky felt
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comfortable protecting and even nurturing slavery in the state.36

As with Maryland, the

Democratic party made inroads in Kentucky, a one-time bastion of Whig strength, in the 1850s.
A newspaper noted that by the end of the decade Kentucky had become “thoroughly
Democratic,” an almost unfathomable achievement in a state dominated by the legacy of archWhig Henry Clay. By the end of the decade Democrats had captured a majority in both houses
of the legislature and elected a governor. Not all Democrats championed a hard-line proslavery
stance, but some were willing to stake out a political approach that resembled their partisan
brethren in the Lower South. Despite these Democratic inroads, the people of the state still
preferred a placid response to heated sectional political issues. The conservative, Old Line Whig
tradition proved durable even in the face of Democratic triumphs during the decade of the 1850s
and would rise to the surface when the secession crisis exploded.37
No other Border South state possessed as powerful an opposition to proslavery politics in
the 1850s as did Missouri. Democratic giant Thomas Hart Benton dominated the Missouri
political scene in the two decades prior to the 1850s. A proponent of hard money and the rapid
settlement of the territories, Benton became the spokesperson of the West in Andrew Jackson’s
powerful Democratic phalanx. In the 1840s Benton opposed the annexation of Texas and in
1847 publicly declared that slavery should not spread into the territories, which caused a major
rift in the state’s Democratic Party. Despite Benton’s powerful appeal, state politics tilted in a
proslavery direction in the decade preceding the secession crisis. On January 15, 1849, a former
lieutenant of Old Bullion Benton rose in the Missouri state house and introduced a set of
resolutions that declared Congress did not have the power to legislate on slavery in the
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territories. The Jackson Resolutions, named for Claiborne Fox Jackson, set the scene for the
decade of the 1850s. Moderate Democrats, some of whom espoused free-soil principles, found
their way into Benton’s camp; proslavery and pro-South Democrats coalesced under the
leadership of Jackson and David Rice Atchison; and a small but influential bloc of Whigs found
themselves swimming in a sea infested with two breeds of Democratic sharks. Historians often
use Benton’s free-soil foray and his protégé Frank Blair’s construction of a Republican
organization in St. Louis as a sign of Missouri’s apostasy on the slavery question. While these
two factions fought tough battles during the decade of the 1850s, Jackson’s coterie gained the
upper-hand and placed the Bentonites on the defensive. Only in St. Louis did free-soilers
achieve success, and even there on a limited basis. After taking his stand against slavery in the
territories, the Missouri legislature in 1850 unceremoniously refused to send Benton back to his
chair in the United States Senate which he had occupied for nearly thirty years. In his stead the
legislature sent proslavery Whig Henry S. Geyer to Washington. Benton spent one term in the
United States House of Representatives before making unsuccessful bids for both Congress and
the Senate in 1854 and the governor’s chair in 1856. The Missouri legislature steadfastly refused
to permit a free-soiler to represent the state in the Senate.38
Claiborne Jackson and his followers spent the rest of the decade vanquishing an
opposition that consisted of former Democrats, Old Line Whigs and Americans, and the tiny
Republican contingent in St. Louis. The state’s proximity to Kansas added fuel to the fire of
politics in the 1850s and kept the slavery question constantly before the electorate. Although
Frank Blair became the only Border South Republican elected to the United States Congress in
38
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1860, his victory does not serve as a barometer of public opinion across Missouri. Most
Missourians found the Republican Party repugnant because of its sectional nature and much
preferred a moderate settlement of the slavery question. They asked the same question as did
John D. Coalter, a delegate sent to the Washington Peace Conference in February 1861: “If
[Republicans] abhor our institutions, how long a step will it be before you abhor us? If you
abhor slavery, how long before you abhor slaveholders?” Even Thomas Hart Benton refused to
endorse the Republicans in the presidential election of 1856 because he feared the organization
might endanger the safety of the Union.39 The majority of people in Missouri searched for
restrained responses to the sectional conflict, but they absolutely demanded that outsiders not
interfere with slavery in the state. Like the rest of the Border South, politicians in Missouri
worked to ensure that the peculiar institution occupied safe ground during the decade of the
1850s. Some solons like Claiborne Jackson agonized over the ramifications of allowing Kansas
to become a free state and sounded the tocsin of disunion. During the secession crisis these
sectional hotspurs stubbornly learned that they had far overstepped the political boundaries most
Missourians had drawn.
Antislavery thought found little fertile ground even in Delaware, a state with a miniscule
contingent of slaves. The state legislature discussed enacting an emancipation plan several times
in the 1840s but a bloc of Democrats from southern Delaware defeated these abolition efforts by
narrow margins. After the defeat of an emancipation bill in 1849 politicians put the issue to rest
and never seriously debated it again in the 1850s.40 Unlike the rest of the Border South,
39
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Delaware did not require manumitted slaves to leave the state. In 1852, however, the legislature
clamped down on free blacks, denying them the right to attend political meetings, to own and
possess firearms, to vote or hold office, or to testify in criminal cases when at least one white
person witnessed the crime. The Democratic Party controlled Delaware politics in the 1850s and
several political luminaries, such as Senator James A. Bayard, embraced a strong pro-South
position. “The lower portion of this state [Delaware]...is ultra Slavery, and Bayard panders to
that feeling,” one spectator observed. The Republican Party gained strength in Wilmington
during the second half of the 1850s, but it often prioritized the tariff issue and minimized the
slavery problem in order to gain adherents in the smallest slave state.41
That antislavery politicians experienced a modicum of success in the Border South leads
some scholars to view the region as open-minded on the possibility of emancipation. In reality,
Border South antislavery politicians manufactured a buzz that far outweighed their limited
political impact. Aside from St. Louis voters sending Frank Blair to Congress, the Border South
electorate overwhelmingly demanded that their politicians protect the institution of slavery.
Blair’s case appears exceptional when arrayed against the rest of the Border South.

He

successfully ran for Congress as a Democrat with free-soil proclivities in 1856 and once in
Washington pushed for the compensated emancipation of Missouri’s slaves and the removal of
freedpersons to Central America. Blair’s plan never came to a vote in the House, but his
suggestion of such a plan contributed to his narrow defeat in a reelection bid in 1858. Blair
claimed his opponents in Missouri’s First District used fraud and trickery to defeat him and
actually won his case and was awarded his seat in Congress in June 1860. Nevertheless, his
41
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August 1856 margin of victory of 3.5 percent had become a deficit of 2.2 percent in August
1858. Each election featured three candidates in the field; in 1856 Blair’s opponents captured
56.2 percent of the vote and in 1858 they won 65.7 percent of the vote. In his victorious bid for
the Thirty-seventh Congress in August 1860, Blair’s two opponents combined tallied 55.9
percent of the total vote. In sum, Blair never won a majority in any of his elections, his plurality
diminished immediately after he introduced his emancipation plan in Congress, and he benefitted
from a large contingent of Germans in his congressional district who supported the Republican
Party and its free-soil doctrine. His solution for the slavery question appeared radical in the
South, but it actually built on the conservative tradition of colonization that many prominent
Upper South politicians had toyed with in the early republic. Unconcerned with the moral
implications of slavery, Blair hoped his colonization plan would free Missouri’s white
population from competition with slave labor, foster economic progress in the state, and build an
unassailable political base from which he could rise to national prominence.42
Blair’s antebellum success must be labeled checkered at best, for he advocated a modest
solution to the slavery problem that made the vast majority of the Border South population very
uneasy. Political aspirants in the Border South who moved beyond colonization and suggested
more radical solutions to removing slavery from the region had a negligible impact during the
1850s.

The irascible Cassius Clay, who unlike Frank Blair advocated working with the

abolitionists of the North, never sniffed electoral success in Kentucky. Clay’s friend James
Sidney Rollins reminded him, “Whatever the fact may be, you are regarded by the world as one
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of the extreme men.”43 Extremism would not play in the Border South, as Clay’s ally John Fee
found out firsthand.

Subjected to mob violence and even threatened with death for his

denunciations of slavery from the pulpit in the 1850s, Fee defiantly continued to deliver his
abolitionist message throughout Kentucky. He established an antislavery community at Berea,
Kentucky, in 1854, and commenced distributing Bibles to slaves in the area. Kentuckians
begrudgingly tolerated Fee’s activities until the aftermath of John Brown’s raid on Harpers
Ferry, Virginia. Two months later, in December 1859, an armed posse demanded that Fee’s
followers leave the state permanently. The governor of Kentucky ignored the Bereans plea for
protection, which prompted them to jettison their antislavery activities in the Bluegrass State and
relocate to the free states. Fee’s case indeed shows Border South forbearance in comparison to
the rest of the South, but it also indicates that Border South patience with antislavery extremism
had worn thin by the end of the decade.44
Thus, even in a region marked by smaller quantities of slaves and lesser slaveholdings
than the eleven states that formed the Confederacy, discussion of ending slavery far more often
invited scorn and contempt than compassion and approval. Table 11 illustrates the percentage of
the white population involved with slavery and the concentration of slaveholdings by percentage.
Just over 84 percent of all slaveholders in the Border South owned fewer than nine slaves, and
the vast majority owned fewer than five slaves. In general, more of the white population in the
Upper and Lower South was involved in slaveholding than in Border South, and slaveowners in
the future Confederate States owned larger concentrations of slaves. But these figures should not
lead to the conclusion that Border South slaveholders exercised apathy when it came to
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protecting their property.45 The muting of antislavery voices and the energy expended on
constitutional and political protections for slavery across the region in the 1850s suggests just the
opposite.
Table 11 - Slaveholdings in the South in 1860
State/Region

% of White
Population
Slaveholders^

Slaves Owned by % of Slaveholders
<5

5-9

10-19

>20

>100

Delaware

3.24%

81.09%

14.65%

4.26%

0.00%

0.00%

Kentucky

21.01%

57.00%

25.34%

13.64%

4.02%

0.02%

Maryland

13.36%

60.75%

20.53%

12.46%

6.25%

0.12%

Missouri

11.43%

64.40%

23.51%

9.87%

2.22%

0.02%

Border South

14.93%

60.18%

23.83%

12.17%

3.82%

0.03%

Upper South

23.89%

50.22%

23.99%

16.39%

10.46%

0.27%

Lower South

34.65%

43.22%

22.50%

16.06%

16.64%

0.93%

Entire South

24.51%

48.95%

23.27%

15.41%

12.00%

0.53%

Source: Slave Schedules, Census of 1860, University of Virginia Historical Census Browser
^ Computed by multiplying the number of slaveholders by the average family size (5) and dividing by
the total white population.

Border southerners recoiled at propositions that would bring about the demise of slavery.
Many Border South residents held a strong economic stake in the peculiar institution’s vitality,
whether they owned slaves themselves, hired out enslaved persons, or relied upon skilled slave
labor to perform functions such as blacksmithing or carpentry. Historian James L. Huston notes
that slave labor proved quite flexible and on the verge of the secession crisis many slaveowners
in the Border South had begun to use slaves in manufacturing and industrial concerns at a rate of
return more advantageous than employing free labor. Huston posits that if not for the outbreak
of the Civil War, the process of selling excess slaves from the Border South to the Lower South
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may have reversed itself.46 While the slave trade itself removed enslaved persons from the
region, it also provided a source of income for many border southerners. The harrowing practice
of splitting up families often fattened the pockets of white border southerners, from slave traders
and slaveowners to transportation outfits that carried out the trade. This industry also fostered
additional economic ties between the Border South and the more southerly slave states that
hungered for laborers.47
Beyond the economic stake, whites in the Border South relied upon the peculiar
institution to reinforce rigid racial barriers. The very prospect of removing slavery from the
Border South invited all kinds of speculation about the place of free blacks in society. In terms
of proportion more free African Americans lived in the Border South than in any other region of
the country, and this sizable contingent would explode if some program of emancipation was
enacted. Border southerners shared the paranoia of Lower South radicals when it came to
envisioning a future without slavery. “[T]he black race will be in a large majority,” a Georgian
warned his fellow southerners, “and then we will have black governors, black legislatures, black
juries, black everything.” Without the institution of slavery to separate the South into two
distinctions rooted in race and to mute potential class tensions, border whites inferred, their
whole society would spin out of control. In such an offing free blacks would compete with
whites for jobs and place and the racial divisions so integral to herrenvolk democracy would
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quickly wash away. The white population of the Border South on the eve of the secession crisis
could not fathom such a future, and longed to avoid this eventuality at all costs.48
As a result of slavery’s momentous social, cultural, economic, and political
underpinnings, border country southerners searched for ways to sustain the peculiar institution
rather than methods of expediting its demise. Whereas the number of people in the Lower and
Upper South who condoned disunion multiplied as the 1850s progressed because of the antiSouth and antislavery rhetoric of some northern politicians, many border southerners continued
to believe the Union and the federal government represented the best safeguards to slavery.
True, a growing number of border southerners beat the drum of disunion during the decade, but
few people marched to their cadence. Not until the Harpers Ferry raid and the momentous
election of 1860 would inhabitants of the Border South seriously begin to ruminate the
prescriptions of the fire-eaters in their midst. Disunionists later found it impossible to relax the
powerful grip of a potent Unionist mindset when the secession crisis reached full steam at the
end of 1860.
The Border South Unionist mindset centered on the belief that remaining in the Union
remained the best available option for preserving slavery.

Throughout the 1850s, border

southerners felt the crunch of heightened sectional tensions. The debate over the Compromise of
1850, the Kansas-Nebraska Act and the consequential dispute over the meaning of popular
sovereignty, clashes over fugitive slaves and personal liberty laws, the Lecompton Constitution,
and the Dred Scott decision had so thoroughly poisoned sectional relations that many Americans
in the far reaches of the Upper North and Lower South by 1859 viewed one another as enemies
48
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more so than fellow citizens.49 Whereas more southerners in the future Confederacy equated
disunion with the safety of slavery as the decade advanced, border country southerners reached a
different conclusion. Two essential external components had helped border southerners in their
internal quest to fortify the peculiar institution during the 1850s: a federal government that
enforced the Fugitive Slave Law and protected the interstate slave trade, and an influential cadre
of conservative northern allies who assisted in preventing sectional extremists from taking over
the ship of state. In the Border South, preservation of this delicate status quo best sheltered the
institution of slavery.
The 1850s taught Border South inhabitants that if vested in the proper hands, the federal
government was the best instrument for protecting slavery. No part of the slaveholding South
could claim as much vulnerability to permanent slave escapes as did the Border South, bounded
by alluring free territory to the north, or in the case of Missouri, to the north, east, and possibly
the west. Historians debate the reliability of census data for fugitive slaves, which in 1860 listed
803 fugitive slaves, a number that decreased from 1,011 in 1850; scholarly estimates of
northward escapes range as high as 5,000 per year. Despite these disparate approximations, all
historians agree that the Border South sustained more northward escapes than their more
southerly neighbors.50 While more slaves escaped from the northern tier of slaveholding states
than elsewhere in the South, border southerners relied on the federal government to execute the
Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 in good faith. Kentucky Unionist Joseph Holt studied the census
data and in 1861 acknowledged that the federal government had done just that as the 1850s
progressed. “[I]t is this law, effective in its power of recapture, but infinitely more potent in its
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moral agency in preventing the escape of slaves,” Holt declared, “that alone saves the institution
in the Border States from utter extinction.” Secession meant forfeiture of this most effective
piece of legislation and as a result the Border South would “virtually have Canada brought to her
doors in the form of Free States.” “Under such influences,” Holt predicted, “slavery will perish
rapidly away in Kentucky, as a ball of snow melts in a summer’s sun.” Thus, the federal
government provided a vital lifeline to the institution of slavery in the Border South.51
Because federal legislation served as a key external element in sustaining slavery in the
Border South, border southerners had to rely on alliances built with moderate politicians in the
North to prevent radicals from steering the national government toward antislavery measures.
What historian William J. Cooper labels the politics of slavery had remarkable staying power in
the Border South. The politics of slavery, practiced by both the Democrats and Whigs until the
1850s, relied upon a national political coalition in which the northern wing acquiesced to
southerners on questions related to slavery.52 After the demise of the Whig Party in the middle
of the decade, border country members of the American Party sought the assistance of Old Line
Whigs across the North, while Border South Democrats tried to maintain the conservative
coalition with the northern wing of the party prior to its breakup at Charleston in 1860. While
border southerners continued to look northward to retain old alliances in order to protect slavery
and offset the ascendancy of the sectional Republican Party, other southerners adopted an
opposite tack. By the end of the decade most people in the Lower South viewed the North as the
unassailable domain of the Republican Party. After a decade of bickering over the political
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ramifications of slavery, many southerners in the states that made up the Confederacy refused to
distinguish between Republicans and the rest of the northern electorate. Left with no allies in the
North, these southerners envisioned but one alternative to protect slavery and the South:
secession.53 In the Border South, on the other hand, most people adhered to the conviction that
moderate free state allies would continue to combat the Republicans and ensure that the federal
government would not backslide on its obligation to protect the peculiar institution.
The resiliency of the politics of slavery in the Border South generated a strong aversion
to extremism, whether it originated in the North or the South.

For instance, a Maryland

newspaper heaped scorn upon Republican Charles Sumner, who in March 1860 introduced a
memorial from his Massachusetts constituents that called for the repeal of the Fugitive Slave
Law and the eradication of the interstate slave trade. “The substantial quality of republicanism is
its exclusive sectionalism,” the editor remarked, “and nothing can be more surely destructive of
the Union than this.” The editor heaved a sigh of relief that the Senate tabled the memorial. 54
Only the maintenance of alliances with conservatives in the North who promised to respect the
constitutional protections afforded slavery and the Dred Scott decision would stave off sectional
extremists like Sumner, border southerners concluded. Likewise, the people of the Border South
abhorred the rashness of southern fire-eaters who hoped to bully the other states into following
their lead. For border southerners, these southern radicals could only help northern extremists in
their quest to eradicate slavery in the United States. One Kentuckian noted that in reality
secession “repeals the fugitive slave law, it makes personal liberty bills in the free states valid: it
accomplishes just what the abolitionists desire, the exemption of the free states from any
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countenance to slavery.”55 The people of the Border South shared the desire of other southerners
to see slavery preserved, but they recommended a different solution to the problem. This
powerful distaste for radicalism conditioned the Border South response to the secession crisis.
By the autumn of 1859, the Border South truly felt caught in the middle of the sectional
conflict. The economy, society, and politics of the region fostered ties in both directions and
imbued the Border South with a strong attachment to the Union. In general the Democratic Party
enjoyed success across the Border South in the 1850s, but strong partisan competition remained
a key facet of the political matrix in the region. Measures had been taken during the decade to
provide the institution of slavery with a stable basis, which tethered the fortunes of the Border
South to the future of slavery. Politicians and voters looked for allies as the country geared up
for the presidential election of 1860. At the very least, those allies had to accept the Border
South condition that the federal government would dependably execute the Fugitive Slave Law,
protect the interstate slave trade, and leave all questions about the future of slavery to the
individual states where it existed. Border southerners tried to avoid lengthy discussions about
the extension of slavery into the territories, which they found detrimental to sectional accord.
They felt these arguments had been rendered moot by the Supreme Court’s 1857 Dred Scott
decision, an opinion handed down by one of their own, Chief Justice Roger Taney of
Maryland.56 Some members of the American or Opposition Party even envisioned the possibility
of rebuilding the old Whig coalition by uniting with conservative Republicans who would purge
their organization of its radical sectional element in an effort to beat the Democrats in 1860. In
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October 1859, however, John Brown’s raid at Harpers Ferry, Virginia, produced a political
earthquake that tested this delicate Border South Unionist outlook forged during the antebellum
period. Its tremors rumbled deep into the secession crisis and injected a Lower South-like
militancy into political discussions that Border South Unionists found difficult to stifle. As the
secession crisis gathered momentum many border southerners, moored to both the North and the
South by the economic, social, and political realities of the 1850s, questioned whether the
hallowed conservative Unionist impulse that John Pendleton Kennedy brilliantly captured in his
essay could endure the towering breakers on the horizon.
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Chapter 2
“We Are Approaching a Crisis Pregnant with Immense & Momentous Results”: The Long
Shadow of John Brown’s Raid, October 1859 – April 1860

Edward Bates surveyed the political landscape in early 1859 and unlike many Americans,
the St. Louis attorney remained optimistic about the future of the republic. Born in the last
decade of the eighteenth century in Virginia, Bates came to Missouri in 1814, read law with the
territory’s preeminent barrister, and established a successful practice in fledgling St. Louis.
Through his successful law firm and his large family Bates built important connections and
entered the cauldron of Jacksonian politics. During his long career he had helped to write
Missouri’s state constitution in 1820, served in both houses of the state legislature, spent a single
term in the United States House of Representatives, and in time became the unofficial leader of
the state’s Whig Party.

The Whigs endured countless defeats in Thomas Hart Benton’s

Democratic stronghold of Missouri, but Bates clung to the principles of the party even after it
crumbled in the middle of the 1850s.

Throughout his professional career, the Missourian

championed a system of internal improvements to augment national growth, cultivate prosperity,
and strengthen intersectional bonds, and his Whiggish intuition nurtured an unceasing suspicion
of the Democrats. He sported a full white beard that at the onset of the secession crisis reflected
his sixty-five years and what many contemporaries considered an outmoded political philosophy.
Bates privately opposed the extension of slavery into the territories but also fretted that the issue
only undermined intersectional cooperation, the very lifeblood of political parties prior to the
middle of the 1850s. In February 1859 he publicly declared his aversion to the effort of a coterie

62

of Democrats to bring in Kansas as a slave state under the Lecompton Constitution and admitted
that “the only party I ever belonged to has ceased to exist as an organized and militant body.”1
As the nation prepared for the presidential election in 1860, however, Bates held out hope
that the many disparate political pieces in opposition to the Democrats could unite under one
banner, defeat their common opponent, and forever remove the vexed question of slavery’s
extension from the political matrix. His political allies in Missouri were even floating his name
as a potential candidate to lead the Opposition in 1860. Bates, his backers insisted, had all the
attributes of the perfect candidate: he hailed from a border state, the heart of the nation; he had
carried himself in a dignified and upright manner throughout his career; and he championed a
conservative, middle ground approach to the slavery extension controversy. Bates insisted that
in time the institution of slavery would suffer a natural death if confined to the fifteen states
where it existed. His plan for extinguishing slavery had none of the zealotry that so many
southerners associated with abolitionism, which political strategists considered an enormous
asset. He called for the compensation of slaveholders who emancipated their bondspersons,
endorsed a colonization program to remove the racial problems brought on by manumission, and
adamantly declared that the federal government had no right to interfere with slavery in the
states.2
Influential Republicans, including editor of the New York Tribune Horace Greeley and
party architect Francis Preston Blair and his sons Montgomery Blair of Maryland and Frank
Blair Jr. of Missouri, enticed Bates to join their organization. Bates, however, shared with most
1
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border country southerners reservations about the designs and composition of the Republican
Party. In a letter to a group of New York conservatives he declared that “the agitation of [the
slavery question] has never done good to any party, section or class, and never can do good,
unless it be accounted to stir up the angry passions of men, and exasperate the unreasonable
jealousy of sections.” Bates found sectional radicals particularly repugnant, and he worried that
an alliance with the Republicans would not only damage his political prospects in Missouri, but
also subject him to the whims of the party’s abolitionist element. He confided to his diary his
doubts about joining the Republicans, whom he feared would foist a legislative plan for
emancipation upon the nation if they gained the ascendancy. Surely, he believed, Missouri had
started down the path to freedom “by the irresistible [sic] force of circumstances, without any
statute to help on the work.” Other states could follow her example, and avoid the deleterious
effects caused by the politicization of the slavery question. Bates considered patience the
ultimate virtue, and at this point he reasoned it far better to avoid commitment to the Republicans
and instead build momentum for a fusion of conservatives to defeat the Democrats. In essence,
Bates looked for a revival of the Whig Party, a national coalition of moderate men who could
divert attention away from the slavery question by emphasizing economic issues, smothering
sectional differences, and guiding the country out of the dangerous waters stirred by eight years
of Democratic leadership.3
Bates favored a quintessentially Border South response to the sectional agitation that
conditioned how many Americans would vote in 1860. His noncommittal stance in early 1859
foreshadowed the Border South’s vain attempt at neutrality once sectional tensions spilled over
3
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into war in 1861. He hoped to protect slavery in the states where it existed, sought a solution to
the slavery extension question amenable to both sections, and faithfully believed in the enduring
power of the Union. Bates attempted to downplay the territorial problem, much to the chagrin of
Republican hardliners in the North, because he understood that most inhabitants of the Border
South would not vote for a candidate who made that issue the centerpiece of his campaign.4
Bates and his followers believed him the perfect presidential candidate because he could see
beyond the slavery extension issue to a brighter tomorrow. Yet Bates actually cast his gaze to a
fictional past free of political agitation on the subject of slavery, and this vision blinded the
Missourian to the realities of the present. The slavery question proved unavoidable, even for a
high-minded politician like Bates. In October 1859, the actions of a small band of men led by a
radical abolitionist just one hundred and fifty miles from Edward Bates’s birthplace in
Goochland County, Virginia, ensured that all border country southerners would have to confront
the issue they had strained to evade throughout the 1850s.
Politicians like Edward Bates, who endorsed a careful and cautious approach to
restricting the spread of slavery, held no interest for a hardliner like John Brown, who also
operated along the sectional border. In response to the Kansas-Nebraska Act, which in 1854
organized the territory immediately to the west of Missouri on the basis of popular sovereignty
and resulted in a showdown over whether the West would become the domain of freedom or
slavery, Brown in October 1855 settled in Kansas with five of his sons. The Connecticut-born
Brown had failed in several business ventures during his life, no doubt distracted from his
professional responsibilities by his unceasing determination to see slavery abolished in the
United States. His religious convictions told him that God wanted to rid the republic of the
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peculiar institution, and over time he became convinced that he was an instrument for carrying
out this divine charge.5
Brown, anything but a politician like Bates, cast tact and guile to the wind. He preferred
swift enterprise, and he never pondered the consequences of his actions nor planned for all
possible contingencies, as did most statesmen and their strategists. By the end of the 1850s
Brown could no longer stomach ostensibly antislavery politicians who spoke in platitudes and
brokered deals that seemed to perpetuate the life of the peculiar institution rather than bring
about its demise. He fancied the sword, and in the autumn of 1859 prepared to unsheathe his
weapon once again in an effort to punish American slaveholders for their sins of the last two and
a half centuries. While he impatiently dismissed the tortured pace of the political process that
conservatives like Edward Bates found soothing, John Brown’s measures ironically influenced
Border South politics to a great degree. His attempt to incite a slave insurrection at Harpers
Ferry, Virginia, quickened the march toward secession, and in the Border South the raid
damaged the region’s normally amicable relationship with conservatives in the North. In this
environment, the alternative of disunion became a distinct possibility even in the Border South, a
region with fewer slaves than the eleven states that formed the Confederacy in early 1861. As
one scholar notes, the raid “captured the attention even of the apathetic, shook the faith of
unionists, and encouraged the disunionists” of the South.6 The raid injected a sectionalist bent
into Border South politics that Unionists strained to withstand, and it made Edward Bates’s
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noncommittal political formula all the more infeasible as the nation approached the election of
1860.
***
During the antebellum period, the dilemma of the future of slavery in the world’s most
republican form of government operated as a roadblock to American greatness. Democrats
upheld the principle of popular sovereignty, which took the issue of the extension of slavery into
the territories out of the domain of Congress and vested it in western settlers, as the best means
to remove the troublesome obstruction from America’s path to perfection. Following the lead of
Michigan Democrat Lewis Cass, Senator Stephen Douglas of Illinois championed popular
sovereignty as the most democratic option for settling the vexing issue of slavery’s extension and
clearing the way for Americans to push westward to the Pacific Ocean. Let the people who live
in the territories render a decision on the fate of the peculiar institution, Douglas argued, not
politicians in far off Washington. This leveled appeal for Americans to seize what they deemed
their manifest destiny inadvertently provided an opportunity for sectional hotspurs to appropriate
the settlement of the West for their own ends and directed the American journey to worldwide
prominence on an agonizing detour.7
John Brown viewed the battle for Kansas as an opportunity to inflict divine retribution on
American slaveholders. He drew national attention in May 1856 when he and his sons murdered
several Kansas settlers who espoused even the slightest affiliation with proslavery forces in the
territory. A Missouri newspaper labeled Brown’s rampage “the legitimate fruits of the Abolition
press and pulpit, who have stirred up the worst passions of a portion of their people against
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another portion of the country, and done [this] with a reckless or a willful knowledge of the
dangerous consequences.”8
Brown’s reputation preceded him after the press broadcast his deeds in Kansas to a
divided nation. Southerners and northern conservatives derided “Old Osawatomie Brown,”
while some northern abolitionists applauded his rampage. Brown escaped prosecution for his
involvement in what became known as the Pottawatomie Massacre, and by the late 1850s he had
begun to solicit money, munitions, and men to strike a grand blow at slavery not in the
territories, but in the slaveholding states.

A handful of prominent abolitionists subsidized

Brown’s ambitious scheme to incite a slave insurrection in the South, though the warrior found it
difficult to attract many recruits to his army of emancipation. Brown rented a farmhouse in July
1859 on the Maryland side of the Potomac River, and three months later twenty-one recruits had
assembled at his headquarters. He chose Harpers Ferry, Virginia, just five miles away from the
Maryland farm, as his initial target. Nestled in the hills that dotted the intersection of the
Potomac and Shenandoah rivers, Harpers Ferry housed a federal arsenal, and a major rail
thoroughfare, the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, ran through the town. Brown anticipated that
once his band took the town, slaves from the surrounding countryside would flock to his
standard. Thereafter he would distribute pikes that he had accumulated in the North and the
cache of weapons stockpiled in the armory to the slaves; in time, Brown reasoned, his liberation
army would swell from twenty-one to twenty thousand, and as his legion gained momentum the
peculiar institution would crumble once and for all.9
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On October 16, 1859, the impetuous John Brown led his outfit to Harpers Ferry, where
they captured the federal arsenal and waited for the onrush of slaves who would join the fight.
During the night, his men committed a colossal blunder when they stopped a train on the
Baltimore and Ohio but later let it proceed on its course. The engineer alerted the president of
the railroad company that some sort of insurrection had been inaugurated at Harpers Ferry and
word quickly spread throughout the Maryland and Virginia countryside. When Brown and his
men surveyed the town on October 17, they discovered no army of enslaved persons, but instead
droves of local white militiamen bent on quelling the uprising in their midst. President James
Buchanan ordered a federal force to the scene, which arrived by ten o’clock that night. The
abolitionists barricaded themselves in the town’s engine works and held out until the morning of
October 18, when the federal contingent stormed the building after Brown refused to surrender.
The insurrection ended nearly as quickly as it had begun. Federal troops captured Brown alive,
though ten of his followers eventually died. Five of Brown’s lieutenants managed to escape, and
seven men were clapped in manacles along with their leader. Authorities soon after searched the
Maryland farm and found a collection of letters that outlined Brown’s scheme for a general slave
insurrection and compromised his patrons. The worst fears of white southerners had been
realized: an abolitionist attempted to upset the delicately ordered southern society by pitting
slaves against their masters. The seemingly far-off violence of the Kansas frontier had been
introduced in their own backyard, fewer than sixty miles from the nation’s capital and eighty
miles from the South’s largest city, Baltimore. Most white southerners breathed a sigh of relief
that Brown failed and boasted that no slaves had joined the nefarious plot, but a pall of anxiety
lingered over the South. Brown and his deluded followers were undoubtedly “the victims of that

69

social and political error with which a large proportion of the northern mind is indoctrinated and
imbued,” one Baltimore editor shuddered.10
Border South moderates often emphasized during the 1850s that abolitionists represented
a tiny element of the northern population. Then governor of Kentucky John Crittenden, the
leader of Border South conservatives by the end of the decade, visited Indiana in 1850 during the
height of the sectional controversy over whether or not to allow the introduction of slavery in the
land acquired as a result of the Mexican-American War. Welcomed in Indianapolis by large
crowds, Crittenden took notice of the “particularly fraternal kindness & affection” exhibited for
Kentucky, a most welcome sign in the midst of the charged sectional atmosphere. Crittenden
assured a Kentucky associate that the people of Indiana sought “compromise & amicable
settlement of all slavery questions.” While in Indianapolis, the Kentuckian did not miss an
opportunity to “talk right plainly to them about Abolition, & the mischiefs that its meddlesome &
false humanity had brought & was tending to bring upon the Country.”11
Border country southerners had always been leery of abolitionists, but throughout the
decade of the 1850s they placed their trust in moderate northerners like Crittenden’s Indianapolis
audience, who helped to relegate northern radicals to the margins of the body politic. Nearly a
decade later, John Brown’s raid on Harpers Ferry threatened to destroy the intersectional bridges
of moderation that Crittenden and his allies had raised. Border southerners expected to hear a
litany of denunciations of Brown’s course from their moderate friends in the North. Plenty of
condemnation issued forth from northern conservatives: in the immediate aftermath of the raid
an Ohio newspaper, for instance, called for “the people of the free States [to] put down the class
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of politicians who belong to the school of Slavery Agitators,” and one of Crittenden’s associates
in Boston commented on a large meeting at Faneuil Hall where the attendees universally voiced
their “reprobation of the attempt of John Brown at Harpers Ferry.”12 But as authorities revealed
the details of the plot, many southerners became blinded in a fit of rage. Southerners ignored
northern censure of Brown and focused instead on the voices condoning the actions of the
crusading abolitionist.

“Day after day, however, and week after week,” the editor of the

Baltimore Sun lamented, “we have the cumulative evidence, furnished voluntarily by the press
and the pulpit, that John Brown is in fact the representative man of a very large class of people of
the North, and that he is the object of their constant concern and sympathy.”13 The raid,
undertaken so close to the Border South, temporarily upset the intersectional fraternity that had
become a hallmark of the 1850s along the sectional border. The absence of universal northern
condemnation of the abolitionist’s deeds provoked some otherwise Border South moderates to
reevaluate the safety of the peculiar institution in the Union.
While John Brown awaited his trial in a Virginia jail, border country southerners
considered the ramifications of the plot. Hester Davis, the wife of a Maryland farmer and
politician, termed the raid an “atrocious attempt” and regretted that a search of his headquarters
not only turned up rifles and “javelins for the use of the negroes,” but also letters from northern
women supporting his effort to inaugurate servile insurrection.

She believed some of the

correspondence came from Quakers and worried of the ominous consequences. If women, even
pacifist Quaker females, in the North prescribed such violent measures, certainly the rest of the
northern population condoned ending slavery through any means necessary. Fearful that the
12
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attempt at Harpers Ferry was merely the beginning of an abolitionist assault, she demanded that
her husband carry two loaded revolvers when he traveled to Baltimore on business.

A

neighbor’s son slept at her Montgomery County house when her husband left home to protect the
family in case of another attack.14

In January 1860 Virginia intellectual George Fitzhugh

accurately gauged the lasting impact of the raid on Border South women like Hester Davis: “Our
wives and our daughters will see in every new Yankee face an abolition missionary.”15
A Missourian attending West Point admitted to his father that Brown’s raid tested his
faith in the ability of the Union to protect the peculiar institution. “Pa I am decidedly a
conservative man...and am in favor of promoting the well fare and future prosperity of our whole
Union,” the cadet asserted. “But I am from a southern state and am not willing for these northern
fanatics & pirates to come upon our southern soil and deprive us of our most valuable
property.”16

John Brown’s actions clearly amplified Border South paranoia about slave

insurrections and the ability of the federal government to guard against abolitionist invasions
from the North. The raid set off a flurry of second-guessing the powerful conservative Unionist
mindset that moderates constructed during the 1850s. How could so many northerners, their
erstwhile allies in protecting the peculiar institution in the South, sympathize with John Brown?
The warnings of western Missourians, inhabitants of the only portion of the Border South
to experience extended violence over the slavery issue during the 1850s, seemed more prescient
14
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to border southerners in the aftermath of Harpers Ferry. During the decade slaveholders in
western Missouri viewed Ohio-born James Montgomery, the leader of free-soil forces in Kansas,
as a cold-blooded killer bent on toppling the social order of the westernmost outpost of the
Border South. Western Missourians asked for and received funds from the state legislature half a
year before the Harpers Ferry raid to defend against Montgomery’s band of abolitionists, who
often crossed the border, absconded with slaves, and destroyed property. Leaders of the state
militia along with most Border South inhabitants, however, claimed in the spring of 1859 that the
western Missourians had overreacted and let their paranoia get the best of them. The Harpers
Ferry raid corroborated the worst fears of western Missourians, who had sounded the warning
time and again during the 1850s. No longer did border country southerners ignore their doleful
admonitions. Fearful that free blacks might serve as liaisons between northern interlopers and
the enslaved population, the Missouri general assembly passed legislation that would force all
free African Americans to enter slavery or leave the state. Governor Robert Stewart, a proUnion Democrat who hailed from the western border town of St. Joseph, vetoed the bill.
Stewart’s executive overruling on the free black legislation should not diminish the reality that
the Missouri legislature took extreme steps to safeguard the peculiar institution in the state after
John Brown’s failure at Harpers Ferry. While he felt the legislation designed to rid Missouri of
free blacks too extreme, Stewart shared the legislature’s belief that the people of the Border
South could not remain idle and allow outsiders to topple slavery in the region. He signed a bill
in December 1859 that reorganized the state militia in the hopes of more effectively defending
the state from abolitionist incursions.17
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In the aftermath of John Brown’s actions at Harpers Ferry the palpable terror that western
Missourians lived with made its way eastward. Mounting numbers of border country southerners
believed the contention of a Virginian who explained, “The border States are the exposed
frontier. Into them the underground railroad insinuates its emissaries, who steal a part of our
slaves and poison the minds of the balance.”18 Kentucky Governor Beriah Magoffin discussed
the implications of northern abolitionist invasions into the Border South at length in his first
message to the state legislature.

In December 1859 he reminded his constituents that the

Bluegrass State had “more cause of complaint than any other State in the Union” due to her
exposed northern border that extended seven hundred miles and abutted three free states.
Magoffin calculated that Kentuckians lost $100,000 annually due to slave escapes, and he
recommended the reorganization of the state militia, a prohibitive tax on out of state peddlers
operating in Kentucky (who he feared might spread incendiary ideas to slaves), a repeal of the
law that allowed free blacks to settle in the state, and the establishment of a program to relocate
free black inhabitants outside of the state. The governor hinted that he would support legislation
that remanded free African Americans to slavery if found guilty of minor infractions such as
drunkenness, immorality, laziness, and misconduct, so-called crimes that would give the state
judiciary considerable leeway to enslave free blacks.19

The legislature oversaw the

reorganization of the state militia system, towns and cities in the state enhanced the manpower of
local police forces, and county authorities supervised more rigorous slave patrolling.20
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Citizens in Kentucky exceeded the authorities in their response to the Harpers Ferry raid.
In late October 1859 a mob in Newport, Kentucky, stormed the printing office of antislavery
editor William S. Bailey, removed his presses, and hurled the type into the Ohio River. Bailey,
who agitated his neighbors when he advocated a John Brown-like war against slavery in the
states rather than on the frontier, defiantly resisted the mob’s demand that he leave the state.
Kentuckians responded by jailing him for publishing incendiary materials. While on a tour of
the free states John Fee, who had established an antislavery community at Berea, Kentucky,
made the bold claim that the nation needed “more John Browns – not in the manner of his action,
but in his spirit of consecration.” The Harpers Ferry raid and Fee’s injudicious remarks “called
into new life the suspicion with which [Fee and his nearly one hundred followers] had been
viewed,” and provoked the people of Madison County to expel the Berea abolitionists from the
state. Other communities followed Madison County’s lead and instructed abolitionists “to leave
Kentucky terra firma instanter.” “We can get along without foreign interlopers,” the editor of the
Louisville Daily Courier snapped, “and can manage our affairs in our own way without
assistance from abroad.”21
Marylanders also took action as a result of the Harpers Ferry raid. Militia units from
Baltimore and eastern Maryland rushed to the western portion of the state once they received
word of the invasion of Virginia. John Brown had established his headquarters in Washington
County, which in the aftermath of the raid provoked western Marylanders to see abolitionists
behind every bush. Enslaved persons comprised just 4.6 percent of Washington County’s total
population and western Maryland contained very few slaves in relation to the rest of the state,
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but the specter of a slave revolt energized the area’s white population. Governor Thomas Hicks,
a member of the American Party and no proslavery zealot, allowed sheriffs and county
authorities in western Maryland to arrest and detain suspicious persons on the slightest pretext.
Rumor and innuendo of a forthcoming slave revolt induced the people of Frederick, Maryland, to
outfit an armed posse to patrol the town’s streets. Although the attack never materialized, the
Frederick company arrested one African American for possession of a firearm. Local officials in
Hagerstown and Boonsboro were granted the authority to detain “all suspicious characters who
may be prowling about or passing along” following the raid. 22 The state legislature appropriated
$70,000 for the formation of additional militia companies to forestall future slave revolts and
crafted legislation with the intent to restrict further the freedom of Maryland’s large free black
population.23
Even Frank P. Blair, Jr., whose views on terminating slavery remained far in advance of
the rest of the Border South population, considered Brown’s plot “atrocious madness &
malignity.” He scorned John Brown not so much for the social chaos his raid may have caused,
but for the political fallout it would create in the Border South. Blair feared that Brown’s
attempted insurrection “will recoil on us as a party in the border states.”24 Suddenly, the
prospects for any type of partnership between former Whigs, Americans, and the sparse
contingent of Republicans in the Border South had vanished. Before the Harpers Ferry raid
some border country southerners held out hope that all political factions opposed to the
Democrats might coalesce in order to beat their common opponent.
22
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presidential election of 1860, men like Samuel S. Nicholas of Kentucky called for all the
opponents of the Democrats to organize under one umbrella organization called the Opposition
Party. Nicholas and likeminded Border South politicos presumed that abolitionists, who made
up a small portion of the Republican Party, would abandon this collaborative association.
Purged of the radical antislavery element, Nicholas calculated the Opposition “would become
essentially national, and would easily put down the sham Democracy.” The raid at Harpers
Ferry sealed the fate of Nicholas’s scheme, which probably only carried a remote chance of
success in the Border South before John Brown led his men into Virginia, although a few
supporters of Republican collaboration clung to the barren project. As Edward Bates learned
more about the attempted insurrection, he noticed “the Democracy is turning every stone to make
party capital out of it. Very probably, they will overdo the thing and produce a reaction.”25
The Democrats of the Border South wasted no time turning over stones in search of
political capital. John Brown’s actions at Harpers Ferry allowed Border South Democrats to
claim that only they could best protect slavery in a region under attack from outside threats.
Some Democrats framed all of their opponents, even conservative former Whigs and Americans,
as proto-Republicans bent on carrying out emancipation through the legislative process. In
effect, Democratic political posturing left former Whigs and Americans with no choice but to
distance themselves from the Republicans. Throughout the 1850s the Democratic Party had
made inroads in the four states of the Border South; aside from Missouri, which had long been
associated with Democratic dominance, the growth of the Democratic Party in the 1850s marked
a departure from Whig and American supremacy in the region. Charts 1 through 4 compare the
composition of all four Border South state legislatures to those in the rest of the South in 1850
and 1860.
25
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Chart 1 - Composition of Border
South Legislatures, 1850
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Chart 3 - Composition of Future
CSA Legislatures, 1850*

NonDemocrat
(420)
47%
*Does not include
Arkansas, Virginia,
South Carolina, &
Texas.

Chart 4 - Composition of Future
CSA Legislatures, 1860*
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The Democratic Party’s ascendancy in the Border South was not on par with that of the
eleven states that formed the Confederacy, but the party of Andrew Jackson nevertheless made
impressive gains throughout the decade.

Party conflict and sectionalism battered non-

Democratic elements on the state level within the region: Democrats held twelve percent more
seats in Border South legislatures in 1860 as compared to 1850.

Although gubernatorial

elections had been held prior to the Harpers Ferry raid, the people of Delaware, Kentucky, and
Maryland had sent Democrats to the governor’s office.

Only Maryland claimed a non-

Democratic executive at the time of the raid: aided by the American Party’s dominance of
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Baltimore, Thomas Hicks had in November 1857 won the Maryland gubernatorial race by a wide
margin.26
John Brown struck Harpers Ferry at the apogee of antebellum Democratic success in the
Border South. Nonetheless, the case of Maryland reveals that the Democratic triumph was in no
way complete. Only Maryland held state elections in the immediate aftermath of the Harpers
Ferry raid. The results suggest that the Democrats capitalized on the paranoia of the time.
Overwhelming non-Democratic majorities in both houses of the legislature disappeared in
November 1859; afterwards Democrats garnered a slim two-seat majority in the Senate and an
impressive sixteen-seat advantage in the House.

27

Maryland also was the only Border South

state to hold congressional elections directly following the raid; the state’s delegation to the
United States Congress remained split between three Democrats and three non-Democrats. A
tabulation of the total votes in the Congressional elections in Maryland, however, indicates that
non-Democrats outpolled Democrats by a margin of 11,712 votes in 1859. Thus, Marylanders
cast almost 57 percent of their votes for non-Democratic candidates for Congress. This number
actually increased from the non-Democratic tally of 55 percent of all votes in the 1857
elections.28 The disparity between Democratic gains in Maryland’s state government and a slight
dip for Democrats in total votes cast for congressional candidates signals that non-Democrats
remained a significant variable in the Border South political equation. In addition, the figures
point toward a region-wide preference for a moderate response to political questions that played
out on the national level and foreshadowed the establishment of a national organization that
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would accommodate this conservative impulse. The raid battered non-Democrats in the Border
South, but even a decade of mounting defeats and the slings and arrows of sectional hardliners in
the fall of 1859 had not vanquished the legatees of Henry Clay.
Table 12 - Votes Cast in Congressional Elections in Maryland, 1857 & 1859
% of Total Non-Democrats
% of Total Total Cast
Year
Democrats
1857

38,252

44.7%

47,237

55.3%

85,489

1859

37,658

43.3%

49,370

56.7%

87,028

Source: Dubin, US Congressional Elections , 178-179, 184.

Some Border South Democrats utilized scare tactics in the wake of the Harpers Ferry raid
that closely resembled the machinations of fire-eaters in the Lower South. The response of
Meriwether Jeff Thompson, the mayor of St. Joseph, Missouri, exceeded most of his fellow
Border South Democrats. Thompson, a native of Harpers Ferry who had followed his ambition
to Missouri in 1847, returned to his Virginia birthplace shortly after the raid and presented a
hemp rope wrought by the slaves of a Missouri woman whose husband had been allegedly killed
by John Brown to local authorities as a sign of solidarity between the Border and Upper South.
While there Thompson bought several of the pikes that the captured abolitionist intended to place
in the hands of liberated slaves and returned to the Missouri frontier with them in tow. He
planned to use the pikes as visual aids to stir the people of western Missouri and show them their
fate if they allowed the Republicans to succeed. Looking back on his efforts to awaken the
people of the Border South while confined to a Union prison in 1864, Thompson proclaimed,
“My Southern proclivities were well known, yet, I was not, nor am I now a secessionist, ‘per se,’
as the Fire Eaters were called. I was then, and I am now, an ‘irrepressible conflict’ man.”29
Thompson split hairs when he assigned himself this label; his actions differed very little from
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those of the better known fire-eater Edmund Ruffin of Virginia, who collected some of John
Brown’s pikes and sent them to southern politicians and governors after affixing a note that read
“Samples of the favors designed for us by our Northern Brethren.”30 Sometime after the raid
Thompson delivered a speech and warned the people of Missouri that John Brown and the
Republicans intended “to massacre millions of the happiest and freest people in the world.” He
admonished the people of the Border South to “drive back the invading horde, before we are
penned up in a few states on the Gulf coast, and the terrible consequences of a servile
insurrection should burst upon us, and rapine, murder and incendiarism run riot through the
land[.]” Although far fewer fire-eaters called the Border South home than the eleven states that
formed the Confederacy, Thompson’s invective and his vivid depictions of the consequences of a
large-scale slave insurrection demonstrates that these sectional radicals sounded no less shrill
than their peers farther to the south in the wake of the Harpers Ferry affray.31
A Virginia court found John Brown guilty of treason and sentenced him to hang on
December 2, 1859. Border southerners overwhelmingly agreed with the sentence. “When he
was ravaging Kansas and Missouri he gave no quarter – committing murder or robbery, or
running off a dozen negro slaves, with equal indifference,” the Marshall Democrat of Missouri
commented, “and he ought to ask no quarter now that the law has him in its clutches and is likely
to hold him fast.” Some Border South newspapers speculated that Brown’s sympathizers would
30
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sweep into Virginia and rescue the abolitionist martyr, but no such attempt materialized. The
region remained on high alert, and the political fallout from the raid continued to accumulate.32
As Brown awaited the gallows, wire-pullers in the North realized that most southerners
would equate Old Osawatomie with the Republican organization and damage the party’s broader
appeal. The weight of the attempted insurrection widened the breach between the sections, to the
delight of hotspurs and the dismay of political realists who understood the necessity of
intersectional amity.

Observers discerned that the Harpers Ferry raid harmed northern

presidential aspirants across the political spectrum, from Republicans to Illinois Senator Stephen
A. Douglas, who had broken with the southern wing of the Democrats in 1857 over the
Lecompton Constitution. “Brown has run his race and his last act has been to deal a fatal blow at
the political prospects of his friend [New York Republican Senator William H.] Seward and
thrown a wet blanket over the shoulder of our friend Douglas and his backers,” a Pennsylvanian
confided to President James Buchanan.33

Republicans who sought to expand the party

southward fretted, while Democrats charged their opponents with provoking Brown to act
through their dangerous partisan objectives.

The St. Louis Daily Missouri Republican, a

Democratic sheet, noticed several Republican newspapers in the Union attempted to distance
themselves from the deeds of John Brown. Unconvinced by the political maneuvering of these
Republican editors, the Daily Missouri Republican offered sardonic praise to the Germanlanguage Anzeiger Des Westens, a Republican paper based in St. Louis, for its consistent stand in
32
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support of Brown. Even after Brown had failed to carry out his plan that would have left the
South “wrapped in flames and deluged in blood,” the Anzeiger refused to disown the crusading
abolitionist as did most Republican journals. A Kentucky native and former Whig who had
moved to Iowa reflected that he was raised to hate abolitionists while he lived in the Bluegrass
State. Now, however, his abhorrence for the Democrats outstripped his loathing of abolitionists
because the Democratic press, like the St. Louis Daily Missouri Republican, used every possible
tactic to attach John Brown’s actions to the Republican Party. “We are damnably exercised here
about the effect of Old Brown’s wretched fiasco in Virginia,” a Chicagoan groused. “The old
idiot – The quicker they hang him and get him out of the way, the better.”34
A stoic John Brown met the gallows in Charlestown, Virginia, in early December and
received “a just retribution” according to Hester Davis of Maryland. “So old Brown has played
out his tragedy to the 5th act, and the curtain has fallen,” John Pendleton Kennedy observed.
“Hero or Devil? – that is the question.”

Most border southerners emphatically answered

Kennedy’s rhetorical question with the latter sobriquet; Kennedy himself came to the same
conclusion after corresponding with an associate who witnessed the trial and hanging at Harpers
Ferry. His unprejudiced spectator had conversed with the imprisoned Brown and described him
as “a very bold reckless man, mean hypocritical and cunning – of a low order of intellect and still
lower morals.” Brown’s “cant about religion was mere craft,” the informant explained; in truth,
Old Osawatomie deserved the label “murderer, horse thief and robber” rather than martyr for the
cause of freedom.35 Border southerners convinced themselves of the veracity of the depictions
34
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of John Brown as the devil, a bandit, a bloodthirsty rogue, or all three. The outpouring of grief
and mourning for Brown’s death reported by newspapers puzzled the people of the Border
South. Border country southerners wondered how, after a trial that even Brown himself deemed
just, could anybody sympathize with a man bent on inciting a slave rebellion and endangering
the entire white population of the South? Hester Davis concluded the “Tolling of Bells, firing
minute guns, sermons, prayer meetings and incendiary speeches” in the North “are not the
feelings of the majority.” That even a minority in the North could empathize with Brown proved
problematic for southern whites, though. The people of the Border South had always looked to
the Union as the best means to preserve slavery. Now a sizable element within the Union
condoned expunging the peculiar institution by the sword which put the nation “in great
commotion.” Whereas border southerners usually exhibited unwavering patience, the Harpers
Ferry raid led some men to uncharacteristic verdicts. “They are discussing a disunion, North and
South,” a Maryland woman commented after visiting with friends in her neighbors parlor.36
“The gallows is the proper end of a career that has been marked by blood and rapine,” a
Kentucky editor exhorted after Brown’s execution. The paper expressed joy that the Union had
endured its latest test “which was so heartily sympathized in by the Black Republican leaders of
the North.”37 The editor relaxed after Brown met his doom, but his invective aimed at the
Republicans underscored the long shadow cast by the Harpers Ferry raid. As the paranoia
gradually receded in the wake of Brown’s death many border southerners forgave conservative
northerners, but they could not forget that a powerful radical element existed within the Union.
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Maryland Democrats met in December 1859 and affirmed their state’s steadfast commitment to
the cause of the South and “their devotion to the institution guarantied [sic] to us by the
constitution, and their reprobation of the fanatical demonstrations at the North, so clearly
pointing, as they do, to a determined purpose to destroy our domestic institutions, and with them
the constitution and the Union.”38 Secession had entered the Border South political lexicon, and
the probability of the region’s non-Democrats aligning with the Republicans had been blasted.
Some border country inhabitants, among them Henry Winter Davis of Maryland, James O.
Broadhead and Charles Gibson of Missouri, and the Blair Family, continued to delude
themselves into thinking that Edward Bates might head an opposition alliance between
Republicans and Old Whigs.39 Their plot to elevate Bates to the head of a coalition ticket faced
trouble in the Border South, however; a Missouri newspaper remarked that the people of that
state “will never walk into the net so gracefully set, by Greely [Horace Greeley, Republican
editor of the New York Tribune] in the North, and Bates in the South.”40
Border South Unionists bent on combating the sectional upswing unleashed by John
Brown’s raid soon realized the difficult task at hand when Congress assembled on December 5,
1859. Table 13 provides a breakdown of the partisan makeup of Border South senators and
representatives who sat in the Thirty-sixth Congress.

Of these thirty-four politicians, 61.8

percent were affiliated with the Democratic Party and 35.3 percent with the Opposition bloc
comprised of former Whigs and Americans. Only one congressman from the Border South,
Frank Blair of Missouri, represented the Republicans. In reality Blair never sat in this session of
38
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Congress; he lost the congressional election held in August 1858 but charged his Democratic
opponent with fraud, and the House subsequently granted him the seat. Blair resigned the post in
June 1860 in order to vindicate his accusation of a voting swindle and put his name before his
constituents in a fair contest, but a special election for the second session of the Thirty-sixth
Congress held on August 6, 1860 resulted in his defeat.41
Border South Democrats in the Thirty-sixth Congress ranged across a broad political
spectrum, from disunionists to unalloyed Unionists.

Representatives Henry C. Burnett of

Kentucky and John B. Clark of Missouri often sounded no different than Deep South fire-eaters
when on the stump; after the commencement of the Civil War the House expelled both of these
sectional radicals, who eventually rendered their services to the government of the Confederate
States of America.

Senator James A. Pearce of Maryland and Representative Thomas L.

Anderson of Missouri, on the other hand, each espoused a strong brand of Unionism during the
sectional crisis.42 Most Border South Democrats in this session of Congress fell somewhere
between these two poles of political persuasion. Almost twice as many national-level politicians
from the Border South came from the Democratic Party than from the Opposition, but the nonDemocratic bloc included several eminent statesmen who exercised a great deal of political
influence.

Chief among these were Kentucky Senator John J. Crittenden and Maryland

congressmen Henry Winter Davis and J. Morrison Harris.

Border South Democrats

outnumbered Oppositionists three and a half to one in the Senate, a sure sign of the ascendancy
of the Democratic Party in the region’s state legislatures, who at the time elected United States
senators. Many Border South Democrats in Washington looked to Vice President John C.
41
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Breckinridge of Kentucky for leadership. Though not a senator, Breckinridge presided over the
upper chamber and played an active role during this session of Congress.43
Table 13 - The Border South in the 36th Congress
Opposition/
American
Democrats
Republican
Senate

7

2

0

House

14

10

1^

Total

21

12

1

61.8%

35.3%

2.9%

Percentage

^Frank Blair, the only Border South Republican, lost his election
but was awarded a seat in the House after an investigation
unearthed significant fraud. He resigned in June 1860 to go before
the people in August 1860, but lost that election.
Source: Biographical Directory of the United States Congress,
1774-present ,
http://bioguide.congress.gov/biosearch/biosearch.asp.

Table 14 - Composition of the 36th Congress
Opposition/
American
Democrats
Republican
Senate

38

2

25

House

101^

27

109

Total

139

29

134

46.0%

9.6%

44.4%

Percentage

^ 13 of these Democrats had split with the Buchanan
Administration and were known as Anti-Lecompton Democrats.
Source: James Ford Rhodes, History of the United States... , 2:417418.

In the Thirty-sixth Congress Democrats held an overall majority in the Senate, but no
party controlled the House of Representatives. Table 14 indicates that both the Republicans and
Democrats had captured nearly nine-tenths of the seats in the House. The organization of the
House depended upon a majority vote for the speaker, however, which made the Opposition bloc
the vital center that the Democrats or Republicans would have to win over to elect a presiding
officer of their choosing. Twenty-three of the Oppositionists hailed from the South, and of that
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number ten came from the Border South.44 Thus, border country southerners made up around
thirty-seven percent of the total Opposition bloc in the House; the two dominant parties highly
prized these influential votes which would determine who held sway in the lower house of
Congress. Once again the Border South found itself caught squarely in the middle of the
sectional stress that threatened to destroy the republic.
The tense atmosphere at the Capitol proved anything but conducive to the normal Border
South brand of politics that centered upon moderation, conciliation, and composure. From the
start, Republicans and their opponents refused to budge on the speakership issue. The House
witnessed a protracted struggle over the election of a speaker, a routine that rarely took more
than a few meetings to settle. During the winter of 1859-1860, though, the balloting for speaker
lasted through forty-four votes and choked the business of the government to a halt. Not until
February 1, 1860, almost two months after the House convened, did the opposing sides settle on
a presiding officer. During the interim, congressmen traded insults, challenged one another to
duels, and brought pistols into the House chamber lest a physical altercation provide an
opportunity to slay one’s political adversary with more than oral vitriol. The sergeant-at-arms
found it nearly impossible to keep the cantankerous congressmen and the boisterous crowds in
the galleries at bay. Iowa Senator James Grimes remarked that on both sides of the aisle
members “are mostly armed with deadly weapons, and it is said that the friends of each are
armed in the galleries.”45
The House tallied its first vote for Speaker on the opening day of the session. The Border
South congressmen scattered their votes among Democrat Thomas Bocock of Virginia, former
44
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Whig Alexander Boteler of the Old Dominion, and Oppositionist John Gilmer of North Carolina.
None of the names the Republicans put forward received a single vote from the Border South, an
ominous sign for the party that held a plurality and needed to capture some of the swing votes
from the Opposition group known as the South Americans.46 After recording the first vote,
Missouri Democrat John B. Clark fired a salvo aimed directly at the Republicans. Clark, who in
1858 had run unopposed in Missouri’s Third Congressional District in the northeastern corner of
the state, submitted a resolution which stipulated that no congressman who either endorsed or
recommended Hinton R. Helper’s book The Impending Crisis of the South: How to Meet It
should occupy the speaker’s chair. The resolution, laden with sectional overtones, produced a
mixture of applause and hisses among the partisans in the galleries.

Hinton Helper, a

nonslaveholding North Carolinian, had in 1857 published his screed, which blamed slavery for
southern backwardness and his native section’s inability to keep pace with the North and
Midwest. “Slavery lies at the root of all the shame, poverty, ignorance, tyranny and imbecility of
the South; slavery must be thoroughly eradicated; let this be done, and a glorious future will
await us,” Helper recommended. Southerners, so dependent upon the peculiar institution for
social, economic, and racial stability, considered Helper the ultimate sectional traitor. Many
Republicans erroneously believed Helper voiced the prevailing sentiment of poor whites in the
South and saw in him an ally, whereas southerners beheld an apostate. Over sixty House
Republicans had endorsed the book and signed a letter dated March 9, 1859, that outlined a
program for abolishing slavery in the South. Moderate John Sherman of Ohio, the Republicans’
top choice for speaker, had imprudently affixed his signature to the document without carefully
reading the book. On the heels of the Harpers Ferry raid, southern congressmen classified all the
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Republican signers as John Browns or Hinton Helpers. Clark’s resolution signaled that not even
the northernmost tier of the South would assist the Republicans in electing a speaker if their
ultimate intentions included the obliteration of the peculiar institution in the South.47
Clark cloaked his attack on the Republicans in the language of Border South moderation.
He hoped to have someone preside over the House who would respect the Constitution and act in
a fair manner to both sections of the nation. The Constitution, Clark maintained, protected
slavery, and its ultimate fate should remain in the hands of the South, not in those of a foreign
political entity. “Whether it is sinful to hold slaves, whether slavery is a plague and a loss, and
whether it will affect our future destiny, is our own business,” Clark proclaimed. “We suffer for
that, and not they.” The Missouri Democrat worried that Republicans would not embrace the
American political creed of conciliation and compromise, and he begged them not to “destroy
the conservative sentiment – that great element which keeps the stars and stripes floating this day
over this Capitol” by insisting upon a speaker who had sanctioned Helper’s book.48
Historians studying the sectional conflict often hurriedly mention Clark and his resolution
before moving on to the political divisions that surfaced in the following months. His resolution,
however, offers a window into the unique Border South approach to the deepening sectional
divide. Clark understood that despite his fire-eating proclivities, most of his constituents in
Missouri eagerly sought a moderate solution to the sectional crisis. Thus, he carefully crafted his
speech as a measured plea for the perseverance of the Union. Yet it also included a veiled
ultimatum to the Republicans which gave the speech and resolution a hard edge that Border
South politics often lacked before October 1859. The management of the institution of slavery
should be left to the people in the South who lived among enslaved persons; Clark nor any other
47
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border country southerner would allow perceived political enemies to have dominion over the
future of slavery. If the Republicans gained control of the government it would “raise a storm
throughout this Union” and “put brother against brother, father against son.” Disunion, Clark
implied, would be preferable to living under the reign of Republican leadership. The speech and
resolution revealed that John Brown’s raid widened a crack in the levee that border southerners
had built to keep sectional radicalism confined to the North and the South.

Kentucky

Congressman John White Stevenson astutely comprehended the political repercussions of the
Harpers Ferry raid that produced Clark’s Resolution. “It is not to be disguised that we are
approaching a crisis pregnant with immense & momentous results,” Stevenson confided to an
associate. “It will require clear heads & patriotic hearts – to keep together.”49
House Republicans ignored Clark’s admonition and stubbornly attempted to secure
Sherman’s election. Border South representatives joined with other southern congressmen and
refused to cast a vote for Sherman or any other Republican. Not until the twenty-fifth ballot,
nearly a month into the session, did some border southerners direct their votes toward a northern
candidate for speaker, the conservative Democrat John McClernand of Illinois. Time and again,
however, partisan wrangling prevented the South Americans and Northern Democrats from
settling on a candidate who could tally enough votes to defeat the Republicans. The impasse
over the speakership afforded ample opportunity for political grandstanding, and Border South
moderates worried that fire-eaters in the House were much more interested in using the
speakership contest to make a plea for southern independence than to organize the government.
D.H. Hamilton of South Carolina believed the people of the Palmetto State would “hail with
delight any measures which the Southern Members [of Congress] may adopt to bring this contest
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into some positive form of action – we are tired of guarding against secret attacks.” In the
middle of December Martin Crawford of Georgia calculated that every member from the fifteen
slaveholding states, excluding two Tennessee congressmen, condoned secession as a remedy if
the Republicans elected John Sherman.50
Crawford, whose vista of the Border South had likely been distorted by John B. Clark’s
actions, overestimated the fire-eating vigor of his Border South colleagues. Most Border South
congressmen reflected the conservative impulse of their constituency and strove for a solution
that would help the Union endure, a marked contrast to southern hotheads who eclipsed the
boundaries of civil discourse and berated their Republican enemies. “The Republicans keep
mum – they regard that there is wisdom in silence - & I agree with them. I wish that some of our
Southern friends would practice more of the maxim,” John White Stevenson scoffed. Missouri
painter George Caleb Bingham likewise complained that radical southern congressmen only
damaged sectional amity with their endless attacks on the intransigent Republicans.

“The

‘nigger,’ John Brown, Helpers [sic] book, and the ‘irrepressible conflict’ are literally worn to
tatters, without the slightest visible impression upon the ‘Black Republican’ ranks,” Bingham
observed. Border country congressmen rejected the Republican candidate, but they also declined
to walk down the path of disunion. In the cauldron of the speakership contest, most politicians
from the Border South sought to revive the conservative Unionist formula that had served the
region in the past.51
The Republicans finally relented and jettisoned John Sherman after the thirty-ninth ballot.
They replaced Sherman with the conservative William Pennington of New Jersey, who had not
50
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signed the endorsement of the Helper book. The southern bloc deemed Pennington guilty by
association, however, and spread their votes on other conservatives from the Democratic Party or
the Opposition ranks. Henry Winter Davis, a three-term American Party congressman from
Baltimore known for his fiery temper and unbounded political ambition, had throughout the
session closeted with the Republicans and urged them to drop Sherman for someone less
offensive to moderates. The replacement of Sherman with the conservative Pennington provided
Davis with a pretext to modify his vote. On January 31, 1860, Winter Davis finally broke ranks
and switched his vote from the American candidate to the Republican Pennington. Later that day
New York Know Nothing George Briggs promised to follow the Marylander’s lead if Winter
Davis would not waver in his support for the Republican. Davis reassured Briggs of his
commitment and on February 1, the two Know Nothings cast their vote for Pennington, giving
the Republican candidate the requisite majority to become speaker. Davis certainly acted as a
regional outlier during the speakership contest: the remainder of the Border South congressional
delegation held fast to their repugnance for the Republicans and vainly tabbed Gilmer or
McClernand on the forty-fourth and final ballot.52
Southerners redirected their barrage of ridicule from the Republicans toward Davis for
his defection. Mississippi Democrat William Barksdale ensured that posterity understood his
contempt for Davis when he asked that the official record of Congress show that “the
Representative of a slaveholding constituency...will be responsible for the election of the
candidate of the Republican party as Speaker of this House.” In his own state of Maryland,
citizens hanged Davis in effigy, and the House of Delegates voted sixty-two to one to censure the
Baltimore congressman for his vote. Even his own party organ in Baltimore predicted that
52
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Davis’s alliance with the Republicans effectively ended his political career in the Old Line State.
Clearly, Henry Winter Davis overstepped the boundaries of Border South political culture when
he assisted the Republicans in electing a speaker. Samuel Du Pont of Delaware, perhaps blinded
by indignation over the treatment his friend Henry Winter Davis received at the hands of the
southern press, moaned that other South Americans “had not the moral pluck to keep you from
standing alone in this matter.” After his lamentation Du Pont took a more objective view of
Davis’s decision and inquired if any of the other southern congressmen maintained social
relations with him after he recorded his vote, a frank admission of the ostracism the Marylander
suffered for his cooperation with the Republicans.53
Henry Winter Davis’s desertion of his border country colleagues, however, should not
distort the overall picture of the Border South reaction to the speakership contest. The rest of the
Border South congressmen towed the line with other southerners and refused to bend to the
Republicans. Border southerners thought along the same lines as a Virginian who declared that
although the “Republicans may not be abolitionists yet they [are] tadpole abolitionists and must
in time become the genuine reptile.” Yet the Border South members of the southern phalanx
eschewed the radicalism of fire-eaters just as readily as they did the Republicans. George
Pattison of Missouri believed that “there is a class of Southern fanatics, who would have been
equally violent defenders of abolition had they been born in New England.”

During the

speakership dispute Pattison yearned for a return to moderate politics and commented that most
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Missouri Democrats “are of course the conservative portion of the people, who deplore the
fanatical agitation of the slavery subject, particularly in Congress.”54
Both the Harpers Ferry raid and the speakership contest demonstrated that even though
sectional radicalism had become a variable in the Border South political matrix, moderation
remained the region’s watchword. The region included people who thought along the same lines
as John B. Clark or Henry Winter Davis, but most border country southerners’ political
persuasion fell in between these two divergent outlooks. “I believe there is conservatism enough
in our union to prevent a dissolution – the times a short time since looked somewhat alarming,
but now the clouds are passing away & the political sky is clearing up,” a Bath County,
Kentucky inhabitant acknowledged.55 Conservative politicians in the Border South harbored a
less sanguine view than this optimistic Kentuckian; they knew they would have to work in a
vigilant manner to keep disunion sentiment from overawing the moderate impulse once the
nation’s attention turned away from the House chamber and toward the presidential canvass of
1860.
Early in 1860, the major political parties remained in a great deal of flux. The only
political organization remaining that considered itself a national party, the Democrats, limped
toward the election of 1860 with two intraparty factions that held very different visions of
slavery’s place in the American territories. One wing of the party marched behind Stephen
Douglas of Illinois, who during his long tenure in the Senate championed westward expansion
and the idea of popular sovereignty or non-intervention in the territories. The territory of Kansas
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operated as Douglas’s laboratory for popular sovereignty; his experiment demonstrated that his
plan worked far better as an ideological construct than it did as a tangible governing principle.
Kansas fell into disarray in the 1850s as proponents of freedom and slavery wrangled over the
future of the West.

Southern Democrats warmly supported Douglas until 1857 when he

repudiated the Lecompton Constitution, a charter for Kansas statehood designed to protect the
institution of slavery in the new state. Lecompton, Douglas insisted, made a mockery of popular
sovereignty because the constitution offered no real opportunity for the settlers to reject it and
slavery.

Democratic President James Buchanan backed the Lecompton Constitution and

Douglas devoted all of his energy to defeating an enabling act for Kansas in Congress. Thus, by
the presidential canvass of 1860, the Democrats functioned as a national organization only in
name. The majority of southern Democrats, many of whom resolutely called for an affirmation
of the Supreme Court’s 1857 decision in Dred Scott v. Sanford which declared Congress had no
right to restrict the spread of slavery into the territories, searched for any means possible to
thwart Stephen Douglas’s presidential ambitions.56
Border South Democrats occupied the fault line between the two wings of the party. A
resident of Lexington, Kentucky, described the party as “split all to peices [sic]” in the Border
South. Democratic distinctions throughout Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, and Missouri rested
on an assortment of variables, such as patronage connections to Buchanan or Douglas and local
political issues, especially in urban areas like Baltimore and St. Louis. Influential Border South
Democrats, including Maryland’s Reverdy Johnson and editor of the St. Louis Daily Missouri
Republican Nathaniel Paschall, championed Douglas for the party’s presidential nomination.
The few Douglas backers throughout the South viewed popular sovereignty as “the most able
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defense of our great Southern Institution, against Black Republicanism.”

Whereas many

Democrats in the states that formed the Confederacy spurned the Little Giant as a heretic for his
stand against Lecompton, Border South Douglas Democrats regarded popular sovereignty as a
moderate and safe approach to the territorial issue. “The conservative men of this Nation need a
leader, one bold & fearless, not caring for the fire-eaters North or South, one who can proclaim
truth on the house-top, Senate-chamber or any where else,” a Missouri Douglas supporter
opined.57
Douglas had plenty of Democratic detractors in the Border South as well, which
underscores the balkanized nature of the region and the party.

Vice President John C.

Breckinridge and senators James S. Green and Trusten Polk of Missouri were a festering thorn in
the side of the Little Giant, and the Missouri duo especially took advantage of every opportunity
to denunciate Douglas and popular sovereignty. Green and likeminded Border South Democrats
complained that popular sovereignty left open the possibility that a territorial legislature might
try to prohibit the introduction of slavery, a direct contravention to the Supreme Court’s Dred
Scott decision. “We ought to banish this question now and forever; we ought to hush these
unnecessary issues on the subject of ‘squatter’ or ‘popular’ sovereignty,” Green barked on the
Senate floor. “[W]e must strictly adhere to the decision of the Supreme Court. It is our only
safety.” Douglas adherents realized that “some of our Democratic brethren are straining at Nats
and if they don’t be careful they will defeat the Democratic Party at the next Presidential
Election.” Douglas’s lieutenants throughout the Border South grumbled that his opponents took
to the stump and misrepresented the conservative nature of popular sovereignty. Critics of the
Little Giant, on the other hand, adhered to the logic of a Buchanan confidant who proclaimed, “I,
57
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for one, am for skinning and quartering this Demagogue...We must drive him from the Party or
cut him in two with a platform [at the Democratic National Convention].” Buchanan’s friend
Levi K. Bowen discerned a powerful hatred of Douglas in Maryland and credited it to “a strong
southern sentiment which regards him as unsound and dangerous,” and a Missourian looked
forward to defeating Douglas’s bid for the presidency in order to affirm his state’s southern
proclivities and to demonstrate “that we desire hereafter not to be controlled by ‘Northern Men,
with Southern principles.’ ”58
Border South conservatives not affiliated with the Democratic Party began exploring
their alternatives at about the same time as Congress convened in Washington. The tempestuous
speakership contest convinced many former Whigs and Americans that they must create their
own political organization independent of the Republicans and Democrats.

A New Jersey

politico informed a Virginian that members of the American Party in the North wanted “an
independent Organisation [sic] all over the Union, and are looking with great anxiety to the
brethren of the South, particularly to the South American members of Congress, who, it is
believed have it in their power to inaugurate a great Union Party which will control the destinies
of the Nation.” Border country southerners functioned as the linchpin and power base of this
nascent independent organization. Kentucky Senator John Crittenden became the nominal leader
of this third party, and he relied upon former Whigs such as John Pendleton Kennedy of
Maryland, Joseph P. Comegys of Delaware, Leslie Combs and Laban Moore of Kentucky,
Hamilton Gamble and James S. Rollins of Missouri, and Alexander Boteler and William C.
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Rives of Virginia for assistance in organizing the movement. Crittenden asked John Pendleton
Kennedy to draft an address in January 1860 which would set forth the principles of the new
organization, known as the Constitutional Union Party. Kennedy admitted that the party hoped
to adopt a nebulous platform that stood by the Constitution and the Union and turned back the
clock to the “old times before slavery became the controlling ingredient in our politics.” George
Fisher of Delaware believed the new organization “will exactly suit our latitude” if it stood as an
opposition to the “ultra fire eating disunion democracy upon the one hand and the Republican
fanatics upon the other.”59
No other political entity captured the Border South political mentality like the
Constitutional Union Party. The organization hoped that its appeals to moderation and devotion
to the Constitution would place it above the dangerous partisan battleground that had served as a
catalyst for extremism in the North and South. Constitutional Unionists found their inspiration
in bygone political personalities such as George Washington, Henry Clay, and Daniel Webster,
all of whom served as symbols of nationalism triumphing over sectionalism. Moderates hoped
to establish a “new party – constitutional and comprehensive – anti-all-the-isms” according to
the description of a Maryland native, one that would vie with the Douglas Democrats for the
conservative vote in the Border South. Some Constitutional Unionists even imagined that they
could convert some of those Douglas Democrats to their standard. “If we can revive the Old
Whig spirit and unite with the large body of the people who detest both of the predominant
parties,” John Pendleton Kennedy contemplated, “we may disappoint them and put a sound old
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fashioned statesmen to the Presidency.”60 The very qualities that these conservatives considered
assets – non-partisanship, nationalism, and a non-committal stance on the slavery issue – in time
emerged as liabilities. Despite of their best efforts, the Constitutional Unionists and the people
of the Border South soon found it impossible to untangle partisanship from sectionalism;
likewise, their reluctance to take a stand on the issues only plunged the party and the region
deeper into the conflict as time passed. Border South conservatives who peered to the past for
solutions just as Edward Bates had prior to John Brown’s raid could not derail the political
locomotive that chugged toward disaster in 1860.
The long shadow of the Harpers Ferry raid made the nation’s most cohesive political
entity the biggest loser in the Border South. With the Constitutional Unionists staking out an
independent course, Republicans realized they could not count on many votes from the people of
the Border South. A few defiant border country Americans warned their colleagues that a third
party stood no chance and that fusion with the Republicans offered the only blueprint to foil the
Democrats in the presidential election. At the same time that he worked behind the scenes with
Republicans to elect a Speaker of the House, Henry Winter Davis attempted to launch an
electoral combination between the antislavery party and the Americans of the Border South.
Davis advised the Republicans to run an Old Whig from the Border South, preferably Edward
Bates, in order to capture the vote of border country moderates. The collective votes of the
Republicans and former Whigs and Americans presented a much more powerful challenge to the
Democrats than an independent Opposition Party, Davis reasoned.
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Crittenden’s third party movement as a “preposterous squad of antiques” that would actually
benefit the Democrats by splitting the presidential vote.61
Some former Whigs, Americans, and Republicans in Missouri shared Davis’s outlook in
early 1860. The group held a convention in Jefferson City, Missouri, in late February 1860,
nominated Bates for the presidency, and constructed a nebulous platform that assailed “the
systematic reopening and dangerous agitation of the slavery question by ultra political leaders,
for party purposes.” The platform, however, took no particular stance on the territorial issue.
Rather, it merely expressed opposition to Buchanan’s endorsement of the Lecompton
Constitution. The platform only explicitly addressed slavery by expressing repugnance toward
reopening the African slave trade. A Democrat quipped that the delegates “fearing to commit
their candidate to any kind of a platform had to deal in generalities – So of course they said
nothing of interest to any one!”

Herein lay the dilemma for a Border South fusion of

Republicans and Americans: most border southerners could not swallow a platform that
expressly forbade the expansion of slavery into the territories, while the Republicans of the
North insisted upon the inclusion of the party’s bedrock principle. Prior to the Jefferson City
meeting, Bates confirmed this conundrum when he acknowledged that many Old Whigs and
Americans in the interior of Missouri “go the length of saying that the[y] are anxious to support
me, but cant [sic] do it if the ‘Black’ Republicans support me[.]” Most border southerners
continued to equate Republicanism with the radicalism of John Brown, an ominous sign for a
region-wide fusion movement in opposition to the Democrats.62
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The tepid platform of the Missouri Opposition movement more closely resembled the
doctrine of the Constitutional Unionists than the Republican Party.

The delegates to the

Jefferson City Convention tried to occupy the middle ground, but found their scheme frustrated
by Bates’s clumsy handling of the nomination. Eastern Republicans, looking forward to the
party’s national convention scheduled to meet in Chicago in May 1860, demanded that Bates
outline his attitude toward slavery and the territories before he could win their support. The
Missourian initially avoided issuing a public exposition on slavery for fear that it might lead to
“dissension, & possibly disruption among those who, for the general good, ought to be friends.”
Bates, however, finally relented and produced a public letter in which he explicitly declared his
opposition to the extension of slavery into the territories, his aversion to the Supreme Court’s
ruling in the Dred Scott decision, and his preference for the colonization of free blacks. Bates
had not substantially altered his conservative viewpoint on slavery, but it was no longer confined
to private conversation or his diary. The Republican Party would not countenance an evasive
stand on the slavery issue as did the Constitutional Unionists; once his inner thoughts about the
restriction of slavery went public, the American-Republican fusion movement melted away in
Missouri and the rest of the Border South. “Mr. Bates has cut his throat politically, at least in all
the southern states,” one Missourian confessed, while a Maryland conservative complained that
“his opinions are too Northern & Eastern for us.” A Republican in Indiana offered a similar
opinion when he acknowledged that “not a man in his right mind would pretend to think that he
[Bates] could carry his own State while standing on the Republican Platform.” Aside from the
followers of Frank Blair Jr. in St. Louis, the rest of the Missouri fusion movement eventually
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abandoned the Republicans and either joined up with the Constitutional Union Party or put past
differences aside and united with the Douglas Democrats. The movement for South American
fusion with Republicans had been on life support ever since John Brown’s raid. Bates’s decision
to endorse the Republican outlook on slavery in the territories finished off what Harpers Ferry
and the speakership contest had started.63
As the nation eyed the meeting of the national party conventions in the spring of 1860,
Border South moderates breathed a momentary sigh of relief. The deeds of John Brown at
Harpers Ferry had temporarily unleashed a form of extremism normally foreign to the Border
South, but conservatives had managed to regain the upper hand by the spring of 1860. Those
moderates could not neglect that the timing of Brown’s incursion nearly proved disastrous. The
raid, followed so closely by the speakership contest and the evolving campaign for the
presidency, had injected additional venom into the already toxic national political scene. Most
Americans now viewed the election of 1860 as an apocalyptic event. The various political
coalitions prepared for battle, fully cognizant that many Americans tied the upcoming
presidential contest to the destiny of the republic.
After surviving the trials of the last half year, an inexperienced politician might have
declared victory: disunionist sentiment had receded after Brown’s execution; even though a
Republican had been chosen speaker of the House, a coalition that included Border South
moderates had prevented the election of one who had publicly endorsed the extreme views of
Hinton Helper; the formation of an extensive Republican organization in the region had been
stymied; and conservatives had constructed their very own political organization with its nerve
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center located in the Border South. With the presidential election looming, however, these
shrewd conservatives knew better than to let down their guard. Most agreed with the prognosis
of Lewis Sanders of Kentucky: “We are now a divided people – bad men have the control in
most of [the] so called free States – they have passed offensive laws [and]...they disregard the
decision of the Courts. All of these troubles grow out of the slavery question – it must be settled
and agitation stopped – or separation must ensue.”64 At any moment, extremists might once
again jeopardize the region’s Unionist impulse. The people of the Border South gazed toward
the presidential contest of 1860 and prepared themselves for yet another political clash freighted
with momentous consequences.
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Chapter 3
“The Wolf Is Really Upon Us Now”: The Presidential Canvass, April – November 1860
The Thirty-Sixth Congress convened in December 1859 while John Brown’s failed raid
at Harpers Ferry and his subsequent execution loomed ominously over Capitol Hill. In the midst
of this turmoil, James Asheton Bayard sat uncomfortably at his desk in the Senate chamber and
watched his colleagues widen the sectional breach. After erstwhile Democratic colleagues
Robert Toombs of Georgia and Andrew Johnson of Tennessee bickered about slavery’s safety in
the Union and traded insults on the floor of the Senate, he sighed that “Reproach & abuse never
yet convinced any man of error no matter how strong the argument.” Bayard had represented
Delaware in the United States Senate since 1851, and he lamented that the explosive political
issue of slavery’s extension into the territories threatened to destroy not only his cherished
Democratic Party, but the entire Union. He shuddered at the thought of a broken Union, which
he considered a likely outcome if intraparty disagreements over popular sovereignty demolished
the last truly national political organization. Bayard confided to his son Thomas that “there
never was a time, when the harmony & unity of the Democratic Party was so essential to the
preservation of the Union.”1
Sixty-years old in early 1860, Bayard was no stranger to political controversy. His
father, James Bayard, Sr., had also represented Delaware in the nation’s capital. The elder
Bayard endured scathing rebukes from his fellow Federalists when he brokered a deal as a
member of the House of Representatives that propelled Republican Thomas Jefferson to the
executive office in the stormy election of 1800. Even though Federalists cursed him as a traitor,
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Bayard Sr. carved out a long career in the Senate, helped negotiate the Treaty of Ghent that
ended the War of 1812, and often exhibited a willingness to work across partisan lines.2 The
younger Bayard established a successful law practice in Wilmington, Delaware, and in the 1820s
followed his father’s footsteps into politics. Unlike his father, though, the younger Bayard
displayed no willingness to cooperate with other political organizations during his career. He
convinced himself that the Democratic Party represented the only vehicle to preserve the Union
and stifle the dispute over the extension of slavery into the territories. Bayard viewed the
abolitionists and later the Republican Party as a band of reckless agitators who sought to tear the
nation apart with their antislavery crusade. During the 1850s Bayard had unsuccessfully pushed
for a new constitution in Delaware that would in his eyes forever remove the slavery issue from
his native state. He supported a constitutional provision that forbade the state legislature from
enacting any plan for emancipation and one that barred free blacks from settling in Delaware.
Once the convention stripped the new constitution of these measures, along with Bayard’s
proposal to reallocate representation in the state legislature to favor his power base of
Wilmington, he changed course and worked for its defeat. The people of Delaware soundly
rejected the new constitution and to Bayard’s dismay the sectional controversy reached new
heights in the middle of the decade.3
Blinded by his political convictions, Bayard refused to concede that his own actions had
contributed to the rupture in the Democratic Party. He found Stephen Douglas’s territorial
panacea of popular sovereignty particularly repugnant because under that formula all Americans,
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slaveholder and nonslaveholder alike, might not enjoy equal access to the territories. Moreover,
he viewed Douglas’s formula as a means to bring about slavery’s eventual termination in
America. Bayard in 1856 worked in collusion with fellow senators Judah Benjamin and John
Slidell of Louisiana and Jesse Bright of Indiana to block Stephen Douglas’s nomination on the
Democratic ticket. These four senators won the battle against Douglas in 1856, but the war
within the party continued. Douglas’s rift with President James Buchanan over the Lecompton
Constitution in Kansas exacerbated intraparty divisions on the national and local level. In
Delaware the Democrats split into two camps, with Bayard and the state’s lone congressman
William Whiteley supporting Buchanan and influential wire-puller Samuel Townsend advancing
the cause of Douglas. Willard Saulsbury, Delaware’s junior senator, a lukewarm supporter of
the Little Giant, and Bayard’s rival for control of the state Democracy, distanced himself from
Douglas as the presidential election neared.

The Harpers Ferry raid awakened Delaware

Democrats to the dangers of intraparty divisions, but as the presidential election of 1860
approached each wing continued to harbor suspicion of the other. Townsend in early 1860
managed to secure a set of resolutions at a Democratic meeting in New Castle County which
advocated a rapprochement between the Buchanan and Douglas factions in Delaware in order to
“help stay the action of all fanatics, from whatever quarter, who seek to weaken the bonds of
Union in these United States of America.” He hoped a united Delaware Democracy would
pledge its support to Stephen Douglas for the presidency because the Little Giant’s national
appeal gave the party the best chance of defeating the despised Republicans.4
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Cognizant of the dangers of a split in the Democratic Party, however, neither of the
Delaware camps could set aside past differences. Bayard saw in Townsend’s efforts subterfuge;
he believed his adversary would try to foist popular sovereignty on the Delaware Democracy and
rebuffed his plea for cooperation.

“We will not any longer put up with the tyranny of

administration men,” Townsend fumed once he learned of Bayard’s uncooperative stance. “We
was willing if we could do so, without sacrafice [sic] of principles, [to] unite with them to fight
against Republicans, but we find we cannot do so.” Bayard had developed the impression that
little difference existed “between western & north western Democrats & Republicans” and thus
could not condone Townsend’s plan to heal the Democratic divisions in the state. Popular
sovereignty, he believed, opened the door to slavery’s slow death by restricting its spread into
the West. Once implemented, popular sovereignty would confine the peculiar institution to the
fifteen slaveholding states and speed the pace of its demise along the southern periphery,
especially in Delaware. “I am sick of Del politics & mean to stand above them,” Bayard told his
son in March 1860. He promised to exert all his energy “to see that the State does not become
abolitionized or squatter-sovereignized.”5
The divisions in the Delaware Democracy highlight several of the problems the people of
the Border South confronted as the presidential election of 1860 neared. Even in the Border
South, where Douglas and his supporters hoped to tap into a strong conservative tradition, the
sectional controversy plagued the Democratic Party. Samuel Townsend noticed that intraparty
differences were so great in Delaware that Bayard and the administration supporters would rather
“see the opposition elected than a popular sovereignty Democrat.” The case of Delaware was
not unique; similar Democratic tensions existed in the other three border slave states. The rift in
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the party, along with the establishment of the Constitutional Union Party in early 1860,
threatened to split the moderate vote that the Democrats coveted.

A divided vote in the

overwhelmingly conservative Border South actually increased the likelihood that a Republican
might capture the presidency in November.

Bayard’s defiant hostility toward popular

sovereignty illustrates that many border southerners would only cast their votes for a candidate
whom they regarded as safe on the question of slavery. Bayard owned none of the fewer than
1,800 enslaved persons in Delaware in 1860, but he vehemently demanded the protection of the
peculiar institution. He, like many other border country southerners, feared that restricting the
spread of slavery in the territories represented the first step to a program of abolition in the states.
While the Border South’s economy did not rely on slavery to the same extent as the eleven
slaveholding states that formed the Confederacy, the peculiar institution ordered the society of
the region. Bayard also knew full well that the other slaveholding states would not countenance
any attack on the peculiar institution. If tiny Delaware endorsed the obstinate position of
Bayard, what about the rest of the South? A Republican victory in 1860 would doubtlessly
unleash radical forces in the North and the South and place the border slave states in a sectional
vise. In short, secession and even war loomed if a Republican won the presidency and did not
respect the Constitution, which Bayard adamantly believed defended the institution of slavery.
Extremely fearful of a breakup of the Union but also intractable in his partisan convictions,
Bayard and border southerners occupied a dangerous middle ground. Just as his father had been
thrust into a political quagmire in 1800, James Bayard stumbled into one sixty years later when
in the spring the nation cast its eyes toward Charleston, South Carolina, the site of the
Democratic Party’s national convention.6

6

Samuel Townsend to Stephen Douglas, Feb. 20, 1860, Douglas Papers, UC; 1860 US Census, Slave
Schedules, www.ancestry.com; James A. Bayard to Thomas Bayard, Jan. 21, 1860, T.F. Bayard Papers, LOC. For

109

***
The Border South became a major concern for party managers of all three major political
organizations when the presidential campaign shifted into high gear in the spring of 1860. A
glance back at the presidential election of 1856 convinced these wire pullers that both the
slaveholding and nonslaveholding border states held the key to victory in 1860. In 1856 the
Democrats, yet unsullied by doctrinal disagreement on slavery in the territories, defeated the
nascent Republican Party and the moribund American Party by carrying fourteen of the
slaveholding states and the Lower North states of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Indiana, and
Illinois. The Democrats won Delaware, Kentucky, and Missouri that year; Maryland was the
only slaveholding state not to go for Buchanan, opting instead for American Millard Fillmore.
By no means did the Democrats trample their main competitors, the Americans, in the Border
South. The narrow margin of the Democratic victory in Kentucky and the loss in Maryland in
1856 signaled a tough fight ahead in these traditional Whig strongholds, while the split in the
Democracy placed the more comfortable victories in Delaware and Missouri in jeopardy.
Constitutional Unionists, Democrats, and Republicans all believed the great border would
determine the election of 1860 and thus expended abundant energy in the region during the
canvass. Each organization seriously considered candidates from the border states, and the
Border South in particular, in order to strengthen their respective chances in the region. The
Republicans, aware that nearly every southerner eschewed the party’s antislavery program,
focused their canvass on the Lower North but still contemplated running a candidate from the
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Border South, while the Democrats and Constitutional Unionists made strident efforts to win not
only the Lower North, but also the Border South.7
The Democratic Party kicked off the campaign of 1860 with its national convention in
one of the most inauspicious cities for a political organization suffering from yawning sectional
divisions. The supporters of Stephen Douglas expected a vicious fight at the party’s April
meeting in Charleston, South Carolina. Many Democrats from the South hoped to scuttle the
Little Giant’s candidacy and his principle of popular sovereignty in one fell swoop.

The

southern hardliners wanted a platform that affirmed the Supreme Court’s ruling in the Dred Scott
case, which opened all the territories to slavery, and they hungered for a candidate who would
acquiesce to such a territorial stance. The Douglas backers faced the onerous task of pushing
through a popular sovereignty platform and securing their candidate’s nomination in a city that
served as an intellectual hub for disunionists and southern radicals. As late as one month before
the convention met in South Carolina, some Douglas supporters even floated the impracticable
suggestion to change the venue from Charleston to the more hospitable city of Baltimore.8
The delegations from the Border South prepared for their journey to Charleston no less
disquieted about the future of the party than those from the rest of the country. In the Border
South the Democrats suffered from petty jealousies, sharp disagreements on policy, and divided
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loyalty to each wing of the discordant national organization, which resulted in a great deal of
confusion on the eve of the Charleston meeting. The Border South Democracy represented a
microcosm of the national party, and the problems facing the organization also illustrate how the
unfolding events of 1859 through 1861 propelled a region that often preferred impartiality on
sectional questions toward a position where the postponement of important decisions no longer
sufficed.
Delaware sent a delegation that included Bayard and Whiteley, warm opponents of
Douglas and popular sovereignty. Bayard privately wished for Robert M.T. Hunter of Virginia
to secure the party’s presidential nomination, but figured that the Douglas opposition would
likely coalesce on current Vice President John C. Breckinridge. He found Breckinridge’s youth
and ambition to be serious liabilities, but still considered the Kentuckian a better option than
Douglas. Both Breckinridge and Hunter endorsed the ultra-southern position on slavery in the
territories, which pleased Delaware Democrats who thought along the same lines as Bayard.9
Although the Delaware Democratic State Convention had cast Douglas supporter Sam Townsend
aside when it named its slate of delegates, the irascible herald of the Little Giant continued to
make his presence felt. Townsend pressed delegate Willard Saulsbury to support Douglas and
claimed the Wilmington-based Delaware Inquirer switched its endorsement from Breckinridge
to the Little Giant due to his efforts. Saulsbury and his two brothers together had built an
impressive Democratic machine in Sussex County, though their detractors charged that the
family only achieved political prominence through vote-buying and corrupt practices. Bayard,
aware of Saulsbury’s reputation, feared that Townsend might influence how the easily swayed
junior senator acted at Charleston. Although Saulsbury told other Delaware Democrats he
9
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opposed Douglas, Bayard believed his colleague merely followed the winds of political
opportunity and did not act on conviction. Bayard, who served on the Charleston Convention’s
Platform Committee, hoped to negate the influence of Townsend and bring the rest of the state’s
delegation into line with his views.10
The divisions in the Kentucky Democracy went beyond territorial policy. As early as
1858 the Democratic opponents of Stephen Douglas had begun to consider candidates who could
supplant the Little Giant as the party’s nominee in 1860. Two of those potential candidates
hailed from the Bluegrass State: Breckinridge and James Guthrie, former secretary of the
treasury under Franklin Pierce. After serving in Pierce’s cabinet, Guthrie returned to Louisville
and served as president of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad. Breckinridge had used his
family connections to climb the political ladder, while Guthrie exploited his business and finance
background to ascend to the elite ranks of the Democratic Party. Guthrie’s backers contended
that two facts made him the best candidate in 1860: he was not associated with the Buchanan
Administration, and he often spoke with a more moderate political tone than did other aspirants
like Breckinridge and Hunter. Beginning in October 1859, the Louisville Daily Courier initiated
a campaign for James Guthrie and in the following months the paper ran a plethora of editorials
explaining why the Charleston Convention should place the railroad promoter at the head of its
ticket. Some Kentucky Democrats, especially the supporters of Stephen Douglas, worried that
the candidacy of two native sons naturally led to petty jealousies and obscured the real issues at
play in the presidential contest. “Every state proposing its favorite son is very much like every
delegate voting for himself,” Lewis Sanders complained. Breckinridge and Guthrie had not built
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up enough of a national following to win the contest in 1860, Sanders presumed, and thus he
hoped the Kentucky delegation to Charleston would acquiesce in Douglas.11
The Kentucky State Democratic Convention, which assembled in January 1860,
requested that the state’s delegates to the Charleston Convention cast their nominating votes for
James Guthrie, and the meeting’s majority report also included a plank that repudiated popular
sovereignty. Supporters of Breckinridge and Douglas pointed out that the state platform did not
instruct the delegates to vote for Guthrie but merely asked them to do this. The elements of the
Kentucky Democracy opposed to Guthrie also complained that the railroad promoter had used
patronage promises to pack the convention in his favor. One Douglasite claimed that the people
of Kentucky really preferred Breckinridge or the Little Giant and thus the state’s delegates to
Charleston would vote for Guthrie on the first ballot out of respect and then transfer their votes
to another candidate.12 Nevertheless, the Kentucky delegation arrived in Charleston without a
domineering personality like James A. Bayard and with no clear plan of action in place. Of the
state’s twenty-four delegates in Charleston, only two had signaled to one of Douglas’s
intermediaries that they would support the Little Giant.13
The cleavages within the Democratic Party impacted the organization in Maryland as
well.

Supporters of James Buchanan occupied influential leadership positions within the

Maryland Democracy and controlled the party machinery in the state, yet the powerful Reverdy
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Johnson, a former Whig who now headed the state’s Douglas wing, made matters difficult for
the opponents of popular sovereignty.14 Johnson put his sharp legal mind to work for Douglas
when in 1859 he anonymously composed a lengthy pamphlet and argued that popular
sovereignty represented the best safeguard to southern rights. Johnson maintained that the
Harpers Ferry raid and the startling growth of the Republican Party made Democratic harmony a
necessity, and he appealed to his fellow Democrats to set aside their internal grievances and
nominate Douglas at Charleston. If the party continued down its destructive path it would ensure
that the Republicans would taste victory in 1860. “The success of the Republicans will be a
calamity, it is feared, beyond remedy, perpetual and fatal,” Johnson reminded his readers, and in
that event the institution of slavery would surely meet its doom in the near future. 15 Johnson’s
philippic underscores the mainstream Border South inclination to shield the peculiar institution
from external political attacks. As the campaign evolved the major political organizations
operating in the Border South attempted to situate themselves as the best guarantor of slavery’s
perpetuity, though in a more moderate tone than many of the proslavery defenders in the Lower
South. For the most part these partisans in the Border South played up the potential strength of
southern solidarity within the Union and attempted to mute secessionist ultimatums. Johnson’s
pamphlet, however, also tapped into the prevailing Border South paranoia about the motives and
intentions of the Republican Party. The moderate attitude of border country southerners which
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had endured an attack by fire-eaters in the aftermath of John Brown’s raid would once again
meet a stern test should the Republicans win the election, Johnson warned.16
Reverdy Johnson’s appeal for Douglas and Democratic unity went unheeded in the Old
Line State. The Democratic-controlled legislature in March 1860 reelected James A. Pearce,
who had abandoned the Whig Party in the 1850s and enlisted with the Buchanan wing of the
Democracy, to the United States Senate. Pearce normally exercised a moderate approach to
sectional politics, but administration men viewed his reelection as a victory over the Douglas
forces.17 The Maryland Democratic Convention met in late March 1860 and issued a platform
that highlighted the divisions that plagued the party in the Border South. The first resolution
proclaimed the people of Maryland “are most vitally interested in the protection of slave property
and in the faithful observance of all the guaranties of the federal constitution” and labeled
antislavery agitation “wicked and treasonable.” The convention also promised to “unite with our
Southern brethren in asserting and maintaining our constitutional rights at every hazard and to
the last extremity.” The third and fourth resolutions, conversely, called for the Democratic Party
to hold fast to the organization’s platform in 1856 which included popular sovereignty as its
centerpiece. The strongly worded first two resolutions revealed that Buchanan men controlled
the Maryland convention, but a surprised Reverdy Johnson informed Douglas that ten of the
state’s sixteen delegates to Charleston expressed some measure of kindliness toward the Little
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Giant.18 Douglas supporters advised their preferred candidate that in order to win the confidence
of the Maryland delegates and people, he must appear “a friend to the rights of the South - & not
opposed to slavery.”19 Like the Kentuckians, the Maryland contingent arrived in Charleston
fully cognizant of the dangers of Democratic discord, but with no clear idea of how to proceed.
The Missouri Democracy confronted more internal bickering than did the organization in
any of the other Border South states. The fissure in the Missouri Democratic Party centered on
the territorial issue but predated the national organization’s split over Lecompton in 1857. Ten
years prior to Lecompton, when the nation endured a fervid dispute over whether to allow the
spread of slavery into territory acquired in the West as a result of the Mexican-American War,
the Missouri Democracy began to splinter into two factions. Thomas Hart Benton, one of the
architects of the national Democratic Party, came out in opposition to the spread of slavery into
the territories, while a group of Democrats centered in the Boon’s Lick, a region that abutted the
Missouri River in the central part of the state and depended heavily on slaves to cultivate hemp
and tobacco, insisted that Congress lacked the power to legislate on slavery in the territories.
Claiborne Fox Jackson became the leader of the Boon’s Lick faction and during the 1850s he,
William B. Napton, and David Rice Atchison cobbled together a powerful statewide coalition in
opposition to Benton.

Jackson and the proslavery Democrats gained control of the state

organization in 1856 and wielded a great deal of power for the remainder of the decade. In time
some of Benton’s followers attached themselves to Frank Blair Jr., who sought to create a
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Republican organization in St. Louis, but the overwhelming majority of conservative Democrats
clung to the party and lent their support to Stephen A. Douglas. The Douglas supporters in
Missouri considered popular sovereignty a moderate alternative to the radical courses of the
proslavery Democrats and the antislavery Republicans. George Caleb Bingham aptly captured
the spirit of Border South conservatism in 1857: “The ultraists of the South will soon discover
that in their attempt to grasp all, they have endangered that which they already possessed.”
Bingham was no Democrat, but his line of thinking meshed well with the conservative
Democrats who placed fire-eaters like Claiborne Fox Jackson in the same category as
intransigent abolitionists in the North.20 Douglas supporters assured the Little Giant that the rank
and file of the Missouri Democracy embraced popular sovereignty, yet “wire working and
trading politicians” like Jackson had obtained control of the party and would try to silence their
voice.21
The Missouri Democrats in 1860 could only agree on one thing – their hatred and fear of
the Republican Party. “I would not trust one of them [Republicans] in my meat house after
dark,” a Douglas Democrat quipped, “much less on the slavery question.”22 Beyond this shared
antipathy to the Republicans, all agreements on policy towards slavery ceased. Of all the Border
South states, only Missouri held a gubernatorial contest in 1860, which further exacerbated the
rift in the state’s Democratic organization. The governor’s election, scheduled for August,
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injected more acrimony into the equation when the Democratic Party on April 9 held its state
convention in Jefferson City. A tongue-in-cheek broadside observed “the big democrats in the
State are all trying to cut each others [sic] throats, so as to show that none of them are any
account, which the people are about ready to believe.” The public letter, written in frontier
Missouri dialect, carped that none of the probable Democratic candidates for governor possessed
the requisite skill needed to patch up the divisions in the party. The writer painted Claiborne
Jackson, the frontrunner of the proslavery wing of the organization, as a money-grabbing
politician in the pocket of the state’s railroad interests. He attacked other candidates as pawns of
Frank Blair, James Buchanan, or Stephen Douglas, contended one prospect could not stay sober
long enough to govern effectively, and charged that one unfortunate aspirant was so weak that
Missourians would “knock his trotters from under him so high that his mustnotmention’ems will
get damp.”23

The broadside certainly reflected the rough-and-tumble political culture of

antebellum America in which party organizers found hyperbole a most effective tool, but it also
underscored Waldo P. Johnson’s observation that “our state, and especially the Democratic
party, are in a state of indescribable confusion, and the man who escapes being dashed away
upon the breakers upon the right or the left will be truly fortunate.”24
After three days of deliberation, the convention adopted a decidedly pro-South platform
which declared neither Congress nor a territorial government held the power to abolish slavery in
the territories, called for the annexation of Cuba, linked the Harpers Ferry raid to the
Republicans, and scorned northern personal liberty laws as unconstitutional and “revolutionary
in their effect.” The convention also settled on Claiborne Fox Jackson as its gubernatorial
23
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candidate. One proslavery Democrat believed Jackson’s selection would “blot out the base
insinuation that Missouri is preparing to desert her Southern Sisters,” and he hoped that his
nomination would once and for all crush the other wing of the party which had fallen under the
sway of Stephen Douglas.25
Once the convention settled into the business of selecting delegates to attend the national
meeting, the divided party squabbled over whether to harness its Charleston proxies with voting
instructions for the Democracy’s presidential nominee. The proslavery wing favored directing
the delegates to vote for Daniel S. Dickinson, Douglas’s enemy from New York whom they
anticipated would grant concessions to the South on the slavery issue and fill the doughface
executive role played so well by Franklin Pierce and James Buchanan. The scheme to tether the
delegates with instructions failed, however, with a large majority of the delegates in opposition
to the plan. The convention eventually chose a delegation to Charleston that revealed the
resiliency of the Douglasites in Missouri. Douglas manager James Eads and the Democratic St.
Louis Daily Missouri Republican agreed that a majority of the delegates supported the
nomination of the Little Giant.26

Thus as the Missouri delegates packed their bags for

Charleston, the party suffered from political schizophrenia: the platform and the gubernatorial
candidate both signaled a radical streak within the Missouri Democracy that made it appear little
different from state organizations in the Lower South, while the state’s delegation to the national
convention demonstrated the persistence of Border South moderation within the party.

25

St. Louis Daily Missouri Republican, April 10, 11, 12, 1860; Samuel Ralston to C.F. Jackson, Apr. 24,
1860, John Sappington Papers, SHS-MO.
26
St. Louis Daily Missouri Republican, April 13, 1860; Robert W. Johannsen, Stephen A. Douglas (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1973), 738, 743-744; James D. Eads to Stephen Douglas, Apr. 13, 1860, Douglas
Papers, UC. The term doughface became a derisive label attached to northern politicians who bowed to the wants of
the South; see Leonard L. Richards, The Slave Power: The Free North and Southern Domination, 1780-1860 (Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2000), 85-86.

120

Delegates arrived in Charleston in mid-April, and soon the town’s sultry streets and
hotels teemed with men “perspiring and smoking, and engaged in mysterious conversations
concerning caucus stratagems of intense interest to themselves.” A great deal of attention
centered on Bayard, who hoped to repeat his performance of 1856 and once again engineer
Douglas’s defeat. The night before the convention, Bayard and his old anti-Douglas Senate
colleagues Jesse Bright, William Bigler, and John Slidell caroused in the pro-Administration
headquarters on King Street. In between meditative draws on his cigar, Bayard told reporter
Murat Halstead that based on his conversations with the various state delegations, Douglas
would fall far short of the requisite two-thirds majority needed for the presidential nomination.
Bayard and his cabal, dubbed the Senatorial Clique, hoped the party could settle on a candidate
like Hunter, Guthrie, Dickinson, or Breckinridge, and they even expressed a willingness to
accept the Cincinnati Platform if one of their men secured the nomination. In true Border South
fashion Bayard believed that such a medial plan might check the dangerous presence of fireeaters such as William Lowndes Yancey, who came to South Carolina bearing the Alabama
Platform, a document that instructed the state’s delegates to withdraw from the Charleston
Convention if the party did not settle on a national platform which expressly requested the
federal protection of slavery in the territories.27 Bayard’s optimistic tone sounded much different
than his private forebodings to his son a couple of months earlier. Perhaps his victory over
Townsend and the Douglasites in Delaware, combined with his discussions with other delegates
from the North and the South, increased his confidence that the party could jettison Douglas and
maintain its unity, or the Delaware senator may have filled his cup one too many times and
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exuded a spirituous self-assurance.

Either way, Bayard momentarily overlooked the deep

divisions and the obstinacy that wracked the party at Charleston. The same day that Bayard
confidently puffed away at his cigar on King Street, Yancey complicated matters when he
convinced portions of the Lower South delegations to withdraw from the convention “unless a
resolution is adopted before the nomination of a candidate declaring in favor of Congressional
protection of slavery in the Territories.”28
Bayard’s optimism wore away once the convention officially opened in Charleston’s
Institute Hall. The conclave voted to construct the party platform before selecting a presidential
nominee, which played into the hands of Yancey’s followers. The platform committee convened
on the night of April 25 and quickly discovered that the “irreconcilable difference” of opinion
about slavery in the territories made their task anything but envious. “We hear hourly that a
crisis involving the fate of the country is at hand,” Halstead announced. The committee on
Friday, April 27, indicated the depth of the crisis: unable to agree on a single platform, the group
submitted three to the convention. Bayard played an instrumental part in drafting the majority
report, which included a declaration that neither Congress nor a territorial legislature could
abolish slavery in the territories and called for the federal government’s protection of the peculiar
institution in that domain. Bayard’s plank undermined popular sovereignty, but William W.
Avery of North Carolina conceded to the convention that the two planks related to slavery “were
adopted by a bare majority of the committee.” The Douglasites on the committee resubmitted
the 1856 platform with an added pledge that the party would adhere to any decisions made by the
Supreme Court on the territorial issue, while a third proposal simply submitted an unaltered
Cincinnati Platform.29
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The Border South attendees faced the uncomfortable reality that they would have to
choose sides, but nothing close to unanimity existed within the individual delegations. Bayard
and William Whiteley of Delaware, for instance, gave the majority report their undivided
support. John B. Clark of Missouri, on the other hand, had endorsed the majority report but
announced to the convention that he refused to vote for the declaratory resolution that denied
Congress and territorial legislatures the power to abolish slavery in the territories. His Missouri
colleague, Austin A. King, “made an ultra-Douglas speech, indorsing the Northern Democracy in
the most unqualified manner,” and rebuked the southern delegates for insisting on the protection
of slavery in the territories. King pleaded for Democratic unity, and he asked his southern
colleagues “not to drive the Northern Democracy to the wall, and alienate them, and thereby
secure the election of [the presumed Republican candidate William Henry] Seward to the
Presidency.”30
The Border South delegates’ thoughts about the platform encompassed a wide spectrum,
ranging from the ultra-southern position to absolute support for popular sovereignty, which
worried southern hardliners. Southern radicals struggled to grasp why the border slaveholding
states might not jump at the opportunity to join the Lower South in a walkout. Charleston fireeater D.H. Hamilton complained that even if Yancey got the Lower South delegations to follow
him out of the convention, the Upper and Border South would drag their feet. For the fire-eaters,
the Border South’s timeworn formula of moderation no longer held any value. Unable to
comprehend the vexed position the Border South shouldered, he scoffed at “the rascals and gulls
of the South” like Austin King who would likely stay in the convention, help nominate Douglas,
30
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and clinch his election in the fall. The impatient Hamilton now equated restraint with an
abandonment of the South.31

The impetuosity of southern radicals coupled with their

subterranean mistrust of the Border South, which the Charleston Convention brought to the
surface, worked in tandem throughout the secession crisis to impede the possibility of a
concerted pan-southern disunion movement. As the Charleston fiasco proved, much to the
dismay of fire-eaters, most politicians in the Border South sought solutions to preserve rather
than destroy the Union.32
On Saturday, April 28 the convention endured more squabbling on the various reports
before adjourning until Monday. Sunday was no day of rest for the delegates; the several
factions closeted with one another and tried to broker some deal to save the party. The Kentucky
delegation’s parlor in the Charleston Hotel assumed the familiar Border South middle ground
position. It became “a grand center of attraction, where genial spirits from the different sections
meet to compare votes, and occasionally to test the quality of some Old Bourbon.” Nothing
came of the weekend negotiations, however, and many Democrats began to consider the
possibility that the party could not reconcile its differences. A Kentucky newspaper considered
the potential breakup of the Democratic Party disastrous. “The National Democratic party may
dissolve,” the editor ruefully speculated, “and if it does the safeguard of our institutions may be
destroyed, and the palladium of our Union removed from its sacred guardianship.” 33 As the
weekend closed, the flustered delegates now looked to see if William Lowndes Yancey would
make good on his promise to bolt.
31
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On Monday, April 30, the Virginia delegation put more pressure on the Border South
when they joined with the Lower South and requested a plank which called for the federal
protection of slavery in the territories. A showdown ensued, and Douglas’s floor managers
successfully substituted their minority platform for the majority report. Shortly after, Douglas
supporter Charles E. Stuart of Michigan threw down the gauntlet with “a very irritating speech,
exceedingly ill-timed, unless he intended to drive out the Gulf States.” The Lower South
accepted his challenge; Alabama delegate Leroy Pope Walker issued his state’s protest and the
delegation withdrew from the convention. Mississippi, Louisiana, South Carolina, Florida, and
Texas followed in quick order, while South Carolinians in the galleries applauded the Lower
South stampede. After this cavalcade, Bayard announced his withdrawal. William Whiteley
accompanied Bayard, but the remaining Delaware delegates stared at one another in
bewilderment. The Upper and Border South delegates who stayed in the convention reacted in a
similar fashion to the disheartened and disheveled Willard Saulsbury, who confessed that he did
not know what he should do. The following day a majority of the Georgia and Arkansas
delegations retired from the convention, while the Virginia, Kentucky, North Carolina, and
Maryland men contemplated their next step.34
The raging waters of sectionalism had finally burst through the patchwork dam the
Democratic Party had erected during the 1850s. “I have seen never more of human folly[,]
imbecility[,] selfishness, and rascality than in all the rest of my life – I will never again be an
actor in such conventions,” an indignant Bayard promised his son. He characteristically blamed
the machinations of Douglas men from the New York delegation for the party’s disruption at
Charleston. The seceding delegates assembled in Charleston’s Military Hall on May 1 and
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named Bayard president of their convention.

Three of Missouri delegates joined the two

Delaware men to represent the Border South among the bolters, but the rest of the region’s
delegates either chose to remain in the Institute Hall convention or returned home.35
Confusion still reigned for the delegates in Institute Hall. Douglas’s handlers thought
that the convention, shorn of the southern hardliners, could now proceed with nominating the
Little Giant. Chairman Caleb Cushing of Massachusetts dashed their hopes when he ruled that
the candidate must secure a two-thirds vote of all the Democrats who had been seated when the
convention opened on Monday, April 23. The convention voted fifty-seven times over two days,
but Douglas never came close to acquiring the requisite two-thirds majority. The first ballot
indicated the fragmented nature of the remaining Border South Democrats: Delaware cast its two
votes for Robert M.T. Hunter; the Maryland delegates scattered their votes among Hunter,
Daniel Dickinson, and Douglas; the Missouri delegation split its tally between Douglas and
James Guthrie; and Kentucky unanimously went for native son Guthrie. Hopelessly divided and
at a loss for how to proceed, the convention finally decided to reconvene in Baltimore on June 18
before it adjourned without selecting a nominee.36
The proceedings in Military Hall left Bayard in a state of discomfiture. All along he had
hoped for Democratic unity, and he later explained that he withdrew from the Institute Hall
meeting because he first wanted that body to elect a presidential nominee and then write the
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platform. Such a course would have helped the convention check the power of the proponents of
popular sovereignty, he argued.37 In hindsight, however, his rationale seems weak. After all,
Bayard while on the platform committee played an instrumental part in writing the majority
report that most northerners found offensive, and he seemed fully prepared to go to any distance
to defeat the Little Giant just as he had in Cincinnati four years earlier. Bayard’s abhorrence of
Douglas and popular sovereignty provoked his rash decision to bolt, and upon reflection he
realized that the overwhelming majority of the Border South delegates eschewed such an
impulsive approach. As he looked out onto the Military Hall floor from the president’s chair, he
saw that few of his border country colleagues had followed him out of the other convention. The
lack of Border South delegates in Military Hall coupled with the votes for the presidential
nominee cast by the delegates who remained in Institute Hall revealed a key facet of the Border
South mindset: although several of these politicians loathed Douglas and his territorial principle,
they would rather work within the confines of the national organization than enter a convention
dominated by hotheads like William Lowndes Yancey. A few months after the Charleston
breakup a well-placed Delaware native observed that Bayard and his fellow bolter Whiteley had
through their impulsive decision to bolt “killed themselves in this State.”38
Perhaps Bayard hoped that the secession of the southern delegates would convince the
Douglas handlers to drop the Little Giant, install a plank in the platform that called for the
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federal protection of slavery in the territories, and invite the bolters back to Institute Hall.39
Bayard hinted at such a policy when on May 1 he advised the Military Hall convention that
lacking a two-thirds majority of the entire Democracy they could not make a nomination, but
only a recommendation for one.

If this was Bayard’s strategy, the northern wing of the

Democracy refused to take the bait. Without a full contingent from the Border South and with
the northern element at Institute Hall unwilling to forge a rapprochement, he became more
uncertain about the path he had chosen. On the evening of May 3 Bayard professed his desire
for Democratic harmony and “spoke for two hours very eloquently against disunion,” and
thereafter tendered his resignation from the convention. “The gentleman said they had come
here to save the Union,” an Alabamian sneered in reply to Bayard’s speech and resignation.
“They had not – they had come here to save the Constitution.” The rejoinder invoked applause,
and before it adjourned the convention agreed to meet in Richmond, Virginia on June 11 rather
than heeding Bayard’s counsel for the delegates to reclaim their seats in a restored Democratic
Convention at Baltimore.40
The proceedings at Charleston alarmed many Border South Democrats who looked to the
party as a stronghold of conservatism. A divided Democracy effectively handed the White
House to the Republicans, border southerners feared. No longer could they scotch the influence
of northern and southern radicals who might endanger the safety of the Union and the peculiar
institution. Moderate border country Democrats desired for the organization to rally behind the
Little Giant in the upcoming contest in order to stave off their premonitions. Oscar Potter, who
lived in the heart of Missouri’s Boon’s Lick, gave voice to that apprehension. “I am a Southern
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man in feeling and residence, have been raised in a Slave State fully imbued with all those warm
and long cherished attachments for the institution of slavery,” he wrote. Potter figured that a
vote for Stephen Douglas would best preserve the Union and protect slavery, and after the
outcome at Charleston he acknowledged “I am now truly in greater dread from Southern fire
eaters than from Northern fanatics.” Other moderates across the Border South calculated that the
rash course of southern extremists actually made the Little Giant more appealing to residents of
their section, and they hoped the Democrats would patch up their differences and nominate him
at Baltimore.41
While the Democrats tried to make sense of the breakup at Charleston, the other national
organizations recognized that the split in the party of Andrew Jackson aided their chances for
victory in the presidential contest. The Constitutional Union Party held its national convention
in Baltimore, a city conveniently located in the organization’s Border South power base.
William C. Rives of Virginia contended “that the late events at Charleston have added
immensely to the importance of [the Constitutional Union Party’s] action & the prospect of its
usefulness.” John J. Crittenden of Kentucky, the elderly figurehead of the new organization,
agreed with Rives. After reading about the fiasco at Charleston, Crittenden noted that the
Constitutional Union Party would benefit from its “experienced & distinguished statesmen, and
they will be our security against any foolish or undesired course.” Crittenden and his colleagues
hoped the new party might corner the vote of Americans who preferred “great moderation &
wisdom.”42
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In the Border South, the Douglas wing of the Democracy and the Constitutional Union
Party vied for the nation’s vital center.

Despite their constituency’s mutual fondness for

moderation, the appearance of these two organizations in the canvass of 1860 actually fractured
the crucial middle ground and played into the hands of the extremists. Henry Winter Davis had
prophesied this likelihood in early 1860 when he pushed for an Opposition fusion between the
Republicans and the remnants of the American Party. As Davis and Edward Bates discovered,
the preponderance of Border South conservatives spurned any combination with the hated
Republicans in the aftermath of the Harpers Ferry raid and the speakership contest, and strong
partisan identification precluded cooperation between most Democrats and former Whigs.43
Davis in the spring of 1860 temporarily set aside his Republican-American fusion plan and
halfheartedly campaigned for the Constitutional Unionists in Maryland, but he too could not
relinquish the familiar partisan odium that he had nurtured in the 1850s. He labored not so much
to secure a Constitutional Union victory, but to prevent any Democrat from winning the contest.
He spurned cooperation with conservative Democrats, whom he had battled for so long in
Baltimore and in the House of Representatives, and cared little to convert his enemies to the
Constitutional Union standard.

A congressman joked that Henry Winter Davis’s “religion

consists [of] hatred to democracy.” His religious abhorrence of the Democrats in time pushed
Davis ever closer to the Republicans, and ever farther out of the Border South mainstream.44
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The fledgling party experienced an infinitely more harmonious national meeting than
had the Democrats at Charleston, and the great bulk of its attendees unlike Winter Davis
exercised a genuine confidence in the success of the Constitutional Union Party. The meeting at
Baltimore saw no unhealthy debates about territorial policy, and the new organization unlike the
Democracy did not have to shoulder the weight of half a decade’s worth of divisiveness and
personal vendettas. The elderly leaders of the conservative organization, imbued with a strong
sense of the dangers of sectional discord, planned to attract a national following by “frowning
upon every form of sectionalism & showing a catholic & equal regard for the rights & interests
of every portion of the confederacy, to restore health & harmony & happiness to the Republic.”45
The dogma of the Constitutional Union Party matched the prevailing sentiment in the Border
South: it sought to situate itself on the middle ground between sectional extremes; the party
looked to the heralds of compromise throughout American history for inspiration; and in true
Border South fashion the organization opted for a nebulous program that might delay taking
decisive action in the sectional conflict.
The Constitutional Unionists, nevertheless, faced an onerous task. While they courted
the nation’s conservative vote, deep partisan attachments made it extremely difficult to
proselytize lifelong moderate Democrats who harbored reservations about their erstwhile
political adversaries. The Constitutional Unionists looked to resurrect the spirit of the Whig
Party, but they had to chart a cautious course in order not to offend potential Democratic
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converts.46 Edward Everett of Massachusetts summarized the difficulties facing the new party in
a political environment infused with profound partisan affiliations.

To attract votes the

Constitutional Unionists had to “seek to conciliate & not to irritate,” Everett cautioned. “I think
that both in the democratic & republican ranks there are good men, - and a good many of them, who without any change of theoretical views are of opinions that the sectional strife has reached
a dangerous length & that it is time to pause,” he noted. “Why should we annoy them by
dwelling upon the wrongs they have committed as members of the respective organizations[?]”47
John Pendleton Kennedy confronted a major conundrum when the party charged him
with the task of writing an address to the American people that asked for their vote in the
upcoming contest. In his first draft Kennedy blamed the Democrats and Republicans for the
sectional crisis, but the party’s executive committee removed his partisan censure and left the
document with nothing “but a little incoherent declamation and some watery dictations which are
interpolated to save the feelings of the parties it is our intention to demolish.” A dismayed
Kennedy snapped off a letter of protest to Crittenden but upon reflection decided against sending
it.48 The party’s determination not to offend potential voters exposed its greatest liability.
Political organizations in antebellum America had to solicit every possible vote and utilize all
means to win the next election. Although some historians view the late 1850s and early 1860s as
the high-tide of nonpartisan spirit in American electoral history, they often minimize the fact that
purported nonpartisan organizations such as the Know Nothings or the Constitutional Unionists
had a distinctively partisan goal: to defeat the other parties in the field. The Constitutional Union
leaders might employ antipartisan rhetoric on the stump, but their ultimate objective differed
46

John Crittenden to John Pendleton Kennedy, Feb. 8, 9, & 28, 1860, John Pendleton Kennedy to Sir
Richard Pakenham, Feb. 19, 1860, all in J.P. Kennedy Papers, EPFL; Washington Hunt to John Crittenden, April 9,
1860, Logan Hunton to John Crittenden, April 10, 1860, both in Crittenden Letters, DU.
47
Edward Everett to John Pendleton Kennedy, May 7, 1860, J.P. Kennedy Papers, EPFL.
48
Diary Entry for Feb. 20, 1860, J.P. Kennedy Papers, EPFL.

132

very little from that of the Democrats or Republicans. As Kennedy observed, they intended to
“demolish” their opponents; rosewater campaign tactics actually worked against this end, he
correctly feared.49 The initial campaign preference for ambiguity placed the Constitutional
Unionists at a distinct disadvantage in the election of 1860.
The Constitutional Unionists also confronted an age gap as they prepared for the
campaign of 1860.

In a society that celebrated spirited youthfulness, the Constitutional

Unionists appeared to some Americans as doddering patricians who looked backward rather than
forward.50 Of the six men the party seriously considered as its presidential nominee, only John
Minor Botts had been born in the nineteenth century (1802).

The birth of two aspirants

antedated the Constitution, and George Washington sat in the executive office when the other
three were born. One observer noted that although an impressive array of politicians assembled
at Baltimore, “most of them are somewhat stale in politics,” and a Democratic newspaper
mocked the convention’s delegates as “fossilized members of the defunct Whig party.”51 Some
of the potential candidates themselves complained of the enervating effect of long careers in
public service. John Crittenden, whom many onlookers considered the party’s best presidential
49
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aspirant, instructed his associates to leave his name off the ticket. “I am tired of the life I am yet
leading…[and] am quite prepared to retire to private life & look forward to that repose with
much gratification,” he intoned. Although disgusted with the direction of national politics and
hopeful that the Constitutional Unionists would win the election of 1860, Crittenden preferred to
operate as a party manager rather than its public figurehead. Edward Everett echoed Crittenden
when he declared that his superannuated status and already prolonged retirement from public life
made him a most ineffectual candidate for executive office.52
Whereas the Charleston Convention dragged on for days, the Constitutional Unionists
took only two days at Baltimore to settle on a platform and a candidate. The party even went so
far as to drop the label of platform, considered a symbol of partisan warfare, and instead issued a
declaration of principles. The declaration underscored the party’s wish to avoid the entangling
issues that had fired the sectional crisis. With spartan simplicity it called for the recognition of
“the Constitution of the country, the Union of the States, and the enforcement of the laws.” This
manifesto of ambiguity evaded the question of slavery in the territories and dodged issues like
the annexation of Cuba, the call for a transcontinental railroad, and the proper rate of tariff
schedules. The delegates in effect asked the American people to trust the nation’s future to the
party of experience, which they promised would govern with the country’s best interest in mind.
On the second ballot for the party’s presidential nominee the convention gave the requisite
majority to John Bell of Tennessee.

The Border South delegations originally ignored

Crittenden’s wishes and split their votes on him and a few other candidates before the convention
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decided to nominate Bell unanimously. The party balanced the ticket by selecting Everett of
Massachusetts for vice president.53
Before the convention adjourned, several delegates offered speeches on behalf of the
Union. Leslie Coombs of Kentucky, who had not taken an active part in politics since Henry
Clay died in 1852, accentuated both the party’s antiquated image and its unflinching devotion to
the longevity of the republic. He remarked that “since the tocsin of disunion had been sounded
North and South, he had thought it his duty to come up out of his political grave and join the
throng of the living, and enter into the campaign for the Union.” Murat Halstead, impressed with
the accord on display in Baltimore that had been so foreign to the delegates at Charleston,
scribbled that upon adjournment the Constitutional Unionists believed they had a monopoly on
“harmony, fraternity, compromise, conciliation, peace, good will, common glory, national
brotherhood, [and] preservation of the confederacy.”54
Six days after the Constitutional Unionists wrapped up their meeting, the Republicans
assembled in Chicago, Illinois.

Most Republicans looked toward the election with great

optimism, especially after the split in the Democratic Party at Charleston. The party’s managers
placed great emphasis on winning the Lower North, which had given the election of 1856 to the
Democrats. In order to do so, Republicans reasoned, they had to run a candidate free from the
taint of radicalism, which would not play well along the sectional borderland. This was a bad
omen for William Henry Seward, the Republican favorite entering the canvass of 1860.
Although he practiced a pragmatic brand of politics, Seward drew the ire of many conservatives
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when he claimed in 1858 that an irrepressible conflict simmered between slavery and freedom.
The New York senator moderated his tone on the slavery issue as the election season neared and
especially in the aftermath of John Brown’s raid on Harpers Ferry, but many conservatives
suspected that he only did so with an eye toward capturing the Republican presidential
nomination. A Missourian claimed that if one looked at Seward’s deeds “when he is not fishing
for the presidency [then] his every action will go to prove that he is a sectional man clothed in
the most brilliant colors.”55 Party managers searched for a nominee who could assuage the fears
of conservatives in the nation’s heartland. Many moderates had strong reservations about voting
for a candidate like Seward, who might upset sectional harmony by taking a strong stand on
slavery. On the eve of the Chicago Convention, Seward’s prospects for the nomination waned
while those of Abraham Lincoln, a moderate from Illinois, intensified.

Lincoln enjoyed

newfound national prominence in the aftermath of his failed 1858 bid to defeat Stephen Douglas
for a seat in the US Senate. Though he lost the contest, Lincoln battled the Little Giant with
great eloquence on the stump. At the behest of party managers Lincoln in early 1860 gave a
series of speeches on the East Coast, which added to the momentum for his nomination.56
Edward Bates’s close associates clung to the notion that he might win the Republican
nomination at Chicago, but outside of Missouri support for Bates had fizzled. The Missouri
backers of Bates doggedly maintained that if the Republicans hoped to have a chance in the
Border South, they had to choose a native son. Only Bates could “steer the vessel safely
between Scylla & Charabides [sic] – northern fanaticism on the one hand [and] Southern Treason
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and Disunion on the other,” James S. Rollins urged.57 Few people took heed of Rollins’s advice,
especially with Harpers Ferry and the speakership contest fresh upon the minds of southerners.
Republican hardliners questioned Bates’s antislavery bona fides, while Border South moderates
worried that if elected president the Missourian might pander to the abolitionist element within
the party. A Kentuckian lamented that the opponents of the Republicans had assailed the
antislavery stance of the party with such vigor and effectiveness that Border South moderates
“will support no man however pure whom the Republicans nominate.”58
Once the Republicans gathered in the Wigwam, a hastily constructed wooden convention
hall, they forever put to rest any notion of a Bates candidacy. In fact, the course of the
convention exposed the insuperable challenges that confronted the feeble outposts of
Republicanism within the Border South. All four of the Border South states sent delegations to
Chicago, but some northern attendees objected to them taking their seats. David Wilmot of
Pennsylvania, whose name was forever linked to the antislavery cause when in 1846 he
introduced a proviso in Congress that stipulated slavery would not be introduced into any
territory acquired during the Mexican-American War, questioned the plausibility of seating
southern delegates who represented states without full-fledged Republican organizations. He
feared that southerners had come to the convention “to demoralize a party, and to break it up.”
The Border South delegates disputed Wilmot’s challenge, and Maryland delegate Charles Lee
Armour asked how anyone could doubt his sincerity when he had been burned in effigy in his

57

James S. Rollins to James Broadhead, Feb. 1, 1860, Broadhead Papers, MO-MH.
C.F. Burnam to James S. Rollins, Feb. 14, 1860, Rollins Papers, SHS-MO. For Border South fears of
Bates falling under the influence of abolitionists, see Nathaniel Albertson to Stephen Douglas, Feb. 13, 1860, D.A.
Veitch to Stephen Douglas, Mar. 29, 1860, both in Douglas Papers, UC. For the persistent hopes of Missourians
that Bates could win the Republican nomination, see James Broadhead to James S. Rollins, Jan. 29, 1860 [misdated
as 1861], Frank P. Blair Jr. to James S. Rollins, Apr. 7, 1860, both in Rollins Papers, SHS-MO; James S. Rollins to
James Broadhead, Feb. 17, 1860, Broadhead Papers, MO-MH. Murat Halstead stated that the push for Bates had
“gone down like lead in the mighty waters” on the eve of the Republican Convention; see Hesseltine, Three Against
Lincoln, 144.
58

137

state and literally risked his life while promoting the Republican cause in Baltimore. Several
northern delegates came to the aid of the Border South delegates and begged the convention to
seat them so as not to appear as a purely sectional organization. After a debate “full of fire” the
convention spurned Wilmot’s objection and allowed all of the southern delegations other than
that of Texas to take their seats.59
Although the Border South delegations retained their seats, the convention marginalized
their influence. The Republicans offered a sop to the Border South by including a plank in the
platform that declared a state had the exclusive right “to order and control its own domestic
institutions,” and the convention rebuked the actions of men like John Brown who invaded
sovereign states for any purpose. The seventh and eighth planks of the platform, however, sealed
the fate of the party in the Border South. This portion of the platform expressed the Republican
Party’s plan to defy the Supreme Court’s Dred Scott decision and keep all the territories free
from slavery.60 A Missourian immediately realized the damage done by including such an
explicit denunciation of slavery in the territories. “If they had been content to say that they were
opposed to the extension of slavery into free territories and to the dogma that the constitution
carried slavery any where [sic], they could have made a lodgment in the border slave states,”
Jonathan Richardson grumbled, “but the Chicago platform completely sectionalizes the party and
is almost insulting to the South.” Even Bates fretted that the platform “is exclusive and defiant,
not attracting but repelling assistance from without.” Some Border South moderates wished the
party had at least introduced a plank which condoned the colonization of freed slaves “to ward
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off the attacks made upon us about negro equality,” but the convention neglected to consider this
option.61
On May 18 the Republicans proceeded to nominate their candidate for the presidency.
The result of the first ballot revealed Bates’s flagging prospects; he placed fifth, and the secondplace nominee, Abraham Lincoln, had over twice as many votes as did Bates. Of the forty-eight
votes Bates received on the first ballot, 66 percent came from the four Border South states. The
large accumulation of votes for Seward and Lincoln clearly signaled a two-man race. Bates’s
total continued to slide on the next two ballots, and only the Missouri delegation remained
wholly committed to him.

The convention nominated Lincoln on the third ballot.

The

Republicans seriously considered placing Kentuckian Cassius Clay on the ticket as vice
president, but instead settled on Hannibal Hamlin of Maine.

“The mistake of putting no

Southern man on the ticket will weaken our efforts in the Cause here immensely,” a thwarted
Clay acknowledged.62
Clay’s premonition rang true, especially in Missouri. Several of Bates’s supporters
looked elsewhere for a political home after the Chicago Convention bypassed their favorite and
released an unsatisfactory platform. James Rollins led an exodus of Bates conservatives into the
Constitutional Union camp. Less than three weeks after the Republicans adjourned at Chicago,
the Constitutional Unionists in Missouri’s second district asked Rollins to run for Congress on
their ticket in the August election. He agreed and took to the stump in support of John Bell. “In
the south this is all we can do, under the circumstances,” Rollins confessed in reference to the
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Republican decision to disregard the wants and needs of Border South moderates. 63

Stung by

the defection of Rollins, Bates struggled to comprehend the objectives of the Constitutional
Unionists. He asked his friend if the new organization was a genuine political organization, “Or
is it only (as a Baltimore paper irreverently called it) a ‘Democratic Aid Society,’ to serve the
present emergency?” Rollins responded that Constitutional Unionists planned “to furnish a
resting place, for the truly conservative elements of the country – Old Line Whigs [&]
Americans – moderate men of all parties; - rather than allow them to be overrun” by the overly
sectionalized Republicans and Democrats.64 Rollins temporarily suffered strained relations with
some of his former allies who steadfastly stood behind Bates, but the voters in his central
Missouri district vindicated his decision to join the Constitutional Unionists in August when they
elected him to Congress.65
While the Republicans and Constitutional Unionists enjoyed relatively painless
conventions, the Democrats attempted to clean up the mess they had made at Charleston. James
Bayard initially believed that the two wings of the party might reconcile with one another and
reunite in Baltimore, but as the summer dragged on he began to doubt that the Lower South
delegations would return to the mainstream party fold.66 Democrats in Bayard’s New Castle
County called a meeting in late May 1860 to consider whether to send their original delegation to
Baltimore or to declare their seats vacated. After an appearance from Whiteley and Bayard’s son

63

C.F. Burnam to James S. Rollins, May 22, 1860, Rollins Papers, SHS-MO; James S. Rollins to James
Broadhead, June 5, 1860, Broadhead Papers, MH-MO.
64
Edward Bates to James S. Rollins, June 2, 1860, James S. Rollins to Edward Bates, June 6, 1860, both in
Rollins Papers, SHS-MO.
65
Entries for June 16, 22, 1860, in Beale, ed., Diary of Edward Bates, 136-138; James O. Broadhead to
James S. Rollins, June 26, July 8, 1860, both in Rollins Papers, SHS-MO. Rollins defeated his Democratic
opponent in a narrow contest; the margin of victory was only 253 votes. Of Missouri’s seven congressional
districts, only two non-Democrats won in the August 1860 race: Rollins and Frank Blair Jr.; for these results see
Michael J. Dubin, United States Congressional Elections, 1788-1997: The Official Results of the Elections of the 1 st
through 105th Congresses (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 1998), 187-188.
66
James A. Bayard to Thomas F. Bayard, May 8, June 8, 1860, both in T.F. Bayard Papers, LOC.

140

Thomas the county convention allowed the two bolters to represent them in Baltimore. A
separate New Castle meeting packed with Douglasites sent Bayard’s old enemy Samuel
Townsend and James A. Montgomery to the national convention. The infighting in the state and
national party took its toll on Bayard, whose cries for party unity soon lapsed back into contempt
for Douglas and his minions.67
After an attempt at compromise between the two wings of the party failed, Douglas
operators across the Lower South decided to send new delegations to Baltimore in the hopes that
they would clinch the Little Giant’s nomination. Before the Baltimore meeting convened, the
delegates who walked out of the Charleston Convention met in Richmond, Virginia, and decided
to repair to Maryland and press for reentry into the national meeting. The proceedings at
Baltimore proved just as tense as at Charleston. The two competing New Castle County,
Delaware delegations went before the committee on credentials to plead for their seats, but the
hearing devolved into a fistfight between Townsend and Whiteley. Unsatisfied, Whiteley later
confronted Townsend at his hotel and received a pair of black eyes for his effort. During the
second altercation a pistol fell from Whiteley’s pocket, which demonstrated the depth of the
resentment that festered within the Delaware Democracy.68
A showdown commenced and on June 21 a majority of the committee on credentials
called for the readmission of bolting delegates from Delaware, Texas, and Mississippi and the
seating of the new Douglas delegates from Alabama and Louisiana. The convention voted the
following day to accept the majority report, but Douglas’s managers insisted that the Little Giant
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receive the party’s nomination.

This proved too much for most of Douglas’s southern

opponents, who conditioned their participation in a reunited convention upon the replacement of
the Little Giant on the ticket. Virginia led the exodus from the meeting in Baltimore; half of
Maryland’s delegation walked out with the Old Dominion, as did the representatives from North
Carolina, Tennessee, California, and Oregon.

On Saturday, June 23, 1860, most of the

Kentucky, Missouri, and Arkansas delegations bolted. For all the fuss they kicked up over
reentry, Bayard and Whiteley again walked out. W.B. Reed, a Kentucky delegate who stayed
put, received a roaring applause from the pro-Douglas audience when he maintained that he and
the remaining Bluegrass State Democrats “will stand with you as a wall of fire in opposing both
extremes.” Reed argued that Stephen Douglas and popular sovereignty best protected the South,
and he claimed that “Gentlemen who own a hundred slaves each say I am right.”

The

convention finally nominated the Little Giant, while the bolters met at Baltimore’s Institute Hall
and selected John C. Breckinridge to head their ticket. An incensed Bayard, who after his
second walkout returned to the Senate in Washington, groused that “the only real Democratic
Convention” had nominated Breckinridge.69
The presidential field was set by the end of June. The choice in the Border South
revolved around three candidates: Stephen Douglas and John C. Breckinridge of the northern and
southern wings of the Democracy, and John Bell of the Constitutional Unionists. Some border
country southerners felt more comfortable with Republican Abraham Lincoln, a native of
Kentucky, than they did with a perceived radical like William Henry Seward, but only a tiny
fraction of the region’s electorate showed any inclination to vote for the relatively unfamiliar
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Illinois lawyer.70

Many more inhabitants of the Border South distrusted Lincoln and the

Republicans. “The abolition element of the [Republican] party will keep it sectional,” J.C.
Richardson of Missouri told an associate, “and I am afraid to trust them on the Fugitive Slave act
and slavery in the district.” Although Richardson had a decent opinion of Lincoln, he conveyed
the fears of many border country southerners when he exhorted, “he can’t control his
[abolitionist] friends.”71 Sophie M. Du Pont captured the prevailing sentiment of people in the
Border South who felt stuck between two sectional extremes:
I deprecate sectionalism, but I deprecate southern sectionalism quite as much as
northern – and there is as much of one as the other & perhaps more of the former.
The abolitionists are but a small fraction of our people, a noisy & intemperate &
intolerant & intolerable one, I grant you – but the South does a great wrong in
classing all the temperate & conservative North; all the men who hold the views
of Washington & Jefferson & Clay &c, with them.72

While the overwhelming majority of Border South voters eschewed extremism from either
direction, the presence of two moderate candidates in the field and the likelihood of a split vote
dimmed the conservatives’ chances for success in November. This placed moderates in a
predicament, because the triumph of either Lincoln or Breckinridge might amplify the
disunionist shrieks in the Border South that had been unloosed in the aftermath of the Harpers
Ferry raid and the speakership contest.
The August gubernatorial election in Missouri suggested that the radical pro-southern
element had garnered enough strength to place one of their own in the highest state office in at
least one Border South state. The race included four candidates: Democrat Claiborne Fox
70
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Jackson; Democrat Hancock Jackson; Constitutional Unionist Sample Orr; and Republican
James B. Gardenhire. Claiborne Jackson edged out the other contestants with 47 percent of the
vote. Orr lost by less than 8,000 votes, a sign that the embryonic Constitutional Union Party
would play a major role in electoral politics in the Border South.

Hancock Jackson and

Gardenhire both trailed the front-runners by a wide margin.73
Table 15 - 1860 Missouri Gubernatorial Election
Candidate

Party

Votes

Percentage

Claiborne Jackson

Democrat

74,239

46.9%

Sample Orr

Constitutional Union

66,460

42.0%

Hancock Jackson

Breckinridge Democrat

11,305

7.1%

James Gardenhire

Republican

6,134

3.9%

Source: Dubin, US Gubernatorial Elections , 146.

Ever since the late 1840s when he broke with Thomas Hart Benton, Claiborne Jackson
had taken a strong proslavery position and built a powerful network in Missouri.

Casual

observers might consider Jackson’s victory the triumph of Democratic radicalism in the
westernmost reaches of the Border South. Deeper scrutiny, however, illustrates the complexity
of politics in the Border South and the remarkable resiliency of the region’s moderate impulse in
the late antebellum period. Without a doubt, Claiborne Jackson favored the Charleston bolters’
stance on slavery in the territories - the struggle in Kansas implanted doubts into his mind as to
whether popular sovereignty could adequately protect slavery in the West – and his political
creed resembled that of William Lowndes Yancey more so than Stephen Douglas. Fearful that
pro-Southern rhetoric might alienate him from many of the state’s conservative voters, however,
Jackson initially attempted to duck presidential endorsements while on the campaign trail. His
evasive stance on the presidential contest, coupled with a promise to support state aid to
railroads, had in May 1860 earned him the endorsement of Nathaniel Paschall, the powerful
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editor of the Democratic St. Louis Missouri Republican. Paschall, an ardent proponent of
Douglas, and the radical Jackson made strange bedfellows, but the endorsement boosted
Jackson’s fortunes in St. Louis, where his proslavery stance had little appeal to metropolitan
voters. After the split at Charleston, Paschall forced Jackson’s hand with an ultimatum: support
Douglas on the campaign trail or lose the endorsement of his paper. Cognizant of the editor’s
influence, Jackson caved and agreed to advocate for the Little Giant. The proslavery element of
the Missouri Democrats felt betrayed by one of their principal architects and ran their own
candidate, Hancock Jackson, who came out for John C. Breckinridge. While on the stump,
Claiborne Jackson rather disingenuously told several audiences that he preferred Breckinridge
but now championed Douglas in order to sustain the health of the Missouri Democracy. “Poor
Claib! I pity him,” one Missouri Democrat remarked. “I saw him at Jefferson City when there
the other day, and he looked like he had lost all his friends.”74
Thus, the triumph of Claiborne Jackson represented no revolution in Missouri politics.
While the contest did place a dangerous sectional radical in the state executive office, he had
achieved his victory not with secessionist diatribes, but with the timeworn political formula to
which Border South voters best responded: moderation and temperateness. The conservative
Paschall handcuffed Jackson, who knew he needed his support to win the race, with his July
ultimatum.

Jackson received nearly 10,000 votes in St. Louis whereas the Breckinridge

Democrat candidate collected just over 200 votes; without Paschall’s assistance it seems unlikely
that Jackson would have held much sway in the state’s largest city. Missouri held congressional
elections the same day, which confirmed the staying power of the moderate mindset. Douglas
Democrats carried four of the state’s seven congressional districts, while the remaining three
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were each won by a Constitutional Unionist, a Republican, and a Democrat who ran on a
Breckinridge-Douglas coalition ticket.75
Table 16 - 1860 Missouri Gubernatorial Race & Slaveholding
County

% of Population
Enslaved
C. Jackson (D)

% of Vote

Howard

36.9%

58.7%

39.7%

1.5%

J. Gardenhire
(Rep)
0.1%

Saline

33.2%

47.7%

51.3%

1.0%

0.0%

Lafayette

31.7%

38.4%

60.6%

1.1%

0.0%

New Madrid

31.4%

34.5%

38.2%

24.8%

0.0%

Clay

26.5%

37.5%

53.9%

8.6%

0.0%

Callaway

25.9%

43.3%

52.9%

3.8%

0.0%

Boone

25.8%

40.1%

57.3%

2.6%

0.0%

43.6%

52.9%

3.5%

0.0%

Total

S. Orr (CU)

H. Jackson (BD)

Sources: University of Virginia Historical Census Browser; Dubin, US Gubernatorial Elections , 144-146.

As Table 16 reveals above, the heaviest slaveholding counties in Missouri cast 52.9
percent of their vote for Constitutional Unionist Sample Orr, while Jackson tallied 43.6 percent
of the vote. Of the seven counties with at least 25 percent of the population enslaved, Claiborne
Jackson won only one and polled no more than 47.7 percent of the vote in the rest. This
indicates that many Missouri slaveholders saw through Jackson’s ploy to pander to the state’s
Douglasites.76 Fearful that his radical past might provoke Jackson to endanger the institution of
slavery by taking a reckless course as governor, voters in the densest slave counties opted for
Sample Orr, who represented “the advance guard of the Union army of the nation” according to
one Missouri editor.77 Outwardly radical candidates Hancock Jackson and James Gardenhire
received only a handful of votes in these counties. The 1860 Missouri gubernatorial election
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confirmed the Border South judgment that the Union, rather than radical options like secession,
best protected the peculiar institution.
Nevertheless, the Border South should not be thought of as insulated from disunion
sentiment.

The strong reaction to perceived northern outrages, from Harpers Ferry to the

speakership contest, demonstrated the subterranean nature of disunionist sentiment in the Border
South. Humphrey Marshall, a former Whig congressman from Kentucky who threw his support
to Breckinridge during the canvass of 1860, exclaimed that the people of the Border South would
not sit idly by and allow the Republicans or the Douglas Democrats to jeopardize the institution
of slavery. In a campaign speech he used the analogy of abolitionist wolves that prowled outside
the peaceful homes of Kentuckians. If the wolves appeared in his neighborhood he would not
park in front of the fireplace and trade stories with old farmers like Constitutional Unionist
candidate John Bell, but instead “follow to the field the young, vigorous, brave leader, whose
energies and known character afforded me the hope that he would protect my property and have
a proper care for my interests.” Border southerners hoped they would not be forced to decide
between the two extremes of North and South, but a Republican victory in the presidential
election might obligate them to do so. Marshall concluded his speech with the frank forewarning
that he loved the Union, but he would rather see his family turned out of Kentucky if the state
acquiesced in “the surrender and sacrifice of the constitutional rights of our people.”78
Marshall’s cautionary language underscores that some moderates had been attracted to the
radical camp on the eve of the election, and more would likely follow if Lincoln won.
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“Speech of Hon. Humphrey Marshall, of Ky.,” in National Democratic Executive Committee, Speeches
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All three of the political organizations that had a realistic chance of winning the
presidential election in the Border South positioned their candidate as the strongest guardian of
slavery, and even the Republicans promised that if elected Lincoln would not interfere with the
peculiar institution in the states or with the Fugitive Slave Law.

The two Democratic

organizations and the Constitutional Unionists doubted the veracity of the Republican pledge.
They opened a hardy attack on the Republicans for their stance on slavery in the territories, and
each of these organizations argued that their respective candidate could best defeat Lincoln. In
Maryland the Constitutional Unionists tried to get the upper hand on their Democratic opponents
with “violent tirades against the Republicans,” while in Kentucky the three anti-Republican
parties colored all Republicans as abolitionists. Anti-Republican campaigners stepped up their
appeals in the aftermath of October state elections in Indiana and Pennsylvania, where
Republicans won each state’s gubernatorial race. These Republican victories in the Lower North
served as a harbinger of the party’s success in that key region in November, and the antiRepublican organizations escalated their assaults on Lincoln and his party in the hopes of
winning last-second converts.79 A pro-Breckinridge paper warned its readers that “a vote against
Breckinridge is a half vote for Lincoln.”

Missourians also complained that Republican

opponents misrepresented the party in an effort to attract voters. “Fanatical abolition addresses,
and distorted paragraphs from the writings and speeches of ultra partizans are quoted in return to
show that an onslaught is designed against the South,” a group of St. Louis Republicans
grumbled. The small Republican contingent in Baltimore witnessed first-hand the results of the
79
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smear campaign. They attempted to hold a series of campaign rallies just days before the
election but time and again unruly opponents broke them up with “showers of eggs, brick-bats
and injurious epithets.”80
In spite of their mutual awareness that a Republican victory might fan the flames of
disunion across the South, a powerful loyalty to each individual organization precluded any
cooperative movement to defeat Lincoln. The political culture of the period nourished strong
partisan attachments among the members of these parties which proved nearly impossible to
unbind. Stubbornness and political machinations also made the likelihood of fusion all the more
difficult.81 In the hopes of clinching victory, the anti-Republican elements in the Border South
committed themselves to a heedless campaign of fear mongering that seriously jeopardized the
safety of the Union in the aftermath of the election.
Voters of all political persuasions trekked to their local polling place on November 6 with
assorted feelings of optimism and unease.

The arduous canvass, the rancorous political

infighting, and the apocalyptic auguring of the fire-eaters had by election day unnerved many
Americans. “Thank the lord the great political struggle is at a close,” a Kentuckian sighed on the
night before the election. “I believe that nothing but a fight will save the South. The sooner the
better.”

The tone of the Kentuckian’s prognostication implies that some border country
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southerners concluded southern defiance represented the next logical step in the deepening crisis
even before casting their ballots. Other Border South inhabitants were equally resigned to the
probability of Lincoln’s election, but spoke of the result in more measured, yet similarly
concerned, language. Charles Gibson of St. Louis advised that Lincoln should tread lightly on
the slavery issue once in the White House to prevent a possible dissolution of the Union.
“Should [Lincoln] prove to be mild & conservative the negro question would be settled,” Gibson
predicted. “Should he prove the contrary, no man can tell the consequences.” “The Wolf is
really upon us now, and even in this old conservative State, a feeling of uneasiness and distrust is
gradually growing up,” a Maryland moderate admitted. “The people of the border states will be
greatly agitated [by Lincoln’s election], and the secessionists further South will be in a perfect
frenzy.”82
The Republican strategy to convert the Lower North, a redoubt of Democratic strength in
the previous two presidential elections, to their column in 1860 paid dividends. Although he
won less than forty percent of the popular vote, Lincoln easily defeated his opponents in the
Electoral College. He swept every free state except for New Jersey, which split its electoral
votes between Lincoln and Douglas. The Little Giant finished second in the popular vote but
dead last in the Electoral College; in addition to three electoral votes in New Jersey he won
Missouri. Breckinridge took every southern state except Kentucky, Tennessee, and Virginia,
which Bell captured. The Republicans opted for a sectional approach to the election, and it
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showed: only in the slave states of the Border South and Virginia did Lincoln’s name even
appear on a ticket. In those five states, Lincoln tallied less than five percent of the total vote.83
Table 17 - Presidential Election of 1860
Candidate

Popular Vote

Electoral Vote

Lincoln (Rep.)

1,855,276 (39.67%)

180

Douglas (Dem.)

1,004,042 (21.47%)

12

Breckinridge (Dem.)

672,601 (14.38%)

72

Bell (CU)

590,980 (12.64%)

39

Source: Dubin, US Presidential Elections , 159.

The results of the election in the Border South, displayed in Table 18, demonstrate the
region was anything but a monolith. The outcome of state and national political divisions in the
1850s presented circumstances that party managers in each of the four Border South states had to
contend with during the presidential campaign. The Breckinridge forces achieved victory in
Delaware and Maryland, Bell won Kentucky, and Douglas carried Missouri. Closer scrutiny of
the election returns, however, reveals that although political allegiances and preexisting
conditions prevented a region-wide consensus on a single candidate, the Border South preference
for moderation on sectional issues retained its vitality. Breckinridge, who campaigned on behalf
of the ultra-southern position on slavery in the territories, won Delaware and Maryland with a
plurality, and in his home state of Kentucky he captured just over a third of the entire vote. In
Missouri he could not muster one-fifth of the total vote. In all four states combined, he received
just under thirty-two percent of all votes cast. The other perceived radical, Lincoln, fared
miserably in the Border South. Although the Republicans attained more votes in the Border
South than anywhere else in the slave states, they still received less than six percent of the border
country’s total vote.
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Table 18 - Presidential Election of 1860 in the Border South
State

Bell (CU)

Douglas (Dem)

Breckinridge (Dem)

Lincoln (Rep)

Delaware

3,886 (24.12%)

1,066 (6.62%)

7,339 (45.55%)

3,822 (23.72%)

Kentucky

66,058 (45.18%)

25,641 (17.54%)

53,143 (36.35%)

1,364 (0.93%)

Maryland

41,768 (45.08%)

6,080 (6.56%)

42,505 (45.88%)

2,296 (2.48%)

58,261 (35.22%)

58,804 (35.55%)

31,312 (18.93%)

17,029 (10.30%)

169,973 (40.43%)

91,591 (21.79%)

134,299 (31.95%)

24,511 (5.83%)

Missouri
Total

Combined Bell & Douglas Vote

261,564 (62.22%)

Source: Dubin, US Presidential Elections , 159.

A conservative impulse, the foundation of Border South politics in the 1850s, still existed
within the region. The two candidates presented to the people as moderates on sectional issues
in the Border South actually trounced their competition if their votes are combined. Together
Bell and Douglas obtained sixty-two percent of the Border South vote. Moderates learned a hard
lesson as a result of the contest: the potent influence of partisanship worked to divide the
mandate for conservatism in the region and helped to propel a sectional candidate into the
executive office. A combined conservative ticket in the Border South alone would not have
prevented Lincoln’s election, but if the forces of moderation had promoted cooperation across
the nation the results may have differed greatly. Those who cherished a careful approach to the
sectional crisis discovered that in order to check the crippling influence of radicalism, they must
set aside party prejudice and work together. A Kentuckian predicted after the election that a
collaborative effort on behalf of conservative principles could salve the nation’s wounds by
expurgating fanaticism: “It [the conservative movement] will be for the Constitution and the
Union, and the overgrown children, the political charlatans, North and South, who have been
engaged in destroying our noble government, will be driven so far into political damnation, that a
sun beam would not reach them in an age.”84

84
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Border South conservatism hinged on the idea that the Union, not secession, best
protected the institution of slavery.

Disunion would surrender the federal government’s

obligation to protect slavery in the states through the Fugitive Slave Law, abrogate key decisions
of the Supreme Court, and relinquish constitutional provisions like the three-fifths clause which
actually enhanced the South’s leverage in Congress. Most border country southerners concurred
with Abiel Leonard, owner of fifteen slaves in Missouri’s Boon’s Lick, who proclaimed the
Union “the sure bulwark of our slave property.” Table 19 below confirms the link between the
moderate impulse and slaveholding in the Border South. The electorate in the forty-two densest
slaveholding counties in the region cast nearly two-thirds of its vote for either Bell or Douglas.
Breckinridge attracted the vote of nearly all of the remaining third of the electorate and Lincoln
amassed just over 250 votes in these counties. A vote for Breckinridge was not an outright
sanction of secession, but it did indicate a preference for a position on slavery that the region’s
slaveholders considered extremely hazardous. “The strongest pro-slavery men in [Kentucky] are
those who do not own one dollar of slave property,” one Breckinridge Democrat proclaimed just
before the election. “We would rather trust them than a thousand John Bells.”85
Delaware’s densest slave county, Sussex, deviated from the general Border South trend.
Sussex inhabitants cast 47.7 percent of their votes for Breckinridge. The moderate candidates
tallied only 38 percent of the total, and Lincoln surprisingly garnered nearly one-sixth of the
overall vote.86
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Missouri

Maryland

Kentucky

Table 19 -Vote for President in Border South Counties with at Least 25% of Population Enslaved
(1860)

C ounty
Bourbon
Boyle
Caldwell
Christian
Clark
Fayette
Franklin
Garrard
Green
Henderson
Henry
Jessamine
Lincoln
Logan
Madison
Marion
Montgomery
Nelson
Oldham
Scott
Shelby
Simpson
Spencer
T odd
T rigg
Warren
Woodford

% of
Population
Enslave d
45.5%
35.2%
25.8%
46.0%
41.5%
44.3%
26.7%
34.0%
26.9%
40.4%
27.7%
39.1%
32.2%
33.4%
35.1%
27.6%
35.0%
35.0%
33.4%
39.8%
40.4%
28.3%
35.6%
41.9%
31.2%
30.7%
52.0%

Anne Arundel
Calvert
Charles
Montgomery
Prince George's
Queen Anne's
St. Mary's
T albot

30.7%
44.1%
58.4%
29.6%
53.5%
26.2%
43.0%
25.2%

Boone
Callaway
Clay
Howard
Lafayette
New Madrid
Saline

25.8%
25.9%
26.5%
36.9%
31.7%
31.4%
33.2%

Total
% of Vote
% of Vote for Bell & Douglas

Lincoln
(Re p)

Douglas
(De m)
29
52
48
467
60
99
37
145
188
211
390
37
72
342
56
904
49
641
263
44
228
194
304
147
177
615
16

755
331
618
411
391
1,051
907
195
367
498
773
559
380
169
914
281
489
333
299
1,176
594
319
94
274
646
182
547

Be ll (C U)
966
697
446
954
959
1,411
790
730
420
846
672
603
743
1,490
1,038
475
540
609
372
734
1,176
404
334
642
623
1,126
633

Total C ast
1,753
1,083
1,115
1,833
1,411
2,566
1,734
1,091
977
1,560
1,837
1,202
1,199
2,004
2,093
1,660
1,078
1,583
936
1,954
1,998
917
732
1,067
1,447
1,926
1,196

98
43
38
99
43
87
190
98

1,017
387
723
1,125
1,048
879
920
898

1,041
399
430
1,155
885
908
261
793

2,159
830
1,197
2,429
1,977
1,874
1,372
1,791

578
839
528
939
774
117
563

652
472
305
247
371
160
366

1,671
1,306
1,045
920
1,577
223
1,035

2,913
2,632
1,878
2,107
2,746
500
1,964

10,849

23,123

34,082

68,321

3
3
3
1
1
5
21
2
5
2
3
4
3
85
2
4
1
3
3
1
6
50
1
1
2
12
15
1
24
267

Bre ckinridge
(De m)

0.4%
65.8%

15.9%

33.8%

49.9%

Sources: University of Virginia Historical Census Browser; Dubin, US Presidential Elections , 167-171, 174-175.
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Even with a strong mandate for moderation in the Border South’s densest slave counties,
conservatives grasped that a tough fight lay ahead. Fire-eaters clamored for the entire South to
secede, and normally moderate men might trade their loyalty to the Union for that of their
southern brethren in the disquieted political landscape brought on by Lincoln’s election. James
A. Bayard represented just one example of a Border South statesman who reassessed his state’s
place in the Union shortly after Lincoln’s election. His consternation had not abated since
December 1859, and misgivings about the Union he so cherished had multiplied. After the
Democratic Party’s second breakup in Baltimore he took a much needed vacation in New York
and Rhode Island before returning to Delaware to campaign on behalf of Breckinridge. The
election results confirmed his worst fears. “I have no hope left for the Union,” he told his son,
“& all we can do now is to separate peaceably if possible.”87 While they studied the results of
the election and calculated the best way to offset the radicalism it would provoke from sectional
hardliners, conservatives prayed that all of their fellow border country southerners had not like
Bayard thrown up the white flag and surrendered to the inevitability of disunion.
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Chapter 4
“What Ought Patriots To Do?”: The Unionist Offensive in the Border South, November 1860 –
Mid-January 1861
John Crittenden normally relished the opportunity to sequester himself in his Frankfort,
Kentucky home whenever his calendar provided a rare opening to escape the bustle of the
American political scene.

The septuagenarian Crittenden had built an impressive political

portfolio over his long career, occupying many important state and national posts: speaker of the
House in the Kentucky legislature, governor of the Bluegrass State, Millard Fillmore’s attorney
general, and intermittent stints in the United States Senate, which began during James Madison’s
presidency. With the presidential campaign completed and the Senate not due to convene until
early December, the weary solon in November 1860 returned home for some much-needed rest.
His “straggling, old-fashioned house” stood at the corner of Main and Washington streets, and
Crittenden delighted in sitting on the front steps during the evening to spend time with his family
and close friends. “First in the order of the day or night, on these occasions,” his daughter
recollected, “were family news, kind inquiries for the sick and absent, [and] little narratives of
the wonderful children everybody had or supposed themselves to have.” During these periods of
repose, Crittenden captivated family and visitors with amusing anecdotes, a sympathetic ear, and
long conversations about his beloved poplar trees that lined the promenade in front of the house.
Try as he might, though, the old Kentuckian’s thoughts never ventured far from politics. Even
while enjoying the tranquility of his Frankfort home, by the end of the night the conversation
normally turned to public affairs. The deepening political impasse tinged his usually cheerful
visage with a gloomy sense of foreboding on this particular trip home.1
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By the autumn of 1860 the years of political toil had taken its toll on Kentucky’s elder
statesman. Edward Bates remarked that his old Whig associate looked “older and feebler than I
ever knew him,” and to his close friends Crittenden expressed a desire to retire from public life
and enjoy the solace of his home and family in Kentucky on a permanent basis. Frustrated with
the highly sectionalized atmosphere that plagued Washington, he looked forward to freeing
himself from the “low party politics of the day, and the miserable scramble for place and
plunder.” His efforts on behalf of the Constitutional Union Party during the presidential canvass
had left him exhausted. During the late summer and fall of 1860 a torrent of invitations to speak
from all corners of the country crammed his mailbag. Constitutional Unionists swept him from
one end of the Bluegrass State to the other, and he traveled from Massachusetts to Missouri to
campaign for John Bell. Despite all his labors, the principal architect of the Constitutional Union
movement saw his worst fears about the direction of American politics confirmed when the
nation’s voters placed Abraham Lincoln in the White House.2
News of Lincoln’s election whipped many southerners into a frenzy, and political
operatives in each of the Lower South states had initiated preparations for special conventions
charged with deliberating whether or not to carry their states out of the Union. “A strictly
sectional political organization has been formed, and its success has sent alarm throughout nearly
half the States of the Union and stricken with fear the honest patriots of the whole country,” one
Kentucky editor blazoned. A Georgia paper reflected the depth of alarm in the South when it
forthrightly declared that the election of a Republican president meant “the Union has failed of
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the objects for which it was formed.”3 Crittenden shared the unease of his fellow southerners,
but unlike the Georgia editor he showed no inclination to capitulate to disunionists. After all, he
had witnessed firsthand his mentor Henry Clay rescue the Union from the brink of ruin on three
occasions. Clay played an instrumental role in resolving the sectional dispute over the admission
of Missouri in 1820, orchestrated a compromise to prevent a showdown between the federal
government and South Carolina in the Nullification Crisis of 1832-1833, and in 1850 laid the
groundwork for a wide-ranging solution to the vexed question of the introduction of slavery into
territory acquired from Mexico.4 At each turn the American political custom of compromise had
triumphed over secession.
In the crisis of 1860, the nation turned to Crittenden to fill the role of Clay, who had died
in 1852. Despite his deep longing to walk away from politics, his sense of duty and love for the
Union drew him once more into the fray. Rest and retirement would have to wait. Crittenden
and other Unionists responded to the query of George Prentice, editor of the pro-Union
Louisville Daily Journal, who asked his readers, “What ought patriots to do?”

Prentice

recommended that they spurn the entreaties of fire-eaters and instead “stand loyally and patiently
in the Union under the Constitution and wield the might of the one and the checks and balances
of the other to protect both.” In the following months, Crittenden labored to uphold Prentice’s
definition of patriot and became a beacon of Unionism in the Border South and across the nation.
He and likeminded Unionists worked assiduously to confine the secession movement to the Deep
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South and to find some settlement that would restore sectional harmony and forever remove the
explosive issue of slavery from the political equation.5
***
Lincoln’s election produced “a perfect tempest of wrath” in the Lower South, where fire-eaters
set the wheels of secession in motion shortly after learning that a Republican would control the
executive branch of the federal government.6 A powerful cadre of disunionists in South Carolina
pushed for their legislature, which had convened a day before the presidential election, to call a
state convention at the earliest possible moment. Ever since the Nullification Crisis in 18321833, a burgeoning group of South Carolina radicals had searched for some way to pull their
state out of the Union. Carolina disunionists nervously watched the antislavery movement grow
during the two decades prior to Lincoln’s election and in each passing year they became more
convinced that the people of the North had only one political objective: to destroy slavery, the
very foundation of southern society. Rebuffed in their disunionist scheme in 1850, Carolina
radicals saw in the Republican triumph at the polls a golden opportunity to strike. They knew
they had to initiate a rapid offensive to prevent a Unionist reverberation, which had stymied their
earlier disunion plots, from overtaking their momentum. They employed the rhetoric of fear,
shame, honor, and revolution to secure the meeting of a state convention on December 17, a
month in advance of the scheduled conventions in other Lower South states. Fire-eaters trusted
that if they withdrew the Palmetto State, the rest of the slaveholding states would have no choice
but to follow their lead.7
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Experience taught the Carolina radicals that their slave state brethren often got cold feet
when it came to following through on promises of secession, and 1860 proved no different.
Several strands of thought existed throughout the South about how best to respond to Lincoln’s
election. Fire-eaters pursued the most expeditious course to clinch their long-sought-after goal.
As in South Carolina they advocated for each slaveholding state to call its own convention at the
earliest possible moment, preferably before Lincoln was inaugurated on March 4, 1861, and then
proceed with the work of pulling their respective states out of the Union. This course, labeled
separate state action, gave fire-eaters the advantage of speed. Separatists plowed forward and
wished to negate the appeals of their neighbors who called for sober second thought about so
radical a course. If they could complete the process of secession in quick order, those who
advocated a careful approach to the crisis or who broached the idea of compromise would have
no leg on which to stand. A Missourian rightfully estimated in November that the Deep South
separatists “are more urgent than ever, taking every means to get their followers pledged to
extreme measures, and to draw in and commit the timid and the doubtful, without allowing time
to look to the consequences and reflect upon the bottomless pit that lies before them.”8
Separatists planned to neutralize the cooperationists and Unionists in their midst.
Cooperationists promoted southern unity; they preferred that all the slaveholding states meet in a
convention, discuss their grievances, and then decide on the best response to Lincoln’s election.
In cooperationist eyes, only cohesive southern action could convince the North of their
earnestness and simultaneously present a front that the federal government could not easily
crush. They believed in the strength of numbers and often pointed to the Nullification Crisis,
and Schuster, 1970), 252-293; Manisha Sinha, The Counter-Revolution of Slavery: Politics and Ideology in
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where the federal government cowed a defiant but isolated South Carolina, as precedent for the
folly of separate state action. “Having the same rights and interests at stake,” a Mississippi
cooperationist concluded, “I think it would be wrong in any one state to take such a position as
would force others against their wishes to join her, without at least first consulting them on the
propriety of the course.”

Separatists saw three major problems with the tactics of the

cooperationists. First, a pan-southern convention would take precious time to organize. Once it
met, the delegates might deliberate for weeks or months, sapping the wind out of the fire-eaters’
sails. The separatists also worried that the cooperationist course might not even result in
disunion.

After careful deliberation, unsound delegates might once again back away from

secession as they had throughout the antebellum period. Finally, history informed separatists
that the cooperation method simply did not work. In the crisis of 1850 a convention of southern
states held in Nashville, Tennessee, snubbed disunion, and in the aftermath of John Brown’s raid
South Carolinians received little support from the rest of the South for a slave state convention to
discuss the region’s place in the Union.9
Unionists also posed problems for the supporters of separate state action.

These

southerners saw no immediate need for secession and preferred that their states remain in the
Union. Many southern Unionists loathed the impulsive nature of fire-eaters, especially the
radicals in South Carolina. One Tennessee Unionist utilized a folksy analogy when he assessed
South Carolina’s actions: “She reminds of the bull that undertook to but [sic] the Locomotive off
the track – courage admirable – discretion small!”10 A wide spectrum of Unionism existed
9
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throughout the South, though historians have for the sake of clarity identified two major camps
of Unionists. Unconditional Unionists vowed never to abandon the federal government and
often labeled secessionists in their midst as traitors. Very few southerners adopted such a
hardline Unionist approach, but greater numbers of unconditional Unionists called the Border
South home than in the states that formed the Confederacy. Conditional Unionists were far more
prevalent throughout the South, and they comprised a large segment of the population in the
Border and Upper South. Conditionalists argued that Lincoln’s election served as no pretext for
secession and begged their southern brethren to wait and see how the first Republican president
would respond to the crisis. Conditional Unionists pledged their faith to the federal government
as long as it did not try to force the states that opted to secede back into the Union. A policy of
coercion, they warned, would in all likelihood convert them to the secessionist standard. In
addition to demanding that the federal government keep its hands off of any state that seceded,
the conditional Unionists pled for concessions from the North to settle the political imbroglio
over slavery. If they felt the North acted disingenuously on compromise or spurned it altogether,
conditionalists promised to jettison the Union. For conditional Unionists, secession equaled the
last resort in the crisis spawned by Lincoln’s election. The large contingent of Border and Upper
South Unionists frustrated the separatists, who viewed them as southern apostates.11
Separatists often operated in a world of black and white – to them all Republicans
endorsed abolitionism and all non-immediate secessionists did not have the best interest of the
South at heart – while cooperationists and Unionists viewed the crisis through a more realistic
prism. Non-separatists realized that not all Republicans sought the immediate abolition of
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slavery; they hoped that a national conservative impulse might overcome radicals North and
South; and many of them displayed a willingness once again to make an attempt at sectional
reconciliation. Although there were separatists in the Border South, the overwhelming majority
of border southerners fell into the cooperationist or Unionist camp. Still, this non-separatist
majority in the Border South should not lead one to the conclusion that the region faced a crisis
any less potent than in the eleven states that eventually made up the Confederacy. The Border
South, straddled along the boundary between slavery and freedom, occupied a most precarious
position, and even the slightest incident could imperil the region’s non-separatist majority.
The election of Lincoln and the precipitous action of the South Carolina legislature left
many border southerners feeling strangled by two very different extremes. George B. Kinkead
of Lexington, Kentucky, captured the precarious position of the Border South in the aftermath of
the election: “They [Kentuckians and border southerners] are excessively provoked at the
obstinacy and folly and malingering of the North and are utterly disgusted with South
Carolina.”12 The fear-mongering campaign tactics of non-Republicans in the Border South made
Lincoln’s election a cause for grave concern, but the geographic position of the region’s
populace and their well-tested but longstanding amicable relations with conservatives in the
Lower North meant immediate separatists had few adherents along the border. “Dis Union [sic]
I have not ever dreamed of, it would be the hight [sic] of folly, as well as treason,” John P. Gillis
remarked in response to his son’s query about what Delaware should do in response to Lincoln’s
election.

Across the Border South, persons of all political stripes complained that South

Carolina’s rush toward disunion forced the hand of the rest of the slaveholding states. W.S.
Bodley, a native of Louisville, interpreted the rash action of the Carolina radicals as the
consummation of a plot thirty years in the making. Fire-eaters in South Carolina exaggerated
12
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every wrong committed by the people of the North while they camouflaged every southern
iniquity in order to convert fretful southerners to their column, he complained. Bodley charged
that the Carolina radicals ignored or disregarded the needs of the Border South by pushing ahead
with secession. Kentucky and the rest of the Border South did not have the luxury of South
Carolina’s insulation from the free states, and the region depended upon the federal government
for slavery’s protection to a much greater degree than did the states further south. The secession
of the Border South would invalidate the Fugitive Slave Law and empower the personal liberty
legislation of the free states. Such a course played into the hands of abolitionists who sought to
rid the United States of slavery, he noted, “and it leaves the Southern States under the cost and
hazard of defending slavery as best they can with hostile neighbors and a diminished union,
exposed to all ills, internal & external, which now exist and innumerable other superadded.”13
The hasty progress of disunion in South Carolina and the Lower South revealed a major
disconnect between the two geographic extremities of the slaveholding states. Southerners along
the border agreed with their Cotton South brethren that several grievances surrounding the issue
of slavery existed, but most border southerners sought redress within the Union.

Border

southerners chafed at the Deep South fire-eaters who tried to dictate their approach to the crisis.
Some even charged that immediate separatists in the Lower South plotted to secede hurriedly in
order to create a Border South buffer that would “serve as a rampart against Northern crusaders.”
These border southerners protested that Lower South radicals cared little for the welfare of the
slaveholding states to their north and instead wanted the exposed Border South to act as a shield
against the federal government. Fire-eaters, on the other hand, lamented the hand-wringing of
border southerners. James M. Mason of Virginia sneered that “some of the Southern States will
13
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be tardy, & others recusant” on the issue of secession, while a South Carolinian was aghast when
he heard a rumor that John C. Breckinridge intended to undertake a tour of the South in support
of the Union.14 Internal southern political divisions, which had haunted the proponents of a
unified South for decades, had not vanished with the election of a Republican president.
Southern radicals and moderates continued to harbor doubts about one another, which made the
contradictory goals of each camp all the more difficult to attain and in the long run played into
the hands of northern politicians who had no inclination to consider any compromise on the
slavery issue.15
Even more egregious to southern radicals, many border southerners expressed a
willingness to allow Lincoln to enter the oval office before they made any decisions about their
future in the Union. John Brown’s raid and the speakership contest of 1859-1860 had buried the
Republican Party’s chances of building a viable organization in the Border South for the election
of 1860, but many border southerners still discerned varying strands of Republicanism. The
powerful tonic of a strong Unionist tradition and their experience with Lower North moderates
who had joined the Republicans as a last resort convinced many border southerners that they
should at least see how Lincoln would govern the nation before they took any action. As long as
perceived moderates such as Edward Bates of Missouri, Francis Preston Blair, Sr. of Maryland,
Thomas Corwin and Thomas Ewing of Ohio, and Simon Cameron of Pennsylvania exerted a
temperate influence over the party, some border southerners were willing to give the Republicans
a trial run. After all, Bates, Corwin, and Ewing had been key allies of Border South Whig
14
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moderates, while Blair and Cameron worked with Democrats from the border area in the days
before the advent of the Republican Party. The party’s decision to abandon the contentious
herald of the irrepressible conflict, William Henry Seward, in the election of 1860 demonstrated
to some Border South moderates that conservatives within the Republican Party had at least
some sway.16
Some Border South Unionists tried to paint Lincoln as a conservative, and to make their
case they often arrayed the president-elect against the more extreme members of the Republican
Party. These Unionists pointed out that Lincoln’s political record and views toward slavery were
far removed from pariahs like Charles Sumner or Henry Wilson, Massachusetts senators known
for their abolitionist tendencies. Several moderates, including Crittenden and Green Adams of
Kentucky, asked Lincoln to make a public statement of his conservative intentions toward
slavery in order to fend off secessionists and empower southern Unionists. Other conservative
Unionists familiar with Lincoln assured their friends and colleagues that the president-elect had
no intention of interfering with slavery in the states.17
George Prentice, a former Whig and editor of the Louisville Daily Journal, and Nathaniel
Paschall, publisher of the Democratic St. Louis Daily Missouri Republican, opened a dialog with
the president-elect around the time of the election in the hopes that Lincoln might confirm their
beliefs about his conservative stance toward the slavery issue. Both men candidly told Lincoln
that they had opposed him during the canvass, but had since become reconciled to his victory.
Rather than engage in a campaign of condemnation against the Republicans, both editors instead
16
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displayed a readiness to treat Lincoln fairly in their papers if he would only publish a letter in
which he promised to uphold the Fugitive Slave Law and ask for the free states to repeal their
personal liberty laws. Prentice calculated that such a letter would “take from the disunionists
every excuse or pretext for treason," while Paschall believed it would “keep down the excitement
now pervading the South.”18 Lincoln, however, rejected their overtures and instead directed the
editors to the Chicago Platform and his many speeches already in print for his stance on slavery.
The president-elect even suggested that if southern papers like Paschall’s, “which heretofore
have persistently garbled, and misrepresented what I have said, will now fully and fairly place it
before their readers, there can be no further misunderstanding.”19 Lincoln claimed he meant no
harm by his words, but they surely sounded anything but soothing to Paschall and Prentice.
No one can measure the effect of the public letter Lincoln never wrote, but it does seem
that he missed an opportunity to quell the fears of unmoved southern moderates at this early
interval. Paschall and Prentice wanted to portray Lincoln in the best light in order to ameliorate
otherwise unimpressed neighbors who sat on the fence between Union and secession. A public
statement straight from Lincoln’s pen might have convinced some skeptical southerners that their
moderate neighbors accurately interpreted the president-elect’s intentions toward slavery. With
the support of Paschall and Prentice and a public avowal from Lincoln, the impulse for disunion
may have once again been confined to the borders of the Palmetto State. Yet the blame cannot
wholly fall at Lincoln’s feet, for these Border South editors asked a great deal from the
president-elect, who had much on his mind. Lincoln correctly observed that time and again
southern radicals had misrepresented his words for their own political advantage. If he issued a
18
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statement in November it opened the door to more distortion and skullduggery. The presidentelect also faced the ominous task of sorting out patronage requests and cabinet appointments,
which added to his busy schedule, tried his patience, and probably contributed to his terse
response.20
Other Border South moderates continually harped on the fact that although the
Republicans had captured the White House, the legislative and judicial branches of the federal
government remained in the hands of conservatives. Upon Lincoln’s election several states had
yet to hold elections for the Thirty-seventh Congress, scheduled to convene in December 1861,
but prognosticators estimated that the Republicans would fall short of a majority in both the
House and the Senate.

Without a majority in Congress the Republicans could not pass

legislation offensive to the South, nor could Lincoln make objectionable appointments to his
cabinet or the Supreme Court. With a non-Republican legislative majority, the new president
also faced serious obstacles if he attempted to dole out patronage to unsuitable candidates in the
South. Moreover, only one Republican sat on the Supreme Court in 1860, and four of the
justices hailed from southern states. Southern Unionists pointed out that Chief Justice Roger B.
Taney’s court gave judicial imprimatur to slavery in the territories with the Dred Scott decision
in 1857, effectively nullifying the centerpiece of the Chicago Platform. Only a drastic alteration
in the composition of the justices could lead the Supreme Court away from its position on
slavery in the territories, and the likelihood of such a change remained remote as long as
Republicans could not carry a majority in the Senate. As a Maryland Unionist observed,
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“[Lincoln] is therefore utterly powerless; not one of his antislavery ideas can be engrafted into
the legislation of the Country.”21
Some moderates within the Border South called for the region to remain in the Union
because they believed the Republican Party teetered on the verge of destruction.

The

Republicans operated much better as political aspirants than as officeholders, Isaac Sturgeon of
St. Louis reasoned. Their purpose had been to capture the White House, and now that they had
accomplished that object the disparate wings of the organization would bicker over what policies
they should prioritize. He considered the Republican coalition too wieldy for it to govern
effectively and please all its adherents.

Sturgeon speculated that “within two years the

Republican party will be broken to pieces & that the fragments can not [sic] be glued together for
a canvass in ’64.” He and likeminded border southerners contended that secession would forfeit
an opportunity for the Democrats or some other conservative party to overtake the splintered
Republicans in the future.22
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The moderate Unionist outlook had a strong foothold in the Border South immediately
after Lincoln’s election, which provided some comfort to otherwise worried conservatives and
deceived Republicans who argued that the party need not grant concessions to the South in its
hour of victory. Most moderates understood the contingent nature of southern Unionist thought,
while Republicans could discern only one variety of Unionism – unconditional. Lincoln’s
refusal to issue a public statement to mollify southern Unionists illustrates how many
Republicans discounted the veracity of reports that the disunion movement might spread beyond
the confines of a few pockets of radicalism in the Deep South. The son of Congressman Charles
Francis Adams of Massachusetts reminisced that during this important interval he and other
Republicans “dwelt in a fool’s Paradise.” “We knew nothing of the South, had no realizing
sense of the intensity of feeling which there prevailed; we fully believed it would all end in
gasconade,” he recalled.23 Conservatives, on the other hand, comprehended the extremely brittle
nature of southern Unionism. In the event that radicals within the Republican Party gained the
upper hand, or if Lincoln tried to undermine the constitutional guarantees to protect slavery, or if
their moderate allies in the North allowed the Republicans to achieve a majority in Congress,
border southerners warned that they would reevaluate their place in the Union. A Missourian
who voted for Lincoln reflected this stance when he admitted “there is much about the
Republican party I dont [sic] like – those who advocate the abominable personal liberty bills –
and the abolition element embraced in this.” He felt as though Lincoln did not belong to this
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abolition element, but hinted that if the new president proved otherwise or failed to respect the
Fugitive Slave Law, he would reconsider his support of the administration.24
A more urgent problem existed for Border South moderates and Unionists. Southern
Unionists prayed that Congress would secure a permanent settlement on the volatile slavery issue
in order to isolate secession fervor.

If the Republicans refused to consider some sort of

compromise on slavery, however, moderates could not promise to keep their constituents in line.
A Republican refusal to retreat from the Chicago Platform kept afloat the possibility that all
fifteen slaveholding states would leave the Union.25 The legislatures of Delaware and Missouri
were scheduled to meet around the start of the new year, while the governors of Kentucky and
Maryland toyed with the idea of calling their legislative bodies into special session.26 If the
Republicans balked on the issue of conciliation in Congress, the Border South legislatures might
very well follow the Lower South blueprint and call state conventions to consider secession.
Before Congress met, rumors and innuendo complicated matters for Border South
moderates. Mob violence and slave stealing resumed along the Kansas-Missouri border in
November 1860 and resulted in several murders; most Missourians blamed the notorious James
Montgomery, a one-time ally of John Brown in Kansas, for the unrest on the heels of the
Republican victory. The lame-duck Missouri governor dispatched General Daniel Frost and a
portion of the state militia to the western border and instructed the units to repel all invasions
from Kansas.

Frost reported that the recent incursions from Kansas had provoked many

Missourians to move elsewhere because they feared for their lives and wanted to protect their
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slaves from theft.27 Frost’s men encountered no opposition once they reached the border, but the
mere fact that the governor found it necessary to send a portion of the militia westward
heightened the anxiety of many Missourians. David M. Fox, a resident of eastern Missouri,
questioned how anyone in the state could claim they wanted to wait and see what the Lincoln
administration would do in the aftermath of the outbreak of violence. “There is yet no cause for
us to move – [Lincoln] is going to do justice to all sections of the Country, Bah!!” Fox
sarcastically wrote. “The justice which he is about to deal out will be such as views portrayed by
him in speeches two years ago.”28 He equated the actions of the Kansans with the presidentelect’s famous House Divided speech, in which Lincoln utilized Biblical imagery to predict that
a showdown between slavery and freedom awaited the United States in the near future. The
outbreak of violence along the Missouri-Kansas line literally raised the ghost of John Brown for
some border southerners. Montgomery denied involvement with the killings, but he reportedly
promised to commence a campaign against slavery in western Missouri at the first opportunity.
As long as Lincoln remained in the White House and preached the rhetoric of a House Divided,
some fretted, the Border South would endure constant attacks from outsiders. Fox considered
the resumption of violence on the western border the tangible consummation of the Republican
program to destroy slavery, and the South added to its own endangerment with every passing
moment it remained in the Union. Years of Republican anti-southern and antislavery rhetoric, he
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gathered, had provoked zealots like Montgomery to raise the sword against the peculiar
institution and now secession remained the only alternative for aggrieved southerners.29
Rumors of an abolitionist intrusion into Kentucky also undermined the Border South
Unionist position. After the election a citizen in Felicity, Ohio, anonymously sent a warning to
the clerk of court in Augusta, Kentucky, situated on the southern bank of the Ohio River
approximately forty miles southeast of Cincinnati, that a band of Ohio abolitionists planned to
invade Bracken County and free any slaves they found.

Two concerned Augusta natives

forwarded the warning to Kentucky Governor Beriah Magoffin. Although they acknowledged
the likelihood of a hoax, the men still asked Magoffin if the state would provide arms to repel
any invasion. The writers reminded the governor that exiled abolitionist John G. Fee currently
resided in Felicity, and they surmised that the Republican victory may have motivated him to
take action against slavery in the Bluegrass State.30
The Border South wobbled between the North and the South during these heady days,
and Unionists across the region comprehended both the scope of the fight on their hands and the
need for immediate combat against secessionists in their midst. George Prentice’s newspaper
became the voice of Unionists throughout the Border South. He counseled border southerners to
set aside partisan differences and work for the preservation of the Union, and advised moderates
to hold public meetings in order to engage in “political worship around the altar of their
country.” Prentice acknowledged that Kentucky and the Border South should take on the
position of mediator in the conflict, for these states represented the true middle ground of the
nation. “Instead of being a satellite to be dragged at the tail and to follow the fortunes of some
distant and eccentric State, she [Kentucky] is the firm centre to which they must be attracted.
29
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Massachusetts and South Carolina may fly off like excited sparks from the solid iron,” Prentice
intoned, “But Kentucky is not going to follow the sparks.”31
Just like Lower South fire-eaters, Border South moderates mobilized in November 1860.
In the following months, Unionists organized a plethora of meetings and rallies across the region
in order to dull the appeals of disunionists in their midst. John Pendleton Kennedy began
composing an influential Unionist pamphlet addressed to the people of the Border South just five
days after the election.

After reading secessionist sermons delivered by his Presbyterian

colleagues Reverend Benjamin Morgan Palmer and Reverend James Henley Thornwell,
Danville, Kentucky, minister Robert J. Breckinridge threw his services to the Union cause. Over
the following months Breckinridge delivered Unionist speeches, traded oratorical blows with his
Presbyterian friends who now advocated the dismemberment of the nation, and oversaw the
dissemination of tracts outlining his pro-Union position.32
The Unionist campaign had great effect throughout the region, and Border South
conservatives initially overawed the proponents of secession with their onslaught. Moderates
utilized the resources at their disposal to bombard border country southerners with their plea for
a measured response to the crisis of the Union. Several major themes emerged in the Unionist
assault and exerted a powerful hold over border southerners throughout the crisis.

First,

conservatives underscored the need for the states of the Border South to stick together in the
unfolding predicament.

The definition of the Border South remained in flux at this early

interval, for most Union polemicists assigned the label to Virginia and some attached it to North
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Carolina and Tennessee. Nonetheless, Unionists time and again reiterated the power of these
slaveholding states and charged them with the task of holding the line against sectional
extremism from both directions. Kennedy argued that the “firmness, justice, and dignified
bearing” of the Border South states would make them “the authoritative and controlling power to
devise and establish the foundations of a secure and durable settlement, with every provision for
the preservation of Southern rights which the seceding States themselves could reasonably
demand.”33 A divided Border South would sap the strength for a permanent settlement of the
slavery issue and provide aid to the secessionists of the Lower South, moderates feared.
Several suggestions about how to maintain Border South unity entered into public
discourse in the months following Lincoln’s election. Because by the end of 1860 all seven of
the Lower South states had initiated the process of calling state conventions to consider
secession, some moderates entertained the idea to call a convention of the eight states that
comprised the Border and Upper South. A Tennessee Unionist predicted that upon meeting
these states could “fix upon a line of policy, saying to the North & South, this far shalt thou go,
& no farther.”34 Other southern Unionists proclaimed that both the free and slave states along
the border should meet in convention in order to receive input from moderates in both the Upper
South and the Lower North. This convention would then present some political settlement to the
rest of the nation in the hopes of silencing sectional radicals and reconstructing the Union. Some
Unionists, including John Pendleton Kennedy, Thomas Hicks, William C. Rives of Virginia, and
Willard Saulsbury of Delaware, hoped to add strength to this proposal by adding an essential
33
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rider: if the states of the Lower South or the Upper North spurned the border compromise, then
the free and slave border states would create their own middle confederacy.

A middle

confederacy, shorn of sectional radicals in the Upper North and Lower South, “would obviate the
only difficulty in the way of settling this matter of slavery relations on a proper basis and
forever.”35
As a corollary to the appeal for Border South unity, moderates played upon the strong
desire for intersectional unity that had been a key feature of the region throughout the antebellum
period. During the 1850s the people of the Border South regarded the inhabitants of the Lower
North as conservative allies who would blunt the thrust of sectionalists who used the slavery
issue for political advantage. Once again, border country moderates called on their neighbors to
trust Lower North moderates. Whether staking out ground for a settlement on the slavery issue
or even building a new middle confederacy, Border South Unionists stressed that the
conservative sentiment in this region could overwhelm the Republicans and fire-eaters
throughout the nation. They pointed to the results of the presidential election, where Lincoln
amassed less than forty percent of the popular vote, as evidence of a bi-sectional conservative
groundswell, and John Pendleton Kennedy projected that seventy-five to ninety percent of the
northern population would not countenance any infringement upon the constitutional rights of
the South. Secession instantly forfeited the northern component that had been so instrumental in
keeping radical elements at bay in the turbulent 1850s. “Nothing, therefore, can be more
suicidal,” Robert J. Breckinridge roared, “than for the border slave States to adopt any line of
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conduct which can justly deprive them of the sympathy and confidence of the border free
States.”36
Second, Border South moderates stressed that the people of their region would not
tolerate northern or southern extremists dictating policy to them. In effect, border southerners
proclaimed that they would resist fanatical abolitionists or radical fire-eaters bullying them into a
hurried decision about their future place in the Union. “We are down on both the secessionists
and abolitionists believing in our humble opinions they are working for the same end but in a
different manner,” a Marylander intoned.37

Border South conservatives reminded their

constituents that they should not blindly follow disunionists nor react precipitously to the taunts
of northern radicals because doing so would only lead to a fractured nation. Rather, the people
of the region should confine these extremists to the margins and follow a trail with their own
self-interest in mind. Unionists and moderates claimed that path had been cut over the previous
eighty years by conservatives who had labored for conciliation and compromise, such as Henry
Clay. Maryland governor Thomas Hicks reminded Crittenden that in this crisis he represented
the “forlorn hope” of the Border South because he must imitate the “Immortal Clay.” Other
border moderates looked to Stephen Douglas to take on the mantle of conservative leadership,
while some hoped that partisan differences might fall by the wayside in order for the two
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political giants to unite on behalf of compromise when the new session of Congress opened in
early December.38
Many Border South Unionists had argued that the Republicans represented the greatest
threat to the safety of the Union during the canvass of 1860, but in the aftermath of the election
they aimed their wrath at the fire-eaters of the Lower South. With Lincoln elected by a legal
vote, border country moderates had to switch gears. Now moderates stressed that fire-eaters
would greatly endanger the Border South if they pulled the rest of the slaveholding states out of
the Union. The secession of the Border South would expose the region to inestimable dangers
while insulating the Gulf South from abolitionist excursions, slave escapes, and in the event of
war, the brunt of the conflict. A Kentuckian complained that Deep South disunionists “do not
stay to fight the battle but desert, & leave inestimable treasures & priceless blessings to perish
behind them.” “The cry of disunion comes, not from those who suffer most from northern
outrage,” Kentuckian Amos Kendall observed, “but from those who suffer least.”

South

Carolina, Georgia, and Alabama lost one slave to every one hundred in the Border South,
Kendall argued, where the enticements of free soil lay just across the Ohio River, the northern
border of Maryland and Delaware, and on three sides of Missouri. Some bold Unionists went so
far to declare that the Border South had a completely different destiny than did the cotton states
and welcomed the idea of a permanent separation between their own region and the Lower
South.39
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Historians have often pointed out that fire-eaters exploited the southern code of honor to
convert their wavering neighbors to the disunionist standard. The code of honor was built upon
the contradictory concepts of liberty and slavery. A truly honorable man enjoyed unencumbered
liberty, while a person without honor submitted to the will of others, as did an enslaved person.
Although the code of honor had receded in other parts of the nation by the middle of the
nineteenth century, it remained vibrant in the South, where the omnipresence of enslaved persons
provided white southerners with a corporeal reminder of the antithesis of liberty.

White

southerners jealously protected their honor and would resort to violence if they felt another had
attempted to trespass upon their liberty. Southern radicals in the Deep South whipped up
secession sentiment in late 1860 by proclaiming that anyone who submitted to Republican rule
lacked honor.40 Border South moderates, however, also employed the rhetoric of honor when
building their case for the Union. During their Unionist offensive these moderates constantly
painted Lower South radicals as cowards who simply wanted to use the Border South “as a
barrier to protect them from the fierce abolition [element] of the North that they are arousing, but
utterly impotent to avert.” A truly honorable southerner would never shirk his duty as the fireeaters attempted to do, moderates argued, and allow someone else to fight for him. Handing
one’s destiny over to sectional radicals equaled a forfeiture of the border southerner’s liberty and
also imbued a sense of dishonor. An Elkton, Kentucky, native noticed that Unionists in his town
had confronted some townspeople who favored disunion, and these secessionists no longer
sported their secession cockades when out in public. “I hope that the wearers have become
40
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ashamed of their disunion badges,” he remarked. The words honor, shame, impotency, and
cowardice had a powerful meaning even in the Border South, and Unionists made good use of it,
albeit in a much different fashion than did the fire-eaters of the Lower South. They wielded
honor against both the radicals in their midst and those in the North and South who would
jeopardize the safety of the Union.

“While [Kentucky] disdains to assume the offensive,

vaunting, blustering style of South Carolina, she is no less jealous of her honor,” one Border
South inhabitant insisted, “and with dignity and firmness demands of the North that redress
which she regards as her due.”41
Perhaps more than any other element in the nation, Border South moderates realized the
potential for war if secession became a reality. Moreover, they perceived that the scope of the
conflict would far surpass what many Americans imagined. A writer in DeBow’s Review, a New
Orleans-based commercial and agricultural magazine that supported disunion, considered war
unlikely in the event that all fifteen slaveholding states seceded, but also made the Janus-faced
concession that all great nations had endured civil wars. This proponent of secession fed the
fears of Border South moderates when he blithely stated that if the more northerly slave states
opted to remain in the Union and war commenced, they could serve as “a barrier to the access of
abolition emissaries.” Lower South editors in favor of secession dismissed the prospect of war
or estimated that a conflict would result in few casualties, and one South Carolina fire-eater
reputedly announced that all the blood shed as a result of secession would hardly fill up a
thimble.42

Time and again fire-eaters promised that their course provided safety to the
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slaveholding states, but those who inhabited the exposed frontier of slavery questioned such
assurances. Although the Border South usually enjoyed harmonious relations with the Lower
North in the preceding decades, the region had endured periodic episodes of violence. The
conflict on Missouri’s western border, episodic confrontations over the reclamation of fugitive
slaves, and the specter of slave revolts brought on by zealots like John Brown conditioned border
southerners to expect much worse if a full-scale conflict erupted, and nothing could more quickly
bring about such a clash than secession. Moderates were mindful that nearly all northerners
exalted the Union and would likely condone an armed conflict to preserve it.

John Pendleton

Kennedy vividly portrayed the outcome for the Border South should they opt to secede. He
predicted “the sack of cities, the brutal and indiscriminate murder of old and young of either sex,
the rape and rapine, the conflagration, the shriek of surprised families, [and] the midnight flight
of mothers and children tracking their way with bleeding feet.”43
Secession, moderates argued, produced instability and desolation for the border rather
than safety and contentment as fire-eaters prophesied. Suffused with realism about war that
other Americans lacked, border country moderates took to the stump to push for mediation, a
course that best protected the Border South, rather than confrontation in the aftermath of
Lincoln’s election. In a public letter in support of a sober approach to the crisis Kentuckian
Amos Kendall howled that the states of the Border South “do not intend that their peaceful
channels of commerce shall become rivers of blood to gratify the ambition of South Carolina and
Alabama.”44
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The third major theme of the moderates’ campaign built on the first two. Border South
conservatives insisted that the Union provided the best shelter for the institution of slavery, while
secession endangered the long-term viability of the region’s social, economic, and political
foundation. Moderates argued that if the states of the Border South seceded, they would put the
peculiar institution in their region on the fast track to extinction. They cited a surfeit of reasons
for their contention. Most importantly, secession meant the Border South surrendered the many
protections the federal government offered to the institution of slavery. For a region that
suffered more escaped slaves than any other part of the South, relinquishing the federal
government’s power to capture fugitive slaves would place the institution on extremely shaky
ground. The Fugitive Slave Law, which one Kentucky Unionist deemed “effective in its power
of recapture but infinitely more potent in its moral agency preventing the escape of slaves,” had
for the most part been faithfully enforced since its inception in 1850. Secession nullified this law
and brought the boundary of Canada down to the northern edge of the Border South. 45
Conservatives admitted that the power of recapture would be lost because the United States
would function as a foreign nation, but they seemed far more distressed that secession would
serve as an invitation for enslaved persons to escape. “What are a hundred slaves – or twenty –
or more or less – worth within twenty miles of a foreign country?” a Baltimore native
rhetorically queried. Their fear of the flood gates opening for escapes underscores how enslaved
persons utilized any leverage available to them in the master-slave relationship for their own
ends. The mere exercise of flight operated as a potent form of slave resistance and in the case of
the Border South it contained a sharp political edge. Moderates acknowledged that Border South
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slaves would easily comprehend the ramifications of secession and use the absence of the
Fugitive Slave Law to their advantage, and they argued that remaining in the Union would
prevent a northward slave drain and the depression of slave prices.46
The secession of the Border South would convert northern allies who pledged to uphold
the Fugitive Slave Law into enemies. The realistic outlook about armed conflict in the event of
secession troubled border moderates because they recognized that the Border South would
become the seat of war. “I would affectionately ask – will not your slaves be less secure, and
their labor less profitable under the new order of things than under the old?” Winfield Scott
questioned. If plunged into war, the Border South could no longer devote the proper resources
needed to maintain the peculiar institution. Invading armies would solicit the escape of enslaved
persons, and white Border South males would have to choose between protecting their families
and enlisting in the southern cause and fighting in far-off theaters.

More harrowing than

anything else, the outbreak of war unloosed all restraint and set the stage for a servile
insurrection on par with the Haitian Revolution. The specter of a massive slave revolt had long
concerned southerners, and Border South moderates claimed secession would make this
nightmare a reality. The recent spate of violence on Missouri’s western border and the rumors of
abolitionist incursions into the Border South gave their prediction some credence.47
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Border country moderates also pointed to the fact that if the region seceded and joined
the Lower South in a slaveholding republic, the Cotton South would dominate the new
government. In that case, the Border South’s interests would be subordinate to those of the Gulf
South. John Pendleton Kennedy predicted that the states of the Lower South would push for the
reopening of the African slave trade, disagree with the Border South about economic policy, and
move to acquire additional territory in the Caribbean and Latin America.

Each of these

initiatives would depress the price of enslaved persons in the Border South and along with the
massive numbers of northward slave escapes expedite the destruction of slavery in the region,
Kennedy reasoned. Robert J. Breckinridge echoed Kennedy’s warnings and bluntly asserted that
if the Border South seceded “we will have taken the most effectual means of extinguishing
[slavery]; and that in the most disastrous of all possible ways.”48
Moderates and Unionists in the Border South certainly did not understate the magnitude
of the crisis that confronted their region. They recognized the enormous stakes at risk if the
Union broke apart, and they hoped to avoid such a calamity at all costs. The final theme of the
conservative offensive accentuated this reality. Moderates argued that the federal government
must not attempt to use force to bring any state that seceded back into the Union, and that if a
state did leave the Union its inhabitants should not attack federal troops or officials in their
midst. The emergent cold war between the Lower South and the federal government must not
become a hot one, Unionists contended; such a circumstance would ruin the chances of a
mediated settlement. Across the nation people realized that the geographic position of the
Border South, along with its political heritage, placed the region in the vanguard of conciliation.
“The Middle States must be the mediators of this terrible strife,” Robert C. Winthrop wrote to
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Kennedy. “If they will only assert their prerogative & assume the umpire, we shall all fall in
with their decision.”49

Any attempts at coercion jeopardized the Unionist initiative, and

moderates pled for both the federal government and the secessionists of the Lower South to keep
their weapons holstered.
The Unionist campaign helped to keep secessionists at bay in the Border and Upper
South in November and the following months. Had moderates and conservatives in these eight
states simply thrown up their hands and let events unfold on their own, the seeds of disunion
sentiment may have blossomed in mid-winter and led politicians in the Border and Upper South
to call conventions merely as a response to Lincoln’s election as had the legislatures of the
Lower South. To the frustration of fire-eaters, Unionists immediately took the initiative and
prostrated the secession movement in the Border South. They preached the value of the Union
and the possibility of attaining some settlement on the slavery issue, which left disunionists
disappointed and on the defensive. The campaign forced fire-eaters in the Border South to rely
upon some outside event – such as coercion on the part of the federal government, the inability
of Congress to agree to terms on a settlement satisfactory to southerners, or the secession of
Virginia, the crown jewel of the South - to spur their neighbors into action.50
Progress toward a compromise served as the fuel of the Border South Unionist offensive.
Conservatives cast their eyes toward Washington, where the second session of the Thirty-Sixth
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Congress assembled on December 3, 1860, two weeks before South Carolina’s delegates were
scheduled to meet and decide the fate of the Palmetto State.

Moderates hoped that the

momentum of the Unionist campaign would carry over to Capitol Hill and result in a permanent
settlement of the slavery issue which might isolate South Carolina extremists, incapacitate fireeaters across the South, neutralize northern radicals who sought an abolitionist political agenda,
and relieve the intersectional tension that threatened to yield a civil war. Crittenden traveled to
Washington cognizant that his curtain call in the Senate required his greatest effort yet.
Upon reaching the national capital, Crittenden sensed that many of his colleagues had
returned to Washington with a defiant mindset. Democrats, Republicans, and moderates alike
assigned the blame for the crisis on their partisan foes; southern politicians clamoring for
secession claimed that Lincoln’s election sealed the fate of the South; and fire-eaters and
northern radicals stared one another down in the streets of Washington.

President James

Buchanan’s mouthpiece in the capital announced that the Republicans had to initiate the process
of conciliation in order to satisfy the South.

The pro-Buchanan editor asked whether the

Republicans would step back from the Chicago Platform and open the door to the preservation of
the Union, “or will they let it go unchecked along the path to destruction, whither all their efforts
for years past have tended to impel it?" The Republican newspaper in the capital, on the other
hand, laid all responsibility for the salvation of the Union at Buchanan’s feet. The fate of the
nation depended upon whether or not the lame duck president would “concede the right of a
State to go out of the Union, and nullify all Federal laws, and take possession of all Federal
property within her jurisdiction, at pleasure.”51 These two approaches differed immensely. The
pro-Buchanan penman called for Republicans to retreat from the party’s keystone tenet in their
hour of triumph, while the Republican scribe made no mention of compromise as a key to saving
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the Union. Crittenden and his followers had to strike some middle ground in order to build a
coalition in favor of conciliation.
Nearly all border southerners believed that any effective settlement relied upon
Republican acquiescence. Crittenden and other Unionists sought a permanent settlement of the
slavery issue and thus needed at least a portion of the Republican Party on board. Without
Republican cooperation, the political battle over slavery might continue in perpetuity. Not all
Republicans took as intransigent a stance as did the publishers of the National Republican, which
gave Border South moderates some hope. Influential Republican editor Thurlow Weed, who had
long served as New York Senator William Seward’s political manager, had in late November
proposed a settlement of the slavery issue on the basis of the Missouri Compromise. Weed
suggested restoring the 1820 Missouri Compromise line, at 36°30′ north latitude, which had been
repealed in 1854 by the Kanas-Nebraska Act, to the territories; slavery would be allowed in all
territory south of the line and forbidden in all territory north of the line.

Weed’s close

relationship with Seward, who nearly all Americans viewed as the leader of the Republican
Party, offered to moderates a glimmer of hope that some Republicans would at least consider
some form of compromise.52
Congress heard Buchanan’s annual message on Tuesday, December 4, 1860, and it did
little to assuage the apprehension of Border South moderates who yearned for a settlement.
Detractors had long considered Buchanan a doughface politician who bent to every whim of the
South; his support of the Lecompton Constitution in 1857 and subsequent break with Stephen
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Douglas had contributed to the fracture of the Democratic Party and confirmed the suspicions of
his enemies. The nation needed leadership during early December, but Buchanan’s term expired
in just three months and his message indicated his ardent desire to leave office without the crisis
escalating into a full-blown war.

In proper partisan fashion, Buchanan charged that the

abolitionists of the North had brought the sectional controversy to its present state and chastised
the Republican Party for politicizing the slavery issue and feeding the incertitude of southerners.
Although Buchanan understood the dread of the southern people, he contended that the legal
election of Lincoln served as no impetus for disunion. The lame duck president forcefully
affirmed that the Constitution denied the right of secession, yet in the same breath he deflected
all responsibility for dealing with South Carolina to Congress. Furthermore, Buchanan insisted
that the federal government possessed no power to keep South Carolina in the Union by force.
Beyond a recommendation that each northern state repeal any personal liberty laws on its statute
books, he advised Congress to call a national convention for the purpose of passing a
constitutional amendment that recognized the right of slavery in the states, protected slavery in
the territories, and affirmed the right of masters to retrieve fugitive slaves.53
Few people found solace in Buchanan’s wavering position toward secession. Some
charged the president with ineptitude; others alleged he had shirked his executive duty. A
Douglas Democratic paper found Buchanan’s logic “simply absurd” and concluded that the
North would never acquiesce to his suggestion of protecting slavery in the territories. “Mr.
Buchanan’s disastrous administration began by disappointing the friends of peace,” a Republican
editor thundered in response to the message, “and it was fitting that it should close in a like
manner.” A New Orleans paper in favor of secession regarded Buchanan’s proposal for a
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constitutional amendment nothing more than “a filmy cover of an ulcerous surface” which left
the cancer, northern fanaticism, intact. Crittenden considered the message “a vile mass of
cowardly verbiage to colour over his base surrender of the Union,” and immediately began
drafting a series of compromise resolutions to submit to the Senate.54
Partisanship drove antebellum politics, and Crittenden understood that it might serve as
an obstacle to a settlement. Partisan passions, after all, had forestalled a collaborative effort of
anti-Republican forces during the canvass of 1860 with disastrous results. In order to find some
solution, politicians would have to set aside party goals and work for the preservation of the
Union. Crittenden apparently made overtures for Democrats to assist him in his quest for
compromise. Francis P. Blair, Sr., a consummate Washington insider, surmised that Crittenden
and Stephen Douglas, the leader of the northern Democrats, were “in cahoot.” Douglas told the
Senate he would “act with any individual of any party” who sought to save the nation, and he
appealed to the rest of his colleagues to “lay aside all party grievances, party feuds, [and]
partisan jealousies” so they may work toward that end. Crittenden also reached out to fellow
Kentuckian Lazarus Powell, a Democrat, who on December 6 introduced a resolution in the
Senate in which he recommended the creation of a committee comprised of thirteen senators
from all sectional and partisan backgrounds. In order to remove the “disease in the bodypolitic,” Powell called for the committee to craft legislation or constitutional amendments to
“give permanent security, and restore harmony, concord, and fraternal feeling, between the
people North and South, and save the Union from speedy dissolution.” Over the next couple of
weeks fire-eaters and hardline Republicans, both of whom sought to obstruct any avenue that led
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to a possible compromise, delivered speeches and utilized stall tactics in an effort to prevent the
formation of the committee. Attention swung over to the House of Representatives, where
moderates hoped to make more headway.55
Two days prior to the introduction of Powell’s proposition, Virginian Alexander Boteler
had secured passage of a similar resolution in the House that created a committee of one
congressman from each state to consider the issue of compromise. Unlike in the Senate, Speaker
of the House William Pennington wasted little time appointing members to the House
committee. Henry Winter Davis of Maryland, William Whiteley of Delaware, Francis Bristow
of Kentucky, and John Phelps of Missouri represented the Border South on the Committee of
Thirty-three. Whiteley and Phelps belonged to the Democratic Party, while Bristow, a former
Whig, allied with the southern Opposition. Davis called himself a member of the Opposition,
but his maneuvers in the speakership contest and during the election of 1860 demonstrated that
he had nearly completed his transformation to the Republican Party. Although Pennington
moved quickly to make appointments, his decision ruffled the feathers of some congressmen.
George Hawkins of Florida and William Boyce of South Carolina, both of whom insisted
Congress could do nothing to save the Union at this point, asked Pennington to remove them
from the committee. The House subsequently voted that neither Boyce nor Hawkins could
recuse themselves from service on the panel; despite this ruling the two congressmen rarely
attended the committee’s meetings. Northern Democrats also complained that the Republican
speaker had purposely kept members of their wing of the party off the committee because they
would actively work with moderate southerners in pursuit of a settlement.

The northern

Democrats’ criticism had merit. Pennington placed sixteen Republicans on the committee; the
only two Democrats from free states hailed from California and Oregon. With one master
55

Francis P. Blair, Sr., to Frank Blair, Jr., Jan. 2, [1861], Blair Family Papers, LOC; CG, 28, 19, 24.

190

stroke, Pennington had effectively silenced the voice of conservatism in the Northeast and
Midwest. The rest of the Democrats represented each southern state except for Kentucky,
Maryland, and Tennessee, from which Pennington assigned Americans to the committee. The
speaker named Republican Thomas Corwin of Ohio chairman.

The moderate Republican

Corwin faced an uphill battle due to the polarized partisan nature of his committee. If Henry
Winter Davis, who privately considered the body a “humbug,” voted with the Republicans and
any southerners abstained from participation, the Republicans held a decisive majority on the
panel and thus could easily kill any compromise proposal.56
Despite the Republican effort to pack the Committee of Thirty-three in their favor, the
establishment of a special commission to deal with the issue of compromise added up to a small
victory for conservatives. Corwin moved quickly and convened the committee on December 11,
which demonstrated his earnest desire to find some solution to the national crisis. The creation
of the committee buoyed the hopes of Border South moderates who longed for Congress to reach
a settlement. George Prentice predicted the House committee “will be the dove to pluck the
olive branch and place it within the ark of our constitutional liberty and glory and
independence.” As long as the committee advanced toward compromise, border moderates
could hold off the overtures of secessionists. Early signs indicated that numerous congressmen
were receptive to conciliation: the House referred a plethora of compromise proposals to the
committee in early December, and Thomas A.R. Nelson of Tennessee introduced a
comprehensive settlement to the panel during its second meeting. Nelson aimed his compromise
package directly at the grievances of the people living in the Border and Upper South and
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probably consulted Crittenden because his proposal closely resembled the package that the
Kentuckian later introduced to the Senate. It consisted of three constitutional amendments which
reintroduced the Missouri Compromise line as a boundary between slavery and freedom in the
territories; prohibited Congress from interfering with the interstate slave trade, abolishing slavery
in the District of Columbia, and reinstating the international slave trade; gave constitutional
imprimatur to the capture of fugitive slaves and the compensation of slaveholders who could not
reclaim their property; and set up a system by which presidential electors would have to split
their votes between northern and southern candidates.57
The prospects of the committee finding some solution brightened when on December 13
Henry Winter Davis entered a resolution that called for the revision of personal liberty laws in
the North. Davis, whose initial poor opinion of the committee and the prospect of compromise
had changed, also submitted legislation that would allow fugitive slaves a trial by jury and
granted magistrates hearing these cases a single fee for their services.

Davis aimed his

suggestions squarely at the border states. His resolution and recommended revisions of the
Fugitive Slave Law addressed the complaints of border country conservatives in each section.
Border southerners felt that personal liberty laws impinged upon their property rights, protected
by the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution. Border northerners, on the other hand, had long
protested that the Fugitive Slave Law unfairly stacked the system against alleged escaped slaves.
The fate of a prisoner rested in the hands of a single federal official who received ten dollars if
he ruled to return the person to slavery and five dollars if he found the captured individual
entitled to freedom.

Published slave narratives and the testimony of African Americans

confirmed that the Fugitive Slave Law had indeed resulted in innocent free blacks being placed
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in shackles and sent southward. A trial by jury and a flat fee for magistrates would ostensibly
add objectivity to fugitive slave cases. With this proposition Davis intended to capitalize on the
intersectional amity that border southerners found absolutely essential to the preservation of
slavery in their states.58
Southern firebrands in Washington realized that as long as moderates dangled the
possibility of compromise before the voters, the South’s electorate might once again waver on
disunion. The same day Winter Davis offered his proposal to the committee, Albert Rust of
Arkansas submitted a resolution that affirmed the legitimacy of southern grievances and implied
that if the committee could not reach a settlement on these complaints, the South would likely
secede. William McKee Dunn of Indiana introduced a substitute for Rust’s resolution which
upheld the Arkansan’s claim of southern grievances and the need for adjustment, but dropped the
language that hinted at disunion. The Dunn resolution passed twenty two to eight, with all of the
negative votes coming from Republicans.

Fire-eaters, hungry for any sign of Republican

intransigence, conveniently ignored the fact that eight members of Lincoln’s party also voted in
favor of Dunn’s conciliatory resolution. Reuben Davis, Mississippi’s representative on the
Committee of Thirty-three, saw the Republican negative votes as a means to fan the flames of
disunion sentiment. That night at a caucus of southern congressmen and senators he presented a
document with the bold proclamation that “all hope of relief in the Union…is extinguished” due
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to Republican obduracy. Twenty-nine southern politicians signed Davis’s “Southern Manifesto,”
which also recommended immediate separate state secession for the South.

None of the

signatories, however, hailed from the Border South, and only three Upper South politicians
affixed their name to the document. The introduction of conciliatory measures on the Committee
of Thirty-three deepened the wedge between the various sub-regions within the South.59
While the Committee of Thirty-three debated Winter Davis’s proposal, Crittenden on
December 18 finally revealed his compromise package to the Senate. The old Kentuckian
remarked that he had studied the sectional controversy with great care and now wished to submit
a proposal that would please all aggrieved parties and permanently end political agitation over
slavery. He begged all political partisans, especially the Republicans, to place the nation above
party platforms and work for a solution. “I fear [secession] may swallow up even old Kentucky
in its vortex,” Crittenden warned, unless Congress accomplished something in the next three
months. If politicians allowed partisanship and petty jealousies to clog any advancement toward
a settlement, he predicted that “anarchy and war” would follow disunion within half a year.
Although several conservatives offered their own proposals for a settlement both prior to and
after December 18, the Crittenden plan served as the polestar for moderates in both houses of
Congress.60
The centerpiece of the Crittenden Compromise dealt with the thorny territorial issue.
Crittenden offered a constitutional amendment that reintroduced the Missouri Compromise line
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as a division between slavery and freedom in the territories. His first amendment forbade the
introduction of slavery in all territory north of 36°30′ then in the possession of the federal
government. Furthermore, the amendment provided that slavery could not be introduced to any
territory subsequently acquired north of the line. South of the line, however, slavery “is hereby
recognized as existing, and shall not be interfered with by Congress, but shall be protected as
property by all the departments of the territorial government during its continuance.” When the
people of these territories applied for statehood, they could enter the Union as a free or slave
state depending upon their choice.61
Crittenden carefully worded his territorial amendment to appease northerners worried
about southern expansion and filibustering. His stipulation for slavery south of the line omitted
mentioning any territory acquired at a later date, so in effect it applied only to the currently held
portions of present-day Arizona and New Mexico. The original wording of the amendment
boxed slavery into a territorial cage, and it freed the federal government from the responsibility
of protecting the peculiar institution therein.

The latter provision undercut Breckinridge

Democrats who had clamored for the federal government to oversee the protection of slavery in
the West. Furthermore, it closely resembled the suggestion made by Republican Thurlow Weed
in the Albany Evening Journal. Historians have often overlooked the cautious verbiage of
Crittenden’s original territorial amendment, but contemporary fire-eaters took notice. Henry
Winter Davis chuckled that the lack of a hereafter acquired clause for territory south of the line
frustrated disunionists, whose “ultimatum is a right to carry slavery to the South pole & a bribe
to filibustering in Mexico to expand the institution!” Conservative southerners and proponents
of popular sovereignty, on the other hand, appreciated that Crittenden included language that
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undercut the Wilmot Proviso and explicitly forbade Congress from interfering with slavery in the
territories.62
The other five amendments of the Crittenden plan also dealt with the political issue of
slavery: Congress could not interfere with slavery in areas under its exclusive jurisdiction, such
as federal forts and dockyards in southern states; Congress could not abolish slavery in the
District of Columbia so long as the institution existed in Virginia and Maryland, and any
emancipation scheme must be with the consent of and include compensation to the district’s
slaveholders; Congress could not obstruct the interstate slave trade; slaveholders who
encountered abolitionist obfuscation in the free states while attempting to reclaim a fugitive slave
would be allowed to sue the northern county where the interference took place for just
compensation; and, finally, no future amendment to the Constitution could overturn the five
preceding amendments, nor could any forthcoming amendment grant Congress the power to
abolish slavery in any of the states where it existed. Crittenden also attached four resolutions to
his package which stated the constitutional legitimacy of the Fugitive Slave Law, asked for the
repeal of northern personal liberty laws, called for the amendment of the Fugitive Slave Law to
allow for equal fees for commissioners and stripped the legislation of its repugnant feature that
allowed federal marshals to enlist private citizens to assist in the capture of escaped slaves, and
requested the everlasting cessation of the African slave trade to American shores.63
Crittenden’s panacea clearly offered more concessions to the South, but he and many
contemporary Americans viewed that region as the aggrieved party in the crisis.

Both

Democrats and former Whigs from the North indicated their satisfaction with his compromise
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measures. Favorable letters from Border South moderates poured in thanking Crittenden for his
efforts, and as the weeks passed citizens from all points of the Union flooded Congress with
memorials and petitions begging for the plan’s adoption.64 Scholars studying the crisis have
attacked the Crittenden Compromise, so warmly received by many Americans, from a variety of
angles.

Some historians have labeled the package infeasible and unwieldy; others have

suggested no compromise could patch the sectional divide at this point; while still others have
lambasted Crittenden for his lack of moral certitude in giving the institution of slavery a lifeline
in the states and territories.65 Overly dependent upon hindsight, these views obscure the reality
of the situation.

First, Stephen Douglas chopped Henry Clay’s original cumbersome

compromise proposals into several pieces of legislation to secure the Compromise of 1850, and
nothing precluded similar surgical repairs to Crittenden’s package in 1860. The groundswell of
support for the Crittenden Compromise which reached Washington during the winter indicates
that many Americans still found compromise a reasonable alternative. Finally, aside from a
small cadre of abolitionists and the nation’s African American population, few Americans
viewed the extension of slavery through a moral lens. As reprehensible as it seems to modern
sensibilities, the plight of the republic, not of four million African Americans held in bondage,
concerned most of antebellum white America. Furthermore, Crittenden had not tethered slavery
onto the Union in perpetuity as some historians have charged. The final amendment only
forbade Congress from abolishing slavery; if the peculiar institution became moribund, a state
64

A sampling of the letters, petitions, and memorials are included in Coleman, ed., The Life of John
Crittenden, 2:237-249.
65
For scholarly attacks on the plan, see Allan Nevins, The Emergence of Lincoln, vol. 2, Prologue to Civil
War, 1859-1861 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1950), Ch. 13; Kenneth M. Stampp, And the War Came: The
North and the Secession Crisis, 1860-1861 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1950); Harold M.
Hyman, “The Narrow Escape from a ‘Compromise of 1860’: Secession and the Constitution,” in Harold M. Hyman
and Leonard W. Levy, eds., Freedom and Reform: Essays in Honor of Henry Steele Commager (New York: Harper
& Row, 1967), 149-166; Patsy S. Ledbetter, “John J. Crittenden and the Compromise Debacle,” Filson Club History
Quarterly 51 (April 1977), 125-142; and Frank Towers, “Another Look at Inevitability: The Upper South and the
Limits of Compromise in the Secession Crisis,” Tennessee Historical Quarterly 70 (Summer 2011), 108-125.

197

still had the power to eradicate slavery within its borders. That his compromise would have
extended the life of slavery far beyond its American death in the final three years of the Civil
War is unassailable, but no one at the time could guarantee that an armed conflict would bring
the peculiar institution to its knees, nor did most Americans feel a great deal of guilt about
perpetuating slavery in the states where it existed. Border country moderates, therefore, had
every reason to remain optimistic that the introduction of Crittenden’s plan offered a realistic
solution to the sectional impasse.
His object centered on forever removing the cause of sectional strife, the agitation of the
slavery issue, from the political matrix. Unfortunately, Crittenden and other moderates asked the
Republicans to acquiesce in a settlement that undermined the very raison d’être of their party.
Several elements combined to create the Republican coalition in the middle of the 1850s, but the
keystone principle of the party centered upon the limitation of slavery’s extension into the West.
Although some Republicans entertained the notion of compromise during the crisis, this
formative precept of the party had not changed. From Springfield Lincoln admonished his
colleagues to stand by the cardinal tenet of Republicanism. “There is no possible compromise
upon [the extension of slavery],” he told Illinois Congressman Elihu Washburne, “but which puts
us under again, and leaves all our work to do over again.” He advised all Republicans in
Washington to “hold firm, as with a chain of steel.”66
Partisanship wielded its commanding influence as it had for the previous thirty years in
American politics. The Republican Party had been conceived at the height of sectional tensions
and unlike the Whigs or Democrats, each of whose founding centered on economic issues in the
1830s, its partisan edge was designed to prevent the introduction of slavery into the territories
and wean the political power of the South. Compromise had always been a major component of
66
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antebellum political culture, but no settlement in the past had required a mainstream party to
abandon its core principle. At this critical juncture the Republicans reacted as all good partisans
had before them – they dug in their heels and stood by the party’s bedrock value. Crittenden and
his colleagues expressed exasperation at Republican intransigence as the crisis deepened, but
they had made an almost impossible entreaty in the eyes of most of the party’s adherents.
Moderate Republican John Sherman admitted that conciliatory measures “demand of
Conservative Republicans a surrender of this House – their manhood – their religious & moral
convictions,” which most of his colleagues could not swallow.67 If border country moderates
wished to secure some form of compromise, they would have to cobble together a coalition of
conservatives from various partisan backgrounds, a most difficult enterprise when placed in the
context of antebellum political culture.
The same day that Crittenden presented his conciliatory measures, Lazarus Powell,
Andrew Johnson of Tennessee, and Stephen Douglas pressed the Senate to create its committee
on compromise. The resolution passed, and on December 20 Vice President John Breckinridge
announced his appointments to the Committee of Thirteen. The vice president struck a balance
between partisan and sectional backgrounds in order to give voice to every political component.
He selected Republicans William Seward, Jacob Collamer of Vermont, James Doolittle of
Wisconsin, James Grimes of Iowa, and Benjamin Wade of Ohio. Northern Democrats included
Stephen Douglas, William Bigler of Pennsylvania, and Henry Rice of Minnesota. Jefferson
Davis, Robert M.T. Hunter of Virginia, Lazarus Powell, and Robert Toombs of Georgia
represented the Southern Democrats. Crittenden, the only member of the Opposition, rounded
out the panel of eminent senators.

Although Powell chaired the committee because he
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introduced the legislation calling for its establishment, Crittenden was the nominal leader of the
body.68 Unlike the House compromise committee, the Senate version included the voice of three
members of the northern Democracy. Breckinridge had arrayed five Republicans, ranging from
the hardliner Wade to the moderate Collamer, against four southern Democrats who covered the
broad spectrum of southern political thought, from the fire-eater Toombs to the conservative
Powell.
At about the same time the Senate formed the Committee of Thirteen, fire-eaters from the
Deep South made a direct appeal for the Border South to join them in their disunion crusade.
Even before the Southern Manifesto fell on deaf ears along the border, Alabama and Mississippi
arranged to send emissaries northward to preach the virtue of secession. Alexander Hamilton
Handy of Mississippi arrived in Maryland in mid-December and began a dialogue with some
friends of secession in the Old Line State. Handy told George Hume Steuart, Sr., that he planned
to convince Governor Thomas Hicks to call a special session of the legislature so it might make
preparations for the state to secede. Steuart, cognizant of the Unionists’ impact on the state,
groused that the “frog Hicks” would probably spurn his overture. Indeed, Hicks had privately
vowed to resist convening the legislature. Handy met with Hicks on the morning of December
19 and came away disappointed. The governor agreed that the two states shared the same habits
and institutions, but he declared that Maryland “is also conservative, and above all things,
devoted to the Union.” Not until all hope for compromise had been exhausted would Hicks even
consider convening the legislature, and he indicated that he would only do so after consultation
with the executives of the other Border South states. “Let us show moderation as well as
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firmness,” Hicks admonished Handy, “and be unwilling to resort to extreme measures, until
necessity shall leave us no choice.”69
The undeterred Mississippian addressed a large crowd at Baltimore’s Hall of the
Maryland Institute the night of his meeting with Hicks, whereupon he framed his state’s intent to
secede as a matter to preserve the constitutional rights of the South. During the course of his
speech Hamilton berated Lincoln and the Republicans, rebuked Henry Winter Davis, and argued
that Congress would find no solution to the crisis. Handy made several more speeches across the
state, but eventually came to the conclusion that Hicks’s intransigence and the “peculiar local
situation” of Maryland, sandwiched between Pennsylvania and the national capital, forestalled
any immediate action by the proponents of disunion he encountered.70
Commissioners sent from Alabama to each of the Border South states had a similar
experience to Handy’s. They quickly realized that the earnestly begun Unionist campaign had
neutralized the secession movement along the border. Not even South Carolina’s official exit
from the Union on December 20 could sway most border southerners as long as Crittenden kept
the hopes of compromise afloat in Washington D.C. Stephen Hale wrote to Kentucky Governor
Beriah Magoffin on December 27 and beseeched him to call the legislature into special session.
Although he agreed that the South had endured the taunts and insults of the Republicans,
Magoffin advocated a convention of all the slaveholding states to present their demands to the
nation. The Kentucky governor, who took a more receptive posture towards secession than
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Hicks, responded in true Border South fashion.

He replied that he still had hope that

conservatives in the North, the longstanding allies of moderates in the Border South, would work
with southerners to find a settlement. “You have no hope of a redress in the Union,” Magoffin
granted. “We yet look hopefully to assurances that a powerful reaction is going on at the North.”
Magoffin did issue a call to convene the legislature on January 17, but for the present he would
wait patiently for the outcome of Crittenden’s efforts in Washington.71
Two days before the scheduled convocation of the Missouri General Assembly, William
Cooper of Alabama spoke on behalf of disunion at a banquet in Jefferson City.

A local

correspondent estimated that about half of the state legislators had arrived in Missouri’s capital
when Cooper delivered his oration; it is unknown how many sat in the audience the night of
December 29.

Cooper predicted that Republican rule would inevitably lead to slave

insurrections on the scale of Haiti if Missouri remained in the Union, but his plea for secession
generated little enthusiasm among the crowd. “Missouri feels and realizes her critical situation,
being a border State…She will move with slow and cautious steps,” Cooper reported to the
governor of Alabama. After the speech state Senator Mosby M. Parsons and Representative
Samuel Hyer, Jr., both of whom sympathized with Cooper’s request, held a meeting to discuss a
plan of action.

Representative D.C. Ballou rebuffed an invitation from Parsons to act as

secretary of the meeting. According to a newspaper report, Ballou told his colleagues that “there
was yet hope that matters might be amicably adjusted,” and thus he preferred that Missouri
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remain in the Union at present. Parsons and Hyer promised to bring Cooper’s suggestions before
the General Assembly when it convened the following Monday.72
David Clopton of Alabama traveled to Delaware and on January 1 met with Governor
William Burton. Clopton, who had to cut his trip short due to an illness in his family, returned to
Alabama with the understanding that although many citizens in Delaware sympathized with the
Lower South, the great majority favored a convention of either the slaveholding states or the
entire nation to “adjust and compromise, if possible, existing difficulties.” His conversations
with Burton and state legislators convinced him that some of the state’s politicians would try to
call a state convention during the ongoing session of the General Assembly.73
While the Lower South secession commissioners made their fruitless journeys to the
border, the Committee of Thirteen convened for its initial meeting. Mindful that any functional
settlement relied upon Republican consent, Jefferson Davis laid out an important ground rule to
which both sides assented: the committee would not report any compromise package to the
Senate unless a majority of Republicans and the rest of the panel’s members voted in favor of the
measures.

Crittenden faced a setback on December 22 when he laid his plan before the

committee. The panel voted to defeat each of his six proposed amendments in piecemeal
fashion. The proposal to extend the Missouri Compromise line lost with six members in favor
and seven opposed. The three northern Democrats, Hunter, and Powell joined Crittenden in
voting for the territorial amendment, but Davis and Toombs cast negative votes along with all
five Republicans. The territorial amendment was the only portion of Crittenden’s compromise
72
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defeated by a simple majority; the remaining five amendments went down to defeat because the
Republicans unanimously registered a negative. Both Davis and Toombs believed that all of the
territories should remain open to slavery and that restricting the peculiar institution’s spread lay
outside the purview of Congress. Moreover, Crittenden’s territorial proposal still lacked a
hereafter acquired phrase for southern territory, which in effect cordoned off the peculiar
institution to the Southwest, an area where slavery would probably have difficulty taking root.
The two Lower South senators initially indicated a willingness to accept the basic terms of
Crittenden’s settlement, but their hesitancy to sanction the territorial amendment revealed a
major obstacle to compromise. With neither the Republicans nor the Lower South senators
bending on their territorial stance, the committee faced an uphill battle.74
The panel next considered the four resolutions Crittenden included in his settlement
package. Republicans blocked Crittenden’s first two resolutions dealing with the legitimacy of
the Fugitive Slave Act and the repeal of personal liberty laws, but the committee agreed
unanimously to adopt the final two resolutions that called for amendment of the Fugitive Slave
Act and a permanent restriction on the African slave trade. In response to the defeat of the
Crittenden plan, Toombs wired his constituents and advised the secession of Georgia.75
On Christmas Eve Stephen Douglas offered a compromise package to the committee that
included two comprehensive constitutional amendments. The first amendment applied popular
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sovereignty to the territories and specifically stated that only when applying for statehood could
the people residing therein vote to keep or disallow slavery. Other facets of Douglas’s first
amendment regulated the acquisition of new territory and applied the process for reclaiming
fugitive slaves to all new territories and states. His second amendment barred all African
Americans from participating in elections and holding office, made preparations for the
colonization of free blacks, and encapsulated all features of the Crittenden plan aside from his
territorial scheme. The committee defeated Douglas’s first amendment by a large margin, with
only the Little Giant and Crittenden voting in favor of the popular sovereignty panacea. As for
the second amendment, the Republicans only agreed to the section that outlined a plan for the
colonization of free blacks. Once again they spurned the features of the Crittenden Compromise
that Douglas had incorporated into his plan.76
Over the next few days the committee considered several other compromise proposals yet
reached no agreement. During the proceedings the Republicans made their own proposal for a
constitutional amendment that prohibited Congress from abolishing slavery in the states where it
existed, amended the Fugitive Slave Law by allowing jury trials for detainees, and asked the free
states to modify or repeal their personal liberty laws.

Seward, whose political intercessor

Thurlow Weed had earlier in December met personally with Lincoln in Springfield and relayed
the president-elect’s views on compromise to his friend, offered the Republican suggestion on
Christmas Eve. The panel agreed only to the portion of the plan that prevented congressional
interference with slavery in the states. The Republican proposal, which did not address the
territorial issue, underscored the limits to which the party would accede. Up to this point Seward
had not indicated whether or not he would endorse conciliation, and many moderates and
Unionists in the Border South hoped the influential New Yorker would throw his substantial
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political weight behind the Crittenden plan. Even Seward, who most people viewed as amenable
to territorial compromise, would not overstep the party line.77
With the rejection of each compromise proposal by the Committee of Thirteen,
Crittenden became dismayed. He somberly told a circle of friends that the panel’s rejection of
his plan resulted in the “darkest day of my whole life.” The prospects of a settlement emerging
from the House committee also looked gloomy toward the end of December.

The

representatives from Florida, Mississippi, and South Carolina had stopped attending the panel’s
meetings; Winter Davis’s revisions of the Fugitive Slave Law had become ensnared in a subcommittee of five; and no agreement had emerged on the territorial question. Moreover, Albert
Rust of Arkansas pointed out that Thomas A.R. Nelson’s compromise proposal, which closely
resembled the Crittenden plan, contained no hereafter acquired clause for southern territory.
Rust proposed adding the clause into the Nelson settlement, which set off further disagreement
among the committee members. Finally, on December 27, the Committee of Thirty-three voted
thirteen to sixteen against incorporating the clause. Every Republican in attendance plus Henry
Winter Davis voted against including the hereafter acquired clause in the territorial proposal; the
other three Border South representatives on the committee voted in favor of its insertion.
Conditions worsened on the Committee of Thirty-three when Nelson asked to substitute
Crittenden’s plan for his own. Winter Davis again voted with the Republicans to remove the
hereafter acquired clause, which technically applied to northern territory, from Crittenden’s first
amendment. In response Miles Taylor of Louisiana charged the Republicans on the committee

77

Ibid., 10-11. For Seward’s actions, see McClintock, Lincoln and the Decision for War, 91-95, 103-104;
Robinson, “Seward and the Onset of the Secession Crisis,” 55-59.

206

with bad faith and indicated he would take no part in further deliberations. Moderates across the
country implored Crittenden not to give in to his despair and to keep up the fight.78
The bleak outlook for a settlement emerging from either official congressional committee
dampened Crittenden’s spirits, but he kept up the Unionist offensive. He called together the
senators and congressmen from both the free and slaveholding border states on December 28.
The border country men closeted at Willard’s Hotel, and at the behest of J. Morrison Harris of
Maryland established a committee of one representative from each of the fourteen border states
in attendance and scheduled a meeting shortly after the start of the new year. Crittenden and
Douglas also snapped off a telegram designed to keep the Unionist campaign alive. They
emphatically insisted that the rights of the South would be protected in the Union. “Don’t give
up the Ship. Don’t despair of the Republic. Let all good men rally bravely to the struggle,” the
two conciliators counseled.79
Hopelessly divided, the Committee of Thirteen dampened the New Year’s Eve spirit
when it reported to the Senate that it had reached no settlement. Undeterred, Crittenden on
January 3 submitted a resolution to the Senate calling for a national referendum on compromise.
The Kentuckian observed that too many of his congressional colleagues had become entranced
by party politics for conciliatory measures to go far. He hoped to take the issue of compromise
out of the hands of politicians who merely cared about their own political future and vest it in the
American people. The correspondence, petitions, and memorials flooding his mailbox convinced
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him that a mandate for settlement existed.

He recommended that Douglas’s compromise

package introduced in the Committee of Thirteen go before the nation.

The Little Giant

endorsed Crittenden’s suggestion for a national plebiscite. He estimated that if the Senate
submitted any serious plan to the electorate, they would ratify them in an expeditious manner “in
order to take this slavery agitation out of Congress, and restore peace to the country, and insure
the perpetuity of the Union.”80
Crittenden and Douglas’s efforts to sustain the hopes for a settlement paid dividends in
Delaware, where the general assembly gathered on New Year’s Day. In his message to the
legislature, Governor William Burton expressed an ardent desire for a settlement along the lines
of the Crittenden Compromise, but he laid the blame for the crisis on fanatics in the North who
had taught “the sentiment that slavery is a crime and a sin, until it has become the received
opinion of a very large portion of one section of our country.” Burton advised the free states to
repeal their personal liberty laws and to agree on a compromise package that settled the question
of slavery in the territories.81

The following day Burton notified the legislature that H.

Dickinson of Mississippi had visited him and wished to give a speech to the general assembly.
The Mississippian must have had some impact on the governor, for Burton also recommended
that the legislature call a state convention to consider Delaware’s place in the Union. The Senate
unanimously adopted a resolution in favor of hearing Dickinson speak, while the House narrowly
passed a similar resolution. The Mississippian addressed the legislature in the early afternoon of
January 3 and asked Delaware to join with the Lower South in the disunion movement. The
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response of the legislators revealed the impact of the Unionist offensive.

The House

unanimously passed a joint resolution that expressed its “unqualified disapproval” of secession.
Two senators who espoused strong feelings for the course of the Lower South attempted to stall
discussion of the joint resolution in the Senate to no avail; the upper house concurred in the joint
resolution by a vote of five to three. Even in the wake of the Committee of Thirteen’s breakup,
the Unionist campaign helped Delaware moderates maintain a resilient attitude toward secession.
Members of the House of Representatives crafted a resolution in support of the Crittenden
Compromise, which passed the lower chamber by a vote of nineteen to two and the Senate by a
tally of eight to one.82
Far off in Jefferson City, the Unionist offensive in the Border South received its first
serious counterattack. The state legislature convened on December 31, 1860, and although
Alabama secession commissioner William Cooper found tepid support for secession among most
of the legislators, he considered new governor Claiborne Fox Jackson a warm advocate of
disunion. Prior to his inauguration on January 3, Jackson privately remarked that Lincoln’s
election represented the culmination of thirty years of antislavery agitation. All ties between the
North and South had been severed by the Republican victory, a triumph he considered “a
declaration of war upon the whole slave property of all the Southern States.” A proponent of
cooperation among all the slave states, Jackson deemed the calling of a state sovereignty
convention a primary objective upon taking office. His inaugural address did not disappoint the
fire-eaters. He roundly criticized Lincoln and the Republicans, defended the course of South
82

Ibid., 83-84, 98-99, 101-103, 105, 141-142; Delaware General Assembly, Journal of the Senate of the
State of Delaware, at a Session of the General Assembly, Commenced and Held at Dover, on Tuesday, The First
Day of January, in the Year of Our Lord One Thousand Eight Hundred and Sixty-One, and of the Independence of
the United States the Eighty-Fifth (Dover: James Kirk Printer, 1861), 42, 44-45, 65, hereinafter cited as Delaware
Senate Journal. Representative William S. Phillips attempted to get the legislature to call a state convention to write
a new constitution or amend the present one, but was rebuffed. Apparently any state convention at this critical
juncture might be viewed as an impetus for secession, and Unionists in the House postponed the Phillips Resolution
and later buried it in committee. See Delaware House Journal, 80, 96, 132.

209

Carolina, and forcefully affirmed that Missouri would stand with the South. Furthermore, he
warned the federal government that a coercive policy toward South Carolina would seal the fate
of the nation. “The first drop of blood shed in a war of aggression upon a sovereign State will
arouse a spirit which must result in the overthrow of our entire Federal system, and which this
generation will never see quelled,” Jackson fulminated. He beseeched the legislature to pass
measures immediately for a state convention and endorsed a convention of all the slaveholding
states to present an ultimatum to the North. If it repulsed the demands of the South, then the
slaveholding states should operate as a unit and leave the Union.83
Missouri presented a conundrum for Crittenden and other Border South Unionists.
Jackson, who hardly denied his radical southern proclivities, had built an impressive following in
the state during the 1850s. Lieutenant Governor Thomas C. Reynolds, an admitted secessionist,
presided over the Senate, while the House elected Breckinridge Democrat John McAfee to the
speaker’s chair. While Douglas Democrats and Constitutional Unionists controlled nearly fiftyfive percent of the seats in the legislature, this trio of leaders could easily twist the arms of their
colleagues and endanger the state’s position in the Union. 84 Reynolds had spent most of the
month in Washington D.C. and became convinced that no compromise would materialize in
Congress. Therefore he urged Missouri to prepare its state militia in case the Republicans opted
for a policy of coercion, and like Jackson he desired that all of the slaveholding states meet in
83
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convention in order to issue an ultimatum to the North. The lieutenant governor also closeted
with avowed secessionists and planned to conquer Frank Blair’s Unionist bastion of St. Louis.
Early in the legislative session the allies of Jackson and Reynolds introduced a bill to give the
governor unfettered control of the state militia as well as legislation to organize a police force in
St. Louis to undercut the city’s Unionists.85
Moderates and conservatives in the Missouri legislature did not back down. The early
stages of the session featured several vitriolic exchanges between Unionist members and
legislators in favor of secession.86

On January 8 the legislature recessed to observe and

celebrate Andrew Jackson’s 1815 victory in the Battle of New Orleans. This annual tradition
afforded politicians of all persuasions a moment to celebrate one of America’s greatest national
triumphs, the defeat of the British in the War of 1812. In the previous legislative session, the
Missouri general assembly had commissioned famed artist George Caleb Bingham to paint large
portraits of Andrew Jackson and Henry Clay for display in the statehouse. Bingham had come of
age in Missouri’s Boon’s Lick, attached himself to the Whig Party, and developed an enduring
Unionism during a brief stint as a state legislator. He found greater success as an artist, but he
never veered far from the political arena; many of his most well-known paintings offer a vivid
portrayal of Missouri’s rough-hewn antebellum political culture.

Bingham supported the

Constitutional Union Party during the election of 1860 and emphatically despised the notion of
disunion. The general assembly had unwittingly placed the limelight on one of the state’s most
combative Unionists.87
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Bingham on January 8 unveiled his renderings of Jackson and Clay in the House
Chamber in front of a crowd of dignitaries, including many state legislators and officials. Called
to the podium that morning for an impromptu speech, the artist delivered a rousing homily in
defense of the Union. The former Whig read excerpts of Andrew Jackson’s farewell address and
praised Old Hickory for his defiance of South Carolina during the Nullification Crisis. The
festive atmosphere in the statehouse soured in the aftermath of Bingham’s speech. Shortly after
the artist concluded his remarks, Reynolds rebuked Bingham and mocked the “meddlesome
outsiders and disappointed office-seekers” who used the ceremony as an opportunity to discredit
the course of South Carolina. Not to be outdone, that afternoon Bingham responded to Reynolds
in a harsh tone, and the confrontation nearly escalated into physical violence. “I cared nothing
about his assumption of dictatorial airs,” Bingham later crowed in the Daily Missouri
Republican. “But I regarded him as desecrating the temple in which he stood, by lauding, as a
virtue, treason against my Government.” In private, the painter labeled Reynolds “a fool, as you
would say a d—ned fool.”88
The Bingham-Reynolds exchange nicely illustrates the passions unleashed by the
secession crisis and serves as another example of the Unionist offensive in the Border South. A
former arch-Whig, Bingham easily dropped his partisan bias and lauded Andrew Jackson, whom
many Whigs once considered the devil’s next of kin, for his strong Unionist stance in the
Nullification Crisis. He even advocated cooperation with former Democratic enemies in this
time of peril. “I trust the genuine remnant of the Old Whig party united with the Douglas
Democrats and Republicans will be strong enough in the Legislature to keep our state in its true
position of loyalty to the Union,” he predicted to his patron James S. Rollins. The willingness of
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moderates to unite with old political adversaries to preserve the Union became a hallmark of the
Unionist offensive in the Border South. The confrontation also demonstrates that Border South
conservatives would not rest on their laurels and allow fire-eaters to gain the upper hand. The
painter did not let the renderings of Jackson and Clay, strong symbols of the Union in their own
right, speak for themselves. Rather, he used the unveiling as an opportunity to check the
counterattack of Missouri secessionists. Finally, Bingham emphasized the Unionist position that
secession jeopardized both peace and the future of the peculiar institution. Follow Claiborne
Jackson and Reynolds, Bingham warned, and all Missourians could count on desolation and the
destruction of their property. Edward Bates echoed Bingham’s thoughts about slavery and the
Union. “Disunion,” he predicted, “though it may not at once destroy slavery everywhere, will
weaken it everywhere, and depreciate its value everywhere, and very probably culminate in
bloody abolition.”89
Jackson and Reynolds claimed victory on January 9 when George Vest introduced in the
House a bill for a state convention. The triumph proved short-lived, however, because Unionists
in the general assembly attached to the bill a stipulation that the actions of the convention would
be subject to the approval of the Missouri electorate. Fire-eaters in the assembly lamented that
the Unionists had obstructed their path to disunion, while Unionists considered the popular
referendum stipulation a success. One conservative representative who voted in favor of the
convention with a referendum commented that since the House “had pared the nails and drawn
the fangs of the tiger, he was willing to let it loose.” The convention bill passed the House by a
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margin of 105-18 and made it through the Senate by a tally of 30-2. Jackson and Reynolds had
their convention, but the people of the state would have the final say on any decision that came
out of the meeting.90
While Unionists battled secessionists in Dover and Jefferson City, Crittenden and his
colleagues kept jockeying for compromise in Washington.

The border state committee,

comprised of five Republicans, five Democrats, and five members of the southern Opposition,
assembled on January 3 and 4 to discuss possible conciliatory measures to introduce to Congress.
Unlike the compromise panels in the Senate and House, the border state committee represented
only the great heart of the nation and included Republicans and Democrats who had shown some
interest in a settlement. Members from the Border South considered these men from the Lower
North their integral allies during the sectional tempest of the preceding thirty years. After two
meetings marked by “long & anxious consultations,” the committee produced a compromise
package on the basis of the Crittenden plan.

The panel made a few key alterations to

Crittenden’s package. First, the border state plan included only one constitutional amendment
which forbade Congress from interfering with slavery in the states; the remaining features of the
package emerged as legislation. Second, the Republicans agreed to a division of the territories
on the basis of the Missouri Compromise line, but they stripped the Crittenden plan of its
stipulations calling for territorial governments to protect slavery south of the line. Thus, if the
residents of a territory south of the line opted to bar slavery prior to applying for statehood, they
could do so. Furthermore, the committee removed all reference to territory hereafter acquired in
this section of the package. The border state plan also called for revision of the Fugitive Slave
Law, requested the repeal of all personal liberty laws, and declared that the abolition of slavery
90
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in Washington D.C. could not take place without the consent of the inhabitants of the district and
Maryland.91
Table 20 -The Border States Committee
Position

Party

State

John J. Crittenden

Senator

Opposition

Kentucky

J. Morrison Harris

Representative

Opposition

Maryland

Robert Hatton

Representative

Opposition

Tennessee

John Gilmer

Representative

Opposition

North Carolina

James Hale

Representative

Republican

Pennsylvania

John Nixon

Representative

Republican

New Jersey

John Pettit

Representative

Republican

Indiana

John Sherman

Representative

Republican

Ohio

William Vandever

Representative

Republican

Iowa

John Barret

Representative

Democrat

Missouri

John Harris

Representative

Independent Democrat

Virginia

John McClernand

Representative

Democrat

Illinois

Willard Saulsbury

Senator

Democrat

Delaware

William Sebastian

Senator

Democrat

Arkansas

Republicans on the border state committee presented the plan to a party caucus on the
night of January 5. James T. Hale reported that the members of the Border South signaled a
willingness to agree to the plan, and he recommended its acceptance because continued
Republican intransigence would “precipitate the country into war.” Hale found few converts to
conciliation at the meeting, however.

Several Republican hardliners blasted the notion of

compromise and even Sherman, a member of the committee, admitted he could not vote for the
settlement.92 A disappointed Hale complained of the obduracy of these hardliners, who he
considered as dangerous as the fire-eaters in the South.

He wrote the president-elect and

suggested that the party should consent to a settlement to prevent the Border South from
“drifting into the vortex.” Lincoln remained unconvinced that conciliation would satiate the
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southern demand for more slave territory and affirmed that he could not condone any
compromise outside of a ban on the acquisition of more American land. “If we surrender,”
Lincoln avowed, “it is the end of us, and of the government.”93
With conciliation efforts ostensibly at a dead end in each of the compromise committees,
Crittenden labored to bring his package directly before the Senate. On January 7, he moved for
its consideration and appealed to all members of the Senate to set aside their partisan convictions
and save the country. “When the fate of my country is on the one side and my dogma on the
other, let the dogma go rather than the country be prostrated,” he explained. He admitted that his
settlement had been designed to assuage southern fears about Republican intentions toward
slavery, but his intentions had the best interest of the Union at heart. 94 The same day Emerson
Etheridge of Tennessee attempted to present a modified version of the border state plan to the
House. Etheridge had combined elements of both the Crittenden and border state plan into a
series of eight constitutional amendments. William Barksdale of Mississippi objected to their
introduction and Etheridge could not secure the necessary two-thirds vote to outflank the
Mississippian and suspend the rules. The inability to get the compromise package before the
House alarmed some border southerners. “Etheridge-Crittenden bill voted down. All hopes lost.
Disunion inevitable,” a troubled Kentuckian telegraphed home to Paducah.95
Border South moderates in Congress worked with a greater sense of urgency in early
January.

The possibility of war between the federal government and South Carolina had

increased since the Palmetto State left the Union on December 20. A garrison of federal troops
had on December 26 moved from vulnerable Fort Moultrie to the more defensible Fort Sumter,
93
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situated on an island in the middle of Charleston Harbor. South Carolina leaders now considered
the state an independent republic, demanded the evacuation of Fort Sumter, and amassed militia
units along the shore of the harbor. Under the command of Major Robert Anderson, the federal
troops ensconced at Fort Sumter became a symbolic lighting rod. To unbending Unionists in the
North, they represented defiance of South Carolina’s crackpot venture; to South Carolinians and
proponents of secession across the South, the garrison represented an affront to disunion. Border
South moderates viewed Anderson’s men and the Carolinians ringing them as a live fuse that
threatened to explode their hopes for compromise. An attack from either side would surely
jeopardize the national mandate for conciliation and might throw wavering border country
moderates into the disunionist column.

Thus Crittenden reiterated the Border South position

that the Republicans must not take a coercive stance toward South Carolina. “If the sword is to
be the only weapon relied upon,” he intoned, “then woe to your Administration! Your victory
will be turned to blood and ashes.”96
Four events on January 9 complicated matters for Crittenden’s forces.

Mississippi

ensured that this crisis of the Union would not mirror the Nullification Crisis or the impasse of
1850 when its convention adopted an ordinance of secession by a vote of eighty-four to fifteen.
This time around, South Carolina had a partner in its disunion project, which certainly allayed
the reservations of radicals in other Lower South states. Second, Republican Daniel Clark of
New Hampshire dampened the slim prospects for Republican cooperation when he entered a
substitute resolution for the Crittenden package which declared compromise unnecessary at
present and called for abidance to the Constitution rather than its alteration. The hardliner Clark
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had fired a salvo across the bow of the moderates, though the Senate postponed the matter for the
present.97
Third, Lazarus Powell on January 9 proposed an amendment to Crittenden’s territorial
amendment that has often gone unnoticed. The Kentucky Democrat added a hereafter acquired
clause to the sentence in the amendment that dealt with territory south of the Missouri
Compromise line. Powell told the Senate that Crittenden accepted the amendment and later
remarked that his colleague had intended to include the phrase when he initially submitted his
package back in December. Northern Democrat George Pugh doubted the propriety of including
the clause because it might damage the plan’s chance for passage, but Powell insisted its
inclusion made the territorial feature “clear and distinct.” The Senate postponed consideration of
Powell’s amendment on January 9, but it passed by a vote of twenty-nine to twenty-four one
week later.

All but one of the negative votes came from Republicans, while a solitary

Republican, Edward Baker of Oregon, joined the southern contingent and Northern Democrats
who voted in favor of the change. All eight Border South senators voted in favor of the
alteration.98
One cannot understate the impact of Powell’s modification of the territorial amendment.
The inclusion of the phrase explicitly contradicted the cornerstone of Republican doctrine and
doomed the likelihood of garnering any support for his settlement among the members of
Lincoln’s party. Whereas Republicans might construe Crittenden’s original wording as a means
to confine slavery to present-day New Mexico and Arizona, the new phraseology invited
expansion into the tropics, an area much more conducive to slave labor than the arid plains and
mountains of the Southwest. No evidence suggests why Crittenden acquiesced on the phrase’s
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inclusion. More than likely senators from the Lower South had pressed Crittenden and Powell to
clarify the territorial portion of the amendment. Perhaps Crittenden submitted to their demands
out of his growing frustration with Republican inflexibility. Powell’s contention that Crittenden
had intended the original proposition to include the hereafter acquired clause for southern
territory seems flawed. After all, the Kentuckian had not altered the wording of his package
when it had been introduced to the various compromise committees for consideration.
Moreover, he left the original wording intact when the Committee of Thirteen deliberated the
proposal, which prompted Jefferson Davis and Robert Toombs to reject that portion of the
package on principle. Davis and Toombs agreed to every other facet of Crittenden’s proposal
and signaled a willingness to accede to the first article if the committee’s Republicans agreed to
it, which did not occur.99 Surely the wording of the amendment came up in the committee room
when the two Lower South senators spurned it, but Crittenden did not alter the phrasing of his
package when he brought it before the Senate over two weeks later.
Finally, the standoff at Charleston nearly escalated into war when at dawn on January 9
the Carolinians opened fire on the merchant steamer Star of the West, which Buchanan had
ordered southward to reinforce Anderson’s garrison at Fort Sumter. The ship retreated to the
Atlantic and the guns in Charleston Harbor remained silent, but the salvo severely tested the
patience of most northerners. “South Carolina has fired the first gun at the Union of the
states…Now is the time in which the government is to be maintained in all the vigor of its
supremacy, or fall in weakness and contempt,” a Connecticut paper screeched. Samuel F. Du
Pont observed that the incident had “greatly exasperated the North & coercion views are
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spreading.” Crittenden scrambled to offset the ill-effect of the news by inviting some thirty
proponents of compromise to a dinner party at his residence that night.100
In this tense atmosphere the Unionist battle continued in Washington, yet Congress
remained paralyzed. Republican William Henry Seward delivered a speech on January 12 which
brought Crittenden to tears. In it Seward waxed eloquent about the value of the Union, but he
offered no tangible concessions to the Border South. “It is obvious that his inclination is towards
a satisfactory settlement, but he cannot arrive at the magnanimity of proposing it himself, lest he
might offend his party,” John Pendleton Kennedy observed. 101 Once again, the Republicans
balked when it came to a territorial settlement, a fact that most Border South moderates noticed.
Anything but unanimity reigned in the House Committee of Thirty-three, which ended its
deliberations on January 14. Unlike the Senate panel, the House committee did have proposals
to bring to the lower chamber. Unfortunately, the lack of accord on the committee forced
chairman Thomas Corwin to bring several proposals to the floor of the House. These various
suggestions represented the views of moderates, southern fire-eaters, and Republican hardliners.
The House temporarily shelved the work of the Committee of Thirty-three so as to allow time for
congressmen to sort out the numerous reports.102
With his patience wearing thin, Crittenden continually pressed for a vote on his
compromise measures. Northern Democrats and senators from the Upper and Border South
condemned the Republicans for avoiding a vote on the conciliatory measures. Anthony Kennedy
of Maryland insisted that the Republicans register a vote “to see whether those gentlemen now
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representing the dominant party in the country are willing to meet us in the spirit of
compromise.” Kennedy got his wish on January 16. After the Senate voted to add the Powell
amendment to the Crittenden settlement, Republicans carried a resolution that replaced the
Kentuckian’s proposal with Daniel Clark’s hardline declaration that the present situation merited
no need for compromise. The Clark substitution passed twenty-five to twenty-three, with all
eight Border South senators voting in the negative. Republicans provided all twenty-five of the
votes in favor of substitution.103
Border South moderates felt the impact of the Republican roadblock in their home states.
In Frankfort, Governor Beriah Magoffin on January 17 recommended that the Kentucky
legislature call a state convention to consider the state’s place in the Union. Magoffin’s hopes
for compromise had dimmed in the three weeks since he had snubbed the Alabama secession
commissioner. “Thus firm in position, obstinate in spirit, and sullen in temper,” Magoffin
charged, “the Republicans have thwarted every scheme devised to restrain the seceding States.”
He also noted that due to Republican intransigence and the secession of four of the Deep South
states, the time may have passed for the slaveholding states to hold a convention and present
their demands to the North. The governor’s tone had decidedly shifted in the days since his lateDecember exchange with the Alabama secession commissioner. An erroneous second-hand
report reached Missouri that senators James Green and Trusten Polk advocated secession in
wake of the Crittenden plan’s defeat. In Maryland, Thomas Hicks fretted that if Congress did
not quickly pass some compromise measures, promoters of secession might force him to call the
legislature into session.104
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“I had strong hopes that the Resolutions I submitted, might be accepted as a basis, at
least, for measures of adjustment & reconciliation,” a saddened Crittenden confessed after the
Republicans replaced his compromise with the Clark Resolutions. “That hope is almost gone!”
Although he admitted “Every thing here looks gloomy & foreboding,” Crittenden and his
moderate colleagues in the two-and-a-half months since Lincoln’s election had buoyed the hopes
of southern Unionists and kept fire-eating radicals at bay in the Border and Upper South.105
Although prospects of a legislative settlement appeared dim in mid-January, the Unionist
campaign convinced many border southerners that Crittenden, Douglas, and other moderate
leaders would find some means to extricate the nation from the tangled sectional thicket. Aware
that compromise would likely fester in the highly-charged halls of the Capitol, Crittenden began
to explore other options for compromise. The following months proved that Unionists in the
Border South had yet to expend all of their ammunition in the fight against secession.
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Chapter 5
“Compromise May Restore the Union, but the Sword Can Never Preserve It,” The Unionist
Offensive Endures, Mid-January – March 1861
Colonel Alexander William Doniphan struck an imposing figure when he entered the
overflowing Liberty, Missouri, courthouse on a blustery late-January night to speak about the
crisis of the Union. Well over six feet in height, the brawny Doniphan sported a shock of coarse
red hair which, according to one observer, protruded from atop his scowling visage “like
porcupine quills.” The attorney had made quite a name for himself in the thirty years since he
left his Kentucky birthplace and settled in Liberty, a commercial hub and the seat of Clay County
at the western edge of the Boon’s Lick region. Local judges and fellow barristers recognized
that Doniphan’s oratorical skills exceeded his mastery of the law, but the fifty-one year old
attorney had built an impressive practice and earned a comfortable living defending clients in
criminal cases. He often rolled up his sleeves, delivered his defense with rhetorical flourish, and
used his towering frame to intimidate his adversaries in the courtroom. Although he disagreed
with the religious customs of Joseph Smith and the Mormons, who in the 1830s made their home
in western Missouri, they kept Doniphan on retainer and provided him with notoriety and an
economic lifeline, two essential components of a successful frontier law practice.

As

commander of a local militia company during the 1838 Mormon War, Doniphan stood up to state
authorities and refused to execute Smith and other Mormon leaders after a court martial found
them guilty of treason. With civilian courts in operation, Doniphan rejected the jurisdiction of
the court martial and dared his commanding officer to attempt the execution. State authorities
backed off, Smith and his colleagues escaped death, and the Mormons left Missouri for Illinois.
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Doniphan’s stand drew the respect of Missourians who appreciated his adherence to legal
principle far more than his defense of the religious outsiders.1
When the United States went to war with Mexico in 1846, Doniphan’s military acumen
generated national fame that far exceeded his provincial legal renown. He guided a regiment of
Missouri volunteers westward into modern-day New Mexico, oversaw the occupation of Santa
Fe and drafted a legal code for the new American territory, then led his troops to victory at the
battles of El Brazito and Sacramento, which cleared out the province of Chihuahua and
contributed to the eventual defeat of all Mexican forces. Upon his regiment’s return to the
United States one of Doniphan’s soldiers published a pamphlet idolizing the unit and their
leader, which went far to cement the attorney’s reputation as a war hero. Americans, in an
outburst of nationalist pride at the conclusion of the war, hailed Doniphan and his volunteers as
torchbearers of the citizen-soldier tradition that reached back to the Revolutionary War. Only
General Zachary Taylor surpassed Doniphan in captivating the American public.2
His successful legal practice, coupled with his experiences in the Mormon and Mexican
wars, paved Doniphan’s path to three separate terms in the lower house of the Missouri
legislature. A member of the Whig Party, Doniphan during his time in Jefferson City promoted
banking initiatives and the construction of railroads throughout the state. Although he despised
the political program of the Democratic Party, he and firebrand David Rice Atchison had
cultivated a close relationship and actually cooperated with one another in an attempt to keep
antislavery agitators from settling in Kansas. Doniphan espoused a moderate temperament
toward most political issues, but he emphatically insisted that the Constitution protected slavery
1
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and that all Americans should have access to the western territories. An owner of five slaves in
1860, Doniphan could not tolerate abolitionists who sought to violate the liberty of his fellow
southerners. Despite his national fame, the war hero never occupied any office higher than the
Missouri general assembly and, by the winter of 1861, had quietly resumed his law practice in
Liberty. He kept abreast of national affairs, however, and once he learned of John Crittenden’s
mid-January setback in Congress, he decided to enlist in the Unionist offensive in his home
state.3
A testament to Doniphan’s celebrity, some two thousand Missourians from Clay, Clinton,
and Ray counties on January 28 braved the cold weather and traversed the snow-covered terrain
to hear him speak at the Liberty courthouse. Because only about one-third of the crowd could
cram inside the building, Doniphan asked for an adjournment and immediate reassembly outside
the courthouse so that all comers could take part in the meeting. The old war hero climbed
above a platform in the cold night air and with his trademark style delivered a ninety-minute
speech in which he admonished all his fellow Missourians to remain loyal to the Union.
Undeterred by Congress’s efforts to stymie all compromise efforts, he also extolled Crittenden’s
compromise package and confirmed to the gathering that hopes for its passage still remained
alive. He noted the efforts of former president John Tyler and the Virginia legislature, which had
on January 19 passed a resolution that laid the groundwork for a national Peace Conference. The
Peace Convention idea met with great enthusiasm in the Upper and Border South, the Lower
North, and merchant communities in northern commercial centers that relied on intersectional
trade. Set to convene on February 4 in the national capital, the Washington Peace Conference
provided another vehicle for the potential passage of the Crittenden Compromise. According to
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Doniphan, a show of hands at the meeting indicated that “19/20 of the crowd” endorsed the
Crittenden resolutions.4
Before he concluded his speech, Doniphan reminded his listeners that they must elect
moderate delegates to the Missouri convention charged with the task of considering the state’s
place in the Union. Against his wishes, the members of the meeting unanimously agreed to place
Doniphan’s name on the ticket. He preferred that Unionists in his district might find some
Democrats to send to the state convention to give their delegation a bipartisan appeal, but
whether he or someone else went to Jefferson City, they had to meet certain requirements. “Let
no man be nominated who is in principle radical,” Doniphan privately remarked to his nephew.
“We must keep the issue secession or compromise – and hence we must have compromise Union
men so that no submission issue can be forced upon us.” He understood the delicate balance of
Missouri and the other states of the Border South and fully recognized that in order to keep the
region in the Unionist column, the hope of a settlement had to remain real.5
Doniphan returned to his home that night with a hoarse voice and numbed extremities,
yet the bitter cold could not dampen his high spirits. He, like most Border South Unionists,
believed that they could continue to isolate the secessionists in their midst as long as a
compromise settlement remained a viable option and neither the federal government or fireeaters in the Lower South inaugurated a shooting war. Events in the following months, however,
placed many dangerous obstacles in the Unionist roadway. In time, some ardent Border South
Unionists like Alexander William Doniphan began to change their tenor. The period between
4
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mid-January and the beginning of April 1861 revealed both the limits to which some Border
South Unionists would accede and the durability of the Unionist campaign that Crittenden and
his colleagues had commenced in the aftermath of Lincoln’s election.
***
While Doniphan and other moderates across the Border South took to the stump on behalf of the
Union, John Jordan Crittenden continued the fight for a conciliatory settlement of the slavery
issue in the nation’s capital.

Although he considered the January 16 substitution of his

settlement package with Daniel Clark’s unbending declaration that compromise was unnecessary
at present an affront, the old Kentuckian began to explore means to circumvent Republican
obfuscation in Congress. As his faith in Congress taking action waned, Crittenden’s trust in the
American people grew. Correspondents from across the country informed him that in spite of
the dangerous Star of the West episode earlier in the month, most Americans still yearned for a
settlement.

If he could get his compromise proposals before the great conservative mass,

Crittenden believed, the electorate would certainly sanction them. The package would need
slight alterations, however, to bring moderate Republicans aboard the ship of compromise.
Northern conservatives asked Crittenden to drop the hereafter acquired language that Lazarus
Powell had inserted into the territorial resolution, while a New Yorker suggested that he remove
the stipulation that territorial governments had to protect slavery south of the old Missouri
Compromise line. A simple declaration that slavery could exist south of the line, rather than a
full-fledged protective proviso, would go far to ease the concern of moderate northerners. “The
sense of right in the North will then not be violated and you will surely succeed in saving the
Union,” a New York moderate wrote.

Maryland Governor Thomas Hicks also assured
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Crittenden that in order to secure the settlement’s passage the masses would “strip [the package]
of the endangering amendment, the Territorial feature.”6
The course of the general assemblies of Delaware, Kentucky, and Missouri helped to
convince Crittenden that a strong mandate for his settlement existed. In Dover, the Delaware
legislature on January 17 passed a resolution that approved of the Crittenden Compromise and
instructed the state’s members of Congress to “advocate the said proposition” or any other means
of reconciliation.

Such a course of action “reflect[s] the will of a large majority of their

constituents” and that of the American people in general, the resolution read. The endorsement
of the Crittenden package passed the Delaware House of Representatives by a vote of 19-2 and
the Senate by a tally of 8-1. The paucity of votes in opposition to an endorsement of the
Crittenden settlement demonstrated that many Delawareans had yet to give up on compromise.7
The pro-Crittenden resolutions came on the heels of the general assembly’s rejection of
the Mississippi secession commissioner, which revealed the breadth of support for a settlement
in the First State. Sophie M. Du Pont noted that even the state legislators who opposed the
resolution that spurned the emissary from Mississippi actually agreed with the majority that
Delaware should not entertain the project of secession. Rather, they dissented because they
wanted to afford the Mississippian his due respect by having an appointed committee reply to his
request. She rationalized that they dissented based on semantics, not because they sympathized
with the disunion movement.

A political insider attributed Governor William Burton’s

recommendation that the legislature call a state convention to the machinations of James A.
Bayard, but even the senior Delaware senator had gone on the record in favor of the Crittenden
plan. Bayard on January 15 presented a memorial to the Senate from citizens of Delaware
6
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asking for the adoption of the Crittenden resolutions, and he declared that although he did not
feel Congress could cobble together the votes to pass the package, he too supported the
Kentuckian’s compromise.8
Debate in the Kentucky legislature, which convened on January 17, also centered on the
Crittenden Compromise. Signs from the Bluegrass State indicated that moderates and Unionists
in the legislature could hold the line as long as the Crittenden package remained viable. On the
first day of the session several senators and representatives submitted different resolutions which
indicated the general assembly’s approval of the Crittenden Compromise. The legislature sorted
through the various proposals and on January 24 fixed on a series of resolutions that asked
Congress to call a national convention to discuss the myriad compromise schemes that
politicians had placed before the public. The resolutions also offered the Crittenden plan as the
preferred program for a settlement. Moderates in the House defeated an attempt made by some
of their colleagues with secessionist proclivities to add language to the resolution which stated
that if the northern states rejected the settlement, Kentucky would follow the Deep South out of
the Union. Stripped of this ultimatum, the pro-compromise resolutions cleared the House by a
vote of 82-8. No roll call exists for the Senate vote, but the upper chamber agreed 37-0 to the
suggestion of the House to present the Crittenden Compromise as the best means to quell the
crisis.9
The Unionist offensive managed to keep disunionists in Frankfort at bay during the early
stages of the special session. On the third day of the session Representative John O. Harrison
8
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and Senator John F. Fisk coordinated on a resolution that required the sergeant-at-arms to fly the
American flag over the state capitol for the duration of the legislative session.

Some of

Harrison’s colleagues unsuccessfully tried to table the resolution, which subsequently passed the
House by a tally of 66-23 and the Senate without a dissenting vote.

Unionists stymied

Representative James G. Leach’s attempt to bring a resolution before the House that called for
the newly minted Committee on Federal Relations to report a bill calling a state convention. The
House on January 21 tabled Leach’s resolution by a vote of 54-36. A further sign of Unionist
strength, Leach had tried to cater to moderates by including a stipulation that any actions taken
by the state convention would be subject to ratification by the electorate. A similar initiative
stalled in the Senate, where Unionists joined hands and blocked Thomas S. Grundy’s attempt to
initiate a popular referendum to see if the people of Kentucky preferred a state convention.
Kentucky Unionists held firm and refused to follow even the cautious path taken by the Missouri
legislature, which had subjected the actions of their state convention to confirmation by the
state’s voters. Moderates achieved two more victories when they buried separate resolutions that
declared secession legal and called for an alliance with the South if the northern states spurned
all means of conciliation in the Committee on Federal Relations.10
The great lengths to which Unionists and conservatives went to thwart a state convention
in Kentucky have gone largely unnoticed by scholars of the sectional crisis. 11

10
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moderates labored day and night to prevent the Bluegrass State, which in terms of its social
complexion came closer to mirroring the Upper South states that eventually opted to secede than
any other state along the border, from even putting the question of a convention before the
people. “I doubt if our people will ever know the deep debt they owe the conservative men who
controlled that Assembly, not so much for the good accomplished as for the evil prevented,” C.F.
Burnam, a Unionist representative from Richmond, later recalled.

“Argument, persuasion,

entreaty, the party lash – all means that can be conceived of, are brought into requisition,” a
journalist for the pro-secession Louisville Daily Courier scoffed. The same reporter termed the
symbolic measure to fly the American flag over the statehouse “a token of submission!” A
proponent of secession lamented that moderates in the general assembly “are acting as a firm
phalanx against any prompt & speedy action” by keeping alive the hopes that a settlement might
yet be reached.12
By employing Unionist symbolism, backroom bargaining, and every available legislative
maneuver, moderates precluded Kentucky from following the path of North Carolina and
Tennessee, where both legislatures allowed for a popular referendum on whether or not to call a
state convention. Although voters in both Upper South states rejected a convention in February,
the passage of the referendum bills put in place the machinery for a quick withdrawal if any
event occurred that endangered the flimsy truce between Lower South secessionists and the
federal government. Had they not taken action, Unionists may have lost the momentum to
secessionists in the Bluegrass State and allowed Kentucky to join the Upper South states which
eventually opted for disunion.

Warm proponents of a state convention with well-earned

reputations for political trickery, including Blanton Duncan and George N. Sanders, exerted all
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C.F. Burnam to James S. Rollins, Feb. 20, 1861, Rollins Papers, SHS-MO; Louisville Daily Courier, Jan.
19, 21, 1861; Blanton Duncan to William Porcher Miles, Jan. 22, 1861, W.P. Miles Papers, SHC-UNC.

231

the influence they could muster upon the state legislators in Frankfort, but fell short in their
effort. Much to the dismay of the advocates of secession, Unionists had built an impressive
bulwark that proved difficult to assail as long as hopes for a settlement remained alive.13
Kentucky legislators of all stripes, however, reviled the prospect of the federal
government coercing any of the seven Lower South states back into the Union. In the aftermath
of the Star of the West episode in Charleston Harbor, several northern state legislatures had
offered the federal government financial aid, supplies, and men to subdue the rebellion in the
Lower South. Some northern governors also began to put their states on a war footing by urging
enlistments in state militias, instructing state militia officers to conduct drills, and procuring
weapons and military accouterments. In response to these foreboding signs from the North,
Representative G.W. Ewing crafted a set of joint resolutions: the first expressed regret that some
northern governments had made preparations to coerce the seceded states; the second asked
Governor Beriah Magoffin to warn state executives in the rest of the Union that if northern
troops marched southward, “the people of Kentucky, uniting with their brethren of the South,
will, as one man, resist such invasions of the soil of the South at all hazards and to the last
extremity.” The first resolution passed the House without a single dissenting vote and the second
resolution carried 87-6.14
Blanton Duncan, a one-time wirepuller for Stephen Douglas who had entered the fireeater camp during the secession winter, viewed himself as the catalyst for Ewing’s resolutions.
He admitted to a South Carolina radical that he had whipped many Kentucky legislators into a
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frenzy over the actions of the northern legislatures and cajoled the passage of the resolutions. A
newspaper reporter also claimed that prior to the vote on the resolutions one of the state
legislators circulated a letter from an unnamed Kentucky congressman who suggested that
Crittenden had given up on compromise because of Republican intransigence in Washington.
Unconditional Unionist Leslie Combs complained of Duncan’s machinations and noted that
Frankfort “is full of Devils & Fireeaters – generally with hair all over their faces – as if ashamed
to be seen by honest men.” Combs noted that Border South Unionism relied on “the anxious
hope that the North will do justice on the Slave & Territorial questions,” and he believed that the
people of the Bluegrass State would not succumb to Ewing’s “volcanic bullying resolutions.”
Duncan’s nefarious political engineering aside, Ewing’s resolutions illustrate both the robust
antipathy toward coercion among border country southerners and the conditional nature of
southern Unionism. Any overt action from the North, especially from their erstwhile allies in the
Lower North, threatened to capsize Unionist sentiment in the Border South.15
Although the Missouri legislature had by late January decided to hold a state convention,
the subject of the Crittenden Compromise did not recede from the imagination of the state’s
politicians or people. Representative Mortimer McIlhany from Audrain County introduced a
resolution that distinguished the Crittenden plan “as a fair and equitable adjustment of the
troubles which now afflict the country.”

Furthermore, his resolution instructed Missouri’s

congressional delegation to “use all their influence to secure [its] passage.” The House placed
McIlhany’s resolution aside, though several politicians in Jefferson City referenced the
Crittenden package while debating the pressing issue of holding a state convention. Senator
Preston Read averred that the Border South and the Lower North had to take the lead in the push
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for the passage of the Crittenden resolutions, which he believed would solve the impending
crisis. Senator John Gullett proclaimed that although he hailed from a district populated by few
enslaved persons, “he wanted to see slave property protected as scrupulously as any other
property.”

Remaining in the Union and securing passage of some compromise settlement

offered the best means to do this, he argued. Robert Wilson, a Unionist state senator from
Andrew County, reminded his fellow politicians that if Missouri chose secession over
compromise, they would surely expedite the destruction of slavery. Prospectively surrounded on
three sides by a foreign nation, secession invited slave escapes, welcomed additional abolitionist
incursions, and created an 800 mile long border to defend from external invasion.

“That

institution about which we have talked so much in this hall, must in a few years disappear from
our borders, should we secede,” Wilson forewarned. He felt it far better to settle the issue along
the lines of the Crittenden Compromise, which he believed would perpetuate the peculiar
institution’s life, than to drive slavery down the path of annihilation by following the course of
the Deep South. Citizens of St. Louis in late January inaugurated a petition drive and in a few
days collected over twelve thousand signatures in favor of the adoption of the Crittenden
package.16
In Annapolis, Governor Thomas Hicks continued to resist the appeals of those who
wanted him to convene the Maryland legislature in special session. A group of eleven state
senators in late December went so far as to sign a circular letter that requested the governor to
call the legislature, but Hicks remained unmoved. An unconditional Unionist pointed out that
Democrats, many of whom sympathized with the course of the Cotton South, controlled both
houses of the legislature and thus would speedily send a convention bill through the assembly.
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Under Maryland’s constitution, he further noted, the executive lacked the veto power, which
increased the odds that a convention bill would pass. Fearful that the general assembly might
make the rash decision to call a state convention, the governor remained firm and asked the
people of his state to rely upon “the sober second thought of the masses,” especially
conservatives in the North, who would ally with the Border South on the quest for conciliation.
Rumors of secessionist plots to carry Maryland out of the Union also strengthened Hicks’s
resolve to keep the legislature from assembling.17
Throughout the secession winter, Hicks stayed in contact with Crittenden. The Maryland
executive believed that the majority of people in the Old Line State yearned for the passage of
his compromise measures, but they had become alarmed by the deadlock in Congress. He
questioned the motives of intransigent northern and southern politicians in Washington, who
“remind me of a pair of bull yearlings with their heads butting together and pressing agt each
other[,] each striving for the mastery.” If only they listened to the electorate, he reasoned, these
politicians would grasp the prevailing impetus for a settlement. Hicks’s outlook on the mood of
his state resembled that of Baltimore merchant Henry Lowe, who recognized “a strong Union
feeling here, but no disposition to aid the government agains [sic] the South.”18
When the Crittenden measures stalled in the Senate in mid-January, Hicks momentarily
relented and considered calling the legislature into session. The pertinacious approach of the
Republicans, along with rumblings of a conspiracy to assassinate Hicks for his unyielding stance,
rattled the heretofore poised governor. “Vipers are to be crushed[,] not argued with,” one such
17
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anonymous subversive warned Hicks, “and we would hold ourselves guilty of murder could we
sacrifice you even thousands of times.” The Maryland governor in mid-January declined to
receive officially a delegation sent by Pennsylvania governor Andrew Curtin, who hoped to
reassure Hicks that they would do all in their power to sustain him in his fight against Maryland
secessionists. He told the Pennsylvania delegation that Maryland could handle its own affairs
and added that he “was a Southerner and a slaveholder, and that his whole feelings and interests
were identified with the South.”

Furthermore, Hicks told the Pennsylvanians that “the

unyielding spirit manifested by the republicans” had forced him to reassess his refusal to call the
general assembly to Annapolis. Soon thereafter, however, Hicks recommitted himself to holding
the line against those who wished for the legislature to assemble.19
Two phenomena helped Hicks and other moderates across the Border South regain their
confidence in the prospects of compromise and redouble their efforts on behalf of the Union.
First, in late January the idea of a convention of the states started to gain traction. Some
advocates of a multi-state convention suggested a meeting of only slaveholding states while
others recommended the free and slaveholding border states convene. As early as December 9,
1860, Beriah Magoffin had proposed to other slave state governors a meeting designed to “arrest
the secession movement, until the question as to whether the Union can be preserved upon fair
and honorable terms, can be fully tested.” With the compromise effort apparently stillborn in
Congress, a growing body of Americans advised a national gathering that included every state in
the Union. In the middle of January, Crittenden got each member of the Kentucky congressional
delegation to endorse a telegram to Magoffin beseeching the governor to appoint a committee of
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five to meet with officials from Virginia in Washington for the purpose of finding a solution to
the national impasse. Convinced that demagoguery and partisanship inhibited the likelihood of a
settlement in Congress, many moderates vested their hopes in a national convention comprised
of dispassionate, sober statesmen who would work toward a feasible compromise. William C.
Rives thought that conservative leaders from the Upper and Border South would assume the
vanguard of conciliation at a national meeting. Moderate Unionists would “overrule the narrow
spirit of sectionalism and party infatuation, and open a way by which the harmonious adjustment
of our difficulties may be reached.”20
The legislature of Virginia took the lead in the push for a national convention and in midJanuary passed a resolution inviting every other state in the Union to send delegates to
Washington on February 4. The general assembly submitted a slightly altered version of the
Crittenden Compromise as a basis for negotiations and sent forth emissaries who pled with
leaders in Washington and South Carolina to refrain from any reckless action which might
provoke physical violence. Unionists across the Border South quickly latched on to Virginia’s
call for a Peace Convention in Washington. The Delaware legislature swiftly sanctioned a joint
resolution to appoint delegates to the meeting and a similar joint resolution sailed through the
Kentucky legislature in a matter of days. Some disagreement arose about who to send to
Washington, but each state chose a delegation of men from various partisan backgrounds who
were committed to the preservation of the Union. The proposition faced some difficulty in the
divided Missouri general assembly, but on January 31 the legislature settled on a team to send to
Washington. With the legislature out of session in Maryland, Thomas Hicks took it upon
himself to assign his state’s members to the Washington Peace Conference. Opponents of Hicks
20
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howled that his decision to send commissioners without legislative fiat represented a usurpation
of executive power, but the governors of six other states also sent representatives without
consulting their respective legislatures.21

Missouri

Maryland

Kentucky

Delaware

Table 21 - Delegates to the Washington Peace Conference from the Border South
Slaves Owned
(1860)
Year of Birth
Name
Party
State of Birth
George B. Rodney

Opposition

0

1803 Delaware

Daniel M. Bates

Democrat

0

1821 Delaware

Henry Ridgely

Democrat

0

1779 Delaware

John W. Houston

Opposition

1

1814 Delaware

William Cannon

Democrat

14

1809 Delaware

William O. Butler

Democrat

0

1791 Kentucky

James B. Clay

Democrat

12

1817 Washington D.C.

Joshua F. Bell

Opposition

14

1811 Kentucky

Charles S. Morehead

Opposition

13

1802 Kentucky

James Guthrie

Democrat

7

1792 Kentucky

Charles A. Wickliffe

Democrat

33

1788 Kentucky

John F. Dent

Democrat

24

1814 ?

Reverdy Johnson

Opposition

1

1796 Maryland

John W. Crisfield

Opposition

23

1806 Maryland

Augustus W. Bradford

Opposition

2

1806 Maryland

William T. Goldsborough Opposition

55

1808 Maryland

James Dixon Roman

Opposition

Benjamin C. Howard

Democrat

John D. Coalter

?

2
12

1809 Pennsylvania
1791 Maryland

3

1818 South Carolina

Alexander W. Doniphan Opposition

5

1808 Kentucky

Waldo P. Johnson

Democrat

1

1817 Virginia

Aylett H. Buckner

Democrat

9

1816 Virginia

Harrison Hough

?

29

1813 Kentucky

Sources: Slave Schedules, Census of 1860, accessed at www.ancestry.com; Biographical Directory of the United
States Congress , accessed at http://bioguide.congress.gov/biosearch/biosearch.asp.
Notes: C.S. Morehead also had plantations in Mississippi & Louisiana, so the number of slaves owned may have
been larger than 13. Reverdy Johnson was listed as the employer of the one slave in the 1860 census, so he
likely rented rather than owned the slave. Waldo Johnson owned 1 slave and rented 2 slaves.
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Table 22 - A Snapshot of Border South Delegates to the Washington Peace
Conference
Mean Slave Ownership

11.3 slaves

Mean Year of Birth

1806

Mean Age

55
Place of Birth

Delaware

5

Kentucky

7

Maryland

5

Missouri

0

Washington D.C.

1

Virginia

Border South

17

73.91%

2

Upper South &
Washington D.C.

3

13.04%

South Carolina

1

Lower South

1

4.35%

Pennsylvania

1

Lower North

1

4.35%

Unknown

1

Unknown

1

4.35%

Party Membership
Democrats

11

Opposition

10

Unknown

2

Tables 21 and 22 provide information about the men chosen to represent the Border
South at the Washington Peace Conference. Nearly all of the delegates had earned the respect of
their peers and colleagues for their work in state legislatures, on the bench, or in the United
States Congress. In addition to their public service, the renown of some of the Border South
delegates to the Washington Peace Conference resonated beyond the borders of their state. Most
Americans had read about the exploits of Alexander Doniphan in the Mexican-American War;
operatives in the Democratic Party had seriously considered James Guthrie, a wealthy railroad
president and former secretary of the treasury, as the party’s presidential candidate in 1860;
Reverdy Johnson served as attorney general under Zachary Taylor, provided legal counsel to
John Sanford in the Dred Scott case, and according to one expert on antebellum law, “was
probably the most respected constitutional lawyer in the country”; and James B. Clay was a son

239

and former law partner of Henry Clay.22 The general assemblies and Governor Hicks almost
evenly split their overall presence at the conference among Democrats and Opposition men, but
no Republicans represented the Border South at the Washington meeting. These eminent border
country politicians were on average fifty-five years of age and owned around eleven enslaved
persons. Ten delegates, however, owned fewer than five or none, while five of the emissaries
had accumulated massive slaveholdings for the Border South and reached the status of planter.
Nearly all of the Border South delegates had been born in the Border or Upper South, though one
hailed from South Carolina and another from Pennsylvania. Their age, wealth, attachment to
slavery, and familiarity with the Border South meant that these men clearly understood the
importance of finding some solution to the deepening national crisis.
Along with the Washington Peace Conference movement, Crittenden and his colleagues
persisted in their effort to get Congress to consider some compromise plan. Two days after the
Senate replaced the hardline Clark Resolutions for his compromise package, Crittenden managed
to get the upper house to reconsider the decisive January 16 vote for substitution.

The

reconsideration measure narrowly passed 27 to 24, with all eight Border South senators voting in
the affirmative. Republican Daniel Clark futilely protested Crittenden’s tactic on the grounds
that a full contingent of senators were not present to vote.23 Even though they voiced concerns
that the bulk of the Republican Party would never acquiesce in a settlement, moderates and
Unionists along the border considered it imperative to keep compromise on life-support in
Congress.

To throw in the towel on Capitol Hill would provide disunionists with greater

leverage and confirm to many southerners the fire-eater argument that the South had no future in
22
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a Union dominated by Republican leadership. Border South Unionists searched for ways to
convince the electorate that not all northerners eschewed compromise. Severn Teackle Wallis,
an outspoken Baltimore lawyer and politician with secessionist proclivities, caustically warned a
Maryland Unionist “that in the absence of such concessions on the part of the North, the
dismemberment of the Republic is a foregone conclusion, & nothing will be left to us, here, but a
choice of adhesion to the one or the other of its fragments.”24
Mindful of the delicate balance in the South, several northern moderates in late January
and early February played up the amicable intersectional relationships between conservatives
that in the 1850s helped suppress radicalism in the great heart of the nation. Democrat William
Bigler of Pennsylvania emphatically announced on the floor of the Senate that the northern
people would accept the Crittenden measures if given the opportunity to vote upon them. He
reminded his colleagues that although the Border and Upper South had stood true to the Union,
the leaders in those states openly declared the absolute need for a settlement and an outright
intolerance of federal coercion of the seceded states. If the Republicans continued to block the
avenue that led toward settlement, Bigler cautioned, many Border South conservatives would
have no choice but to join in the disunion movement. The Pennsylvanian shuddered at the
prospect of secession and war along the sectional border, where a line on a map simplified the
complex relations built up over generations. “That line is sanctified by all the ties that can
endear men to each other – political and commercial ties; ties of interest and custom; ties of
consanguinity and affection. Great God!” Bigler exclaimed, “Are all those to be severed?”
Boston conservative Edward Everett warned that if the Border South sided with the Lower

24
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South, “the fate of the country is sealed.” Everett counseled political leaders to listen to the
northern people and moderates in the Border South who ached for a settlement.25
Border South moderates saw a glimmer of hope on January 21 when Republican senator
Simon Cameron of Pennsylvania avowed he had an inclination to vote for the Crittenden
package. Delaware senator Willard Saulsbury thanked Cameron for his conciliatory outlook and
expressed his optimism that other conservative Republicans would eventually come around and
join hands with their erstwhile partisan rivals to secure a settlement. Virginian James Mason, an
advocate of disunion, immediately questioned Cameron’s motives and pointed out that the
Pennsylvanian had voted on January 16 to defeat the compromise initiative. Cameron responded
that Crittenden had personally approached him, made a strong case for compromise, and asked
him to reevaluate his position. The two senators may have agreed to a political trade. Earlier in
the day the Senate voted on an enabling act that would bring Kansas into the Union as a free
state. So long the explosive centerpiece of sectional animosity in Washington, the Kansas issue
ironically came to a conclusion during the secession winter without much fanfare. Several
Lower South senators had resigned from the upper chamber when their states left the Union,
which allowed the measure to pass the Senate by the comfortable margin of 36 to 16. Only one
Border South senator – Crittenden - voted in favor of the state’s admission, while four voted
against the measure and three abstained.26 Perhaps Crittenden joined with Republicans and
northern Democrats to pass the bill in order to earn political capital with the very people who
held the fate of his compromise in their hands.
25
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Republican cooperation on compromise, however, never materialized in the Senate. The
day after Cameron’s speech, Lazarus Powell beseeched the Republicans to pass the Crittenden
program. “If you adopt this amendment,” the Kentucky Democrat importuned, “the guns of
demagogues, north and south, will be spiked.” Pleas for assistance from Border South moderates
and northern Democrats did not resonate with Republicans across the aisle. They utilized an
array of parliamentary tactics to bring less important matters before the Senate and stall a second
vote on the Crittenden proposition. Likely at the behest of party operatives and to salvage his
own political career, the slippery Cameron retreated from his conciliatory stance. Just two days
after expressing his approval of the Crittenden plan, the Pennsylvanian led a Republican effort to
postpone the discussion of compromise and instead take up a tariff bill. The few remaining
southern radicals in the upper house teamed up with their Republican enemies in an attempt to
disrupt the Crittenden resolutions by voting in favor of delaying measures. Stephen Douglas
fumed that “it is no longer worth while to conceal from ourselves the fact that the extremists on
this side and on the other side are in concert, from different motives, to defeat a settlement.”27
While he could not procure a vote on his resolutions, Crittenden had seen to it that
radicals could not simply move past the issue.

The agitation of moderates prevented

Republicans from burying the compromise initiative on the Senate calendar. He successfully
bridged the gap between the substitution of the Clark resolutions and the meeting of peace
commissioners at Washington in early February by constantly pressing for consideration of his
measures.

Once the Peace Conference commenced on February 4, Crittenden relaxed his

campaign for the consideration of his compromise package out of respect for the assembled
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delegates working toward the same end, but he promised to renew his efforts in the Senate once
the meeting concluded.28
Over in the House of Representatives, the chances for a comprehensive settlement
appeared to break down. Debate on the six separate reports from the Committee of Thirty-three
commenced on January 21 and continued ad nauseam throughout much of the remainder of the
legislative session. “The Committee of Thirty-three neither saved the Union nor their own
reputations,” a newspaper correspondent grumbled in response to the panel’s absence of
cohesion. “Interminable debate still proceeds.” The lack of unity on the Committee of Thirtythree spilled onto the floor of the House when the committees’ reports came up for discussion.
Politicians of all stripes used the occasion to deliver eloquent speeches which ranged from fireeating diatribes and Republican denunciations of secession to honest appeals for peace. During
the often vituperative debates, several Border South congressmen admonished their colleagues to
vote rather than talk. J. Morrison Harris, a Unionist from Maryland, reminded the House that
although the Upper and Border South remained true to the Union, secession sentiment would
spread if Congress rested on its laurels. “In the whole tier of these border States, and greatly in
my own State, before the rush of events whirls us into greater excitement,” Harris announced,
“we want to know whether the northern Representatives in this Congress, who hold the power of
this great salvation or this absolute ruin in their hands, are disposed to do anything, upon a basis
that will be saving and sufficient.”29
Harris’s warning apparently prodded some Republicans to action in the House.
Massachusetts Republican Charles Francis Adams on January 31 clarified his views on the crisis
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and stated that although he could not endorse the Crittenden plan with the hereafter acquired
clause tethered to it, he would accept Thomas Corwin’s suggestion for a constitutional
amendment that would protect slavery in the states. William Kellogg of Illinois on February 1
submitted a compromise package that extended the Missouri Compromise line westward and
incorporated the Corwin amendment to safeguard the peculiar institution in the states, and John
Killinger of Pennsylvania followed Kellogg with a conciliatory speech in which he praised
Crittenden as “the last of his school; that school of patriots which the Whig party gave to the
country.” The overtures of these Republicans toward compromise, however, failed to generate
any excitement throughout the rest of the party. Few Republicans joined in this brief flurry of
conciliatory sentiment and most of the party faithful took it upon themselves to confirm their
commitment to intransigence. Kellogg faced a veritable firing squad for introducing a settlement
package that surpassed Corwin’s suggestion.

Constituents in his congressional district

denounced his compromise proposal; the Chicago Tribune read Kellogg out of the party; and one
observer in Illinois regarded the congressman as “politically dead in all parts of the state but
among democrats.”30
Abraham Lincoln’s stance on compromise had not significantly changed since he
admonished his Republican colleagues at the opening of Congress to resist any measures that
would jeopardize the party’s key principle of prohibiting the spread of slavery into the territories.
Republicans looked to Lincoln for guidance and direction, and he had not backed away from his
unyielding standpoint on the extension of slavery in the West. Still ensconced in Springfield, the
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president-elect brushed off the mountain of appeals from the Border South calling for him to
issue a statement and maintained his public silence on the unfolding national crisis.31
The petitions of a few influential Border South moderates, however, did provoke Lincoln
to relent ever so slightly. In mid-December Nathan Sargent met with a handful of senators and
congressmen in Washington to discuss the national crisis. During the meeting Senator James
Pearce of Maryland acknowledged that although a public statement from the president-elect
would have little impact in the Lower South, it “would have a powerful effect in the Northern
slave states, and might arrest the epidemic now so fearfully & rapidly spreading.” Crittenden
and his fellow Kentuckian Green Adams also informed one of Lincoln’s intermediaries that if he
issued a public statement outlining the nuance of his position on slavery in the states versus the
territories, it would smother the disunion movement in the Border and Upper South. President
James Buchanan followed suit and sent Duff Green, an elderly native of Kentucky and a
formerly powerful newspaper editor, out to Springfield in the hopes of procuring a letter from the
president-elect that sketched his intentions toward the South. Green placed the Crittenden
resolutions before Lincoln, who offered his normal response: the extension of the Missouri
Compromise line might quiet the agitation of the slavery issue at present, but it would only invite
future filibustering schemes from proslavery zealots and leave the root of the issue unresolved.
Lincoln added that although “he intended to sustain his party in good faith,” he would acquiesce
to the will of the people if they chose to add an amendment to the Constitution through due
process. Green apparently convinced Lincoln to compose a letter in which he outlined his

31

David Potter and Russell McClintock each explain how leadership of the Republican Party transferred
from William Seward to Abraham Lincoln during this crucial interval; see Potter, Lincoln and His Party in the
Secession Crisis & McClintock, Lincoln and the Decision for War. See the following letters on December 12 for an
example of the daily Border South appeals that flooded Lincoln: J.M. Bullock to Abraham Lincoln, Dec. 12, 1860,
Leroy P. Cord to Abraham Lincoln, Dec. 12, 1860, J.H. McKee to Abraham Lincoln, Dec. 12, 1860, R.W. Monecatt
to Abraham Lincoln, Dec. 12, 1860, all in Lincoln Papers, LOC.

246

sentiment that no amendment to the Constitution was necessary, but he would not interfere with
the political process if the American people desired to alter the document. Furthermore, the
president-elect copied directly from the Chicago Platform the Republican Party position that “the
right of each state to order and control its own domestic institutions according to its own
judgment exclusively, is essential to that balance of powers on which the perfection, and
endurance of our political fabric depends.”32
Lincoln consented to the publication of the letter only under the condition that six of the
twelve senators from any of the Deep South states aside from South Carolina also affix their
name to the document. He also placed the communication in the hands of Lyman Trumbull, not
Duff Green, and instructed him to deliver it only if he felt it would do the party no harm.
Although Green apparently received the letter, he did not make it public. Speculation about
Green’s reticence to publish the letter revolves around two possibilities: he held back because of
Lincoln’s “unwillingness to recommend an amendment to the constitution which will arrest the
progress of secession” or because he could not procure the signatures of six southern senators.
Green did file a report of his visit to Springfield in the New York Herald in which he commented
that once in office the Republican president would meet several of the demands of the South –
from taking no action against slavery in the District of Columbia and federal property in the
southern states to keeping the interstate slave trade intact – but on the issue of the territorial
expansion of slavery Lincoln was “firmly and unequivocally resolved to make no concession”
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unless through constitutional amendment. While Green painted Lincoln in a favorable light, his
testimonial did little to pacify nervous southerners about the president-elect’s intentions.33
From outward appearances Lincoln seemed to barricade himself away in Springfield and
idly wait for his term to begin in early March. In reality he spent long days poring over
correspondence from Republicans in Washington, entertaining an endless stream of visitors, and
sifting through a plethora of possible cabinet appointees. The composition of his cabinet became
an engrossing issue for all Americans because it would likely indicate the trajectory of the first
Republican administration. Would he fill his official family with hardline Republicans who
sympathized with the abolition movement, or would he opt to staff his cabinet with more
moderate men? This question carried momentous weight among southerners. It held even more
value in the Border South, a region that utterly depended on conservative northern cooperation
and in which some of its inhabitants had prior to John Brown’s October 1859 raid even
contemplated an alliance with the Republicans.34 For border country southerners, Lincoln’s
cabinet served as a barometer of the Republican approach to the South and would likely impact
many people’s decision about Union or secession.
Border southerners found it difficult to discern how the tight-lipped Lincoln would
proceed. He twice met with Edward Bates in December and told the Missourian that he planned
to include him in his official family. Lincoln confided to Bates that he would also place William
Seward, the senior senator from New York and the de facto leader of the party, in his cabinet.
Bates hinted to Lincoln that Seward’s inclusion “would exasperate the feelings of the South, and
33
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make conciliation impossible, because they consider Mr. S[eward] the embodiment of all that
they hold odious in the Republican party.” At a meeting on December 31, Lincoln showed Bates
some letters which Seward, who had accepted the post of secretary of state, had written. Bates
expressed surprise that the New Yorker, whose reputation for radicalism actually cloaked a
conservative outlook, suggested several southerners and conservatives to round out the cabinet.35
The Missourian accurately gauged the opinion of many border southerners toward
Seward. The New Yorker had in the 1850s invoked the ire of the South for his declaration that
an irrepressible conflict existed between slavery and freedom.

The adjectives that many

southerners used to describe Seward rarely evoked a positive tone: during the crisis a clergyman
labeled him an “arch-demagogue”; a Kentuckian considered him “the most obnoxious man of all
to the South”; and one South Carolinian lamented that the New Yorker “damns us – scoffs at us
with devilish wit.”36 Unbeknownst to most southerners, Seward went to great lengths to keep the
Border and Upper South in the Union during the secession winter.37 Nonetheless, for many
conservatives the selection of Bates the Border South moderate failed to counterbalance the
appointment of Seward, the perceived abolitionist demon.
Most pundits agreed that Lincoln choose wisely when he selected Edward Bates. Perhaps
more than any other southern Republican and aside from his desperate groping for the party’s
nomination in the run-up to the Chicago Convention in May 1860, the former Whig had
established himself as a conservative on the slavery extension issue. Thurlow Weed, who
campaigned on behalf of Seward for a moderate cabinet, felt that Bates made a good addition, as
35
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did some Republicans in the Border South.38 Rumors prevailed that Lincoln might assign
additional posts in his cabinet to men from the Border South, but the other names talked of
frightened both Republicans and border southerners. Cassius Clay, the hard-edged abolitionist
from Kentucky, actively sought a place in the cabinet and in early January 1861 told Lincoln, “I
know the South – ‘conciliation’ will never save the Union!”

While his viewpoint on

compromise tended to mirror Lincoln’s, advisors to the president-elect warned of the ill effects
of placing Clay in his official family.

Robert J. Breckinridge, who met with Lincoln in

December to discuss his cabinet, remonstrated that the appointment of the firebrand Clay would
likely tip the balance in the Bluegrass State toward secession. “Kentucky would feel insulted at
having forced on her as her organ a citizen over whom she would even prefer Seward,” George
Robertson admitted.39
Some Republicans also mentioned Henry Winter Davis for a post in the cabinet. Davis,
like Cassius Clay, generated more discontentment than satisfaction among most border
southerners. His spiteful political style, deep-seated nativism, and most importantly his alliance
with the Republicans during the speakership contest of 1859-1860 made the Baltimore politician
anathema to most border southerners. A Marylander predicted that if Lincoln included Winter
Davis in his cabinet, the already tiny Republican Party would wither in the Old Line State. John
T. Graham complained that Winter Davis had never really won an election; rather, he drummed
up an army of working class “rowdies” and drove honest voters from the polls. “I tell you, the
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people of Maryland and the whole South would rather be represented by Mr Hale [abolitionist
Senator John Hale of New Hampshire]” than Henry Winter Davis, Graham moaned.40
Lincoln faced pressure to place someone from the powerful Blair family in his cabinet,
too. Francis Preston Blair, Sr., a former Democrat and political advisor to Andrew Jackson, had
assisted in the formation of the Republican Party in the 1850s. From his home in Silver Spring,
Maryland, the aged Blair worked the machinery of the party and hinted that one of his two sons
deserved a place in the first Republican administration. The placement of Edward Bates in
Lincoln’s official family made it unlikely that fellow Missourian Frank Blair, Jr., would receive
an appointment. Frank Jr.’s older brother Montgomery, however, lived and worked in Maryland
as an attorney and provided a more conservative alternative to Winter Davis. Francis and his son
Frank began a campaign on Montgomery’s behalf, which gained momentum in the winter of
1860-1861. Blair, Sr., thought his eldest son the perfect cabinet appointment, especially because
he could help the party grow throughout the Border South. Montgomery’s connections to
Kentucky, Missouri, and Maryland and the Blair family’s relatively moderate approach to the
political issue of slavery – they condoned hindering the westward spread of the peculiar
institution but insisted the Constitution protected it in the states and preferred colonization as the
best means to whiten America in the future – placed his thinking closer to the Border South
consensus than that of Winter Davis or Cassius Clay.41
The president-elect mulled over the names of these prominent Border South Republicans
as he prepared to leave Springfield on February 11 and make his journey to Washington.
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Lincoln understood that as president of the United States he needed southerners in his cabinet to
offset his party’s sectional cast, but he faced an uphill battle convincing the people of the Border
South that the Republicans meant their region no harm. Conservative Republicans like Edward
Bates and Montgomery Blair, both of whom eventually entered the cabinet, were nonetheless
still Republicans, which frightened many border country inhabitants.42 Without some public
assurance that he would not touch slavery in the states, border southerners worried the new
president might fall victim to radicals in his party who in their minds planned “some
subterranean design to wage an exterminating crusade against [the South] by all the power and
patronage of the incoming administration.” James A. Bayard held similar concerns about the
designs of the Republican Party when in January 1861 he told his son that the “inevitable result
of [Republican] dogmas must be the destruction of negro slavery, and the ultimate equality of the
negro and the white man.” On the floor of the House, Thomas L. Anderson of Missouri laid bare
the paranoia that had engulfed the Border South since Lincoln’s election: “Many of our slaves
are now impressed with the idea that, after the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln, they are to be free.
This impression makes them restless and discontented; renders our homes, our wives, and our
children unsafe,” Anderson railed. “Surely no rational man expects us to live with such a state of
things in our midst.”43
Lincoln’s silence, discussions of possible cabinet appointees with radical inclinations, the
possibility of armed conflict at Charleston Harbor, and the obstinate stand of Republicans in
Congress together manufactured a great deal of disquietude among border southerners. By
42
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February tensions ran high as the window for congressional action shrank. Instead of utilizing
their time to speak on the reports of the Committee of Thirty-three for constructive means, some
Border South congressmen instead delivered diatribes against the Republicans. George W.
Hughes of Maryland attacked Lincoln, Seward, and other Republicans as “mischief making
politicians” who had brainwashed the northern people with the repugnant doctrine of an
irrepressible conflict. Kentuckian Laban Moore warned Republicans to retreat from the notion
of coercion and accept some form of compromise, or else they would drive the Border South to
join the Deep South in a slaveholding confederacy.

“No army can be marched through

[Kentucky’s] borders to invade a sister State, without making every plain therein a battle field,
and every mountain pass a Thermopylae,” Moore announced.44
Affairs in St. Louis complicated matters for Border South moderates who in order to
sustain the Unionist offensive wished to avoid an armed conflict at all costs. Missouri’s largest
city included a lightly guarded federal arsenal packed with about 60,000 stands of arms and
commanded by an officer who sympathized with secessionists in the Lower South. Frank Blair,
Jr., heard rumors that disunion militants with the blessing of Governor Claiborne Fox Jackson
planned to seize the federal arsenal and distribute the enclosed arms to the state militia. Blair
worried that a heavily armed state militia would serve as a boon to secessionists and might
convince some wavering disunionists that Missouri could successfully stand up to the federal
government. In January 1861 he organized a Union Committee of Public Safety and his own
militia unit to offset the secessionists in his midst. Blair named his militia unit, comprised
mostly of St. Louis Republicans and Germans, the Home Guards to distinguish it from the state
militia. Fears arose among moderates that a standoff in their own backyard of St. Louis, rather
than far away Charleston Harbor, might inaugurate hostilities and unravel the tapestry of
44
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Unionism in the Border South. Isaac Sturgeon, who worked as an administrator in the United
States Treasury office in St. Louis, warned James Buchanan that if either the disunionists or
Blair’s organization captured the arsenal “war would at once begin in this section as neither
would submit to its possession by the other peacefully.”45
Fearful of an outbreak of hostilities, General in Chief Winfield Scott ordered Lieutenant
W.J. Robinson and forty federal soldiers to St. Louis. After his arrival on January 11 Robinson
stationed his men in the upper rooms of the city’s post office. Sturgeon worked with local
authorities and had the unit moved to the arsenal, where they anxiously held their post while
secessionist militia units mobilized around them. Captain Nathaniel Lyon on February 6 led a
company of United States regular army troops into St. Louis to buttress the forty regulars and
Blair’s Home Guard.

Lyon, a Connecticut-born officer who had earned a reputation for

impetuosity in the regular army while leading troops in the Mexican-American War and fighting
Indians in California, undermined commanding officer Major Peter V. Hagner and eventually
took charge of the arsenal.46 The amplified federal contingent kept the pro-secession forces in
St. Louis at bay for the time being, but news of an increased federal presence on Missouri’s soil
alarmed most of the state’s congressional delegation in Washington. Rumors of federal troops
entering Missouri had reached the national capital in mid-January, which prompted Senator
James Green and Congressman John B. Clark each to submit resolutions of inquiry to the
secretary of war to find out “whether we are put under a military despotism.” The resolutions
45
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failed to advance in either body, but Clark caused an uproar when he pressed the matter and
declared, “I want to know whether martial law is declared in my State; whether our women and
children, when they go to their post office, are to be met by soldiers and bristling bayonets.”47
The possibility of conflict in St. Louis foreshadowed the difficulties that Unionists would have to
endure if coercion overcame compromise. Furthermore, the prickly reaction of Green and Clark
laid bare the contempt that many border southerners felt for federal troops entering any part of
the South, even the Unionist bastion of St. Louis.
Aware of the mounting frustration and the escalating impatience that border southerners
espoused, Republican George Palmer of New York on February 11 offered a pair of resolutions
that proclaimed the federal government and the people of the North had neither the desire nor the
constitutional right to interfere with slavery in the states and that radicals in the North who did
not ascribe to this viewpoint were “too insignificant in numbers or influence to excite serious
attention or alarm.” Intended to allay the fears of border southerners, the resolution instead
provoked the wrath of Henry C. Burnett, a Democrat from western Kentucky who embraced
secession. A Cincinnati newspaper described Burnett as “a big, burly, loud-mouthed fellow who
is forever raising points of order and objections, to embarrass the Republicans in the House.” He
had snipped at Republicans throughout the session and cast aspersions at their aims and goals
toward the South. The irritable Burnett saw in Palmer’s resolutions an opportunity to impugn the
despised Republicans.48
Discussion arose about the resolutions, with Burnett and Thomas C. Hindman of
Arkansas taking the lead in questioning the phrasing of Palmer’s outwardly innocuous
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statements. Burnett claimed he could not vote for the first resolution because he doubted that
northerners would respect the Constitution in regard to the peculiar institution in the southern
states. “I have no doubt, sir, that the majority of the people of the North, as evinced by the men
they elect and send here, and especially by the election in November last for President and Vice
President, are in favor of interfering with slavery in the slaveholding States,” he huffed. After a
period of acrimonious debate, Republican John Sherman suggested simplifying the resolution to
read “That neither Congress, nor the people or the governments of the non-slaveholding States,
have the right to legislate upon or interfere with slavery in any of the slaveholding States of the
Union.” The abridged resolution passed the House by a vote of 161-0, though four Border South
congressmen refrained from casting a ballot.49
The Palmer resolution managed to clear the House, but the debate it produced
demonstrated that some border southerners had begun to reevaluate their section’s place in the
Union. Some, like Henry Burnett, increasingly warmed to the idea of secession as the days
passed and no compromise settlement emerged. Others began to express interest in the idea of
armed neutrality, where each state of the Border South would in the event of war maintain its
relations with both the federal government and the seceded states. Former governor Robert M.
Stewart of Missouri had broached this idea upon leaving office in late December 1860, and
Kentucky congressman William E. Simms had written a letter to his constituents on Christmas
Day in which he advised such a course of action if war commenced. An anecdote in Kentucky
nicely illustrates how the idea of neutrality started gaining traction in the region while Congress
remained paralyzed. An unidentified Kentucky lawyer affirmed to a client, who presumably
sought legal advice but first wished to test his prospective attorney’s sectional bona fides, that he
was indeed a Unionist. When the patron asked if he would shoulder a federal rifle against the
49
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seceded states, the attorney replied: “I have a good rifle of my own – and will never fight against
the South[,] but I am in favor of restoring the Union.” The Kentuckian added that he would help
hang the first federal tax collector who tried to procure money from him to fund a war of
coercion.50 The plodding course of Congress and longstanding fears about the Republicans
placed a great deal of pressure on Unionists in the Border South. As a result, the conditional
nature of Border South Unionism exposed itself. Many border southerners stayed true to the
Union, but more and more of the region’s inhabitants began to consider neutrality as a halfway
house between a Republican-dominated Union and secession.
Many Americans transferred their hopes for the perpetuity of the Union from the
hamstrung Congress to the Peace Conference which on February 4, 1861, opened its proceedings
in Washington. The very same day, delegates from the Lower South gathered in Montgomery,
Alabama to create a government of their own. Nearly everyone appreciated the irony that the
two conventions – one charged with saving the republic of their forefathers and the other with
establishing an entirely new nation – met on the day in which seventy-two years earlier the
electoral college confirmed George Washington as the first president of the United States. “This
day will decide whether we are to have absolutely two governments,” Samuel F. Du Pont
remarked to a friend.51
At noon on February 4 Kentuckian Charles S. Morehead called the Washington Peace
Conference to order. A portrait of George Washington stared out at the approximately sixty
delegates from eleven states who sat in the dance hall of Willard’s Hotel on the first day of the
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meeting. Over the next few days more representatives arrived; by the end of the proceedings in
late-February over 130 delegates represented 21 states at the meeting.

The legislatures in

California and Oregon deemed it logistically impossible for a group to travel from the Pacific
Coast to the national capital before Congress adjourned and thus opted not to send
representatives. Time and distance understandably prevented the states of the Far West from
participating in the conference, yet the absence of representatives from Michigan, Minnesota,
Wisconsin, and Arkansas proved more distressing. Political disagreements about compromise
prevented the three northern states from attending the conference, while disunionists in Arkansas
managed to thwart Unionists from sending a delegation to Washington. Iowa and Maine simply
instructed its congressional delegation to represent them at the conference; with their primary
commitment to the undertakings of Congress, these congressmen found their time stretched thin
and only intermittently participated in the meeting. The Lower South, engaged in its own
experiment to construct a new nation of seceded states, also sent no delegates to the meeting.52
The composition of the Washington Peace Conference revealed the degree to which the
nation had become fractured by mid-winter. The Border and Upper South states, caught in the
vise between two extremes, seemed more eager to effect a settlement at the conference than any
other region. Other parts of the nation doubted that much good would emerge from the meeting.
“A chance for settlement which depends so entirely on the all but unanimous support, through all
its stages, of the Black Republican States,” scoffed a Louisiana editor, “is too remote a vision of
credulous hope or unsubstantial figment of the imagination to be the basis of any acts by the
Southern people either compromising their rights, or their powers and modes protecting them.”
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A Wisconsin Republican denounced the Peace Conference and asked, “Who can tell what
possible good can arise from sending delegates to the [Peace Convention]…unless those
delegates have authority to make an unconditional surrender of all the principles, purposes and
objects of the Republican party?”53
With the Lower South and portions of the Upper North striking a posture of defiance,
conservatives hitched their hopes of a settlement to the good faith of their Lower North allies.
Unfortunately for Border South moderates, Republican-controlled legislatures in Illinois and
Ohio had appointed delegates who refused to budge on the issue of compromise. Indiana
governor Oliver P. Morton, a staunch Republican who like Thomas Hicks took it upon himself to
appoint his state’s delegates, admitted to Lincoln that he favored sending representatives to
Washington not because he “expected any positive good to come from it, but to prevent positive
evil.” Morton worried that Republicans in Pennsylvania might upon reaching the meeting waver
and condone a settlement. To counterbalance the vacillating Pennsylvanians in Washington, the
governor recommended that the rest of the Lower North states dispatch hardliners who would
“operate as a powerful restraint upon any disposition on the part of other states to compromise
the integrity and future of the Republican party.” Moreover, the legislatures of several northern
states had in their resolutions to send delegates to the meeting indicated that they felt it
unnecessary to amend the Constitution at present. The resolutions from Illinois, Indiana, New
York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania stated a willingness to attend the conference and hear out the
complaints of southerners, but they also plainly conveyed an indisposition towards any
compromise on the territorial issue. Other states bound any action of their delegates to the

53

New Orleans Daily Picayune, Feb. 8, 1861, in Dumond, ed., Southern Editorials on Secession, 451;
Milwaukee Daily Sentinel, Feb. 4, 1861, in Perkins, ed., Northern Editorials on Secession, 1:266-267.

259

approval of the state legislature.54 These stipulations and riders boded ill for moderates of the
Border South who in previous sectional disputes had often counted upon the collaboration of the
Lower North.
Upon assembling, the Peace Conference quickly decided to name former president John
Tyler of Virginia the president of the convention and settled on a set of rules to govern the
meeting.

The body agreed to keep all deliberations secret; the attendance of seven state

delegations equaled a quorum; and each state would be allotted one vote, rather than allowing
each individual delegate to cast a ballot. The delegates clearly attempted to emulate the revered
1787 convention that produced the Constitution. The rules closely mimicked those adopted at
Philadelphia, and the selection of John Tyler to lead the meeting had deep symbolic meaning for
the assembled statesmen.55 Tyler hailed from Virginia, as had George Washington, the president
of the 1787 meeting, and nearly all Americans recognized the name of the former national
executive.

Beyond their Virginia birth, however, all comparisons between Tyler and

Washington ceased. Washington’s name, especially in the aftermath of the American Revolution
and prior to his enduring the rancorous presidential politics of the 1790s, evoked veneration
among Americans. Tyler, on the other hand, had been placed in the White House after the death
of William Henry Harrison, which earned him the unenviable sobriquet of “His Accidency.”
Prior to the Peace Convention, his political career had foundered on the shoals of partisan
politics. The party to which he belonged, the Whigs, excommunicated him while president for
vetoing Henry Clay’s multifaceted economic package.
54

Without a political home, Tyler

Oliver P. Morton to Abraham Lincoln, Jan. 29, 1861 Lincoln Papers, LOC; Gunderson, Old Gentlemen’s
Convention, 46; Chittenden, Report of the Washington Peace Conference, 456, 458-464. The Republicans of
Illinois held a majority of seven seats in their lower house and one in the upper house; in Ohio the Republicans
carried an eleven-seat majority in their House and a majority of fifteen seats in their Senate. For the partisan
breakdowns on these legislatures, see Michael J. Dubin, Party Affiliations in the State Legislatures: A Year by Year
Summary, 1796-2006 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2007), 57, 148.
55
Gunderson, Old Gentlemen’s Convention, 47-49; Richard Beeman, Plain, Honest Men: The Making of
the American Constitution (New York: Random House, 2009), 80-85.

260

subsequently helped to unleash a torrent of sectional acrimony when beginning in 1842 he
vociferously pushed for the annexation of Texas, a portion of Mexico where slavery had taken
root, into the United States. One of his contemporaries in 1861 labeled Tyler a “tottering ashen
ruin” who among the list of former presidents was “more cordially despised” than any other.56
After placing Tyler in the president’s chair and setting the ground rules for the meeting,
James Guthrie of Kentucky proposed the creation of a committee of one delegate from each state
in attendance to review the numerous compromise proposals before the nation and make a report
on the best mode of settlement. Guthrie chaired the committee, which included Daniel M. Bates
from Delaware, Reverdy Johnson from Maryland, and Alexander W. Doniphan from Missouri.
The rest of the convention waited, at times impatiently, while the committee closeted from
February 6 until February 14. During the interval, Border South moderates implored their
colleagues from the North to recognize how crucial a settlement was to the Unionist offensive in
their states. “Our Border State friends say we must not be deceived – Unless some adjustment is
made those now Union men, will join their futures to the Southern Confederacy,” an Ohio
delegate chronicled to his brother.

On Capitol Hill, Henry Winter Davis fretted that the

“assembled fogeydom” at Willard’s would complicate matters for Congress.

“They know

nothing of the temper of the country,” Winter Davis complained, and if the meeting broke up
without a settlement it would exacerbate already seething tensions. On the other hand, he
reasoned, any compromise that emerged from the convention would probably go down to defeat
in Congress, which would likely yield the same result.57
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While the delegates in Washington awaited the Guthrie Committee’s report, Abraham
Lincoln on February 11 started his meandering journey to the nation’s capital. Ever since the
results of the election became known, several towns and state legislatures had invited the
president-elect to visit them on his way to the White House. Although Lincoln could not honor
every invitation he received, he did make several stops on his train ride east. Large crowds
assembled at each stop, hoping to catch a glimpse of the next president. After three months of
public silence, Lincoln used the trip to lay out some perfunctory views on the national crisis.
Border South moderates certainly grimaced when they read his remarks in the paper.

In

Indianapolis he made light of the southern demand that the federal government not attempt
coercion by likening such a position to “a sort of free-love arrangement.” In Cincinnati on
February 12 Lincoln tempered his comments and reminded the people across the Ohio River in
Kentucky that in 1859 he proclaimed that Republicans “mean to leave you alone, and in no way
interfere with your institution; to abide by all and every compromise of the constitution,” and to
treat them with mutual respect as Americans. Lincoln assured the crowd that circumstances had
not changed his viewpoint toward the South. Yet he concluded his remarks with a tactless
warning that if the South could not see this, “the fault shall not be mine.”58
Many border southerners considered Lincoln’s flippant attitude toward the crisis
offensive. An acquaintance of Blanton Duncan had conversed with Lincoln before he left
Springfield and asked the president-elect about several different resolutions before the Kentucky
legislature which expressed the state’s disapprobation with a federal policy of coercion. One
such resolution went so far as to proclaim that if the federal government used force against the
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seceded states, Kentucky would consider the act “a dissolution of all previous compacts” and
would make preparations to resist invasion. Lincoln allegedly responded that if these resolutions
represented the true sentiment of Kentucky, “let her prepare for war.” Duncan read Lincoln’s
Indianapolis speech and believed it confirmed that the new president “is the most fanatical of his
party & it is idle to hope for peace.” Several newspapers in the Border South lamented the tone
of Lincoln’s speeches, while those that advocated secession colored each oration as a declaration
of war on the South. “He approaches the capital of the country more in the character of a
harlequin, dealing with the great issues which agitate and agonize the minds of thoughtful and
rational men as if they were only the absurdities of a pantomime which would all be ‘put to
rights’ by a touch of his magic wand,” a Baltimore editor muttered. Alexander Doniphan took
time out from his labors on the Guthrie Committee to read Lincoln’s speeches and deduced that
“we are constantly looking for him to ruin everything [with] his ridiculously childish display of
eloquence & presidential taste and literary attainment.” An angry Doniphan branded Lincoln “as
ridiculously vain and fanatic as a country boy with his first red morocco hat” and dismissed the
president-elect as “an ignorant, country buffoon.”59
While Lincoln continued his journey toward Washington, the Guthrie Committee on
February 15 finally presented its majority report to the Peace Conference. The compromise
settlement the committee issued contained elements of both the Crittenden Compromise and the
solution earlier advised by Crittenden’s unofficial joint border state committee.
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associates called for a constitutional amendment that divided the territories between slavery and
freedom at the familiar parallel of 36°30′, but in an effort to attract Republican support it
required neither Congress nor territorial governments to protect the peculiar institution south of
the line. The committee’s plan included Crittenden’s original suggestions that Congress could
not abolish slavery in Washington D.C. without the consent of Maryland, nor could it abolish
slavery in the states where it then existed.

Furthermore, the committee called for the

enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Law, the eternal prohibition of the African slave trade, and
just compensation for slaveholders who due to interference from abolitionists could not recapture
enslaved persons who had fled northward. In an attempt to stifle the repeated sectional agitation
caused by territorial acquisition, the Guthrie panel recommended that four-fifths of the Senate
had to ratify any future attainment of land. According to one attendee, Guthrie and Reverdy
Johnson of Maryland had taken the lead in ushering the majority report through the committee.
Separate minority reports from the committee called for a national constitutional convention,
which some moderates considered nothing more than a means for Republicans to continue their
policy of inactivity, and a hardline southern report which included a provision that clarified the
right of secession.60
For the next several days the delegates discussed every proposal before the body.
Reverdy Johnson asked the Republicans in attendance to realize the enormity of the crisis if the
body produced no settlement. If the Peace Convention accomplished nothing, he surmised, then
Kentucky and Missouri would likely join the disunion movement and war would commence.
The Marylander asked the delegates to grasp that the slaveholding states, not the North, were
willing to yield on slavery in the territories. He pointed out that the 1857 Dred Scott decision
60
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granted slaveholders the right to take their property into any territory, and now he and other
moderates would “abandon our rights North” by agreeing to divide the territory at the old
Missouri Compromise line. Like Crittenden in Congress, Johnson and his moderate allies at
Willard’s wished for Republicans to put party considerations aside and think of the fate of the
entire nation. Debate eventually turned on the territorial issue and appeared to ground to a halt.
A few Republicans, such as Iowa’s Samuel R. Curtis, Frederick Frelinghuysen of New Jersey,
and Stephen T. Logan of Illinois, signaled to the moderates a willingness to bend on the
territorial issue.

Curtis conceded that he would accept a division of the territories if the

conference cleared up the language of the settlement so it would mirror the Missouri
Compromise and tacitly, rather than explicitly, sanction slavery south of the line. Moderates,
who feared such a revision would not appease their southern brethren, rejected Curtis’s
suggestion.

On February 23, the delegations of New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio,

Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island joined the southern states to defeat the Curtis amendment.
Southerners argued that they needed the Republicans to relent even more if they hoped to
confine the secession movement to the Lower South.61
Alexander W. Doniphan watched the proceedings unfold and became less hopeful that
any effective settlement would be reached. Although he rarely entered into the endless floor
debates, Doniphan privately complained that most Republicans had come to Washington to
derail any conciliatory measures and “baffle us to all eternity.” Most of the Republicans would
not budge until Lincoln arrived in the capital, he concluded. Doniphan believed that if the
president-elect fell under the spell of William Seward, his designee for secretary of state who
behind closed doors had given a nod toward conciliation, the Republicans at the convention
61
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would acquiesce in a deal. If, however, Republican hardliners held sway over the new president,
“then we may go home and tell our people to call on Gabriel to blow for the Union will be
dissolved in a few days or months at most.” The Missourian, who had been an integral part of
the Unionist offensive in his home state just a month before, began to entertain the hard
conclusion that the Border South might have no choice but to leave the Union.62
Lincoln arrived in Washington during the early morning hours of February 23 after
hurrying through Baltimore the previous night. Rumors swirled around the capital about a
possible attempt on the president-elect’s life as he made his scheduled trip through Maryland. A
concerned William Seward and Winfield Scott managed to contact Lincoln, who altered his
plans and swiftly passed through Baltimore sometime before dawn. A large crowd had gathered
at the train depot in Baltimore in anticipation of the president-elect’s arrival, but around the
middle of the morning someone announced that Lincoln had already made it to Washington. Not
all of the people had assembled at the depot to cheer the new president.

A Baltimorean

commented that a large portion of the assemblage hoped to jeer Lincoln, and he figured that by
stealing through the city undetected “you have saved bloodshed and a mob.”63
The night of his arrival, Lincoln met with several members of the Peace Conference at a
reception in one of the parlors of Willard’s Hotel. Maryland’s John Crisfield came away from
the meeting impressed that Seward had “him in charge and it is perhaps fortunate for the Country
it is so” because the New Yorker would probably act as a conservative influence on the new
president. Other southerners and moderates who attended the reception walked away with a less
optimistic outlook than did Crisfield because Lincoln showed no inclination to give way on the
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territorial issue and adamantly declared that the Constitution had to be “enforced and obeyed in
every part of every one of the United States.” Three days after Lincoln appeared in Washington,
the Peace Conference rejected the territorial provision of the majority report by a vote of 11 to 8.
Delaware, Kentucky, and Maryland joined New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and
Tennessee to cast an affirmative vote; only Missouri of the Border South voted against the
territorial proposition. For the Missouri delegation, Alexander W. Doniphan, Waldo P. Johnson,
and Aylett Buckner overruled John Coalter and Harrison Hough to cast the state’s vote in
opposition to the key provision. Doniphan later explained that he spurned the territorial proposal
not because he advocated Missouri’s secession, but because he felt that only the Crittenden
resolutions could adequately remove the issue of slavery in the territories for perpetuity. A
saddened convention adjourned for the night, but many delegates had only begun their day’s
work; informal caucuses lasted into the next morning as the representatives sought some way to
revive the scuttled settlement package.64
That night several influential delegates from the Upper and Border South held another
meeting with Lincoln. Doniphan, Charles S. Morehead and James Guthrie of Kentucky, and
William C. Rives and George Summers of Virginia all beseeched the president-elect to
comprehend “the dreadful impending danger, and entreated and implored him to avert it.”
Coercion, they warned, would unquestionably turn the tide in favor of secessionists in the Upper
and Border South, but if Republicans adopted a conciliatory stance those eight slaveholding
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states would likely remain in the Union.65 The elderly Rives made an impassioned appeal on
behalf of the Union but told the president-elect that if he opted for coercion and forced Virginia
to secede, even an old Unionist like himself would go with his state.

Lincoln reportedly

responded with a bargain: if Rives could promise to keep Virginia in the Union, he would
withdraw the troops from Fort Sumter once he entered the executive office. Rives replied that he
had no authority to make such an agreement, but that he would continue to work to preserve the
Union.66
Whether or not Doniphan and his associates had an impact on Lincoln remains mere
conjecture. Nonetheless, when the Peace Convention reassembled on February 27 the Illinois
delegation had a change of heart and voted in favor of the territorial provision; the delegations of
Indiana, Kansas, New York, and Missouri abstained from voting, which allowed the provision to
pass narrowly by a count of 9 to 8. With the territorial hurdle leaped, the convention quickly
approved of the remaining articles of the majority report. Aside from Missouri’s abstention on
the territorial provision and the state’s delegation voting against the final article which dealt with
slaveholder compensation in cases where fugitive slaves could not be recaptured, the delegations
of the Border South voted in favor of every piece of the majority report, which the convention
hurried to the Capitol for the consideration of Congress. 67 Cannons boomed as the Peace
Conference adjourned, and one newspaper boldly proclaimed “Every border State has been
saved…, and the return of the seceded States to the Union is now but a question of a short time.”
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A Wilmington, Delaware, businessman noted that the news of the Peace Convention’s passage of
the settlement provoked the town’s citizens to raise American flags and celebrate in the streets.68
The fate of a compromise settlement returned to the hands of Congress, whose members
in the interim had continued to snipe at one another instead of making progress toward a
settlement. One interested observer bemoaned to John Pendleton Kennedy that Republican
stubbornness in Congress had aggravated matters in the Border South to the point that “the
ground upon which you stand – solid as it may seem to you now, will become quicksand to
swallow you & all your noble Conservatives in Maryland.” The work of the Peace Conference
signaled headway for Border South moderates, but they had not yet come close to clinching a
victory. Two events on February 18, one in Missouri and the other in the halls of Congress,
illustrated the paradoxical nature of Unionism in the Border South. Across Missouri, voters
trekked to their polling places and selected delegates for the state convention slated to meet in
Jefferson City at the end of the month. The result of the election demonstrated how far the
Unionist offensive had evolved in Missouri. Conditional and unconditional Unionists smashed
their secessionist competitors in the contest – not a single one of the ninety-nine delegates
elected to the state convention had campaigned on behalf of separate state secession – much to
the dismay of disunionists. “Our election is over & as far as Missouri is concerned the Union is
safe,” an excited conservative proclaimed. A resident of Grundy County, Missouri, claimed that
secessionists had made a last-ditch attempt to proliferate disunion documents in the hopes of
converting voters, but they discovered that the well-established Unionist offensive could easily
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counteract their poorly managed onslaught. Months of rigorous campaigning paid dividends for
the Missouri Unionists, who captured 110,000 votes in comparison to 30,000 for disunionists.69
Despite the auspicious results of the February 18 election, the Missourian who avowed
that the election made the state safe for the Union spoke prematurely. Candidates for the
convention election entered the field on one of three distinct tickets: Conditional Unionist;
Unconditional Unionist; and States’ Rights or Anti-submission.70 The predominant form of
Unionism among the delegates remained the conditional variety, which meant that external
events could easily convert these representatives to the secessionist camp. Exact numbers for the
preferred brand of Unionism among the delegates are difficult to ascertain because an early
twentieth-century fire at the Missouri statehouse damaged a large portion of the official election
returns. Nonetheless, one scholar counts fifty-two of the ninety-nine delegates as Unconditional
Unionists and the remaining forty-seven representatives as Conditional Unionists, while another
assigns the Conditional Unionists with a two-thirds majority at the convention.

Although

inexact, these unsubstantiated estimations highlight the contested nature of Unionism in the
Border South. Unionists attending the Missouri state convention split almost evenly among the
two factions and several most likely wavered between the two blocs, which meant that a defiant
northern posture toward compromise or an explosive physical altercation at Fort Sumter, St.
Louis, or elsewhere could easily tip the balance of the state toward disunion.71
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While Missourians registered their votes, the introduction of a controversial piece of
legislation in the United States House of Representatives on the very same day exemplified the
tenuous nature of Border South Unionism. Benjamin Stanton, a Republican from Ohio, on
February 18 reported a militia bill to the House that would prepare the nation’s military forces in
case war commenced. Southerners howled that the measure, which they derisively labeled the
force bill, placed the nation on a war footing and served as an endorsement of a policy of
coercion. Border southerners would have been aghast to know that two inhabitants of their
region had been prime movers in the introduction of the objectionable legislation. In response to
the rumored machinations of secessionists in and around St. Louis, Frank Blair, Jr., had written
his brother Montgomery in January 1861 and asked him to inform his numerous contacts in
Washington that the Unionist effort in the city would benefit greatly from the passage of a militia
bill. Blair, who probably allowed his anxieties to cloud his better judgment, miscalculated that
legislation allowing officers to make enlistments, accept volunteers, and arm their troops, would
successfully offset the disunion movement in St. Louis. Henry Winter Davis also had a hand in
the legislation, though he seems to have worked to try and moderate the force bill. He told a
friend that he “drew it & know it will do its work & got it substituted for a very offensive and
impudent one.”72
Perhaps nothing else better reveals how Blair and Winter Davis had greatly surpassed the
mainstream attitude of the Border South toward coercion. Upon Stanton’s introduction of the
force bill, every border southerner in the House, aside from Winter Davis, voted to reject the
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legislation or abstained from voting. The motion to reject the force bill lost 110-68 on Feb. 18;
southerners tried to table the bill on Feb. 19 but lost by the same vote, with 15 Border South
congressmen in favor of tabling and 9 abstaining.73 Winter Davis believed that secessionists had
frightened Border South conservatives about the nature of the legislation and seduced them to
oppose Stanton’s bill. “They [southern Unionists in the House] cannot see their power even now
that Missouri has spoken,” Winter Davis carped. “They halt between wish & will – till it may be
too late.”74
Blair and Winter Davis woefully misconstrued the typical Border South reaction to
Stanton’s force bill. Perhaps influenced by their urban constituencies, neither of the Border
South proto-Republicans could comprehend how greatly coercion would undermine the Unionist
cause. A friend of Winter Davis’s in Delaware lamented that he had voted with the Republicans
on the measure, which she considered unconstitutional and extremely hazardous to Unionism in
the region.

In the House debate on the bill, border southerners let loose a barrage of

condemnation against the measure. The ire of many border country congressmen had been
aroused when two days prior to the introduction of Stanton’s force bill, Republican Daniel E.
Somes of Maine suggested that the people of the Border South should consent to the abolition of
slavery in Washington D.C. and on federal property and additionally should undertake a scheme
of gradual emancipation within their own borders. William E. Simms of Kentucky labeled
Stanton’s legislation “a bill of murder…a war measure, not only made and desperate in its
designs, but a measure in direct violation of the Constitution.” Simms followed up his salvo with
a pointed query for the Republicans: “While ostensibly you merely talk of enforcing the laws,
will you not avail yourself of the war you have thus inaugurated to accomplish that first and
73
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highest purpose of your party organization, the overthrow of slavery throughout the southern
States?” Republicans refused to dignify the Kentuckian’s charge of a “double purpose” in the
force bill, and moderates within Lincoln’s party managed to postpone the measure, which with
time drawing to a close on the session effectively killed the legislation.75 Nevertheless, Simms
more accurately expressed the sentiments of the Border South than did Blair or Winter Davis.
Coercion and force threatened to shatter the conditional Unionist coalition that had held firm thus
far, and most of the region’s inhabitants dreaded the commencement of a civil war that would
surely place the peculiar institution on fragile ground in the Border South.
The icy atmosphere in the House of Representatives proved anything but conducive to
passing some form of the compromise during the late stages of the session. On February 26 and
27, the House made quick work of several compromise proposals. A suggestion for a national
constitutional convention lost, 74-108, with 10 Border South congressmen in favor of the
proposition and 14 opposed. Shortly afterwards William Kellogg’s compromise package went
down to defeat by a tally of 33-158; only 2 congressmen from the Border South supported this
measure. The greatest blow for Border South moderates came on February 27 when the House
voted against adopting the Crittenden resolutions, which Virginia Democrat Sherrard Clemens
had placed before the lower chamber.

Republicans consolidated ranks and defeated the

Crittenden plan, 80-113. No Republican voted in favor of the Crittenden resolutions, and all but
three of the negative votes came from members of Lincoln’s party. Twenty-one of the twentyfour Border South congressmen voted for the Crittenden proposal; only Henry Winter Davis cast
a negative vote. Green Adams of Kentucky abstained from voting on the measures and Thomas
L. Anderson of Missouri recorded no vote because he had left the Capitol to take care of an ill
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family member.

The House next considered Thomas Corwin’s proposed constitutional

amendment that prevented Congress from interfering with slavery in the states where it existed.
It too failed to pass the House. Constitutional amendments require a two-thirds majority, and
with 123 yea votes opposed to 71 nays, the Corwin amendment fell just short of the requisite
vote. All twenty-three border southerners in the House on February 27 voted in favor of the
Corwin amendment.76
The somber mood in the House improved on February 28 when Republican David
Kilgore of Indiana entered a motion to reconsider the vote on the Corwin amendment. Kilgore,
who had been born in Kentucky and moved to Indiana at age fifteen, chastised his Republican
colleagues for their inflexible attitude. “If the Republicans to-day have changed their ground,
and claim now the right to invade the sovereignty of the States, and interfere with the institution
of slavery – if that is Republican doctrine, then I am no Republican,” Kilgore thundered. The
Indiana congressman provided border southerners with the conservative cooperation that they
had so often relied upon during the 1850s. Enough Republicans changed their votes to secure
passage of the Corwin amendment, 128-65, which in the absence of securing the Crittenden
proposal at least allowed Border South Unionists to tell their constituents that Congress had
pledged not to interfere with slavery in the states. The proposed Thirteenth Amendment under
the floor leadership of John Crittenden and Stephen Douglas passed the Senate during its final
hours by a vote of 24 to 12.77
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Outside of the passage of the Corwin amendment, all other compromise measures failed
in the House of Representatives. Moderates in the lower house could not muster the requisite
two-thirds majority needed to suspend the rules and consider the Peace Conference proposals,
which sat undisturbed on the speaker’s table when the gavel fell on the morning of March 4 to
close the session of Congress.78

Republicans in the House had held firm throughout the

secession winter and did not bow to any conciliatory measures outside of the Corwin
amendment. Some border southerners attacked the Republicans for their “plotting and plodding
on selfish and dark thoughts and deeds,” while others appreciated that at the bare minimum the
conservatives in the organization had convinced enough of their party brethren that they should
acquiesce on an amendment protecting slavery in the states. “As a domestic institution it is a
state right, with which Congress has no right to interfere,” a Marylander jotted down in her diary.
“It is but right the Border States should have such a guarantee.”79
As in the House, compromise made little headway in the last days of the session in the
Senate. On February 27, Lazarus Powell charged the Republicans who attended the Washington
Peace Conference with bad faith and asked that for the sake of accomplishing something the
Senate should set aside other matters and consider the Crittenden resolutions. Powell pointed to
letters that had been recently published from Michigan senators Kinsley Bingham and Zachariah
Chandler to Governor Austin Blair in which the triumvirate of Republicans discussed ways and
means to wreck conciliatory measures at the Washington Peace Conference. “They desire, in the
language of these letters, to save their party from destruction,” Powell accused.

“In the

estimation of the Senators, [the Republican Party] is higher, holier, and better, it seems, than the
Union.” Despite the Kentucky senator’s scathing remarks, the Senate refrained from considering
78
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the Crittenden compromise and instead sent the resolutions from the Peace Conference to a
special committee of five chaired by none other than John Crittenden.80
In the following days Crittenden pled with his colleagues to do anything to secure a
settlement and even suggested replacing his own resolutions with the Peace Conference
proposal. The aged Kentuckian acknowledged that the major difference between his proposal
and that of the Peace Conference revolved around the hereafter acquired clause in reference to
the territories and the dividing line between slavery and freedom. He explained that he had
acquiesced in including the clause in his settlement because he wanted a permanent settlement on
the issue. Crittenden felt the nation had grown large enough; he would gladly appease the
Republicans by accepting the Peace Conference resolutions without the inclusion of the
offensive clause. Missouri’s James Green followed with a speech that indicated a fissure in
Border South unity on the issue of compromise. Green had joined the growing contingent of
border southerners who believed no settlement would emerge that would adequately satisfy their
demands. He certainly would not vote for the Peace Conference proposal, which he claimed “are
designed simply to lull us into a fancied security” and did not sufficiently protect slavery south
of the Missouri Compromise line. “I believe that the die is cast,” the Missourian articulated,
“that there is a belligerent feeling, diversity of sentiment, and a difference of opinion so
diametrically opposite that we cannot live together.” He advised that in the absence of passing
Crittenden’s resolutions, Missouri should secede from the Union and join the newly minted
Confederate States of America.81
Green’s speech, which illustrated how some border southerners had by the start of March
slid into either the secessionist or neutral camp, surely stung Crittenden and other moderates. By
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Sunday, March 3 the Senate had taken no action on any of the various compromise packages.
That evening, a haggard and disappointed Crittenden delivered what he thought to be his final
speech on Capitol Hill. He praised the efforts of his northern colleagues, especially Stephen
Douglas and Pennsylvania’s William Bigler, who had cast aside partisan labels and worked with
him in the name of compromise during the session, and he beseeched his fellow Kentuckians to
stand by the Union. Finally, he appealed to Republicans across the aisle to do something in the
last hours of the session to save the Union. Crittenden begged them at least to sanction the
Corwin amendment, which he considered a first step that “may have some good effect, like a
solitary ray of sunshine breaking through the clouds, which might show an opening in them.”
Abraham Lincoln reportedly sat in the galleries while Crittenden delivered his stirring
valedictory which several times drew the applause of the packed Senate chamber.82
The Senate worked through the night and into the small hours of Monday, March 4.
While Crittenden’s colleagues heeded his advice and passed the Corwin amendment, the rest of
the compromise proposals collapsed ingloriously. The Senate voted 7-28 against substituting the
Peace Conference settlement for Crittenden’s own. Crittenden made a last-ditch effort to secure
his proposal’s passage when he inquired if he could remove the hereafter acquired clause before
the Senate took a vote. The chair ruled that he could not, and the package suffered defeat by a
tally of 19 to 20; every dissenting vote came from the Republicans. Four border southerners
voted for the Crittenden resolutions and although none of the region’s senators cast a negative
vote, four senators abstained from voting. At dawn, the second session of the Thirty-sixth
Congress came to a close. Many of the senators headed to their Washington residences to catch
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a few hours of much needed rest before Lincoln’s inaugural ceremony commenced later that
day.83
Shortly after noon, Lincoln stood atop a wooden platform on the east portico of the
Capitol and delivered his inaugural address. A few days prior he had asked Seward to read and
make comments on a draft of the address. Seward, who worried that Lincoln’s prose at times
bordered on daring the seceded states to inaugurate war, made several suggestions to soften the
tone of the president’s message. He even predicted that if Lincoln read the original message
without any alterations Virginia and Maryland would promptly secede. Even though Lincoln
incorporated several of the changes that his secretary of state proposed, detractors still argued
that the address, and especially the president’s promise to “hold, occupy, and possess” all federal
property and collect federal revenue, was tantamount to a declaration of war on the seceded
states. Many Border South moderates, on the other hand, found the inaugural reasonable and
temperate. The president disclosed that he had no objection to the Corwin amendment and ended
his message with a plea for friendship and a hope for peace, which resonated with conservative
border southerners. Pleasantly surprised Kentucky politician C.F. Burnam felt that Lincoln’s
address had done nothing to exacerbate the crisis, and he estimated that if the new president
eventually evacuated Fort Sumter “the Union cause in the Border States of the South will be
vastly strengthened.” After reading the speech John Pendleton Kennedy concluded that Lincoln
did not aim to coerce the seceded states back into the Union. He breathed a sigh of relief that the
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new president did not belong to the camp of “pragmatic, sour, conceited numskulls who both in
and out of Congress represent the inveteracy of Black Republican policy.”84
Border southerners of all political persuasions found what they wanted to hear in
Lincoln’s inaugural. “Some think it warlike & some think it conservative,” Samuel Haycraft
confided to his diary after speaking with his neighbors in Elizabethtown, Kentucky.

The

diversity of opinion among border southerners illustrates the many degrees of southern Unionism
and underscores how Lincoln’s course during the previous three months had forced some of the
region’s inhabitants to reassess their Unionist outlook. The moderately toned inaugural and his
politically well-balanced cabinet that included Edward Bates and Montgomery Blair could not
offset his initial studied silence and his barbed remarks on his journey to Washington. Lincoln’s
actions, coupled with Republican inaction in Congress, left many erstwhile moderates more
concerned about the future of the nation than ever before. John C. Breckinridge appreciated the
conciliatory nature of the inaugural, but he had developed a fear that the combination of
hardliners in both his party and his cabinet would force Lincoln down a path of “collision and
bloodshed.”

Moreover, Breckinridge still suspected that the Republicans had designs to

eradicate slavery throughout the nation. “They [southerners] will never, never consent to be
hemmed in by a hostile policy, and denied all share of the public domain, as an outlet for their
people and the natural increase of their slaves,” he declared.
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increasingly called for a peaceful separation between the United States and the newly created
Confederate States of America, and he warned that if the federal government attacked the new
nation, the states of the Border South would add their names to its roster. As time passed,
Breckinridge and many border southerners edged ever closer to a neutral or secessionist
standpoint.85
Table 23 - Slaveholdings of the Delegates to the
March 1861 Missouri State Convention
Slaves Owned

Percentage of
Total Delegates

Number

0

39

39.4%

1-4

25

25.3%

5-9

17

17.2%

10-19

12

12.1%

20 or more
Total

6

6.1%

99

100.0%

Mean Slaveholding

4.84 slaves

Median Slaveholding

2 slaves

Source: Census of 1860, Slave Schedules.

Lincoln’s course of action became a heated topic of discussion at the Missouri state
convention, which on February 28 convened in Jefferson City. The delegates chose Sterling
Price, a former Missouri governor, president of the convention and Unionists rammed through a
resolution to move the convention from Jefferson City, where Governor Claiborne Jackson and
other pro-secessionists might have a debilitating influence on some of the wavering members, to
St. Louis. Alexander W. Doniphan, who while attending the Peace Conference had been elected
as a delegate to the Missouri convention, left Washington at the conclusion of the meeting’s
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proceedings and on March 4 arrived in St. Louis as the delegates prepared to resume their
business.86
Table 24 - Occupations of the Delegates to the March 1861 Missouri State Convention
Profession
Lawyer

Number

Total

Occupational Category

53

Legal (53.5%)

26

Agriculture (26.3%)

15

Entrepreneur (15.2%)

5

Professional (5.1%)

45

Circuit Court Judge

6

Common Pleas Court Judge

1

Circuit Court Clerk

1

Farmer

26

Merchant

10

Merchant-Banker

1

Leather Dealer

1

Lumber Dealer

1

Blacksmith

1

Tanner

1

Physician

3

Civil Engineer

1

Bank Commissioner

1

Source: Journal and Proceedings of the Missouri State Convention…March 1861 , pp. 5-7.

Tables 23 through 25 provide statistical details of the men who met Doniphan at the
convention in St. Louis. Nearly 61 percent of the delegates owned slaves, though a solid
majority of the slaveholders had accumulated holdings of 9 slaves or less.

The average

slaveholding for the delegates was 4.84 enslaved persons, which closely mirrored the larger
Missouri slaveholding population (nearly 88 percent of all Missouri slaveholders owned fewer
than 9 slaves). The legal profession served as the primary occupation for over half of the
delegates, and almost 80 percent of the representatives either worked in the law or in agriculture.
Nearly 82 percent of the delegates hailed from one of the eight Upper and Border South states,
with over half being born in either Kentucky or Virginia, and the mean age for the delegates was
45. In terms of slave ownership, a majority of the delegates had a stake in perpetuating slavery;
the vast majority of the delegates had been born in the South and whether they owned slaves or
86

Wooster, Secession Conventions of the South, 230-231; Launius, Alexander William Doniphan, 248-249.

281

not, understood the importance of the institution to the society, economy, and culture of their
state and region.87
Table 25 - A Snapshot of the Delegates to the March 1861 Missouri State
Convention
Mean Slave Ownership

4.84 slaves

Mean Year of Birth

1816

Mean Age

45
Place of Birth

Delaware

0

Kentucky

30

Maryland

2

Missouri

13

Border South

45

45.5%

36

36.4%

Virginia

1 Upper South
3
&
Washington
9
D.C.
23

Alabama

1 Lower South

1

1.0%

5

5.1%

Upper North

8

8.1%

Foreign-Born

4

4.0%

Washington D.C.
North Carolina
Tennessee

Illinois
Ohio

2
1 Lower North

Pennsylvania

2

Maine

1

New Hampshire

3

New Jersey

1

New York

3

Austria

1

Bremen

1

Ireland

1

Prussia

1

Source: Journal and Proceedings of the Missouri State Convention…March 1861 , pp.
5-7.

In St. Louis, the convention created a committee on federal relations at the behest of
Hamilton Gamble, a former chief justice of the Missouri Supreme Court and brother-in-law of
Edward Bates. Doniphan joined Gamble and eleven other men on the important committee,
which began preparing a report that included suggestions for Missouri’s future course of action.
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Luther J. Glenn, a secession commissioner from Georgia, on March 4 addressed the convention
and beseeched Missouri to secede, but found that his speech generated little enthusiasm from
most delegates.

Unionists buried Glenn’s recommendations for secession in a special

committee; later in March the convention postponed consideration of the issue until December
1861, effectively killing the Georgian’s prescription for the secession of Missouri.88
While the important committee on federal relations deliberated, several delegates offered
resolutions that ranged from bitter denunciations of coercion to practical suggestions for a
conference of all the states of the Border and Upper South. Nearly all the resolutions submitted
included a declaration of the dangerous nature of coercion, and several avowed that the
Crittenden Compromise remained the best hope for procuring a peaceful settlement. Clearly
Crittenden’s efforts to keep the hopes of compromise alive in Washington had resonated with the
Missouri delegates, who on March 7 adopted without a single dissenting vote a resolution
tendering thanks to the Kentuckian and Stephen Douglas for their “patriotic, able and untiring
efforts” on behalf of compromise. Crittenden and other Unionists had come to the realization
early in the crisis that the fate of the non-seceded slaveholding states hinged on keeping a
settlement package before the nation, and the unanimous passage of this resolution in the only
Border South state to hold a convention revealed the fruit of their labors. Even though many
border southerners had started contemplating the idea of neutrality and secession, the resolution
and vote exposed the enduring strength of the Unionist offensive. The resolution even indicated
the embers of compromise had yet to be extinguished, further proof that at least in the eyes of
border southerners Crittenden and Douglas had not wholly failed in their effort to acquire a
conciliatory settlement.89

88
89

Journal of the Missouri State Convention, March 1861, 19-22, 50-52, 56-57.
Ibid., 21, 23-30, 32. The resolution of thanks passed the convention 83-0.

283

While the convention heaped approbation upon the peacemakers, it scorned the
Republicans and Lincoln. On the very day that the resolution of thanks passed, James H. Moss
pressed for a discussion of the president’s inaugural against the wishes of Robert Hatcher, who
proclaimed that such conversation “would be an apple of discord thrown into this Convention.”
The convention tabled Moss’s suggestion, but the following day Unionist John Long submitted a
resolution that proclaimed Lincoln’s inaugural “a message of peace and not of war.” After Long
introduced the resolution, Moss expressed his fears that the Republicans might use Lincoln’s
message as an instrument of coercion. If Lincoln agreed to a coercive policy, he asserted, “the
friends of the Union [in Missouri] will melt away like snow-flakes.” The ardently pro-southern
John T. Redd declared the inaugural “a declaration of war against the institutions of the South”
and compared the position taken by Lincoln to that of Britain’s George III in the 1770s.
Moderates correctly feared that an extended discussion about the inaugural would provoke
partisan wrangling and managed by a vote of 52-37 to table the resolutions. They clarified their
position the following day when they stated that the tabling of the resolution in no way indicated
a test vote on the content of Lincoln’s message, but a means to preserve harmony at the
convention.90
The committee on federal relations on March 9 submitted its report to the convention.
The report indicated that conditional Unionists had the upper hand in Missouri’s convention. It
emphasized that although the Republicans had gained the ascendancy, the Supreme Court still
served as a check on any repugnant legislation that might interfere with slavery. Further, the
committee acknowledged that the federal government had always faithfully executed the
Fugitive Slave Law and reminded the delegates that when fanatics like John Brown had invaded
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the South to overthrow slavery, “they meet their death by the law, and that is the end of their
scheme.” The report affirmed that Missouri’s secession was unwarranted for several reasons: the
magnitude of the South’s present grievances did not require such bold action; trade would
dwindle in the event of Missouri’s secession; and, significantly, “our slave interest would be
destroyed, because we would have no better right to recapture a slave found in a free State than
we now have in Canada.” The committee attached seven resolutions to the report that included a
promise for Missouri to continue to work toward compromise, a declaration that the Crittenden
Compromise represented the best basis of adjustment, a call for a national constitutional
convention to carry out the Crittenden settlement, and a cautionary warning that coercion would
blast all hopes for a peaceful solution and provoke war.91
The resolutions concerning coercion and compromise generated the greatest conflict
among the delegates. George Y. Bast failed on March 19 to add an ultimatum that stated if the
North would not agree to the Crittenden Compromise, then Missouri “will not hesitate to take a
firm and decided stand in favor of her sister slave States of the South.” His suggestion went
down to defeat by a wide margin, 23-70. The outspoken John Redd, who hardly hid his
secessionist proclivities, growled that if the rest of the delegates were willing to allow federal
troops to remain in the seceded states, then they should go ahead and remove the grizzly bear
from the Missouri coat of arms “and substitute in its place the fawning spaniel, cowing at the feet
of its master and licking the hand that smites it.” Missouri had a choice, Redd proclaimed: stay
in the Union and allow the Republicans to carry out “the extinction of slavery everywhere, or the
establishment of the proposition that man cannot hold property in man,” or join the Lower South
in the project of disunion to forestall the party’s designs on the slaveholding states. Redd’s
continued comments in favor of disunion provoked a response from the Unionist majority.
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Sample Orr noted that if Missouri seceded, he and the rest of the delegates would witness the
destruction of slavery in their state within one year. “The only salvation for the institution of
slavery,” Orr maintained, “is her adherence to the [federal] Government that protects slavery.”
M.L. Linton replied to Redd that secession would greatly endanger the peculiar institution by
making “a Canada of every Northern State.” Linton compared disunion to “cutting off an arm to
cure a wart – it is like jumping out of the frying pan into the fire.”92
Some of the pro-southern representatives pushed for the inclusion of either a separate
resolution or the amendment of the existing resolution relating to coercion to request the
withdrawal of federal troops who remained in the seceded states. Thomas Shackelford on March
20 recommended an amendment of the coercion resolution to state that a withdrawal of federal
troops would greatly enhance the chances for peace. After proceeding through two very narrow
procedural votes, the convention by a vote of 89-6 accepted Shackelford’s amended resolution.
Shackelford had clearly softened the language so as not to offend the federal government and
simultaneously to express the great desire of the people of the Border South to avoid a collision
of arms. Nearly all of the delegates in St. Louis and indeed most border southerners agreed with
Alexander M. Woolfolk who delivered a doleful tocsin upon casting his vote in favor of the
Shackelford amendment: “Compromise may restore the Union, but the sword can never preserve
it.”93
By Friday, March 22, the convention had passed each one of the seven resolutions
suggested by the committee on federal relations. Most of the provisions cleared the convention
by large margins, which underscored the perseverance of a strong Unionist impulse in Missouri.
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During the proceedings, several delegates had warmed to the notion of a conference of the
Border and Upper South states. The Border State Convention idea had gained momentum in the
Virginia state convention, which also was in session in March. Hamilton Gamble, mindful of the
need to sustain the Unionist offensive by keeping all means for a settlement alive, had apparently
been in communication with colleagues in the Old Dominion and on March 14 presented a
resolution for the convention to elect delegates to such a meeting. A week later the Missouri
convention passed Gamble’s resolution and proceeded to elect one representative from each of
the state’s seven congressional districts to represent the state at the proposed conference. Before
adjourning on March 22, the convention agreed to meet again in December 1861 and established
a committee of seven charged with the task of reassembling the body in the event of an
emergency before the end of the year. Delegate Samuel Breckinridge privately acknowledged
that the committee of seven had been created because “our Governor, & the state officers
generally, as well as the majority of the members of the Legislature, are avowedly hostile to the
Convention, & entirely in the interest of secession.” Breckinridge and other Unionists worried
that Claiborne Jackson might take matters into his own hands if conditions deteriorated in the
state.94
Unionists and moderates could breathe a sigh of relief as the Missouri convention
adjourned in late March. The previous two-and-a-half months had been trying, but they had
accomplished their goal of relegating the secession movement to the Lower South. The Missouri
convention had not taken any steps toward secession, and Unionists in the legislatures of
Delaware and Kentucky had blocked secessionists from even calling a sovereignty convention.
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Even though Congress spurned a comprehensive compromise package, Crittenden and his allies
could point to the fact that a constitutional amendment protecting slavery in the states had
advanced through the initial stages and now only awaited ratification by the states. Moreover,
the proceedings of the conventions in Missouri and Virginia and the suggestion of a Border State
conference had revealed that the hopes for securing a compromise remained alive and well
among moderates in the eight slaveholding states remaining in the Union. On the whole, the
Unionist offensive had endured through the grueling trial, absorbed the shocks of Republican
intransigence, and helped buoy the hopes of border southerners for a peaceful solution of the
crisis.
By late March, however, the fear of an outbreak of war and foreboding signs from the
Republicans had exposed some cracks in the Unionist offensive. “At present, the country is
resting in anxious suspense, altogether uncertain of the future,” John Pendleton Kennedy relayed
to a friend. Kennedy postulated that if Lincoln attempted a policy of coercion, he would
“instantly break down all this conservatism, and drive the whole of the Border States into a
separation.” Another onlooker observed that “Missouri is safe for the present. The Convention
is decidedly anti-Secession; but every body is in a fever about Fort Sumpter, the question being –
how can it be supplied without opening the war?”95
War would unquestionably jeopardize the position of the remaining southern states and
likely convert many border southerners into secessionists, which Unionists fully comprehended.
Over the past couple of months, some of their neighbors had already left the Unionist standard
and adopted a preference for neutrality or, to a lesser degree, secession. Missourian Thomas
Shackelford recalled that during the state convention Sterling Price, the president of the body
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who had been elected on a strong Unionist platform, confessed to him in mid-March: “I believe
that war is inevitable…I cant [sic] fight against the South, so I must go with the Border States[.]”
After the convention adjourned on March 22, Price never retook his seat. Another Missourian
watched the state convention “sacrafice [sic] Right, Principle, and every thing else for the sake of
the name.” “As long as there was a possibility of an amicable adjustment, I was for Union,” he
continued, “but now that all hope is lost, and the Union virtually disolved [sic], common sense
dictates that [the Border South’s] interest[s] are identified with the South.” With Congress
adjourned and Lincoln in the White House, some border southerners had already lost faith in the
Union. Unwilling to wait for war to commence or a compromise to materialize, they went ahead
and cast their lot with the Confederacy.96
Many border southerners, suspicious of Republican designs but unable to desert wholly
the cherished Union, embraced the idea of neutrality. Alexander Doniphan had started down this
path during the first quarter of 1861. His effusive optimism about a peaceful settlement, so
evident when he tramped through the snow and addressed his neighbors back in late January,
began to wane as he witnessed the Washington Peace Conference neutralize the Crittenden
resolutions and substitute a package in its stead that he considered nothing more than a transient
“patchwork.” Moreover, he watched helplessly as Republicans in Congress dismantled every
serviceable compromise proposition. For much of the Missouri state convention the gifted orator
sat in unusual silence. By the time he returned to his western Missouri home, early spring rain
showers had replaced the white snow of winter and left the ground a muddy morass. Doniphan’s
mood closely resembled the dark skies that opened every day and kept him housebound. He
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confessed that he had “no well founded hope” that the national crisis would ever improve, and
now he used the poor weather as an excuse to refrain from making Unionist speeches to his
neighbors. In time, Doniphan “quietly folded the comforts of his home around him” and became
“an idle spectator of one of the mightiest Revolutions that ever crowned the earth.” The old
colonel would not raise his sword against the Union, yet neither would he unsheathe it to
subjugate the South. The Unionist offensive had kept the Border South safe, but it churned
forward with less momentum as winter gave way to spring.97
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Chapter 6
“If We Can’t Go With the South Let Us Quit the North”: The Muddled Career of Border South
Neutrality, April – September 1861

Throughout the winter of 1860-61, Baltimore attorney Severn Teackle Wallis struggled to
keep his composure. Descended from a wealthy Eastern Shore family, the forty-four year old
Wallis opted to pursue a life of the mind in the teeming southern metropolis rather than follow
the path of his father, who in 1837 left behind Baltimore’s cobblestone streets and the exhausted
soil of the family’s ancestral Chesapeake home, headed to the virgin bottomlands of the
Mississippi Delta, and reestablished himself as a planter. Instead of acquiring farmland and
slaves as had his father, Severn Teackle Wallis had by 1860 amassed a respectable fortune
through his metropolitan law practice. The life-long bachelor employed two African-American
servants in his St. Paul Street home in 1860, but according to the federal census he owned no
slaves on the eve of the Civil War. Rather, Wallis made his entrée into Baltimore’s highest
circles through his sharp legal mind and his devotion to education, history, and literature. One of
the founders of the Maryland Historical Society, he also belonged to prestigious European
societies such as Madrid’s Royal Academy of History and Copenhagen’s Society of Northern
Antiquities. Entranced by the Old World, he often traveled to Europe during the 1840s and
1850s. Visits to Spain inspired him to pen two travel accounts about the Iberian nation, and he
also dabbled in poetry while not arguing cases. Visitors to his Baltimore home noticed his
impressive library, which included one of the earliest surviving editions of Miguel de
Cervantes’s Don Quixote de la Mancha. During the 1850s Wallis undertook a lifelong crusade

291

to improve the quality of education available to Marylanders, which culminated in a two-decade
long stint after the war as provost of the University of Maryland.1
Wallis’s cosmopolitan taste and urbane style, however, did not impede him from taking a
deep interest in the unfolding national crisis that had placed Abraham Lincoln in the White
House and provoked the secession of South Carolina.

For Wallis, the non-slaveholding

Baltimore socialite, was one of the Border South’s most outspoken proponents of secession.
During the secession crisis Wallis’s library and his memories of Spain provided him with little
solace. His polish and charm gave way to indignation and frustration when parlor conversations
turned to the future of his beloved Maryland. Known for “the sharpness of rapier-like thrusts
which he gave his adversaries,” Wallis in early 1861 focused his resentment on two entities: the
Republicans, whom he viewed as a band of abolitionists bent on provoking a war in order to
complete their project of emancipation; and Maryland Governor Thomas Hicks, whom he
charged with stifling the voice of the people for his refusal to call the legislature into an
emergency session. A friend recalled that Wallis “hated and loathed [abolitionism] with a hatred
and loathing which exhausted the resources of his unmatched vocabulary of invective.” His
feelings toward Thomas Hicks hardly qualified as subordinate to his repugnance for the
Republicans. A friend remembered that when stirred to speak of either subject, Wallis unleashed
a tirade of “rather mordant” wit which poured forth “as if from the mouth of a gatling-gun.”2
Throughout his career, Wallis’s concern with politics matched his fascination with the
law and belles lettres. As a member of the Whig Party he had twice been defeated for public
1
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office, unsuccessfully running for the state legislature in 1847 and for the office of state attorney
in 1851. Unlike many Maryland Whigs, the demise of the organization in the mid-1850s
prompted Wallis to transfer his allegiance not to the American Party, but to the Democratic
Party.

In the late-1850s he began writing occasional editorials for the Daily Exchange, a

Baltimore newspaper devoted to unseating the American Party and reforming the city
government. He successfully championed new election laws and a restructuring of the Baltimore
Police Board to offset the Know Nothings, who he felt utilized gerrymandering and intimidation
to maintain control of the Old Line State, and in the election of 1860 Wallis warmly supported
the candidacy of John C. Breckinridge. Unable to sit on the sidelines while Maryland drifted
into the deepening chasm between the North and the South, he agitated for a sovereignty
convention to decide the state’s destiny. After carefully examining the state constitution, Wallis
believed the legislature must issue a summons for a convention. As long as Hicks remained idle
at Annapolis, Wallis’s much anticipated convention remained stillborn.3
Unable to restrain himself any longer, Wallis accepted an invitation to speak at the
Maryland Institute on the evening of February 1. With his stooped carriage, the tall, spare Wallis
scarcely evinced the body language of a firebrand when he climbed the dais that night. His eyes,
however, betrayed the storm brewing behind his learned mien. An acquaintance remembered
that Wallis had “the most expressive blue eyes I have ever seen, seeming now to dance with
smiles and again to darken and flash with scorn.” During the address he carefully catalogued
what he considered the deceptive course of Thomas Hicks since the election of Lincoln. The
governor, he argued, had purposefully kept the legislature from meeting in order to keep
Maryland “inert and silent under one pretext or another, until the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln,
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and then her people are to be rallied to his support, as the representative of the government and
the Union, and their love and devotion to the Union are to be their lure and decoy into the
practical support of the Republican party.”

Not only was Hicks a handmaiden of the

Republicans, Wallis complained, but he had also acted unconstitutionally when he sent
Maryland’s delegation to the Washington Peace Conference without conferring with the
legislature.

His list of Hicks’s offenses even led Wallis, who normally preached perfect

subservience to the word of law, to an extralegal conclusion: if the governor refused to call a
state convention, the people of Maryland must take action and issue the summons themselves.
With six states out of the Union and several other slaveholding states poised to follow,
Marylanders could not remain inactive. He unabashedly remarked that if the border between
slavery and freedom became a dividing line between two nations, “the right is on the one side
and the wrong is on the other, and the Republican party is the champion of the wrong.”4
Several other proponents of a state convention echoed Wallis’s complaints and
suggestions at the Maryland Institute that night. The conclave scheduled a larger meeting on
February 18 to consider how to call a state convention in the absence of legislative imprimatur.
Wallis attended this meeting as well, but nothing more than another plea for Hicks to assemble
the state legislature emerged from the conference. As Baltimore native John Morris correctly
predicted, the convention occupied “an indefinite ground which will mean anything or nothing as
future events may determine. They will not move one step towards secession unless Virginia
encourages them.”5 Wallis and likeminded Border South secessionists found that the Unionist
4
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offensive had for the most part stonewalled their belated mobilization on behalf of disunion. The
auspices of a settlement in Congress or in the Washington Peace Conference left most border
southerners unwilling to follow the drastic course recommended by Wallis and other border
country secessionists. The inauguration of Lincoln and the endurance of a tense truce between
the seceded states and the federal government won Wallis very few converts in the Border South.
Furthermore, much to the dismay of border country fire-eaters, John Crittenden and his
colleagues had in March broached the idea of a Border State convention to keep the idea of
compromise afloat. While some border southerners had soured on the hopes of a comprehensive
settlement and adopted a neutral attitude, many more seemed willing to give Crittenden every
conceivable opportunity to reach a compromise agreement. The conditional nature of Border
South Unionism, however, became as much a liability for Crittenden as it was an asset for
Wallis. A collision might jeopardize everything Crittenden and his allies had worked for over
the past five months and could very well convert many border southerners to Wallis’s line of
thinking. Although frustrated by the cautious course of the Border South constituency, Severn
Teackle Wallis and his colleagues tenaciously clung to the dream of secession as winter gave
way to spring.6
***
John Crittenden, no longer a United States senator, returned home to Frankfort in mid-March
1861, just as the Kentucky state legislature reassembled after a recess of a little over a month.
As a sign of respect for his herculean efforts in Washington, the legislature suspended business
on March 20 and repaired to the Frankfort train depot to welcome the aged Crittenden. Although
greatly wearied by the grueling schedule of long Senate sessions, seemingly endless committee
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meetings, and late-night parlor politics, Crittenden’s return to Frankfort did not signal the
commencement of retirement. In late February, a group of Kentucky Unionists broached the
idea of Crittenden running for Congress. These Kentuckians believed that Crittenden could
continue to lead the Unionist offensive from the House chamber. Moreover, his presence in
Washington would indicate that even with a Republican president in the executive office, the
hope for compromise remained alive. “You can do more for us & yourself in the house than you
can do in the Senate,” C.J. Blackburn asserted. “Lincoln is a bigoted fool therefore it is more
necessary you should be in Congress.” His old friend Orlando Brown reported that the people in
and around Frankfort had rallied behind Crittenden’s candidacy. Although initially reluctant to
sign up for another tour of duty in Washington, Crittenden’s return home convinced him that
retirement would have to wait once again. With congressional elections in Kentucky scheduled
for August, he had some time to contemplate his political future. For the present, he devoted his
time and energy to organizing a convention of the Upper and Border South states.7
Although the Kentucky general assembly adjourned on February 11, 1861, without
calling a state convention, the idea of a conference of the slaveholding states remaining in the
Union had gradually gained momentum. Once the legislature returned to Frankfort on March 20,
proponents of a slave state conclave renewed their efforts to secure passage of an enabling
resolution for the meeting. Throughout the month of March, a growing number of Unionists
from across the Upper and Border South clamored for what became known as a border slave
state convention.8 The border slave state convention scheme had been discussed at length in the
7
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state conventions of Missouri and Virginia, the general assemblies of Delaware and Kentucky,
and the southern press. Unionists realized that with Congress adjourned, a convention could
keep the issue of compromise before the people. In short, it would signal to wavering Unionists
throughout the South that conservatives had yet to surrender. “A heavy responsibility devolves
upon the central states, where the great heart of the country beats,” a Virginia native remarked in
response to the possibility of a border state conference. “May they be fully alive to their
responsibilities and true to them!”9
Kentucky Unionists played their trump card on March 21 when they asked Crittenden to
address the state legislature. No other personality held as much sway in Kentucky or the Border
South as did Crittenden, and the invitation provided the manager of the Unionist offensive with a
platform that would draw the attention of the regional and national press. He agreed to the
invitation, scheduled the speech for March 26, and took a few days to prepare his address. Just
over three weeks after his valedictory to the United States Senate, the old Kentuckian discovered
that although he held no public office, his name still attracted an immense crowd.

An

overflowing throng of men and women packed the galleries of the House chamber, crowded the
floor, and spilled into the lobby of the statehouse. Crittenden took the floor around 11:00 in the
morning and spoke to the joint session of the general assembly for roughly two hours.10
During the address, Crittenden emphasized that as long as the nation avoided an outbreak
of hostilities, the Border South could depend on support from the conservative masses of the
North. He underscored that in the recently adjourned session of Congress, thousands of voters
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from all over the North had sent him petitions and letters in support of his compromise package.
“It showed me that the argument which had been so often used to disunite us – that the North
hates the South and that the South hates the North – is not true,” he admitted. He warned his
fellow border southerners that extremists in both the North and the South had used partisanship
to fire the passions of the people and cloud the true spirit of intersectional cordiality which still
existed. Thus, Crittenden advised that the South should continue to press for recognition of her
rights within the Union.

“Let us struggle in the Union, contend in the Union, make the Union

the instrument with which we contend, and we shall get all that we ask – all that we can desire –
all that reason can warrant us in expecting,” Crittenden pled.11
He continued with a reminder that most border country southerners had family members
or friends who lived in either the North or the Lower South. Thus, he found the notion of
coercion utterly repugnant. The shedding of blood, Crittenden cautioned, would dash the hopes
of reconciliation and instantly convert intersectional amicability into sectional hatred. Rather,
both sides ought to find a peaceful means of patching the old Union back together. He hoped
that the Border South would follow the example set by Henry Clay, who in 1850 had labored
intensively for a compromise settlement and boldly declared to the Kentucky legislature that he
would never give up on the Union. In his appeal for peaceful measures, Crittenden pointed out
that the electoral process, not revolution, granted the American voter the best means of setting
aside bad rulers and political leaders.12
Although Crittenden did not explicitly condone a border state convention in his address
to the Kentucky legislature, his plea for peace, calm, and Union certainly helped the legislators
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who pushed for the meeting. C.F. Burnam believed that Crittenden’s address rejuvenated the
Union movement in the general assembly and paved the way for the passage of a resolution
calling for the border state conference. The “aged & worthy public servant” had dinner with
several members of the legislature shortly after delivering his speech, which also bolstered the
spirits of Bluegrass State Unionists. In the following days the legislature considered several
different proposals for the border state convention.

The timing and means of electing

representatives to the convention became the two main points of contention. Some members
wanted to schedule the convention in August, while others preferred May. Debate also ensued as
to whether the people of Kentucky should elect their delegates to the meeting or if the legislature
should appoint them. In the end, the legislature on April 2 settled on holding an election for
delegates to the conference on Saturday, May 4, 1861; the meeting would convene at Frankfort
on May 27. The final legislation passed the Senate by a vote of 27-0 but faced more difficulty in
the House.13
In the House proponents of secession George B. Hodge and W.B. Machen unsuccessfully
attempted to insert language that upheld the Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, which Thomas
Jefferson had drafted in opposition to what he deemed an overabundance of executive and
legislative power during the Quasi-War with France.

Throughout the nineteenth century,

nullifiers and secessionists utilized Jefferson’s resolutions as a precedent for resisting the
authority of the federal government when they regarded its actions unconstitutional. Apparently
Machen hoped to gain a victory for Kentucky secessionists by tethering this interpretation to the
bill. His ploy failed by the close margin of 41-44, and on April 2 the House passed the
legislation by a vote of 82-2 after John C. Breckinridge, whom most Kentucky Unionists
13
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considered “the head & front of disunion” in the state, gave his blessing to the border state
convention. Only Machen and Daniel P. White voted in the negative.14
When the general assembly adjourned on April 5, Kentucky Unionists again
congratulated one another for their efforts. Although some conservatives had in the absence of a
comprehensive settlement from Congress jumped off the Unionist bandwagon, the March-April
1861 session of the Kentucky legislature highlighted the resiliency of the Unionist offensive.
For the second time in 1861, moderates had prevented their pro-secession colleagues from
ramming a bill for a state sovereignty convention through the legislature. At this term, prosecession legislators even failed to bring the state convention proposition to a vote. Furthermore,
during this brief sitting the Kentucky legislature passed a resolution in support of the proposed
Thirteenth Amendment, known as the Corwin Amendment, which forbade Congress from
abolishing slavery in the states where it existed. While nearly every southern Unionist agreed
that this amendment addressed only a portion of the numerous political problems plaguing the
nation, they could at least view its passage as a necessary first step toward a settlement and likely
calm the nerves of uncommitted conservatives. Kentucky secessionists knew this precisely and
tried to prevent the measure’s passage by adding various explanatory resolutions to the
amendment. One called for the immediate withdrawal of all federal troops in the South, while
another insisted the Corwin Amendment was “a declaration of rights we already claim to
possess.”

George B. Hodge, leader of the obstructionists, feared that ratification of the

amendment would set a dangerous precedent because it opened the door to the federal
14
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government rendering future decisions on slavery in the states. Unionists stripped the final
package of these obstacles and settled on a resolution that expressed the shared conviction that
the passage of the amendment did not equate to a final settlement of the crisis, but nonetheless
exemplified Kentucky’s desire to avoid the agitation of the slavery issue.15
Politicians who favored disunion had come to Frankfort in March full of optimism, yet
once again found themselves overmatched by the regimented Unionists.

Fire-eaters could,

however, count one small victory in late March. The same day that the legislature opened and
Crittenden made his return, a group in favor of disunion held a meeting in the Kentucky capital.
They branded themselves the Southern Rights Party and established a committee to manage the
new organization’s affairs. Blanton Duncan orchestrated the development of a network of
Southern Rights clubs to circulate secession propaganda across the state and launched a
campaign to gather signatures for petitions to the legislature in favor of calling a state
convention. Nevertheless, the unfolding events in the legislative session demoralized some of
the Southern Rights members and exposed the party’s lack of strength in relation to the
Unionists.16
Crittenden’s speech and presence helped neutralize the embryonic party, which one
moderate labeled a band of “Secession buccaneers.” John C. Breckinridge, whom the legislature
had in November 1859 tabbed to replace the retiring Crittenden in the United States Senate,
discovered in April 1861 the difficulties of following his predecessor. Invited to speak to the
legislature on April 2, Breckinridge struggled to convince many fence-sitters to join the Southern
15
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Rights crusade. Whereas Crittenden stressed the commonalities between the North and South,
Breckinridge underscored the differences between the sections. Republicans reigned supreme in
the North, he claimed, and now the federal government resembled “an alien government, the
worst that ever cursed the world.” He warned his fellow Kentuckians that Republicans in the
recently adjourned Congress had practiced the art of deception and duped most southern
Unionists. Even though the Republicans acquiesced in the Corwin Amendment, Breckinridge
reminded his listeners, they remained firmly committed to preventing the spread of slavery into
the territories. This, he averred, signaled a Republican design to abolish slavery “by more
circuitous but not less fatal means.” The former vice president predicted a woeful future of
social ruin if the state’s quarter of a million enslaved persons became free. Finally, Breckinridge
advised that Kentucky take part in the proposed border states conference, but declared if nothing
came of the meeting then the Bluegrass State should join the government that best protected its
inhabitants from the “combined influence of fanaticism, hypocrisy, and perfidy” – the
Confederate States of America.17
Breckinridge’s speech did little to mobilize the Southern Rights men in the legislature.
Many Kentuckians still shared Crittenden’s conviction that they could reach out to moderates in
the North for cooperation just as they had in the preceding three decades.

By the time

Breckinridge spoke most legislators considered the passage of legislation for a border state
conference and resistance to a Kentucky state sovereignty convention a foregone conclusion.
Several irked Southern Rights members and confident Unionists headed home before the close of
the session and did not even witness Breckinridge’s address; a day before his speech a
newspaper correspondent remarked that if the legislature did not soon adjourn “the defection will
17
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amount to a stampede.”

Both the Unionists and the Southern Rights adherents, however,

realized that a massive number of Kentuckians and border southerners remained conditional
Unionists and that outside events could alter their outlook on secession. With that thought in
mind, both camps geared up for the May 4 election for delegates to the border states convention.
Some Unionists, mindful of the substantial size of the conditional bloc, expressed misgivings
about the meeting because they feared disunionists would use it as a means to present an
impracticable ultimatum to the North and convert equivocating moderates to their standard.
Crittenden likely took these factors into consideration when he eventually consented to run for
Congress despite his admission that he had long wished to retire.18
Since the beginning of the secession crisis, Border South Unionists had anxiously
monitored two situations, one in St. Louis and the other in Charleston, South Carolina, in which
federal troops stared down pro-secession forces. Earlier in the winter Nathaniel Lyon and a
small contingent of federal regulars had reinforced the United States arsenal at St. Louis, which
provoked the wrath of many Missourians. Lyon worked closely with the Unionist Home Guard
under the direction of Frank Blair and Franz Sigel, a leader in the St. Louis German community,
to ensure that the arsenal remained adequately defended. Secessionists in St. Louis made their
presence known by flying disunion flags from rooftops throughout the town, including one atop
the city courthouse for a few days in early March. Basil Duke, a St. Louis attorney who
supported secession, had organized a paramilitary organization of about four hundred men
known as the Ninth Ward Washington Minute Men, which kept onlookers on edge. Duke later
admitted “the chief and primary object of this organization was the capture of the arsenal,” but a
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lack of adequate arms and hesitancy among some of the secessionist leaders prevented the
Minute Men from achieving their goal during the winter. The pro-secession forces celebrated a
small victory when on April 1 the city’s voters elected Daniel G. Taylor, who ran on an antiRepublican coalition ticket, to the mayor’s office. Taylor replaced Republican Oliver Filley and
in the contest he defeated the Republican candidate John How by a sizable margin. “We have
taken our position against Lincolnism,” a conservative editor boasted, “and against that
malignant theory of the North which declares perpetual war on the slave States and their
institutions.” Disunionists also rejoiced when Governor Claiborne Fox Jackson appointed Duke
and several other men with secessionist proclivities to the St. Louis Police Board.19
Despite the uncertain and untenable conditions in St. Louis, by April 1861 the standoff
had not escalated into open warfare. Americans could not count on similar results in Charleston
Harbor, where a federal force commanded by Kentuckian Robert Anderson in Fort Sumter
became a symbol of defiance to Confederates and an emblem of resiliency to northern hardliners.
For months border southerners of all political persuasions had bemoaned the presence of federal
troops in the seceded states. Before returning to Frankfort for his speech to the legislature, the
newly installed John C. Breckinridge used the special session of the Senate in late March,
normally reserved for confirming the nominations of the incoming president, to submit a
resolution that called for the removal of all federal troops from the Confederate States of
America. Unwilling to act upon the resolution both because it represented a tacit recognition of
Confederate nationhood and because most Republicans viewed it as base surrender to the
demands of traitors, the Senate cast his resolution aside. Moderate border southerners also asked
for the removal of federal forces from the Lower South, albeit for different reasons. They
19
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understood that as long as the two forces faced one another in the cradle of secession, an
overzealous potshot from one of the shore batteries ringing Fort Sumter might provoke return
fire and bring about war, which would likely derail all hopes for a peaceful compromise
settlement. Unionists in both the Missouri state convention and the Kentucky legislature had
with varying degrees of success entered resolutions asking that Lincoln remove the troops from
the seceded states so that negotiations toward a compromise could proceed unencumbered.
Samuel F. Du Pont of Delaware, like many other committed Unionists, conceded that the
evacuation of Fort Sumter would be “a bitter pill to swallow,” but he figured such a course
would prevent civil war and exponentially increase the likelihood of a political settlement.20
Breckinridge likely asked for the removal of troops so that the Confederate project could
advance unimpeded, but he provided a common Border South explanation when he introduced
his resolution. Most border southerners realized that the outbreak of war would likely plunge
their region into the thick of the contest. “Those of us who live a few miles on either side of the
border, if the passions of men should become aroused, and if indeed human nature has made no
progress since the times of the Peloponnesian war…would be engaged in it; yes, and would have
to contribute our children to the unnatural strife,” Breckinridge somberly predicted. A Delaware
Unionist echoed the sentiments of Breckinridge when she remarked, “Every patriot ought to
bend all his energies to prevent the commencement of civil war, for if once begun it will be
applying the match to the tinder, [and] the whole land will be in a blaze.” A Kentucky politician
lamented that if war commenced, “the beautiful Ohio would run red with the blood of
slaughtered brethren.” Perhaps before any other element of the Union, border southerners
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grasped the destructive toll that a civil war might unleash. Their geographic position along the
sectional fault line, along with glimpses of episodic violence in the preceding decades, taught
them that a full-blown armed conflict would place the Border South in a most vulnerable
position.21
Even as handwringing in the Border South over the impending outbreak of war
intensified, conditions in Charleston deteriorated during the spring. Soon after Abraham Lincoln
entered the executive office on March 4, 1861, the new president received astonishing news:
Anderson only had enough food and supplies to keep his garrison in operation for six more
weeks. Before most Washington revelers concluded their inauguration festivities, Lincoln faced
a painfully difficult decision. Should he reinforce Anderson, which would certainly provoke
retaliation from the Confederate forces on the shore, and risk the commencement of war? Or,
should he evacuate the federal troops, avoid war, and possibly face a fractured northern populace
and Republican Party? Over the next six weeks Lincoln weighed his options, relying on the
counsel of his cabinet, General-in-Chief Winfield Scott, and a small cadre of army and navy
officers.22
Lincoln in mid-March polled his cabinet to ascertain their thoughts on the situation at
Fort Sumter. From the beginning, Secretary of State William Seward led the way in advocating
21
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the removal of Anderson’s men. Several Upper South Unionists and influential delegates to the
Virginia state convention had convinced Seward that the remaining eight slave states would stay
in the Union only if the federal government adopted a peaceful stance toward the seceded states.
He reasoned that the evacuation of Fort Sumter would demonstrate to these Unionists that the
administration had chosen peaceful means to end the crisis and that a pacific posture would keep
the eight states of the Upper and Border South firmly attached to the Union.23 Missourian
Edward Bates originally followed Seward’s line of thinking and advised the president to remove
Anderson’s men from Sumter and send additional troops to Fort Pickens and other installations
along the Gulf of Mexico, which held less symbolic and strategic value than Fort Sumter.
Bates’s Border South thinking about war, the Union, and the fate of slavery contributed to his
initial decision for withdrawal. He predicted that reinforcing Fort Sumter would bring about
armed conflict, which “would soon become a social war, and that could hardly fail to bring on a
servile war, the horrors of which need not be dwelt upon.” At the outset, only Montgomery Blair
of Maryland voiced an outright opposition to evacuating the fort, which he considered caving to
the demands of traitors. The disparate opinions of Lincoln’s two Border South cabinet members
reveals how each man’s political antecedents influenced his thinking.

Bates, the cautious

moderate, adhered more closely to the conventional opinion of border southerners, while Blair,
the former Democrat who had broken with the mainstream of the party back in the 1840s and
entered the free-soil fold, thought more in terms of absolutes.24
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During the following two weeks, Seward worked every angle possible to convince the
president to evacuate Fort Sumter, yet Lincoln remained uncommitted. The secretary of state
kept in contact with Unionists in Virginia and Confederate commissioners in Washington and
made the grave blunder of assuring them that Anderson and his men would withdraw from the
fort. Lincoln, however, finally decided in late March to resupply Anderson after General Scott
suggested abandoning not only Sumter but also Fort Pickens in Pensacola, Florida. Lincoln
could not accept Scott’s recommendation to yield both forts, especially since Pickens suffered
little duress in relation to Sumter. He viewed Scott’s suggestion as ignoble submission, and all
but Seward and Secretary of the Interior Caleb Smith now agreed with the president. In early
April the president prepared orders for the navy to provision Sumter. Tipped off that a flotilla
had left New York City with supplies for Anderson’s men, Confederate president Jefferson
Davis instructed the commanding officer at Charleston to prevent the federals from restocking
the bastion. Before sunrise on April 12, the Confederate batteries opened fire on the fort. After
a bombardment of more than thirty hours, the federal garrison surrendered and evacuated
Charleston Harbor. On April 15, Lincoln responded with a proclamation calling for 75,000
troops to subdue the rebellious Lower South states. For border southerners, the unthinkable had
occurred. “I fear the effect of this event upon the Border States,” John Pendleton Kennedy
despondently scribbled in his diary. “It strengthens the secession men and may end in driving us
all out of the Union.”25
Reactions to the bombardment at Fort Sumter and Lincoln’s proclamation varied from
outrage and indignation to exuberant delight. In response to the news, disunionists raised a
secession flag over the courthouse in Elizabethtown, Kentucky, while fire-eaters took to the
25
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streets of Magnolia, Delaware, and cheered for Jefferson Davis and the Confederacy. One Kent
County, Delaware, merchant adamantly refused to allow authorities to post Lincoln’s call for
troops inside or outside of his store. While a great gulf separated the mindset of fire-eaters and
unconditional Unionists in the Border South, both groups seemed relieved that the contest had
finally come. Disunionists were confident that the Border South would now follow the Lower
South out of the Union, and unyielding Unionists looked forward to exterminating the fire-eaters
in their midst. “The war has begun & I am glad it is inaugurated by the act of Rebels in the State
of South Carolina; if it has to be, let those who are the authors of all the trouble, reap the first
fruits of the dire Calamity,” an unconditional Unionist in Delaware squawked.26
Moderates greeted the news with a less sanguine outlook than did secessionists and
unconditional Unionists. The opening of the war apparently caught some Unionists off guard
and left them unsure of how to proceed. A Danville, Kentucky, native remarked that “The Union
party seem as mad as march hares, running backward & forward from one extreme of policy to
the other.” James Guthrie worried that the attack would cause Virginia and other Upper and
Border South states to secede. Moreover, he fretted that emboldened disunionists in Maryland
might attempt to capture Washington D.C, throw the federal government into disarray, and win a
massive victory for the Confederacy. An inhabitant of St. Louis proclaimed to Stephen Douglas
that until the attack on Fort Sumter he had stood firmly beside the Union, but stated he would
never join with the Republicans who he charged with inaugurating the war “for party purposes
against slavery.” Confused and saddened, he asked the Little Giant for advice. The attack
produced a change in sentiment for many conditional Unionists across the region. William
Nelson reported that in Louisville “the people have absolutely gone mad. Some of the best
26
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Union men are talking and acting as officers of secession meetings.” Orville Hickman Browning
gazed across the Mississippi River from his Quincy, Illinois home and concluded that “treason
and secession are rampant” in Missouri.27
The inhabitants of both the Border and Upper South understood that the action of
Virginia would have a profound impact on the other seven slaveholding states. Virginia, the
largest slaveholding state, proudly boasted of a prestigious political lineage that dated back to the
early seventeenth century, and most southerners revered the Old Dominion’s lengthy roster of
eminent statesmen. Many border southerners hailed from Virginia and thus looked to their
former home for guidance throughout the crisis. A prominent Virginian predicted that the Old
Dominion “is so ponderous a vessel of state that she will drag all the rest of the border slave
states along in her wake.” An advisor to Lincoln early in the year warned that if Virginia
seceded, he might as well prepare for the rest of the Border South to “surrender to the demon.”
“If Virginia plays the fool now the whole South is lost,” James Guthrie likewise fretted.
Unionists in the Border South held their breath when on April 17 the Virginian convention
discarded the advice of delegate Waitman Willey, who warned that secession would destroy all
the social, economic, and political accord that had long been so important to the states along the
sectional border, and voted 88-55 in favor of secession.28
Good fortune smiled on the Unionists of the Border South in that neither the Missouri
state convention nor the general assemblies of the four states were in session when on April 12
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the feeble truce between the Confederacy and the federal government fell through. Had the
Missouri convention remained in session beyond March 22 or the Kentucky legislature beyond
April 5, the worst fears about a conditional Unionist metamorphosis to disunionism may have
been realized. Much to the chagrin of Border South fire-eaters, legislators and delegates had
scattered across the vast expanse of the region and returned to their homes when the cold war
between the Lower South and the federal government ended and a shooting war ensued.
Disunionists relied upon brisk action; with none of these Border South legislative bodies in
session their task became more difficult in the four northernmost slaveholding states. William
Watkins Glenn, a Baltimore fire-eater, groused that although Virginia had voted to secede, his
disunionist colleagues in Maryland did little more than talk of their indignation about Lincoln’s
proclamation. Glenn recalled with frustration that the lack of “concerted action” on the part of
Baltimore disunionists prevented them from riding Virginia’s coattails at this juncture.29
The attack on Fort Sumter combined with Lincoln’s proclamation tipped the balance in
favor of disunion in the Upper South, where the machinery for secession had been assembled
earlier in the winter.

All four of the Upper South states contained significant pockets of

concentrated pro-secession sentiment which unlike in the Border South served as an effective
counterweight to the Unionist offensive. Prior to the bombardment, state conventions had met in
both Arkansas and Virginia, though neither body had rendered a final decision about its state’s
future in the Union. Virginia’s convention remained in session at this crucial interval and wasted
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little time preparing and passing a secession ordinance in response to Lincoln’s proclamation. In
Arkansas, the governor recalled the adjourned convention and in early May the delegates swiftly
declared the state out of the Union. Although voters in North Carolina and Tennessee had
spurned holding a convention in February, the groundwork had been laid for each state’s exit
from the Union. In Tennessee, the legislature in early May approved of a military alliance with
the Confederacy and later in June the state’s voters approved of secession in a public
referendum. North Carolinians sent delegates to a state convention in mid-May, which passed a
secession ordinance in quick order. Unionists in the Border South, however, had through their
efforts during the winter applied the brakes to precipitate legislative action in their region. 30
While Border South politicians read of the events at Fort Sumter and Virginia from their
firesides, the executives of the region wasted little time in their response to Lincoln’s call for
troops to subdue the rebellion. The biting rejoinder from Kentucky’s Beriah Magoffin and
Missouri’s Claiborne Fox Jackson varied little from that of state executives across the Upper
South. “In answer I say emphatically Kentucky will furnish no troops for the wicked purpose of
subduing her sister Southern States,” Magoffin snorted in reply to the request. Jackson made an
even bolder declaration: “Your requisition, in my judgment, is illegal, unconstitutional, and
revolutionary in its object, inhuman and diabolical, and cannot be complied with. Not one man
will the State of Missouri furnish to carry on any such unholy crusade.” Governor William
Burton of Delaware also refused to provide troops to the federal government, although he
responded to Secretary of War Simon Cameron in significantly more measured language than
did Magoffin and Jackson. Burton acknowledged that Delaware law did not include a provision
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for a standing militia; with no state militia, he could not turn any units over to the federal
government. He conceded that volunteer companies existed and were forming and that state law
granted him the authority to commission the officers of these units, but “it is altogether optional
with them to offer their service to the U.S. authorities.”31
The jarring rebukes of Magoffin, Jackson, and Burton revealed the complexity of the
Border South position in the crisis. None of these Democratic executives wished to contribute
troops to a war against their southern brethren, and all three men claimed that Lincoln lacked the
constitutional authority to call up soldiers for such a purpose. Most border southerners agreed
that Lincoln had overstepped the boundaries set forth in the Constitution with his call for 75,000
men to crush the rebellion. Nathaniel Paschall remonstrated that the question before the people
revolved around “whether our liberties are secured by laws or whether they are subject to the
will, the mere will of despotism.” Still, the St. Louis editor held out hope that a pacific
separation might occur between the warring sections. “The ties by which the Border States have
been bound to the Union, and which have been displayed in many sacrifices of feeling and
interest for its preservation,” he proclaimed, “have been much weakened by the developments of
the last two weeks.” Paschall admitted that if Lincoln did not entertain the idea of a peaceful
settlement, the Border South might venture into the unknown ground of secession.32
While Paschall conceded the possibility of secession, he gave voice to the growing
demand for neutrality in the Border South. Once the cannons opened fire at Fort Sumter,
Paschall and other border southerners experienced more countervailing sectional pressure than
ever before. Beriah Magoffin and William Burton both fixed on neutrality as the best response
to Lincoln’s proclamation and the specter of war. Magoffin on April 24 asked the legislature to
31
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convene on May 6 so that it could prepare the state for the future, which alarmed committed
Unionists in the Bluegrass State. Kentucky Unionists had twice before beaten back fire-eaters in
the general assembly who had clamored for a state convention; they now wondered if they could
continue to hold the line. Unconditional Unionists in Kentucky distrusted Magoffin and doubted
his intentions in setting the state on the path to neutrality. “He is a rebel at heart and afflicted
beyond hope of cure,” James Speed later surmised.33 Scholars have engaged in a long-running
debate about the intentions of the Kentucky governor in the spring of 1861 and formed two
camps of opinion: one group portrays Magoffin as a disunionist who hoped the adoption of
neutrality would eventually lead Kentucky to align herself with the Confederacy, while the other
praises the governor for his efforts to keep the Bluegrass State out of the fray. 34 Despite
enriching our understanding of Kentucky’s governor, these interpretations tend to overstate his
long-term vision. Magoffin, like almost every other American and border southerner, found
himself blindsided by the opening of the conflict. Although war had been much discussed ever
since Lincoln’s election, few Americans had prepared for an actual conflict. His preliminary
response to the war belied sheer confusion rather than ulterior machinations or patent
choreography for Kentucky’s future.
Magoffin initially sought a decidedly Border South solution to the commencement of
war. In addition to advocating neutrality, he reached out to the governors of Indiana and Ohio
and gauged their interest in joining him to mediate a peaceful settlement between the
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Confederacy and the federal government. If they could effect a truce between the warring
sections, “the passions of the people may cool in the meantime” and politicians across the nation
could find some means by which “this horrid war may be stopped and our difficulties adjusted in
a manner honorable to all parties.”35 In his proclamation Lincoln had called for a special session
of Congress to meet on July 4; Magoffin figured that preventing armed hostilities until that point
would produce a mandate for a settlement.

While Magoffin counted on the antebellum

intersectional amity that had been so integral to the Border South’s conception of the Union, he
failed to understand the momentous sea change that had occurred in northern opinion once
Confederate soldiers opened fire on federal troops at Fort Sumter. No longer did northerners
view the crisis as merely a political question about slavery’s future in the republic. With their
nationalism placed on trial, most northerners allowed a rage militaire to overcome the
intersectional goodwill that border southerners had relied upon during the antebellum years.36
The bombardment at Fort Sumter “has united all the free states as one man,” Sophie Du Pont
correctly discerned. “What has started the North, is the sentiment of fealty to the constitutional
authority of the land & the flag of our country.” A Democratic paper in Pennsylvania noted in
the aftermath of Fort Sumter that it had long advocated a compromise between the sections, “but
now, they have fired upon the flag of their country, and of ours. No American of true heart and
brave soul will stand this.” Ohio governor William Dennison refused Magoffin’s invitation and
35
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proclaimed the federal government “to be wholly in the right.” After initially signaling a
willingness to meet with Magoffin’s proxy, Indiana governor Oliver Morton also declined and
asked Kentucky to side with the free states in the contest.37
While attempting to convince the executives of Indiana and Ohio to meet with him,
Magoffin also sent emissaries to New Orleans to purchase arms and munitions for the state
militia commanded by Simon Bolivar Buckner, a West Point graduate, former instructor at the
academy, and a distinguished officer during the Mexican War. The Kentucky legislature had in
March 1860 passed a law to revamp the state militia, which became known as the State Guard.
The general assembly placed Buckner in charge of the outfit, and by early 1861 he had organized
sixty-one companies and scrounged equipment and weapons from every available outlet in the
Bluegrass State.

The State Guard had a decidedly pro-southern complexion, and some

Kentuckians believed that Magoffin intended to use it “to cow down the unprotected Union men”
in the state. One of Magoffin’s agents procured about 1,500 guns in the Crescent City but
confessed that other equally anxious parties had gobbled up all the rest of the weapons in New
Orleans. The governor’s other agent seemed less concerned about the urgency of the situation
and instead spent the majority of his time on a barstool, much to the dismay of Magoffin. The
governor realized that in order for a policy of neutrality to garner respect, the state had to arm
itself adequately. His search for arms in the heart of the Confederacy, however, only aroused the
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suspicions of many unconditional Unionists, who in response urged the formation of independent
militia units to counter the presence of the State Guard.38
Delaware governor William Burton, like Magoffin, also had trouble deciding how best to
respond to the opening of hostilities between the sections. His refusal to commit Delaware
troops to the United States government upset some of the state’s unconditional Unionists, who
felt that Burton and James A. Bayard’s clique of Democrats planned to deliver the state to the
Confederacy. Bayard, who in late March had on the floor of the Senate proclaimed that war
could never mend the severed ties between the Lower South and the federal government, took an
inopportune vacation through the Lower South during the month of April. In the aftermath of
Fort Sumter, unconditional Unionists charged him with conspiring with Confederate officials.
Bayard’s letters to his son during this interval indicated his strong desire for Delaware to join in
the secession movement, but he conceded that “unless [Virginia] and Maryland go South, we are
tied hand and foot” to what he derisively labeled “a free negro republic.” 39 Burton refrained
from calling the legislature into special session, which unlike in the rest of the Border South
concerned Unionists.

While the governor wavered, volunteer militia units with differing

sectional allegiances organized throughout the state. One Wilmington editor bemoaned that “we
are surrounded by secret secessionists.” Henry Du Pont, the president of the Du Pont powder
works located just outside of Wilmington, coordinated the Unionist militia and complained that
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without the legislature in session to pass an appropriation bill his troops would suffer from
inadequate supplies and munitions.40
Governor Claiborne Jackson of Missouri, unlike Magoffin and Burton, acted with force
and myopic conviction in the aftermath of Lincoln’s proclamation. No one could question
Jackson’s sympathies or motives; he unapologetically yearned for Missouri to add its star to the
Confederate flag. Soon after he refused to offer troops to the federal government, Jackson called
the state legislature into an emergency session on May 2 so it could prepare the state for war.
Militia units hummed with activity in the days following Jackson’s defiant response, and
secessionists in the western part of the state captured the federal arsenal at Liberty and
absconded with a cache of weapons and four cannon.41 Jackson informed David Walker, the
president of the Arkansas state convention, that he and the people of Missouri would not
countenance living under a government controlled by the Republicans.

He felt that the

Republicans, whose primary goal was the extinction of slavery, had begun “the most damnable
and hellish crusade that was ever waged against any people upon earth.” The halfway step of
neutrality would not satisfy Jackson – he preferred “a full, complete and final separation” – who
predicted that Missouri would secede within thirty days.42

Many Missourians applauded

Jackson’s brash stand, but he had misread the great mass of his constituency. Far more of the
state’s inhabitants followed the line of thinking of William F. Switzler, the editor of the
Columbia Missouri Statesman. “Let them [the states of the Border South] stand as a wall of fire
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between the belligerent extremes, and with their strong arms and potential counsel keep them
apart,” Switzler recommended.43
Of the four Border South executives, Thomas Hicks had up to April 1861 proven the
most committed to the Union cause. The firing on Fort Sumter and Lincoln’s call for troops,
however, led to a series of events in Maryland that placed the fate of the state in great peril.
Prior to Fort Sumter tensions ran so high in Baltimore that one inhabitant claimed “that people
are afraid of their own shadow.”

Afterwards, large crowds with contradictory sectional

allegiances assembled in the streets, cursed either Lincoln or Jefferson Davis, and engaged in
sporadic fistfights. Fearful of the reaction that might result from acquiescence to Lincoln’s
proclamation, Hicks traveled to Washington on April 15 and conversed with the president,
Winfield Scott, and Simon Cameron. The triumvirate promised Hicks that any troops raised in
Maryland would either protect the national capital or stay in the Old Line State. The governor
returned to Annapolis, mulled over the offer, and on April 17 agreed to the proposition.44
Hicks technically had not agreed to furnish any troops to coerce the seceded states and in
essence had adopted a policy of armed neutrality, which the Frederick Examiner and the
Baltimore American outlined as the best policy for Maryland and the Border South. As a symbol
of this policy, the Maryland state flag for a brief stint replaced the American flag above some
public buildings. Hicks surely understood that this policy did not satisfy all Marylanders. “Shall
Maryland be with the North, or with the South, is the true question to consider now,” John F.
Dent queried. That Hicks had cooperated with the Lincoln administration sickened Dent, who
43
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implored the governor to call the legislature into session so that it could inaugurate the process of
holding a state convention. Throughout the winter and spring Hicks worried that the spirit of
disunion had mushroomed and could any day overtake the Unionists in the state, especially if
Virginia left the Union.45
One historian of Maryland politics considers Hicks’s course of armed neutrality a ploy to
buy precious time for Unionists, whom he considered a dominant force throughout the state. In
hindsight, such a program appears well coordinated and thought out, a neat step in the state’s
inevitable progression toward the Union column.

Neither Hicks nor any other Unionist,

however, knew what lay in store for Maryland. Even in late July 1861, once the war had begun
in earnest and federal troops occupied the state, a Baltimore native remarked, “there is no hotter
secession state than Maryland and in the final enlistment she will go with the South.” Moreover,
Unionist John Pendleton Kennedy acknowledged in September 1861 that “here in Maryland we
are only saved from the outbreak of civil conflict by the presence of the great force which now
keeps the peace of the State.” Most likely, the governor advocated neutrality because it was the
most noncommittal course available and perfectly suited to a Border South state sandwiched
between the slave states where secession had gained the ascendancy and the free states where a
rage militaire had overtaken the majority of the people.46
Furthermore, the swift onrush of another crisis deprived Hicks the luxury of time or
foresight. Maryland’s proximity to the national capital proved inauspicious for a policy of
neutrality because units from the northeast responding to Lincoln’s proclamation would have to
cross through the Old Line State on their journey southward.
45
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excitement in the days after Fort Sumter, housed an interchange of the major rail lines
connecting the northeast to the national capital. To reach Washington expeditiously, nearly all
northeastern units would be siphoned from secondary lines onto the Philadelphia, Wilmington,
and Baltimore Railroad, which terminated at Baltimore’s President Street Station.

These

passengers then had to disembark and walk a mile through the heart of the city to the Camden
Station, where they boarded trains bound for Washington. On April 18 angry citizens ignored a
plea from Mayor George W. Brown to refrain from taunting southbound soldiers and greeted the
first northern troops to enter Baltimore with epithets, jeers, and bibulous renditions of “Dixie.”
The troops, likely nonplussed and dumbfounded by the crowd, did not respond to the
provocations. Later that evening T. Parkin Scott and Ross Winans hosted an impromptu States
Rights Convention which passed a series of resolutions calling on Marylanders “to repel, if need
be, any invader who may come to establish a military despotism over us.” Brown and Hicks
relayed to Lincoln that “the excitement is fearful” and advised the federal government to find
another route for soldiers coming to Washington. “It is not possible for more soldiers to pass
through Baltimore unless they fight their way at every step,” an unnerved Brown warned the
president.47
Unfortunately, troops from the Sixth Massachusetts and ten companies of unarmed
Pennsylvania militiamen left Philadelphia around three o’clock on the morning of April 19 and
arrived in Baltimore at noon. Chaos descended upon Baltimore once the approximately 1,700
northern troops disembarked at the President Street Station and boarded horse-drawn trollies
bound for Camden Station. Observers accumulated along Pratt Street, and “as the troops kept
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passing, the crowd of bystanders grew larger, the excitement and – among many – the feeling of
indignation grew more intense.” Seven companies of the Massachusetts soldiers made it through
the gauntlet unscathed, but the mob pelted the last horse-drawn car with debris and used sand
and cobblestones to obstruct the street. The remaining four companies had to march through the
growing mob, which now rained bricks and stones down upon the troops. The frenzied throng
soon added bullets to its arsenal of brickbats, rocks, and rails. Discipline among the troops
quickly dissipated; they returned fire and a full-fledged street battle erupted. Mayor Brown,
Police Marshall George P. Kane, and a contingent of Baltimore policemen arrived on the scene
and eventually pressed back the mob. Before the last soldiers reached Camden Station and made
their departure for Washington in the early afternoon, the Massachusetts troops endured between
four and thirteen deaths and three dozen wounded men in the melee. The Pennsylvania militia
units never left the President Street Station; they scattered once the mob set in on them and some
escaped by rail back to Pennsylvania. Still, three Pennsylvanians perished, more than twenty
suffered wounds, and about two hundred temporarily went missing. Officials estimated that
twelve civilians died during the fracas and an unknown number sustained injuries. The violence
brought tears to the eyes of one Baltimore Unionist, who lamented that Maryland’s “soil must be
a battle field, a slaughter house, because her people…cannot see Northern troops pass through to
war with their brethern [sic] of the South.”48
The bloodletting in the streets of Baltimore weighed heavily upon Hicks. Brown called
together a public meeting at Monument Square around four o’clock on the afternoon of the riot
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in the hopes of preventing the edgy citizenry from turning on one another. Several prominent
inhabitants of Baltimore addressed the excited crowd, including Mayor Brown, William P.
Preston, and Severn Teackle Wallis. Although he had not expected to speak, Wallis delivered a
short speech in which he advised the people of the city to trust the local authorities. Like several
of the other speakers, Wallis probably agitated rather than soothed the crowd when he expressed
his sympathy for the seceded states and his desire for Maryland to follow them out of the Union.
“He hoped the blood of the citizens, shed by an invading foe,” a reporter summarized, “would
obliterate all past differences, and seal the covenant of brotherhood among the people.” The
crowd demanded to hear from Hicks, who had barricaded himself in a nearby hotel. At the
Monument Square meeting the governor voiced a desire for the preservation of the Union, which
provoked an angry reply from the audience. Shaken, Hicks retreated and stated “I will suffer my
right arm to be torn from my body before I will raise it to strike a sister State.” Brown, worried
about the safety of the governor, invited him to lodge at his house. That night Hicks, disoriented
and confined to a bed, met with Brown and other Baltimore officials and apparently gave his
approval for Maryland militiamen, the Baltimore police, and private citizens to burn all the major
northbound railroad bridges surrounding the city in order to prevent more troops from entering.49
Hicks returned to Annapolis the next morning; two days later he finally relented and
called the legislature into special session.

Disunionists in Maryland certainly felt that the

outburst at Baltimore would provide them with the necessary mandate to push a convention bill
through the general assembly when it met on April 26. They received more good news when on
April 24 a special election in Baltimore resulted in all ten of the city’s seats in the lower house
49
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going to Southern Rights candidates. The special election occurred because the House in 1860
had vacated the ten Baltimore seats on the suspicion of voter fraud. The Southern Rights
candidates ran unopposed in the spur of the moment election, and less than a third of the voters
that participated in the presidential election of 1860 cast ballots on April 24. Nevertheless, the
election represented a victory for Maryland fire-eaters, including Wallis, who after two
previously unsuccessful runs for public office could now boast of a victory.50
A contingent of four Baltimore officials, including George Brown and Wallis, met with
Lincoln, his cabinet, and Winfield Scott on April 21 and begged them to find some other route to
shuffle troops to Washington. The president and his advisors agreed and decided that henceforth
soldiers would take the railroad to the Chesapeake Bay, then board a water transport to
Annapolis, where they could once again travel by rail to the capital. Although a roundabout
course, this new route did prove less provocative to the people of Maryland. That day, General
Benjamin Butler arrived in Annapolis with the Eighth Massachusetts Regiment and proceeded to
Washington without interference from Marylanders. In order to avoid a collision between the
legislature and federal troops, Governor Hicks on April 24 moved the extra session to Frederick,
a town situated in the heavily Unionist western portion of the state.51
The Baltimore riot and its aftermath generated three significant consequences for
Maryland and the Border South. First, and most obvious, it prodded Hicks to summon the
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legislature into session after months of sidestepping the issue. The general assembly, and
especially the Southern Rights contingent from Baltimore, caused no shortage of headaches for
Hicks and other Unionists in the following months. With the legislature finally in session,
moderates and Unionists in Maryland found that they would have to amplify their offensive to
keep the state’s fire-eaters from gaining superiority. More ominously for Maryland fire-eaters,
however, the riot gave the federal government the excuse they needed to station troops in the Old
Line State. Once Butler’s troops landed at Annapolis on April 24, Maryland would not rid itself
of a federal presence for the duration of the war. “Our Pontius Pilate (Gov Hicks) without
washing his hands,” one disunionist observed, “handed our beloved state over to blustering Abe
to be crucified.” Federal troops augmented the strength of Maryland’s unconditional Unionists
and their presence cowed many conditional Unionists, the largest element of the Border South
populace, who may have otherwise converted to the secessionist standard in the aftermath of Fort
Sumter, Lincoln’s proclamation, and the Baltimore riot. Finally, the riot only increased the
ferocity of the northern rage militaire, which reduced the chances for bringing about a truce and
reaching a compromise between the sections. Border South conservatives found few allies in the
once ripe region of northern moderation, the Lower North, in the aftermath of the altercation at
Baltimore. “If Baltimore was laid in ashes the North would rejoice over it and laud the Spirit
that dictated the act,” remarked Andrew H. Reeder, a former Democrat who lived in
Philadelphia. “All hope of help, and almost all hope of neutrality, from the Border States is
given up by our people. The policy of conciliation which a few weeks ago had so many friends,”
Reeder continued, “has now no friends at all.” In due time the moderate impulse that animated
elements of the Lower North returned, but at this crucial interval its momentary disappearance
struck a hard blow for Border South conservatives.52
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Hicks welcomed the legislature to Frederick on April 26 with an address in which he
chronicled his response to the Baltimore riot. Hicks defended his course and noted that he had
met with Lincoln personally and asked that no additional federal troops cross over Maryland soil,
but the president and his advisors replied that they could not comply. The soldiers, Lincoln told
the governor, had come to Washington to protect the national capital, not to place Maryland
under the heel of a military despotism. The governor thus asked the legislature to adopt a policy
of neutrality in the unfolding contest. “We have violated no rights of either section,” and thus “I
cannot counsel Maryland to take sides against the General Government, until it shall commit
outrages upon us which would justify us in resisting its authority,” Hicks declared. The governor
cautioned that if Maryland embraced secession instead of neutrality, the state would become the
seat of the war. He hinted that in that event, Maryland would suffer economic, political, and
social devastation.53
Disunionists in the general assembly failed to heed Hicks’s advice and on the second day
of the session pressed for the creation of a special committee to prepare legislation for the
summoning of a state convention. Unionists and conservatives immediately realized that, just
like their brethren in the Kentucky legislature and the Missouri state convention, they faced a
sturdy opponent. Democrats held a two-seat advantage over Americans in the Senate and a
sixteen-seat edge in the lower house, though party affiliation did not always distinguish fireeaters from moderates.

Democratic senator H.H. Goldsborough, for example, led the

unconditional Unionist forces throughout the session, while American James U. Dennis
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applauded the secession movement and even submitted a resolution intended to accelerate the
process for a state convention in Maryland.54
Party lines underwent a wartime mutation from the antebellum distinctions of Democrats
and Americans or Constitutional Unionists into Union and Southern Rights organizations. The
Union Party had started taking shape prior to the Baltimore riot, but it faced the unenviable task
of overcoming former partisan allegiances and distancing itself from the Republican Party. “The
Union party must sustain not the administration but the government,” William Kimmell
explained. In order to do so, Kimmell called for a nationwide coalition between the followers of
John Crittenden, Stephen Douglas, and Andrew Johnson of Tennessee.

Because so many

Marylanders and border southerners disapproved of Lincoln, the Republicans, and their
adherents in the region such as Cassius Clay and Henry Winter Davis, Kimmell and the leaders
of the movement strove to make distinctions between their movement and the president’s party.
The new organization had to emphasize an opposition to secession rather than the slavery issue,
Union Party organizers believed. He worried that the presence of Winter Davis, who had been
angling for spoils from the Lincoln administration, would complicate matters in Maryland.
Kimmell asked for Douglas to flex his political muscle and get Winter Davis appointed to any
political office outside of Maryland, preferably one in a foreign nation. “Send him somewhere,”
Kimmell quipped, “even if it should be the court of his Satanic Majesty.” Another Union Party
manager acknowledged that fire-eaters in Maryland attempted to smear them as handmaidens of
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the Republicans, “but we firmly hold to the middle national ground we have always held & we
desire to conquer a peace.”55
Maryland Unionists in the general assembly employed an array of tactics to stonewall the
overtures of the disunionists. In the House they swept T. Parkin Scott’s proposal for a state
convention into the committee on federal relations. Although Southern Rights men occupied
five of the seven seats on the committee and outspoken secessionist Severn Teackle Wallis
chaired it, the group as a whole suffered from a divergence of opinion about how best to pull
Maryland out of the Union. Wallis, for all his bluster about secession, insisted that it could only
be accomplished by calling a convention, electing delegates, and allowing that body to render a
decision about the state’s future. Other Southern Rights men feared the result of the lengthy
convention process, especially since federal soldiers had entered the state.

They rejected

Wallis’s constitutional reservations and claimed that the sitting legislature could itself adopt a
secession ordinance. E. Pliny Bryan presented a memorial from 216 voters in Prince George’s
County endorsing the latter course, but five of the seven members of the committee agreed that
the legislature lacked the constitutional authority to carry Maryland out of the Union. The House
concurred in Wallis’s opinion and refused to accept the memorial. The Senate in effect forced
the House to acquiesce in accepting secession only through constitutional means. Two days
prior to Bryan’s introduction of the memorial, the Senate composed an address which assured
Maryland voters that the legislature grasped the fact that it had no authority to pass a secession
55
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ordinance, and the statement cleared both houses of the general assembly by unanimous
consent.56
While Unionists and fire-eaters sparred in the state legislature, a period of relative calm
overcame Baltimore and the rest of Maryland. Just ten days after the riot John Pendleton
Kennedy noted that “the spirit in favor of secession in this State is very much sobered.” He
credited the relaxation of the disunionist impulse to the appearance of three large camps of
federal troops just across the Pennsylvania border. Kennedy estimated that this large gathering
of federal soldiers would pounce on Maryland if the legislature or the people made a bid for
secession. Fire-eaters complained that the presence of the federal troops had intimidated many
of their colleagues who just a week earlier had promised to do everything in their power to help
Maryland join the Confederacy.

An officer in the United States Navy remarked that

Marylanders had begun to realize “that geography has something to do with the policy of the
states.” As long as Maryland lay between the national capital and the free states, the federal
government would use any means necessary to ensure the state stayed in the Union column.
Republican Lyman Trumbull of Illinois recommended that the federal government and Unionists
in Maryland should “meet them [secessionists in Maryland] right square in the face & we shall
soon subdue them…Let the blows fall thick and hard.” In the wake of the riot Maryland
Unionists took heed of Trumbull’s advice.57
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Secessionists in the legislature began to realize the combination of federal might and
Unionist resolve made their dream of leaving the old republic behind all the more difficult. In
early May they made a desperate attempt to gain the upper hand through circumvention. Senator
Coleman Yellott at a May 1 secret session of the legislature introduced what became known as
the Public Safety Bill. Ostensibly intended to safeguard the vulnerable state from northward or
southward invasions, the bill actually sought to cut into Hicks’s executive authority by
establishing a seven person committee of public safety. Yellott envisioned the committee, made
up of six proponents of secession and Hicks, as a leadership council with the power to organize
and arm the state militia, remove and appoint officers above the rank of captain in the militia,
and provide for the defense of the state. Few people failed to see that the legislation would give
the skewed committee the tools to procure Maryland’s eventual secession. Henry Winter Davis
dismissed the bill as a ruse to bring about a “military despotism” in the state and projected that if
the Senate passed the measure, the Unionist home guard in Frederick would “turn the Senate out
of doors by arms.” John Pendleton Kennedy, who valued the Union as dearly as Winter Davis
but rarely agreed with him on policy, in this instance affirmed his Baltimore neighbor’s depiction
of the proposed council. “This is the most open and bold exposure of the machinery of secession
we have yet had,” he confided to his journal. Kennedy predicted it would arouse the Unionists
of Maryland into urgent action and proceeded to organize a public meeting in Baltimore in
opposition to the bill. Even A.S. Abell, the pro-southern editor of the Baltimore Sun whom
many Unionists considered a closet secessionist, claimed that Yellott had overreached. “Whither
it [the legislature] goes the people will follow,” Abell published, “but that people will not follow
under any leadership except that of the Legislature, or of a convention called by that
Legislature.”58
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The Public Safety Bill indeed roused Maryland’s committed Unionists, who flooded both
houses of the legislature with petitions against the measure’s passage. The records of the general
assembly indicate that Unionists presented no fewer than forty-four petitions or memorials in
opposition to the bill in the days following its introduction, another sign of the administrative
capacity of Border South moderates.59

Unionists in the Senate utilized every possible

parliamentary tactic to prevent the Southern Rights men from ramming the legislation through
the upper house. They paralyzed the measure’s momentum by offering a dizzying array of
amendments to the bill, which included replacing the six pro-southern members of the committee
with devout Unionists; officially rebranding the committee a “Military Despotism”; and
subjecting any of the committee’s action to a referendum of the people.

None of the

amendments passed the Senate, but they served their intended purpose of delaying a vote on the
legislation.

Unionists also took the opportunity to filibuster and repeatedly pushed for

adjournment in their campaign for the bill’s derailment. The Unionists claimed victory when on
May 4 the Senate sent the bill back to committee, which one reporter considered “as equivalent
to its defeat, certainly in its present shape, and unless radically modified.”60
By the second week in May the tide had turned in favor of the Unionists in the Maryland
legislature, which many of the advocates of secession found difficult to accept. It surely pained
Severn Teackle Wallis, who on May 9 delivered to the House the report from the committee on
federal relations in regard to the propriety of calling a state convention. The report included
Wallis’s trademark caustic commentary. He labeled Lincoln’s proclamation for troops nothing
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less than a declaration of war and expressed Maryland’s indignation at the federal policy of
coercion.

“Unless the American Revolution was a crime, the declaration of American

Independence a falsehood, and every patriot and hero of 1776 a traitor,” Wallis argued, “the
South was right and the North was wrong.”

The report castigated Thomas Hicks for his

irresolute reply to Lincoln’s proclamation, which its author claimed paled in comparison to the
bold rejoinders of the governors of Kentucky and Missouri. Because of Hicks’s vacillating
course since the Baltimore riot, Wallis complained, Maryland had been trampled over by the
federal government “partly for military convenience, and partly for chastisement…and her name
blotted out, for the time, from the list of free governments.” Wallis sadly confessed that due to
this circumstance “no election, held at such time and with such surroundings, could possibly be
fair or free.” An election for delegates to a state convention, he contended, would not reflect the
will of Maryland’s people as long as the state’s voters witnessed the gleam of federal bayonets at
the ballot box. Therefore, he and the committee recommended that Maryland adopt a policy of
official neutrality and hold off on calling a sovereignty convention at present.61
Maryland fire-eaters viewed Wallis’s lament as nothing more than capitulation to the
Unionists. “I anticipate the very worst, and when I find that I and others who are ready at all
hazards to resist and fight are left in the lurch I will resign and leave the State – go into Virginia
and claim the privilege of shouldering a musket in the cause of Southern rights,” George Hume
Steuart scoffed in response to the legislature’s inaction. The number of Maryland radicals who
followed Steuart southward will never be known, but it seems as if the combination of federal
troops and the redoubled efforts by Unionists convinced many other fire-eaters to abandon what
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they now considered a lost cause in the Old Line State.62 Unconditional Unionists in the House
unsuccessfully attempted to moderate Wallis’s acid tone and on May 10, the resolutions passed
45-12 in the lower chamber. The Senate on May 14 concurred with the House and passed each
of the resolutions by a wide margin before adjourning until June. The short session produced
none of the results that fire-eaters had just three weeks prior considered within reach. Without a
sovereignty convention, a board of Public Safety, or even legislation to arm the state militia,
Maryland radicals returned home in mid-May empty-handed. “Maryland has succumbed to
Lincoln, and degraded herself,” a distressed diarist grumbled.63
Unfolding events dealt added blows to the secession movement in Maryland. On May
13, the night before the legislature adjourned, Benjamin Butler led his troops into Baltimore and
occupied Federal Hill. The following day Butler arrested Ross Winans, a Southern Rights
member of the legislature who had just returned from Frederick, charged him with treason, and
imprisoned him at Fort McHenry. Because Lincoln had in the aftermath of the Baltimore riot
suspended the writ of habeas corpus along the rail corridor from Philadelphia to Washington,
Winans had no means for legal recourse. Butler’s action set a precedent that alarmed Maryland
fire-eaters, who faced the possibility of imprisonment for flying secessionist flags, sporting the
blue cockade, or speaking out against the policy of the federal government. On the heels of
Winans’s arrest and emboldened by the legislature’s adjournment, Hicks finally called for four
regiments to meet the terms of Lincoln’s April 15 proclamation. Secretary of War Simon
Cameron actually refused the governor’s call because the federal government now desired
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enlistments for three years rather than three months, as Hicks stipulated in his message.
Nonetheless, Hicks had officially abandoned the project of neutrality and decidedly cast his lot
with the federal government. Despite Cameron’s negation, recruiting for the Union army began
in earnest. One Union soldier who marched through Maryland in May 1861 remarked that he
saw few American flags in the state, a sign that many of the state’s inhabitants still harbored
neutral sentiments. Many northerners and unconditional Unionists applauded the governor’s
actions, while secessionists lambasted him. “It is said that Nero fiddled while Rome was burning
and it appears to me that you have been fiddling as far as the welfare & safety of your State is
concerned,” an upset Marylander protested. The angry writer wondered how Hicks could allow
the “beautiful city of monuments [to be] gagged by Lynn shoemakers.”64
In Delaware, Unionists also intensified their efforts to ensure that the proponents of
secession did not gain leverage in the state. Rumors that secessionists planned to overrun the Du
Pont powder works in Wilmington, along with reports of the mobilization of disunionist militia
groups in Kent and Sussex counties, prodded Unionists to action.65 Although Governor Burton
still refused to offer troops to Lincoln based on his technical reading of the state constitution, on
May 11 he issued a pair of general orders that made Henry Du Pont major general of the armed
forces in Delaware and gave him the discretion to distribute arms and munitions to the volunteer
units as he saw fit. Henry Du Pont tried to strengthen the governor’s general orders by requiring
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all members of the volunteer companies to take an oath of allegiance to the United States before
receiving arms and munitions. Du Pont agreed with an unconditional Unionist in Clayton,
Delaware, who remarked, “I look upon a conditional Union man as a rebellious character equal
to the secessionist[s] of S Carolina.” Du Pont and his colleagues wished to place arms only in
the hands of firmly committed Unionists. Upon hearing of Du Pont’s oath requirement and the
general’s intention to disarm any companies that refused to take the oath retroactively, Burton
rescinded General Orders No. 2. The governor claimed Du Pont lacked the legal authority to
require the oath of Delaware volunteers, which he felt “would indicate a distrust of their loyalty
and reflect upon them as good citizens.”66
Although unconditional Unionists complained of Burton’s hedging stance, the governor
did not interfere with the organization of troops who wished to volunteer their services to the old
republic. The First Delaware Volunteer Infantry in May 1861 enlisted in the federal cause
without any meddling from Burton. The governor loathed Lincoln and the Republicans, but he
and most Delawareans appeared to value the Union to a greater degree than many border
southerners.

“Although Mr. Lincoln is not our choice for President,” a member of the

Brandywine Home Guards professed, “still he is our President & must be sustained.” Unionist
John P. Gillis reminded his sons that “we are all now Unionists or Secessionists…Let selfish
politicians and fanaticism be all tied up in bags, like the Kilkenny cats.” Secessionist activity
still occurred in Delaware, but by the end of May the Unionist offensive overseen by Henry Du
Pont had left little doubt that as long as Maryland stayed in the Union, so would Delaware. “We
have some bloody secessionists in this State, but they are pretty well muffled,” Henry Du Pont
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noted. By the summer of 1861, Delaware had all but abandoned neutrality in favor of the
Union.67
James A. Bayard discovered first hand that many of the residents of Wilmington had
thrown their lot in with the Union. Thomas F. Bayard kept his father informed of Wilmington’s
reaction to the opening of the war as he made his way back to his Delaware home from his
vacation in the Deep South. Thomas pronounced that his heart was “full of abhorrence for the
Northern sentiment” that he witnessed in Wilmington during the spring. He held his community
in contempt because so many residents seemed reluctant to aid the cause of the Confederacy. In
light of these displays Thomas, concerned for his father’s safety, advised him to take an alternate
route to their home and even instructed him to carry a revolver. Upon his arrival in Wilmington
on May 4, Bayard faced accusations that he had conspired to pull the state out of the Union while
in the Deep South. He denied these reports, noting that he had scheduled the vacation a year in
advance. Three days after his return home, Bayard made a brief foray to nearby Philadelphia.
Hardline Unionists in Wilmington telegraphed ahead to Philadelphia that the senator would
arrive in the city by rail. By the time he reached his destination, a mob of at least two hundred
people had assembled to give Bayard a less than warm welcome to the City of Brotherly Love.
The city police detained Bayard for his own safety, took him to the mayor’s office, and helped
him secure passage back to Delaware. A conservative Philadelphian grieved that conditions had
devolved to the point where an angry mob thirsted for Bayard’s blood simply because he had
advocated recognizing the independence of the Confederacy. Upon his return Bayard offered to
resign from the Senate if the citizens of Delaware did not agree with his stance on peaceable
separation. He remained in office at the behest of his friends, though he removed most of his
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family to Dorchester County, Maryland, in the aftermath of the incident.

His experience

revealed that the rage militaire of the North had by the late spring infected some inhabitants of
the northernmost portion of Delaware.68
While Bayard encountered the strident Unionism of a portion of his constituents,
legislators in Kentucky prepared in early May to return to Frankfort for the opening of the
special session of the general assembly. The Kentucky legislators watched with great interest as
the state’s voters went to the polls on May 4 to choose their delegates to the border states
conference. Circumstances had left Kentuckians with few options on their ballots. In response
to the onset of war, the entire slate of Southern Rights men removed their names from
consideration in the contest. James Brown Clay, a Southern Rights candidate and the son of
Henry Clay, explained that he had withdrawn because the clash at Fort Sumter, the secession of
Virginia, and the Baltimore riot had convinced him that few, if any, states would now send
delegates to the meeting. Blanton Duncan, who had been angling for Kentucky’s secession,
considered a peaceful settlement ludicrous and rejoiced that the Southern Rights men would not
take part in the election. “All this [talk of a compromise at the border states convention] is damn
nonsense & child play,” Duncan howled, “for there is no Earthly chance of restoring the Union
& Kentucky is compelled to take position with the seceded states.” Another advocate of the
Border South’s secession disparaged the thought that any good could come from the convention.
He scoffed that the delegates, by holding out the false hope of a peaceful compromise, would
only chain “the border States as a tail to the Northern Confederacy, and thus abolitionize them
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all.”

With no Southern Rights candidates in the field, Unionists swept the May 4 election in

Kentucky.69
Approximately three-quarters of the Kentucky voters who cast ballots in the November
1860 presidential election participated in the May elections, which indicated a fairly strong
turnout.70

The popularity of John J. Crittenden, who headed the Union ticket, aided the

Unionists, along with the fact that some secessionists had already begun a southward exodus
from the Bluegrass State. In late April, Blanton Duncan and John Hunt Morgan recruited young
men, marched them out of Kentucky, and offered their services to the Confederacy. Other
proponents of secession, frustrated by the idleness of their Kentucky neighbors, began making
their way for the Confederacy after Fort Sumter and Lincoln’s proclamation.71 The May vote,
however, does not indicate an outright endorsement of unconditional Unionism in Kentucky.
Even Crittenden expected his native state to adopt a neutral stance, as did many other
Kentuckians who voted the Unionist ticket. “Kenty is averse to this Civil War,” Crittenden told
his son. “And it is now, & I trust will continue, to be her determination to keep out of the strife.”
“He is holding the State of Ky with steady hand as a good rider does an unbroken colt,” one
Unionist remarked in response to Crittenden’s campaign on behalf of neutrality. A Kentuckian
from Spring Hill who voted for the Unionists described his decision more bluntly: “If we can’t
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go with the South let us quit the North & not be like a free negro at a Barbecue unable to speak
till they have all left.”72
The legislature met in Frankfort just days after the border state convention election, and
its actions revealed that many Kentuckians espoused an outlook similar to an inhabitant of
Henderson, who proclaimed “my sympathies are for neither of the extremes North or South…I
want our rights, all that our great patriot Crittenden claims for us.” In his message to the general
assembly Magoffin acknowledged that the idea of secession “is now receiving the thoughtful
attention of the people and authorities” of Delaware, Maryland, and Missouri, and thus he
advised the passage of legislation which would allow for a referendum on a state convention.
Furthermore, he asked the general assembly to adopt measures to place Kentucky in a position of
armed neutrality for the present. Magoffin portrayed himself as absolutely neutral in thought and
deed, but in reality his initial discomfiture about the crisis had given way to anticipation that his
state would eventually cast its lot with the Confederacy. Confederate general Gideon J. Pillow
met with Magoffin in late April and the governor conveyed to him that because of its proximity
to the Lower North, Kentucky must adopt a stance of neutrality to buy time and possibly effect
the state’s secession at a later date. “I condemn and utterly abhor his neutral policy, or rather his
alliance with Lincoln,” Pillow reported, “but yet I am satisfied that he will ultimately break the
shackles with which he is now manacled.”73
Those shackles proved most difficult for Magoffin to unchain. Petitions for armed
neutrality flooded the legislature, but most of them indicated an ardent desire to adopt such a
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stance in order to beget peace between the warring sections rather than as a means to effect
Kentucky’s eventual secession. A petition from 242 Bracken County women, for instance,
beseeched the legislature to remember the Unionism of Henry Clay, assume a stance of
neutrality, and act as a mediator to bring about a settlement. “Guard us from the direful calamity
of Civil War,” the women continued, “by allowing Kentucky to maintain inviolate her ‘armed
neutrality.’” No fewer than sixty-four similar petitions or memorials reached the legislature
during the brief session, another indicator of the mobilization of Unionists throughout the state.74
Unionists in the legislature vowed to prevent the Southern Rights contingent from
gaining an edge on them at the session. Suspicious of Magoffin’s loyalty, they requested that the
governor provide the general assembly with any documents about his efforts to obtain arms for
the state in the previous month. Magoffin responded carefully that he had not been in official
communication with any agent of the Confederate government other than Secretary of War
Leroy Pope Walker, whose overture for a regiment from Kentucky he had spurned.

The

governor’s response was deceptive, but not wholly dishonest. He qualified that he had engaged
in no “official” communications, which meant he considered his meeting with Pillow a casual
affair. He also provided information about his efforts to procure arms and munitions in New
Orleans. Unconditional Unionists in the Senate attempted to create a three-man committee to
investigate the governor’s relationship with Walker, but the Southern Rights men blocked the
initiative.75
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During the May session the Southern Rights legislators again ineffectively devoted much
of their energy to securing passage of legislation to summon a state convention. Aware that their
opponents now considered armed neutrality akin to a declaration of the state’s Unionism, the
Southern Rights men worked to prevent either house from issuing a proclamation of neutrality.
Once again, they failed: on May 16 the House adopted by a tally of 69-26 a resolution which
called for Kentucky to occupy a position of neutrality and to involve itself in the conflict only as
a mediator between the sections. The House agreed to a second resolution that approved of
Magoffin’s response to Lincoln’s request for troops by the wide margin of 89-4, but the Southern
Rights men had foundered in their effort to convert conditional Unionists to their line of
reasoning. John Crittenden explained to Winfield Scott that the adoption of the two resolutions
did not indicate Kentucky’s defiance of the Union, but rather a means “to preserve, substantially
and ultimately, our connection with the Union.” In response, Magoffin issued an executive
neutrality proclamation four days after the House passed its resolutions. The Southern Rights
men in the Senate held out until the final day of the session, when the upper chamber passed a set
of resolutions in concurrence with the policy adopted by the House and the governor.76
Unionists in the legislature took additional steps to give neutrality teeth and ensure that
neither Magoffin nor any other state officials could bend the policy in the direction of secession.
For some time Unionists had expressed concerns that the officer corps of the State Guard
included an overwhelming majority of disunionists.

William Nelson, a naval lieutenant,

unconditional Unionist, and liaison for the Lincoln administration, had in April begun to raise
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Unionist militias throughout the state to offset the State Guard.77 The general assembly passed a
bill that created a five-man military board and vested it with the power to borrow funds for
arming the state, to purchase munitions and accoutrements, and granted it control over the state’s
military preparation. Magoffin sat on the board, but the remaining members gave absolute
fidelity to the Union. To ensure passage, the bill left the State Guard intact, but also established
the Unionist Home Guard, and required both militias to swear an oath of allegiance to the United
States Constitution. With their work done, the Unionists on May 24 procured the general
assembly’s adjournment. “Thus has ended the weakest, and most worthless Legislature ever
called together in Frankfort,” a pro-secession reporter fumed.78
Unionists in the Kentucky legislature had accomplished what secessionists had attempted
in the Maryland legislature – they stripped the governor of his sole constitutional authority over
the state militia – in order to achieve the contradictory objective of keeping the state safe for the
Union. They ignored their constitutional scruples and even violated the neutrality proclamation
when in late spring they began funneling arms and money from the federal government to
Unionists throughout the state. “If we dont have [the guns],” Joshua Speed informed Lincoln,
“we will in all probability have to run the gauntlet for our lives.” Afraid to risk losing Kentucky
to the Confederacy, federal authorities gave their blessing to the distribution program, but
cautiously cloaked their involvement.

William Nelson managed the delivery of what

Kentuckians dubbed “Lincoln guns” to the state’s Unionists. Together these efforts ensured that
many conditional Unionists would not slip into the ranks of the secessionists.79
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Deteriorating conditions in Missouri probably contributed to Lincoln’s resolve to keep
Kentucky in the Union column at all costs. Prior to calling the legislature into special session,
Governor Claiborne Fox Jackson and General Daniel M. Frost, a leader in the state militia, made
preparations to attack the United States arsenal at St. Louis, rid Missouri of the federal presence,
and open the way for the state’s unimpeded route to secession. To carry out his plan for
Missouri’s secession, the governor realized that he must adequately arm and equip the state
militia, who would no doubt feel the power of federal retaliation. Jackson reached out to
Confederate president Jefferson Davis, who agreed with the governor “as to the great importance
of capturing the arsenal and securing its supplies.” Davis sent cannon to Jackson, who also
ordered the state militia to begin drilling. Frost established an encampment for the state militia
units under his command on the western edge of St. Louis and named the militia base Camp
Jackson to honor the governor whom he trusted would deliver Missouri from the clutches of the
federal government.80
Missouri Unionists suspected that in the aftermath of Fort Sumter and the Baltimore riot,
the governor and his pro-secession colleagues might try to push the state out of the Union. A
Jefferson City Unionist assured his associates in St. Louis that “the Old Fox will be well watched
here. His movements are carefully guarded and will be hard of detection, but we may catch him
yet.” In St. Louis, Frank Blair and Nathaniel Lyon made preparations for an expected attack on
the arsenal, which to Missouri secessionists had assumed comparable symbolic value to Fort
Sumter in Charleston Harbor. Blair would not let the Unionists of St. Louis suffer at the hands
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of a fire-eating mob as had occurred in Baltimore. He told his brother Montgomery that he
would not condone “shilly-shally childsplay with these infamous scoundrels.” “There is but one
policy now to preserve either your honor or safety,” Blair thundered, “and that is vigor, vigor,
vigor.” With General William S. Harney, the federal commander of the Department of the West,
away in Washington to give the president and his advisors a report on affairs in Missouri, Lyon
organized four regiments of volunteers and Blair distributed weapons to the Home Guard.
Unionist forces occupied the high ground near the arsenal, and Lyon posted pickets at several
points surrounding the federal building. The two unflappable Unionist leaders worked with
Illinois governor Richard Yates to ship all the extra arms and munitions housed in the arsenal
across the Mississippi River for safekeeping in the Prairie State.81
By the time the legislature assembled at Jefferson City on May 2, St. Louis had become a
volcano on the verge of explosion. Jackson asked the legislature to adopt a policy of armed
neutrality, yet his actions in the three weeks after Fort Sumter clearly indicated that he wished to
use the policy as a means to steer the state toward the Confederacy. The Missouri governor
shared none of the reticence that the other Border South executives seemed to possess in
multitudes. Unionists in the general assembly, however, remained resolute and stymied the
initial efforts of Jackson’s pawns to pass a bill placing the state on a war footing and granting the
executive expansive military authority. Although the general assembly met in secret session,
few doubted the topic of discussion in the statehouse.

“By a good many of the reckless

politicians, a collision at St. Louis would be hailed as a God-send,” a St. Louis newspaper
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gleaned from its sources privy to the clandestine assembly of legislators. 82 In far off Washington
D.C., Edward Bates realized the apparent likelihood of another Border South clash in his native
city. The attorney general implored the St. Louis Unionists to avoid a collision at all costs
because it would result in disastrous consequences for the state’s citizenry, especially
slaveholders. The onset of war on Missouri soil would yield “a general stampede of the negroes,
both to the north & to the south, & the state will be practically abolitionised in less than 100
days.”83
In the heated atmosphere of St. Louis, however, few participants thought about the longterm consequences of war. Lyon and Blair received word that the pro-secession men had
procured arms from the Confederacy and decided they could wait no longer. Lyon on May 10
marched two companies of United States regulars and a couple of Union volunteer regiments
into Camp Jackson and overwhelmed the meager state militia unit posted in western St. Louis.
Realizing that the federal forces far outnumbered his own, Frost in mid-afternoon surrendered to
Lyon without a fight. Thus far, both sides had averted open violence. Once Lyon began
marching his prisoners back through the streets of St. Louis, however, the seething tensions
between the city’s Unionists and secessionists detonated. A gathering mob howled at the federal
troops who escorted the column of prisoners through the city, reserving their greatest scorn for
soldiers of German extraction and the pugnacious Lyon. The scene quickly devolved into a
reprise of the Baltimore spectacle: the crowd’s verbal missiles gave way to gunfire and a riot
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soon erupted. In a spree of violence that lasted three days, twenty-eight civilians, two federal
soldiers, and three state militiamen lost their lives.84
As in Maryland, the St. Louis riot produced doleful consequences for the state’s
secessionists. Upon receiving news of Lyon’s foray, the legislature swiftly passed the militia bill
and other military measures that Jackson craved. The governor mobilized the state militia, took
control of Missouri’s railroads and telegraph network, and exploited the many contacts he had
made as state banking commissioner in the 1850s to solicit funds for arming the state troops.85
Many Missourians condemned Lyon’s rash actions, but Jackson could not capitalize on the
indignation of the populace. The tense atmosphere across the state abated somewhat when on
May 21 the recently returned General Harney met with Sterling Price, the president of the
adjourned state convention and newly appointed commanding general of the Missouri State
Guard, and the two mutually agreed to respect the state’s neutral position. Unionists, distrustful
of Jackson and Price, complained that secessionists throughout the state had ignored the accord
and continued to commit acts of aggression. Partly due to the machinations of Lyon and Blair
but mainly because he feared that Missouri might slip into the hands of the Confederacy, Lincoln
arranged for Harney’s removal and replaced him with Lyon.86
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Lyon’s elevation to command turned the tide in favor of the Missouri Unionists. In
Lyon, the unconditional Unionists found a man who shared their steadfast devotion to the flag.
He believed two classes of Missourians existed – Unionists and traitors – and would use all the
force at his disposal to guarantee that the state remained true. Alexander Doniphan observed that
Lyon preferred “eating the lamb to lying down with it.” Conservatives, desperately clinging to
the rapidly vanishing policy of neutrality, in early June arranged a meeting between the heads of
Missouri’s pro-secession and unconditional Unionist factions in the hopes of preserving peace in
the state. Claiborne Jackson and Sterling Price met with Lyon and Frank Blair at the Planters’
House in St. Louis on June 11 and soon discovered that Doniphan had not missed the mark in his
depiction of the new commander. After hours of unfruitful discussion Lyon coolly pointed to
each of his guests and remarked that he would rather see they “and every man, woman, and child
in the State dead and buried” than to concede to state officials “the right to dictate to my
Government in any matter however unimportant.” Lyon turned to the governor and proclaimed,
“This means war.” Jackson and Price stood in stunned amazement as Lyon whirled around and
exited the room.87
Lyon’s bold declaration ended all hopes for neutrality in Missouri. As in Baltimore, the
riot in St. Louis had given the federal government the pretext it needed to justify occupying
Missouri. The federal commander made plans to march on Jefferson City, but before Lyon’s
troops arrived Jackson and the state government fled toward the southwest corner of the state.
Two men with a penchant for rash action, Jackson and Lyon, proved utterly incapable of sharing
control of Missouri. Lyon’s triumph over Jackson equaled a major victory for the Unionist cause
in the state; the duly elected governor of Missouri spent the rest of the war on the run from
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federal forces. Even prior to Lyon’s challenge, the increased presence of federal troops had
taken effect in St. Louis and the eastern portion of the state. “The Camp Jackson affair and other
events following it have operated like a poultice,” James Broadhead noticed. “The inflammation
has been drawn out of a great number of men who were heretofore rampant secessionists.”
George Caleb Bingham agreed, comparing the state’s fire-eaters to once ferocious tigers who had
been caged in by the federal troops and now “become the sport of boys who will poke them in
the ribs and make merry over their insane antics.” Many dark days of internecine violence and
long periods of uncertainty about the state’s future lay ahead, but Lyon’s late spring stand dealt
Missouri’s secessionists an enormous setback.88
The collective shock of Fort Sumter, Baltimore, and St. Louis, seriously undercut the
movement for a peaceful settlement between the Union and the Confederacy and a compromise
to bring the seceded states back into the Union. By the end of May only Kentucky adhered to an
official stance of neutrality, but even there both the Union and Southern Rights organizations
either violated or found ways to circumvent the policy. For John Crittenden and the leaders of
the border state convention, this proved most inauspicious. The conference on May 27 convened
in the Kentucky Court of Appeals building in Frankfort, but few observers attended the
proceedings. A sign of the withering belief in compromise, Delaware and Maryland did not even
send delegates to the summit. Four Missourians joined the Kentucky representatives and a single
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delegate from Tennessee over the course of the weeklong meeting. “The members themselves
look as though they have despaired of doing anything,” a reporter mockingly commented. 89
Crittenden presided over the meeting and soon after it convened he appointed a
committee to look into possible compromise measures that would “secure the slave States, and
the citizens thereof, the enjoyment of their just and equal rights in the Union and under the
Constitution.” William A. Hall of Missouri chaired the committee, which reported the following
day that the Crittenden Compromise represented the best means of ameliorating the political
differences caused by the slavery issue. The convention formed another committee that included
Hall and fellow Missourian Hamilton Gamble, along with James Guthrie, Joshua Bell, Archibald
Dixon, Charles Wickliffe, and George Dunlap of Kentucky, and charged it with the task of
composing an address to the people of the United States. The committee closeted for the next
several days to prepare the message.90
The convention unveiled its address on Monday, June 3, just prior to its adjournment.
The message represented a treatise of the conservative Unionist Border South mindset and the
importance of slavery to the region. The delegates aimed their missive at the conditional
Unionists of the South and asserted the need for constitutional amendments that would “secure to
slaveholders their legal rights, and allay their apprehensions in regard to possible encroachments
in the future.” They estimated that the passage of the Crittenden Resolutions would go far to
quell the anxieties of southern Unionists, and they recommended their introduction at the session
of Congress scheduled to meet on Independence Day. If Congress once again operated in a
dilatory manner, the delegates urged the summoning of a national convention to vote on the
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amendments. These conservatives hoped that the passage of the Crittenden plan would not only
allay Unionists in the Border South, but would draw the seceded states back into the Union.
Finally, the delegates warned of the urgent need to adopt the resolutions in order to avoid war.
“The kind feelings that once existed have been changed to bitterness, soon to degenerate, it may
be, into deadly animosity,” the moderates somberly predicted.

The four Missourians in

attendance, Tennessee’s John Caldwell, and all but one of the Kentuckians signed the address.
Only Charles S. Morehead, who condoned neutrality and Governor Beriah Magoffin’s resistance
to provide troops to the federal government, withheld from signing the document. In a separate
address to the people of Kentucky, the Bluegrass State representatives vowed to attend Congress
and fight to safeguard the institution of slavery.91
Few people in the North or the seceded states of the South paid much attention to the
proceedings of the border state convention. One reporter groaned that the delegates “have eaten
fine dinners, smoked fine cigars, and fared otherwise sumptuously,” but accomplished nothing of
substance during their week in Frankfort.92 The meeting, however, did help to sustain the
Unionist offensive in the Border South. Crittenden and his colleagues made it perfectly clear
that despite the foreboding signs pointing toward war, they intended to keep up the fight for
compromise and peace. Moreover, they declared once again that the preservation of slavery
unquestionably required adherence to the Union. Scores of Border South moderates, including
Reverdy Johnson, John Pendleton Kennedy, Joseph Holt, and Hamilton Gamble, followed suit
and took to the stump or picked up their pens to emphasize the key correlation between
adherence to the Union and the maintenance of the peculiar institution. Kentuckian Garrett
Davis met with Lincoln in late April and received the president’s guarantee that he “would make
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no attack, direct or indirect, upon the institutions or property of any State.” Unionist newspapers
circulated Davis’s report of the meeting in an effort to assuage concerns about Lincoln’s
intentions. Upon returning to Missouri John B. Henderson, one of Missouri’s representatives at
Frankfort, advised his Unionist friends in St. Louis to issue a proclamation that echoed the
border state conference message and Davis’s conversation with Lincoln. “Be sure that you
pledge…that there is no desire by the Government to interfere with slave property,” Henderson
counseled. “If this be done and promptly done,” he continued, “the victory is won and Missouri
is safe.”93
The message of the conservative Unionists certainly registered with the voters of
Kentucky and Maryland. The executives of each state had to push their congressional elections,
usually held in August in Kentucky and November in Maryland, up to June in order to have
representation in the special session of the Thirty-seventh that Lincoln had called to meet on
Independence Day. The early meeting date did not affect either Delaware or Missouri, where
congressional elections had taken place in 1860. At the Union Party’s state convention in
Maryland, the executive committee issued a set of resolutions that maintained the state’s
commitment to the Union and called for the Border South states to take the lead in mediating an
end to the contest. Moreover, one resolution promised that “The Union men will oppose to the
utmost of their ability all attempts of the federal executive to commingle in any manner its
particular views on the slavery question.”94
When Marylanders went to the polls on June 13, they delivered the Union Party a
resounding victory. Unionists defeated Southern Rights contenders in five of Maryland’s six
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congressional districts and only in the third and sixth district did the Southern Rights candidates
come anywhere close to beating their opponents. The race in Maryland’s fourth district, which
encompassed Baltimore, pitted two Unionists against one another. Henry May defeated Henry
Winter Davis by a wide margin in this race, another indication that border southerners harbored
reservations about politicians who allied themselves with the Republicans. Davis carped that “a
combination of the secessionists with the mamby pambies of the peace party” had engineered his
defeat, but upon an investigation of the overall results in the state he proclaimed: “That ends
secession in Md. The State is ours in the fall.”95
Kentucky Unionists enjoyed similar success in their congressional elections, which took
place a week after the Maryland contest. Unionists routed the Southern Rights ticket in nine out
of Kentucky’s ten congressional districts. Except for the state’s first district, where incumbent
Henry C. Burnett defeated Unionist Lawrence S. Trimble by a wide margin, the Union Party
trounced its competition.

The closest race occurred in the eighth district, where John J.

Crittenden overpowered incumbent William E. Simms, who captured only forty percent of the
vote.

A pleased Nathaniel Paschall treated the Unionist victory, specifically Crittenden’s

triumph, as a sign of the dominance of conservative Unionism in the Border South. “Mr.
Crittenden draws, as we all draw, a distinction between Republicanism and the Government of
the United States,” Paschall observed. “We are for the Government, not the Administration – for
the Constitution, not the Chicago platform.”96
Tables 26 and 27 below provide the results of the June 1861 congressional elections in
the Border South. In addition, data has been culled from the federal census of 1860 to compute
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the percentage of slaves in relationship to the overall population of each congressional district.
Henry C. Burnett, the only victor from the Southern Rights Party, won Kentucky’s first district,
in which slaves comprised 18.8 percent of the overall population. Four other congressional
districts in the Bluegrass State had denser slave populations than Burnett’s, and in each one the
Union Party candidate captured no less than 59.4 percent of the vote. The results suggest that for
the most part, Kentuckians viewed the Union Party as the best vehicle to preserve the peculiar
institution. The Maryland results reveal a closer contest in the state’s district with the densest
slave population; Charles B. Calvert narrowly edged Benjamin G. Harris in Maryland’s sixth
congressional district, which was bounded by the Chesapeake Bay to the east, Virginia to the
south, and Baltimore to the north. Nonetheless, the Maryland results demonstrate that the state’s
inhabitants believed the Union Party represented the preeminent guardian of slavery.
Table 26 - Results of the June 13, 1861 Maryland Congressional Election
Congressional
% of Total Population
Candidates
% of Vote
District
Enslaved
First

19.0%

Second

6.6%

Third

2.0%

Fourth

1.0%

Fifth

5.0%

Sixth

40.4%

John W. Crisfield (U)

57.4%

Daniel McHenry (SR)

42.6%

Edwin H. Webster (U)

98.6%

Others

1.4%

Cornelius L. Leary (U)

52.0%

William P. Preston (SR)

48.1%

Henry May (U)

57.6%

Henry Winter Davis (U)

42.5%

Francis Thomas (U)

96.2%

Others

3.8%

Charles B. Calvert (U)

50.9%

Benjamin G. Harris (SR)

49.1%

Sources: Dubin, US Congressional Elections , 189; Parsons, Beach, & Dubin, US Congressional Districts and Data , 64;
US Census of 1860, University of Virginia Historical Census Browser.
Note: T he data for the second, third, and fourth districts is slightly skewed. District 2 included a portion of Baltimore
County; District 3 included a portion of Baltimore County and wards 1-8 of Baltimore; District 4 included wards 9-20
of Baltimore. Because this data is not readily available in the US Census, I simply included the raw data provided.
T herefore, my calculations for District 2 include all of Baltimore County; for District 3 I included all of Baltimore
County & Baltimore city; & for District 4 I included all of Baltimore city.
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Table 27 - Results of the June 20, 1861 Kentucky Congressional Election
Congressional
% of Total Population
Candidates
% of Vote
District
Enslaved
First

18.8%

Second

24.0%

Third

25.6%

Fourth

17.4%

Fifth

24.2%

Sixth

11.4%

Seventh

18.1%

Eighth

36.7%

Ninth

16.0%

Tenth

7.3%

Henry C. Burnett (SR)

59.1%

Lawrence S. Trimble (U)

40.9%

James S. Jackson (U)

73.4%

John T. Bunch (SR)

26.6%

Henry Grider (U)

77.0%

Joseph H. Lewis (SR)

23.1%

Aaron Harding (U)

80.7%

Albert G. Talbot (SR)

19.3%

Charles A. Wickliffe (U)

75.1%

H.E. Read (SR)

24.9%

George W. Dunlap (U)

97.3%

Others

3.7%

Robert Mallory (U)

79.4%

Horatio W. Bruce (SR)

20.6%

John J. Crittenden (U)

59.2%

William E. Simms (SR)

40.8%

William H. Wadsworth (U)

75.9%

John L. Williams (SR)

24.1%

John W. Menzies (U)

65.2%

Others

34.8%

Sources: Dubin, US Congressional Elections, 189; Parsons, Beach, & Dubin, United States Congressional Districts and
Data , 60; US Census of 1860, University of Virgina Historical Census Browser.

Most conservatives in the Border South expected Crittenden once again to lead the
conciliatory forces when he reached Washington in mid-summer. J.B. Underwood, a Union
Party candidate for a seat in the Kentucky legislature, advised Crittenden to introduce a
resolution that declared the people of the North had enlisted in a war to preserve the Union, not
to destroy slavery.

Underwood believed that such an affirmation, especially if carried by

northern votes in the House, would soothe the concerns of border southerners and resuscitate the
antebellum intersectional accord that proved vital to Border South moderates. 97

Several

obstacles made Crittenden’s task extremely difficult. With the blood of federal troops shed in
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the streets of Baltimore and St. Louis, few northerners came to Washington with a magnanimous
attitude toward any southern state, even those that had thus far remained loyal to the federal
government. A Republican editor blasted the notion of Crittenden bringing about a ceasefire and
a compromise settlement at this point. “But as long as [Kentucky] tries to impose terms upon the
Government to advance her own slavery interest, or fancied interest, she will be regarded as
seeking to secure the profits of rebellion without incurring its dangers,” the editor railed.
Thomas Ewing of Ohio took stock of the northern mindset and advised his friend to hold back
introducing any compromise settlement in the special session of Congress. “The conservative
men who rallied around you last winter would consider this an unpropitious moment,” Ewing
acknowledged. Moreover, the Kentuckian had lost his most influential northern ally, Stephen
Douglas, who unexpectedly fell ill in May and died on June 3 at the age of forty-eight. An Ohio
Democrat claimed that southern Unionists “heard of his demise as the death knell of their loyal
hope.” “I know of no man who might have been more useful in this fearful crisis,” Crittenden
solemnly observed on the floor of the House after his return to Washington.98
The president’s Independence Day message to Congress indicated that Lincoln and the
Republicans planned to prosecute the war to the fullest extent possible. He asked Congress to
appropriate $400 million in order to equip, arm, and train an army of 400,000 men; Republicans
managed to pass legislation that granted even more money and men than the president had
requested. A few border southerners with an appetite for disunion, among them Henry C.
Burnett, James Bayard, and John C. Breckinridge, used the session to grandstand against
Lincoln, the Republicans, and the war, which further complicated Crittenden’s task. Burnett
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often sparred with northern congressmen and defiantly refused to vote for any war measures,
which led several colleagues to question his loyalty. Bayard attacked the president’s suspension
of the writ of habeas corpus, compared Lincoln to Louis XIV, and forcefully divulged his
preference for a peaceable separation between the United States and the Confederacy. In an
impassioned speech before the Senate, Breckinridge accused the Republicans of ignoring the
boundaries of the Constitution and implementing a plan of emancipation under the guise of
wartime confiscation. The onset of the war provided radicals in both the North and the South
with a pulpit from which to preach their incongruous sermons. In this frenzied environment,
obstreperous shouts of zealotry often muffled the voice of moderation.99
In spite of an erosion of the vital center, Crittenden pressed forward. The tenor of
Congress and Ewing’s warning convinced the Kentuckian most northerners were absolutely
committed to crushing the rebellion. Without the assistance of congressional delegations from
the Upper South and with overwhelming Republican majorities in both houses of Congress, the
Crittenden Compromise faced an even more ominous chance of passage than it had at the
previous session. Therefore, rather than expose his compromise proposals to almost certain
defeat, he instead sought to clarify the aims of the federal government in the burgeoning war.
Crittenden most likely shifted direction because he knew that if Congress again spurned his
settlement package, even more conditional Unionists in the Border South might join the
secession movement. One observer derisively remarked in mid-July that in spite of the recent
Unionist victories in the Border South, the region still contained massive quantities of “mewling
conditional creatures” whose allegiance hung in the balance.100
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Crittenden on July 19 presented a resolution similar to the one that J.B. Underwood had
suggested earlier in the month. The resolution affirmed that secessionists in the Lower South
had brought about the war and plainly declared the preservation of the Union the sole objective
in the contest. “This war is not waged upon our part in any spirit of oppression, nor for any
purpose of conquest or subjugation, nor purpose of overthrowing or interfering with the rights or
established institutions of those States: but to defend and maintain the supremacy of the
Constitution and to preserve the Union with all the dignity, equality, and rights of the several
States unimpaired,” Crittenden’s resolution stated. A few hardline Republicans tried in vain to
table the resolution, but Crittenden’s fellow Kentuckian Burnett succeeded in having it divided
between the portion which laid the blame for the war at the feet of the seceded states and the
remainder, which specified the preservation of the Union as the design of the war.

The

accusatory clause passed the House by a count of 121-2, with only Burnett and Missouri’s John
William Reid voting in the negative. The House approved the second provision 117-2, with the
dissenting votes coming from two Republicans. The Senate on July 24 approved of Crittenden’s
resolution by the tally of 30-5; the four senators from Kentucky and Missouri joined Republican
Lyman Trumbull in opposition to the measure. The Kentucky and Missouri senators voted
against the resolution because they felt it unjustly assigned responsibility for the start of the war
on the Confederates. Crittenden exerted more control over the border southerners in the House
than those in the Senate. In the lower chamber, 15 of the border southerners voted in favor of the
first portion; 2 opposed it; and 6 abstained. For the second part, 16 voted in the affirmative; none
opposed it; and 7 abstained. Only Willard Saulsbury and Anthony Kennedy of the Border South
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voted for the resolution in the Senate. Aside from the four negative votes in the upper chamber,
James Bayard and James Pearce refrained from casting a ballot.101
The war aims resolution briefly quelled the fears of border southerners, who worried that
the Republican-dominated Congress would make the destruction of slavery, not the salvation of
the Union, its paramount objective. Garrett Davis of Kentucky predicted that the Crittenden War
Resolution would “have great & salutary influence in the adhering slave states, and much
influence over the public opinion of even the seceded States.” The passage of the resolution,
however, soon proved a pyrrhic victory. The first major battle of the Civil War took place in
nearby Manassas, Virginia, while Crittenden’s resolution worked its way through Congress, and
resulted in a startling Confederate triumph. On the heels of the loss, Republicans resolved to
remove any obstacles to a more thorough prosecution of the war.102
During the session a confiscation act, which would allow the federal army to seize the
property of those engaged in active rebellion against the government, had been widely discussed.
The measure included enslaved persons, which most border southerners viewed as a first step
toward a program of total emancipation.

Southern Unionists had already read of General

Benjamin Butler’s refusal to return fugitive slaves in Virginia, and Maryland slaveholders
protested that federal troops enticed enslaved persons into their camps and prevented their
owners from reclaiming them. “I beg leave to say that these grievances require immediate
correction if the Government desires to protect our Rights and encourage and foster the Union
feeling in the Border States,” a Maryland congressman implored the president. Congress acted
in spite of the opposition of border southerners and Democrats. Near the end of the session the
bill passed the House by a vote of 60-48 with the support of only one Border South congressman
101
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– Frank Blair. On August 5, the Senate approved of the confiscation act, though no roll call vote
exists.103 A Delaware Unionist admitted that the measure made it “hard to be obliged to fight for
our nationality,” while a Kentucky paper bashed the legislation as “the necessary and inevitable
result of the teachings of Abolition statesmen.”104
While Congress debated the Crittenden War Resolution and the necessity of confiscation
legislation, the Missouri state convention reassembled in Jefferson City on July 22 to address the
flight of the state government. Several vacant chairs revealed that many of the conditional
Unionists, including president Sterling Price, had decided to align themselves with Claiborne
Jackson, chosen not to attend, or faced difficulties making it to the state capital. With a quorum
in place, the convention replaced Price with Robert Wilson and established a committee of seven
to consider how to handle the exodus of Jackson and the state government. Disagreements arose
as to what authority the convention possessed: could they actually declare the state government
deposed and operate as a provisional government, or did they only have the power to call a
special election to staff the vacated government? James O. Broadhead on July 25 delivered a
report from the committee that proclaimed the executive office vacant. To remedy the situation,
the committee recommended that the convention appoint executive officers who would govern
until August 1862, when special elections for those offices would take place.105
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Several moderate members of the convention felt that Broadhead and the committee had
suggested too bold of a course. On July 26 the convention voted to add Hamilton Gamble, who
had recently arrived from a trip to Washington D.C., to the committee and recommit the report.
Gamble worked to overhaul certain parts of the report, including moving the elections up to
November 1861 and subjecting the body’s final recommendations to the electorate to give it
more of a democratic appeal. A St. Louis colleague informed Gamble that the lengthy interim
between elections appeared “as an act of usurpation by the convention” to many Missourians,
and James H. Birch unsuccessfully attempted to move them up to September. The convention
squabbled over the constitutionality of these suggestions, but in the end voted to vacate the
state’s executive offices, deposed the general assembly, and scheduled the election for
November. The convention also proclaimed that as the proxy of the Missouri electorate, they
could fill the executive offices until the November election.106 The next day, the convention
appointed Gamble governor and Willard P. Hall lieutenant governor. Upon assuming the office,
Gamble pled with his delegates to work in unison to bring peace to Missouri and the nation.
Without harmony, “the scenes of the French Revolution may be enacted in every quarter of our
State,” he eerily predicted. With its work complete, the convention adjourned on the last day of
July. “C.F. Jackson, who has proved himself so pestiferous an instrument in bringing civil war
and great disasters on this State, is no longer Governor,” Nathaniel Paschall jubilantly
exclaimed.107
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The fulfillment of Gamble’s plea for unity never occurred. The proceedings of the
convention itself offered foreboding signs. Whereas the convention enjoyed relative accord
when it assembled in March, the July meeting witnessed more discordance among the returning
delegates. The stress of the war, Jackson’s rash actions, and the question of constitutional
authority had created a fissure among the state’s Unionists. About one-third of the delegates
present at Jefferson City voted in opposition to each of the major policy measures the convention
approved. The drastic, even extralegal, steps that the convention took pushed some conditional
Unionists in attendance, such as Uriel Wright, into the pro-secession ranks. Shortly after the
convention adjourned, Wright enlisted in the Confederate army. As in other areas of the Border
South, many Unionists still harbored ample reservations about Lincoln and the Republicans.
Charles Gibson expressed great unease that their opponents might classify conservative
Unionists as Republicans. He told Gamble that on a visit to Washington he had informed
Lincoln that abolitionist speeches on the floor of Congress had done more damage for Unionists
in the Border South than the secessionist tirades of John C. Breckinridge. Another Missouri
moderate admitted that even though Lincoln, “whose principles touching slavery are as heinous
to me as to any one,” occupied the presidency, he would stay firm in his commitment to the
Union.108
Claiborne Jackson and his followers played up these divisions in an attempt to attract
conditional Unionists to their standard. The day of the convention’s adjournment, Thomas
Reynolds delivered a message in which he laid the blame for the war at Lincoln’s feet, labeled
the state convention “a mere rump” and the “convenient tool of foes” with no constitutional
authority, and recommended the legislature pass an ordinance of secession. In response to the
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actions of the convention, Jackson on August 5 issued a declaration of independence for
Missouri. The menacing presence of Union soldiers also impacted Missouri’s citizenry. Lincoln
appointed John C. Frémont, an adventurer who had helped the United States acquire California
and been the Republican Party’s first presidential nominee in 1856, commander of the
Department of the West. He arrived in St. Louis in late-July, surrounded himself with a band of
supplicants and placemen, and refused to cooperate with Gamble and the provisional
government. An observer noted that “men of patriotism, honor and probity, ready to devote their
lives and property to the defence of the Union are really under the ban, while a gang of
California robbers and scoundrels rule, control and direct everything.”

Unionists also

complained that federal troops searched private homes at will and committed acts of violence
against Missourians they perceived as disloyal. A distressed inhabitant of western Missouri
complained that the actions of federal soldiers were “making secessionists every day.”109
The Blair family handpicked Frémont to augment Nathaniel Lyon’s hold on the state, but
a cavalcade of problems soon arose. The Unionist officer corps that Frank Blair had collaborated
with to keep Jackson at heel also suffered from Frémont’s truculence and contempt. “The
officers in command here are evidently military asses,” he arrogantly griped upon his arrival in
St. Louis. The general’s relationship with the Blairs soured in the aftermath of the Battle of
Wilson’s Creek, which took place just a week and a half after the state convention adjourned.
On August 10 the State Guard, led by former state convention president Sterling Price, combined
with Confederate forces in southwestern Missouri and won a stunning victory over the federal
army. The brutal fighting foreshadowed the enormity of the war to come and buried forever
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Gamble’s fleeting wish to avoid violence in Missouri. All told, the battle produced over 2,500
casualties, and the losses on each side exceeded any single battle in the Mexican-American War.
Nathaniel Lyon lay among the dead soldiers scattered at Wilson’s Creek, the first federal Union
general officer to lose his life in battle. During the fray Frémont remained in his headquarters at
St. Louis and denied Lyon’s request for reinforcements. After the battle guerrilla violence
erupted in western Missouri and plagued the state for the remainder of the war. “Men begin to
reason that the only hope of safety is to be neutral or join the winning side,” John Poyner
reported to Lincoln. “The people are divided, distracted, overawed and disheartened.”110
Frémont’s parsimonious use of troops distressed Frank Blair, but during the month of
August the general’s actions compounded the growing rift between the two men. Frémont
suppressed local newspapers that attacked him, refused to grant an audience to leaders of the
Missouri Unionist movement, played favorites with the St. Louis German population, and
blamed the Lincoln administration for the disaster at Wilson’s Creek. Blair fumed that the
martinet Frémont seemed more concerned with keeping Union soldiers out of whiskey shops
than stopping Price and the State Guard, who through the month of August inched closer to the
central part of the state. Blair’s patience reached its limit on September 1, when he wrote to his

110

John C. Frémont to Abraham Lincoln, July 29, 1861 (first quote), John Poyner to Abraham Lincoln,
Aug. 27, 1861 (second quote), Henry T. Blow to Abraham Lincoln, Sept. 20, 1861, all in Lincoln Papers, LOC;
William Garret Piston & Richard W. Hatcher, III, Wilson’s Creek: The Second Battle of the Civil War and the Men
Who Fought It (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 268-269, 287, 306-308, 323. For insightful
treatments of the emerging guerrilla war in Missouri, see Michael Fellman, Inside War: The Guerrilla Conflict in
Missouri during the American Civil War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Daniel E. Sutherland, A
Savage Conflict: The Decisive Role of Guerrillas in the American Civil War (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 2009); Geiger, Financial Fraud and Guerrilla Violence; & Aaron Astor, Rebels on the Border: Civil
War, Emancipation, and the Reconstruction of Kentucky & Missouri (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University
Press, 2012).

363

brother Montgomery and recommended Frémont’s removal from command at the earliest
possible moment.111
Lincoln might have chalked up Blair’s peevishness to unfulfilled ambition were it not for
the abundance of correspondence that flooded his mailbox in response to Frémont’s growing
hubris.

The general issued a proclamation on August 30 that seriously impaired the

accomplishments of Unionists across the Border South. Due to the upsurge in guerrilla violence,
Frémont declared martial law throughout the state and promised to shoot any person whom a
military court-martial found guilty of disloyalty. The general included a stipulation that allowed
federal troops to confiscate the property of disloyal citizens and, moreover, granted freedom to
any enslaved persons owned by those inhabitants.

The decree worked at odds against

Crittenden’s War Aim Resolution and signaled to wavering Border South conservatives that the
Republican desire to eradicate slavery had overtaken their limited objective of preserving the
Union.112
From the beginning of the secession crisis, Border South conservatives had preached that
the Union best protected the institution of slavery. Frémont’s proclamation, coming less than a
month after Congress had passed the Confiscation Act, jeopardized the Unionist position across
the region. A Kentucky newspaper labeled the edict “an abominable, atrocious and infamous
usurpation,” while John B. Henderson complained that thousands of Unionists in northern
Missouri had gone over to the secessionists. “Say death and Union men will accede to it,”
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Henderson groused, “but they have been bedeviled on the nigger until many of them take spasms
whenever a word is said on the subject.”113
Perhaps nothing better illustrated the brittle nature of Border South Unionism than the
reaction to Frémont’s proclamation, especially in Kentucky and Missouri, the region’s largest
slaveholding states. Kentucky Unionists claimed another victory when on August 5, nearly a
month before Frémont’s edict, they ran roughshod over the Southern Rights Party in the election
for the state legislature. The Union Party won 76 out of 100 seats in the lower house and 27 of
the 38 seats in the Senate, yet even in the hour of triumph a resident of Louisville cautioned
government officials against counting the state safe.

He warned that many young folks

supported secession and that numerous conditional Unionists sympathized with the plight of the
Confederacy. Conditional Unionists “vote and talk Union,” he acknowledged, but in reality
“almost every union man considers the South aggrieved.” “I am sure that Kentucky is only a
Union State for fear of the consequences of being the seat of war as a border Confederate State,”
he added. Similar warnings emanated from Missouri, where N.J. Eaton notified Edward Bates
that the state “is trembling in the balance now, & I do not know but it is too late to save it.”
Eaton feared that in the wake of Frémont’s decree, many members of the Home Guard and the
federal army would throw down their weapons, quit the fight, and hand the state over to the
disunionists.114 Garrett Davis of Kentucky admitted that “the proclamation fell amongst us with
pretty much the effect of a bomb shell.” “There is a very general, almost universal feeling, in the
state against this war being or becoming a war against slavery,” Davis confided. Conservative
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Unionists across the region made Lincoln abundantly aware of the proclamation’s potentially
disastrous impact.115
“There is not a day to lose in disavowing emancipation or Kentucky is gone over the mill
dam,” a group of Unionists wired to Lincoln’s friend Joshua Speed, who owned a large farm
outside of Louisville. Speed minced no words when he cautioned his friend the president that
the emancipation edict “will crush out every vestage [sic] of a union party in the state.” “So
fixed is public sentiment in this state against freeing negroes & allowing negroes to be
emancipated & remain among us,” Speed calculated, “that you had as well attack the freedom of
worship in the north or the right of a parent to teach his child to read.” Both the State Guard and
the Home Guard continued to build up their forces, which literally placed Kentucky on the brink
of an internal civil war. On top of the deleterious effect of Frémont’s proclamation, conservative
Unionists worried that William Nelson’s blatant violations of neutrality might further endanger
their cause. In mid-August Nelson actively recruited volunteers for the federal army and created
Camp Dick Robinson in central Kentucky as a bastion for his army. All the while, Confederate
forces had assembled just across the southern border of Kentucky. Lincoln realized he must act
rather delicately to keep from losing the Border South to the Confederacy.116
Despite admonitions from Republicans who protested that the president had alienated
“the great mass of your supporters in the North in order to propiciate [sic] a few quasi Union
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men in Kentucky and Mosouri,” Lincoln reined in Frémont. He privately asked the general to
revise the proclamation so that it meshed with the recently passed Confiscation Act, which
stipulated that only enslaved persons who actively engaged in aiding the rebellion were subject
to freedom. Moreover, the legislation allowed federal courts to review any confiscations that
took place under the policy.117 When Frémont dragged his feet, the president on September 11
issued a public letter that officially modified the edict. Lincoln faced a firestorm of criticism
from the more radical elements of his party, but he held firm. Frémont’s obstinacy forced the
president to remove him from command two months later. The president informed Orville
Browning, who protested his modification of the emancipation decree, that if he failed to act he
feared the weapons that the federal government had funneled to Unionists in Kentucky would
have been turned against them. He noted that one Bluegrass State Union company had already
responded to Frémont’s proclamation by dropping its guns and disbanding. Lincoln believed
that if he left the proclamation unchanged Kentucky would secede and the entire Border South
might follow. “I think to lose Kentucky is nearly the same as to lose the whole game. Kentucky
gone, we can not hold Missouri, nor, as I think, Maryland,” Lincoln explained. “These all
against us, and the job on our hands is too large for us.” Many Republicans failed to appreciate
the president’s hard-edged political calculation, but his modification of the decree certainly
resuscitated the Unionist cause in the Border South.118
The career of Border South neutrality came to a crashing close in September 1861.
Fearful that the Union army might gain a strategic advantage in the Mississippi Valley if it took
the town of Columbus, Kentucky, an impatient Confederate General Leonidas Polk ignored the
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state’s neutrality and on September 3 ordered the occupation of the city. The Union army
countered by seizing Paducah, and the legislature, cognizant of Lincoln’s modification of
Frémont’s emancipation decree, sided with the federal forces on September 18 and requested that
the Confederates leave the state’s soil. The exhausting labors of the state’s committed Unionists,
a heavy dose of subterfuge, and delicate maneuvering by Lincoln held Kentucky in the balance,
but the introduction of federal troops sealed the state’s fate.119 Union soldiers now occupied
portions of all four Border South states, making the project of secession ever more fleeting for
the region’s fire-eaters. Even prior to September, observers in Kentucky and Missouri noticed
that the pace of frustrated Confederate sympathizers leaving the region had escalated over the
summer. Orlando Brown happily watched as secessionists in Kentucky moved “to Virginia, to
Tennessee, or [to] the Devil,” and J.O. Davis reported that large numbers of Missourians
streamed southward to join the Confederate army. The struggle for the western states of the
Border South had just begun, but the likelihood of an official push for secession had diminished
greatly by the time summer gave way to autumn.120
If delicacy marked Lincoln’s approach to Kentucky and Missouri, then boldness
characterized his attitude toward Maryland. With the state’s legislature set to reconvene on
September 17 and the Southern Rights members still clamoring for the body to adopt an
ordinance of secession, Lincoln authorized the arrest of pro-secession political figures in the
state. Under the direction of General John Dix, an erstwhile conservative Democrat from New
York, federal troops swept through Maryland in the middle of the night on September 13,
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arrested twenty-seven members of the state legislature, Congressman Henry May, Baltimore
mayor George Brown, the editors of several anti-administration newspapers, and confined them
to Fort McHenry. “The ‘Hotel de McHenry’ is becoming quite fashionable and popular,” a
Maryland Unionist joked, “at any rate there is quite a number of our prominent citizens [that]
have been furnished with apartments there.”121
Severn Teackle Wallis’s political career ended nearly as quickly as it had begun. In the
middle of the night federal soldiers entered his Baltimore home, rifled through his personal
papers, clapped him in handcuffs, and whisked him away to Fort McHenry. Locked in his cell,
Wallis protested that he and his colleagues had been arrested on mere pretense and without any
commission of treasonous acts. Over the coming months he used his pen to unleash a salvo of
invective at Lincoln and the Republicans for abrogating the civil liberties of Marylanders and
bending the war to their abolitionist designs. “You allowed the victims to languish, for nearly a
year and a half, in prison after prison, to which they were dragged – you emancipating negroes,
the while, by the thousand, as the President now is, by the million,” Wallis fulminated in a letter
to Senator John Sherman. Yet for all his venom and for all his self-assurance that he occupied
the side of right, Wallis and his fire-eating colleagues had suffered defeat. Their energy had
been transferred from the movement for Maryland’s secession to extended discourses on the
Constitution and justifications of their actions.122
No doubt, the president had played fast and loose with the Constitution. Later in the war
Secretary of State William Seward reportedly responded to complaints about arbitrary arrests in
the Border South with a harsh rejoinder: “I don’t give a damn whether they are guilty or
121
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innocent. I saved Maryland by similar arrests, and so I mean to hold Kentucky.” As Wallis and
other Border South fire-eaters discovered, hardline Unionists utilized every available tool to
ensure the region did not slide from neutrality to secession. Missourian Abiel Leonard captured
the resolve of the Unionists in a missive to one of his colleagues: “We must cut down the
secessionists in this State or they will put us down – it has come to this issue at last, and we must
meet the issue boldly, and not with words, but with acts and pretty strong ones too, if we would
succeed.” By the fall of 1861, much to the chagrin of pro-secession Marylanders, Unionists had
seen to it that Wallis’s arsenal included nothing more dangerous than that which he possessed
before he entered the legislature in April: his pen and inkwell, florid vocabulary, and bitter
wit.123

123

Quoted in Walter Stahr, Seward: Lincoln’s Indispensable Man (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2012),
288; Abiel Leonard to James Broadhead, July 29, 1861, Broadhead Papers, MO-MH.

370

Conclusion
“Pursued to the Last Extremity”: Henry Winter Davis’s Republic
Robert Jefferson Breckinridge’s tone had changed a great deal in the four and a half years
since he beseeched his countrymen to remedy the nation’s problems through moderate means at
the ceremonial laying of the cornerstone at the Henry Clay National Monument in Lexington,
Kentucky. A likeness of Henry Clay stood atop the 120-foot tall limestone monument, but by
December 1861 the statue no longer peered out at the unified nation that Breckinridge once
considered to be on the verge of unimpeded greatness. The cancer of disunion had during the
interim spread into the Border South and even into his own family: several of the men with
whom he shared the dais at the Clay ceremony had cast their lot with the Confederacy; two of his
sons and a son-in-law eventually enlisted in the Confederate cause; and in December the United
States Senate expelled his famous nephew John C. Breckinridge, who in response offered his
services to Jefferson Davis. In 1857 Breckinridge extolled Clay for his lessons of “forbearance,
brotherhood, and mutual concession for the common liberty”; in the aftermath of John
Crittenden’s failed compromise and the opening of the Civil War, however, the Presbyterian
minister promised that the American people would “put an end to the traitorous dominion of the
cruel and perfidious class minority” that had brought about the conflict. A wartime ardor to
annihilate the traitors in his midst, even his wayward family members, supplanted his antebellum
preference for conciliation and moderation.1
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By the end of 1861, Unionists in the Border South had won a hard-fought victory that
often receives scant attention from scholars of the Civil War. Often obscured by the secession of
the Lower South, Fort Sumter and the Upper South’s procession out of the Union, and the
massive buildup of armies in the corridor between Richmond and Washington, the fight in the
Border South was no less perilous than these other closely studied events. The battles took place
in the halls of Congress and the legislative chambers of statehouses; on the stump at country
barbecues and at polling places that varied from neat county courthouses to seedy urban taverns;
and on the streets of Baltimore and St. Louis, the hills of western Missouri, and the interior of
Kentucky.
The Unionist victory emboldened some border southerners and embittered others. For
Robert Breckinridge and many other Unionists in the Border South, by the end of 1861 the great
American tradition of compromise appeared as lifeless as Henry Clay’s bones, which lay
entombed under the Lexington monument he had consecrated on that Independence Day in 1857.
They joined the ranks of unconditional Unionism and sought to vanquish their foes by any means
necessary. Still other Unionists clung to the fleeting notion of neutrality, hopeful that the war
would come to an end before it escalated to once inconceivable levels. By the summer of 1861,
conditional Unionists faced the unenviable task of choosing an allegiance. The vast majority of
border southerners, unlike Robert Breckinridge, anguished over this decision. A tormented
Frankfort, Kentucky mother spoke for many border southerners in response to her prosecessionist son’s jubilant exclamation upon hearing the news of the Confederate victory at the
Battle of Bull Run. “To me the news of victory on either side is distressing for we are all
brethren & I did still hope for compromise,” she glumly reported to her brother.
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conditional Unionists remained committed to the cause, others tried in vain to stay out of the
fray, and still others joined the Confederate experiment. “How this state of things breaks up the
family ties, carrying scorn to so many happy homes,” a Louisville woman lamented in the
summer of 1861.2
Calculating the number of conditional Unionists in the Border South who abandoned the
Unionist cause is a difficult enterprise.

Scholars have estimated the number of border

southerners who fought for the Union or the Confederacy, but poor contemporary record-keeping
and the absence of vital records lends a certain level of doubt to the viability of these figures.
Furthermore, many border southerners who joined the Confederate armed forces enlisted in
states other than their own, and the figures neglect whole swaths of the population, such as
women and the elderly.

Nonetheless, the enlistment estimations provide a context for

understanding the impact of the Unionist offensive in the Border South.

Table 28 below

provides a breakdown of the estimated troop enlistments from each Border South state and
compares these numbers to the overall 1860 population of white and black (both enslaved and
free) males age 20 to 59. According to the estimates, 29.4 percent of all white males aged 20-59
enlisted in the Union army, while 14.5 percent of all white males of the same age enlisted in the
Confederate army. The data suggests that twice as many white border southerners opted to fight
for the federal army, a clear indication that the Unionist offensive helped to keep more men of
fighting age loyal to the old flag. Nearly 40.3 percent of enslaved and free blacks of the same
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age group enlisted in the Union army, which illustrates strikingly the devotion of African
Americans to the cause of freedom.
Table 28 - Troop Enlistments in the Border South
Total Enlistment Estimates

% of Male Population, Age 20-59

Union
State

White

Union

Black

Confederate

White

Black

Confederate

Delaware

10,000

1,000

1,000

48.5%

23.8%

4.8%

Kentucky

50,000

24,000

35,000

25.0%

54.0%

17.5%

Maryland

34,000

9,000

20,000

28.9%

26.4%

17.0%

80,000

8,000

30,000

31.6%

37.1%

11.8%

174,000

42,000

86,000

29.4%

40.3%

14.5%

Missouri
Border South Total

Sources: Kennedy, Population of the United States in 1860; OR , Series III, vol. 4, 1269-1270; Gienapp, "Abraham Lincoln
and the Border States," 39, T able 3; Freehling, The South vs. The South, 61.

Although in the latter half of 1861 many pro-secessionist border southerners trekked
southward to enlist in the Confederate army or to wait out the war in more comfortable
surroundings, a scattering of the region’s inhabitants refused to relent in their effort to pull the
Border South states out of the Union. The Missouri state convention in July 1861 prorogued the
officially elected state government, yet in spite of their fugitive existence Governor Claiborne
Fox Jackson and a few pro-secession legislators remained undeterred. In September Jackson
summoned the legislature to meet in Neosho, a town in the far southwestern corner of the state,
to make arrangements for Missouri’s secession.3 Extant records do not reveal how many of the
deposed legislators showed up in Neosho, but it seems likely that no more than a handful made
an appearance. The Senate journal for the session, perhaps as a means to obscure the scant
turnout, contains no roll calls. Moreover, the names of only twelve of the state’s thirty-three
senators appear in the document. The House created a committee of five to determine if a
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quorum had been achieved, but the panel never produced a report and the lower chamber’s
journal does not include a roster or roll call votes.4
The absence of a quorum, however, did not daunt the ever assertive Jackson. The
legislature passed an ordinance of secession over a single negative vote, ratified the Provisional
Confederate Constitution, and selected members to attend the first Confederate Congress.5 On
November 28, 1861, the Confederate Congress admitted Missouri to the new nation, but the
state’s government spent the rest of the war in exile. It met only once more in early 1862, but
with federal troops in the vicinity of New Madrid the legislators scattered before attending to any
business. The resolute Claiborne Jackson never returned to his home along the Missouri River;
rather, he established the seat of his Confederate government in Arkansas, where he died in late
1862 after a battle with stomach cancer.6 Jackson’s dream of a Confederate Missouri never
reached full maturity, but the vicious guerrilla violence that wracked the state for the next four
years demonstrated that many Missourians shared in his secessionist illusion.
The story in Kentucky closely mirrored that of Missouri, with one major exception – in
the Bluegrass State a United States congressman, not the elected governor, led the charge for
secession. Henry C. Burnett protested the prosecution of the war while in Washington during
July and August; when he returned home to Cadiz in late summer, Kentucky’s neutrality
vanished and the legislature declared for the Union.
4

Rather than remain prostrate as did

Journal of the Senate, Extra Session of the Rebel Legislature, Called Together by a Proclamation of C.F.
Jackson, Begun and Held at the Town of Neosho, Newton County, Missouri, on the Twenty-First of Day of October,
Eighteen Hundred and Sixty-One (Washington D.C.: Statute Law Book Company, 1916), passim; Missouri General
Assembly, House of Representatives (Confederate), Journal, 1861, Typescript, 2, State Historical Society of
Missouri, Columbia, Missouri. The author wishes to thank Joan E. Stack, Curator of Art Collections, and Amy L.
Waters, Reference Specialist, both of the Missouri Historical Society, Columbia, Missouri, for their assistance with
locating the names of the attendees at this session of the legislature.
5
The House journal does not record the actual tally of the vote on secession, but merely states that the
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6
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University of Missouri Press, 2000), 273.

375

Governor Beriah Magoffin, Burnett took action. He raised a regiment of Confederate volunteers
and in late October chaired a meeting of pro-secessionists held at Russellville, a small town
located in southwestern Kentucky and just miles from the Tennessee line. Burnett and the
attendees called for a sovereignty convention to meet in the town on November 18. He presided
over the November meeting, too, which attracted approximately two hundred Kentuckians. The
convention passed a declaration of independence, adopted an ordinance of secession, established
a provisional state government, and named George W. Johnson, a planter from Scott County,
governor. Burnett and former Congressman William E. Simms repaired to Richmond and made
an appeal for Kentucky’s inclusion in the Confederacy. Jefferson Davis and the Confederate
Congress complied, and on December 10 Kentucky officially became the thirteenth member of
the Confederacy.7
As in Missouri, the Kentucky Confederate government spent most of its life fleeing the
Union army. The United States Congress in December 1861 expelled Burnett, who spent the rest
of the war in the Confederate Senate. In October 1861 George Johnson, full of enthusiasm and
envisioning a short war, boasted to his wife, “I expect to be with you much sooner than Lincoln
and his minions may desire.” Johnson split his executive duties with soldiering and in April
1862 found himself on the battlefield at Shiloh, Tennessee. His prognostication about the war,
however, proved erroneous. Johnson suffered wounds to his thigh and abdomen on April 7
during a vicious fight against federal forces that included a large contingent of his erstwhile

7
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Historical Society 77 (Autumn 1979), 271-273; E. Merton Coulter, The Civil War and Readjustment in Kentucky
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(Bowling Green, KY: [no publisher identified], 1861), 5-9. For statistical information on the contributors to the
Border South secession conventions, see the Appendix below.
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Kentucky neighbors. He died two days later, an ominous foreshadowing of the internecine
violence that razed the Bluegrass State throughout the war.8
The voices of the participants demonstrate the high stakes involved in keeping the Border
South tethered to the Union and the very real likelihood that these four states might follow the
other eleven slaveholding states into the Confederacy.

Writing after the war, Basil Duke

calculated that without the federal occupation of St. Louis, Missouri would have joined the
Confederacy and substantially altered the outcome of the Civil War. “I was convinced then, and
believe now,” Duke wrote, “that it would have eliminated all danger of failure [for the
Confederacy].” Unionists across the Border South went to great pains to foil their secessionist
neighbors, certain that if they relaxed for even a moment disunionists might gain the advantage.
“If those who favored the Union had been less active and vigilant, there is reason to believe the
State would have been declared out of the Union,” Kentuckian Thomas Speed remembered. In
the spring of 1861 Garrett Davis summarized the tenacity with which the Border South Unionists
worked during the crisis. “We will remain in the Union by voting if we can, by fighting if we
must, and if we cannot hold our own,” Davis confided to George McClellan, “we will call on the
General Government to aid us.”9
Abraham Lincoln certainly understood the strategic importance of keeping the Border
South in the Union, and he listened attentively to the Unionists who explained the precarious and
nuanced nature of the region’s Unionism. Garrett Davis and scores of other Border South
8
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Unionists had warned the president that the very success of their offensive hinged upon
convincing the inhabitants of these four slaveholding states that the federal government would
not interfere with the peculiar institution. Through 1861 Lincoln, mindful of the importance of
satisfying Border South Unionists, had exposed himself to ridicule from the radical wing of his
party in an attempt to limit the war to the preservation of the Union. While border southerners
continued to cast a suspicious eye on Lincoln, his revision of John C. Frémont’s emancipation
edict and decision to sack the non-compliant general demonstrated the president’s absorption of
the critical precept of Border South Unionism.10
The president took bold strokes and utilized less than desirable means to ensure that the
Border South felt the weight of federal military might, but on the subject of slavery Lincoln
acted with restraint. Crittenden’s War Resolution, protests over the confiscation of enslaved
persons, and the outcry over Frémont’s proclamation convinced Lincoln that broad swipes at the
institution of slavery would unquestionably undermine the progress that Border South Unionists
had made.

Arraying census data for the Border South men elected to the Thirty-seventh

Congress against those chosen to sit in the Provisional Confederate Congress further establishes
the link between slavery and Unionism in the Border South. Table 29 illustrates that Unionist
Border South congressmen owned, on average, nearly twice as many enslaved persons in 1860 as
did the border southerners sitting in Congress at Richmond. Furthermore, nearly half of the
representatives in the Confederate Congress owned no slaves; only one-fifth of Unionists fit this
category. The region’s politicians and the people who voted to send them to Washington clearly
comprehended the correlation between Unionism and slavery in the Border South. William S.
Harney gave voice to this connection in the spring of 1861 when he told a Missourian that if the

10

See especially William C. Harris, Lincoln and the Border States: Preserving the Union (Lawrence:
University Press of Kansas, 2011).
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state left the Union, it would lose every protection which the Constitution and the federal legal
code vouchsafed to its slaveholders. “The protection of her slave property, if nothing else,”
Harney advised, “admonishes Missouri never to give up the Union.”11
Table 29 - A Comparison of Border South Congressmen and Senators in the
Thirty-Seventh US Congress and the Provisional CS Congress
Nation

Percentage who Owned No
Slaves in 1860
Mean Slaves Owned in 1860

United States
Confederate States

13.2

20.0%

6.7

47.1%

Note: T he numbers for the US Congressmen and Senators does not include those members who
either resigned to join the Confederacy or were expelled because of doubtful allegiance. T his
data includes only those who remained attached to the Union cause. Census data was located for
30 of the 33 US politicians and 17 of the 18 CS politicians. T he US poiticians hailed from all 4
Border South states, whereas the CS politicians came only from Kentucky and Missouri, the 2
Sources: US Census of 1860, Slave Schedules; Biographical Directory of the US Congress ,
www.bioguide.congress.gov; Ezra J. Warner & W. Buck Yearns, Biographical Register of the
Confederate Congress (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1975), Appendix III.

Not until November 1861, with state elections completed and federal troops occupying
portions of each of the Border South states, did Lincoln feel comfortable enough to broach the
question of emancipation. The president sent out feelers to two Delaware Unionists, who after a
discussion with Lincoln pressed members of the general assembly to enact a program of gradual,
compensated emancipation. Lincoln hoped to use Delaware, with fewer than 1,800 enslaved
persons, as a laboratory for Border South emancipation.

The president wished to avoid

constitutional entanglements and believed the experiment in Delaware, which would not
complete the process of emancipation until 1893 and offered $400 for each slave, might catch on
in the rest of the Border South. Furthermore, in order to offset concerns about social unrest, he
made his preference for colonizing the freed slaves to the Caribbean or Africa known to his
colleagues. Even at the end of 1861, however, the Unionists of the Border South refused to
accept Lincoln’s conservative emancipation program. The devout Unionist Hamilton Gamble,
who had been handed the governorship of Missouri by the state convention, spoke for many
11
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Border South conservatives when he heard rumors of Lincoln’s emancipation scheme. “If he
should yield to the malignant influence of those black hearted and insane abolitionists I have no
longer hope for the restoration of peace and order,” Gamble declared. “In such a war I can take
no part.” The members of the Delaware legislature agreed with Gamble. Lincoln’s intercessors
could not muster support among the state’s legislators, and the bill for compensated
emancipation never received formal introduction in the general assembly.12
By the beginning of 1862, few of the region’s inhabitants were prepared to depart
voluntarily with the peculiar institution. Even in the northernmost outpost of the South, where
areas of sparse enslaved populations overshadowed pockets of dense concentrations of slaves,
the peculiar institution commanded a powerful influence over the region’s politics, society,
culture, and economy.

This truism animated the Unionist offensive from its inception in

November 1860 and continued to resonate with the people of the Border South. Few border
southerners could imagine a future without slavery; most remained firmly convinced that if
emancipation occurred, its responsibility lay with the individual states, not the federal
government.
In the spring of 1862, Sophie M. Du Pont, who harbored great reservations about the
legality and the ensuing social consequences of emancipation, asked her close friend Henry
Winter Davis what he thought about the prospect of abolition. He agreed that emancipation at
present violated the law of the land, but disagreed with her misgivings about the outcome. In his
usual posture far in advance of the Border South mainstream, Davis considered immediate
emancipation just and necessary. “The rebellion has ensured this result – which two years ago
12

Eric Foner, The Fiery Trial: Abraham Lincoln and American Slavery (New York: W.W. Norton. 2010),
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no one would have been justified in saying was likely to occur in five hundred years,” Davis
forecast. “There may be suffering – inconvenience [-] confusion – but no injustice.”13
Few border southerners would agree with Davis in 1862, but his prophecy came true.
Ironically, as conservative Border South Unionists like Robert Breckinridge called for the
prosecution of the war “to be pursued to the last extremity,” they also unleashed the forces that
would undermine slavery, the institution which they sought to protect by remaining in the Union
in 1861. Large battles, guerrilla warfare, marching armies, and the flight of enslaved persons
substantially weakened the peculiar institution across the Border South.

American slavery

received its deathblow in 1865 when Congress passed the Thirteenth Amendment and threefourths of the states ratified the constitutional decree that capped four years of torturous war.
Perhaps not surprisingly, two Border South legislatures showed an empty devotion to the
peculiar institution by refusing to ratify the amendment.

The Delaware legislature finally

acquiesced during the administration of William McKinley, while Kentucky held out until
1976.14
During the secession crisis the Border South Unionists warned that war, once unbridled,
would alter forever the landscape of the region. “Our fields will be laid waste, our houses and
cities will be burned, our people will be slain, and this goodly land be re-baptized ‘the land of
blood.’

And even the institution, to preserve or control which this wretched war was

undertaken,” the delegates to the border state conference in the spring of 1861 dolefully
predicted, “will be exterminated in the general ruin.”15 Henry Clay’s statue in 1865 stood watch
13
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over a scarred, transformed, and remodeled land, one that his Border South heirs had seen on the
horizon and vainly tried to resist. They had kept their states in the Union, but the exigencies of
civil war had irrevocably destroyed Clay’s America. Whether they were willing to accept it or
not, border southerners now lived in the republic of Henry Winter Davis.
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Appendix
The Secessionists of the Border South

Historians studying the antebellum South often face the problem of identifying who,
outside of the fire-eaters who trumpeted the cause of disunion on the stump and in the press,
endorsed secession across the region. The voices of some of those disunionist zealots in the
Border South, such as Claiborne Fox Jackson, M. Jeff Thompson, and Blanton Duncan, have
been utilized throughout this study to open a window on the mindset of the region’s
secessionists. In addition, the analysis of election returns provides clues to the depth and breadth
of secession sentiment throughout the Border South and has helped to track the ebb and flow of
attitudes toward disunion in Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, and Missouri. Aside from the
words and deeds of the region’s secessionist leaders and the faceless ballots cast by Border South
voters, though, scholars are left with few sources to build a more complete picture of the region’s
disunionists.
The manuscript record provides some clues to how historical actors regarded the
secessionists with whom they worked and worshiped, attended court days and county elections,
shared familial ties, and in extreme instances, fought.

C.F. Mitchell, an inhabitant of

Flemingsburg, Kentucky remarked that “all the substantial property Holders in the state are on
the side of the Union – But every poor white scamp, every adventurer, every demagogue & every
disappointed office seeker & slavery fanatic in the state” endorsed secession. Mitchell also
rehashed a scene at a Frankfort tavern, where in January 1861 an outspoken, and most likely well
lubricated, fire-eater energetically preached the gospel of disunion from his barstool. Not all
members of the barroom congregation experienced a conversion that day. During the fire-eater’s
tirade a substantial slaveholder interrupted and asked why the disunionist so adamantly wanted
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Kentucky to secede. The fire-eater responded that he desired to maintain his rights of property,
to which the slaveowner queried how many slaves the hotspur owned. The disunionist answered
that he owned no slaves, but members of his family possessed twenty-nine bondspersons. “Well
sir,” the slaveholder retorted, “tell your ‘people’ to bring their slaves to me & I’ll buy every one
of them & then your damnd [sic] County will have no excuse for going out of the Union.”1 A
similar anecdote from Bowling Green buttresses Mitchell’s depiction of Unionists as well-off
slaveholders and secessionists as impoverished upstarts. A wealthy Kentuckian confided to her
diary in March 1861 that her youthful brother Warner fought a classmate who had chastised him
for his resolute Unionism. Warner, whose family owned twenty-eight slaves and a handsome
plantation named Mount Air, thrashed his fellow student and declared that “he would teach a
low down cur who didn’t know which side of the line he was born on and never owned a mule,
much less a negro, how to call him a ‘Yankee and Abolitionist, because he was Union.’”2
Anecdotal evidence from Missouri complements the portrayal of Kentucky secessionists
as poorer and younger than the state’s Unionists. “The old oaks, the men of property and
substance” in St. Louis supported the Union, Isaac Sturgeon detected. “The young men, the hot
heads and rable [sic] to a great extent with few honorable exceptions of age and experience,” he
continued, “are with S. Carolina and for any extreme measures.”3 The depiction of secessionists
in Maryland varied somewhat from those of Kentucky and Missouri fire-eaters. A Baltimorean
surveyed the landscape and claimed that the “Old ‘Aristocracy’” of the Eastern Shore and
southern Maryland combined with merchants whose trade primarily went southward to form the
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backbone of secession sentiment in the Old Line State.4 Delawareans often commented on the
secessionists that surrounded them, but unlike the other three states of the Border South few
contemporaries classified those disunionists as rich slaveholders or meager parvenus.
Scholars investigating the Border South have offered some conclusions that tend to
support to varying degrees the anecdotal generalizations about fire-eaters included in the
manuscript record. James E. Copeland used census data and the records of volunteers for the
Union army from Kentucky to map pockets of Unionism and secession sympathy throughout the
Bluegrass State. He found that most support for secession came from the western end of the
state and noted that slaveholding and prosperity was more entrenched in the central portion of
Kentucky, where Unionists outstripped fire-eaters.5 In his study of election returns in Missouri,
William Roed argued that no strong correlation exists between votes for John C. Breckinridge in
1860 and support for secession.

While he reached no firm conclusions about Missouri

secessionists, Roed’s discoveries support the notion that many shades of Border South Unionism
existed and some conditional Unionists easily made the transition to support for the
Confederacy.6 Frank Towers has undertaken the most recent attempt to distinguish Border South
secessionists. He used census data culled from the arrest records of the Baltimore Riot of April
19 to confirm the contemporary assertion that wealthy merchants and managers of commerce
took the lead in promoting secession.7
In an effort to shed more light on who comprised the backbone of the push for secession
in the Border South, I have collected census data for attendees of pro-secession conventions or
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conclaves in Kentucky, Maryland, and Missouri. For Maryland, I used a roster of the February
18, 1861 state convention which met in Baltimore and attracted delegates from across the state.
Census data were recovered with reasonable certainty for 152 of the seated delegates; Tables 30
and 33 below provide a composite snapshot of those delegates and their interest in slavery.
Table 30 - Census Data for Seated Delegates to the Maryland
State Convention, February 18, 1861
Mean

Median

Age

44.8

44

Real Estate

$23,958

$14,550

Personal Estate

$19,216

$10,000

8.4

2

Slaveholdings
Place of Birth
State or Region

Number

Percentage

Maryland

137

90.1%

Border South

139

91.4%

Upper South

2

1.3%

Lower South

0

0.0%

Free States

8

5.3%

Foreign Born

2

1.3%

Not Listed

1

0.7%

Occupation
Grouping

Number

Percentage

Agriculture

71

46.7%

Legal

38

25.0%

Entrepreneurial

24

15.8%

Professional

13

8.6%

None Listed

6

3.9%

Sources: Baltimore Sun , Feb. 18-19, 1861; US Census, 1860; US Census,
Slave Schedules, 1860.

Finding a sample of Missouri fire-eaters proved more problematic. I used the journals of
the deposed Missouri legislature, whose members in October 1861 gathered in Neosho and drew
up a secession ordinance for the state. Unfortunately, the scanty journals list very few names and
contain no roll call votes. Most of the same legislators served on the few committees created
during the brief session, which suggests that a true quorum did not exist.

Despite these

deficiencies, I found census data for thirteen of the state legislators (mostly from the Senate) and
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Governor Claiborne Fox Jackson. While a sparse sample, the data in Tables 31 and 34 at least
provides a starting point for understanding who supported secession in Missouri.
Table 31 - Census Data for Legislators Attending the Missouri
Legislative Session in Neosho, October 1861
Mean

Median

Age

39.4

39

Real Estate

$11,200

$7,400

Personal Estate

$11,599

$6,150

7.6

5

Slaveholdings
Place of Birth
State or Region

Number

Percentage

Missouri

0

0.0%

Border South

5

35.7%

Upper South

7

50.0%

Lower South

0

0.0%

Free States

1

7.1%

1

7.1%

Foreign Born
Occupation
Grouping

Number

Percentage

Agriculture

5

35.7%

Legal

7

50.0%

Entrepreneurial

1

7.1%

Professional

1

7.1%

Sources: House Journal , Senate Journal , Missouri Rebel Legislature, SHSMO; Missouri Official Manual of 1935-1936 , 204-205; US Census, 1860;
US Census, Slave Schedules, 1860.

The secession convention that met in Russellville, Kentucky, in November 1861 offers a
decent sample for building a composite of Bluegrass State disunionists. Extant records include a
list of the signers of the state’s secession ordinance, but the document contains some problems.
A transcription of the document survives, but several of the names do not include their county of
residence, rendering it impossible to locate those signers with any certainty. Also, as a means to
provide an illusion of legitimacy by adding more signatures to the ordinance, the organizers of
the convention apparently had soldiers and civilians, rather than true delegates, affix their names
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to the document.8 Nevertheless, census data has been recovered for eighty-seven of the signers
and are displayed in Tables 32 and 35 below. Unfortunately, I came across no data that would
help to offer a glimpse of secessionists in Delaware.
Table 32 - Census Data for Delegates to the Kentucky
Secession Convention, November 1861
Mean

Median

Age

37.6

35

Real Estate

$8,169

$3,000

Personal Estate

$8,265

$3,000

6.1

2

Slaveholdings
Place of Birth
State or Region

Number

Percentage

Kentucky

57

65.5%

Border South

61

70.1%

Upper South

21

24.1%

Lower South

0

0.0%

Free States

5

5.7%

Occupation
Grouping

Number

Percentage

Agriculture

32

36.8%

Legal

25

28.7%

Entrepreneurial

15

17.2%

Other

2

2.3%

None Listed

5

5.7%

Sources: The Declaration of Independence and Constitution…, 9-11; US
Census, 1860; US Census, Slave Schedules, 1860.

Together, the profiles of secessionists in three of the four Border South states tend to
corroborate the anecdotal evidence from the manuscript record. The secessionists of Maryland
were older and richer than their colleagues in Kentucky and Missouri; the great majority of
disunionists in each of these states made their living off the land or by practicing law. Aside
from Missouri, most of the region’s fire-eaters had been born in the state in which they resided in
1860. Large slaveholdings accumulated by a handful of these fire-eaters skewed the average
slaveholdings upward, but the median values and the breakdown of slaveholdings in Tables 33-

8
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35 indicates that in general most of the Border South secessionists were not substantial
slaveowners. Strikingly, a majority of the men in each of the three samples owned fewer than
five enslaved persons or none at all.9
A comparison of the findings about these groups of secessionists with the census data that
Ralph Wooster compiled and analyzed for the legislatures of Kentucky and Maryland and my
own data for the strongly Unionist Missouri state convention illustrates a few important points.
The attendees at the Maryland state convention closely resembled the membership of the
Maryland legislature, in which the average age (44.5 years) and median age (44 years) nearly
mirrored those of the delegates. Wooster found that the mean slaveholdings for the legislators
stood at 9.5 (as compared to 8.4 for the delegates) and the median holding stood at one slave (in
comparison to 2 for the delegates).10 The Missouri legislators who attended the rump session at
Neosho were significantly younger (average age of 39.4 years) than the delegates who attended
the Unionist-controlled convention (average age of 45 years). Although the mean and median
slaveholdings of the legislators exceeds those of the delegates, one must consider the small
sample size of the Neosho legislature and the fact that Governor Jackson’s ownership of fortyeight slaves significantly raised the average. When Jackson’s slaveholdings are removed, the
average falls back to 4.5 enslaved persons, a figure smaller than the average for delegates to the
convention (4.8 slaves).11 The signers of the Kentucky secession ordinance were younger (an
average age of 37.6 and a median age of 35 for the signers; an average age of 41.3 and a median
age of 40 for the legislators) than their counterparts in the Unionist-dominated legislature, though
9
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their slaveholdings closely resembled one another (the legislators held 6.3 slaves on average with
a median value of 2 enslaved persons; the signers owned a mean of 6.1 slaves and a median of
2).12 These composites have shaped my approach to the secession crisis in the Border South and
illustrate the strong connection between the protection of slavery and Unionism, rather than
disunion, in the region.
Table 33 - Slaveholdings of Seated Delegates of the
Maryland State Convention, February 18, 1861
Slaves Owned

Number

Percentage

0

57

37.5%

1-5

39

25.7%

6-9

13

8.6%

10-19

21

13.8%

20 or more

22

14.5%

Total

152

100.0%

Mean Slaveholding

8.4

Median Slaveholding

2

Sources: Baltimore Sun , Feb. 18-19, 1861; US Census, 1860; US
Census, Slave Schedules, 1860.

Table 34 - Slaveholdings of Legislators Attending the
Missouri Legislative Session at Neosho, October 1861
Slave Owned

Number

Percentage

0

4

28.6%

1-5

3

21.4%

6-9

5

35.7%

10-19

1

7.1%

20 or more

1

7.1%

Total

14

100.0%

Mean Slaveholding

7.6

Median Slaveholding

5

Sources: House Journal , Senate Journal , M issouri Rebel
Legislature, SHS-M O; Missouri Official Manual of 1935-1936 , 204205; US Census, 1860; US Census, Slave Schedules, 1860.
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Table 35 - Slaveholdings of Delegates to the Kentucky
Secession Convention, November 1861
Slaves Owned

Number

Percentage

0

38

43.7%

1-5

17

19.5%

6-9

15

17.2%

10-19

8

9.2%

20 or more

9

10.3%

Total

87

100.0%

Mean Slaveholding

6.1

Median Slaveholding

2

Sources: The Declaration of Independence and Constitution… , 9-11;
US Census, 1860; US Census, Slave Schedules, 1860.

391

Bibliography
PRIMARY SOURCES
Manuscript Collections
Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library, Chicago, Illinois
Stephen A. Douglas Papers
Delaware Historical Society, Manuscripts Division, Wilmington, Delaware
James A. Bayard, Jr. Family Letters, Accession 86.34
William and Frank Brobson Papers
Callery Collection of the Bayard Family Papers, Accession 78.25
William Canby Journal
Rodmond Gibbons Papers
John P. Gillis Papers
Special Collections, Perkins Library, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina
Alexander R. Boteler Papers
Eliza Hall Ball Gordon Boyles Papers
John C. Breckinridge Papers
John Jordan Crittenden Letters
John Sherman Papers
Franklin E. Smith Papers
Alexander H. Stephens Papers
George Hume Steuart Papers
Robert Augustus Toombs Correspondence
Shadrach Ward Correspondence
Joseph S. Williams Letters
Enoch Pratt Free Library, Archives of the Peabody Institute, Baltimore, Maryland
John Pendleton Kennedy Papers
Filson Historical Society, Louisville, Kentucky
Bodley Family Papers
Papers of Orlando Brown
Bullitt Family Papers – Oxmoor Collection
Clark-Strater-Watson Family Papers
John J. Crittenden Letters
Phebe Wood Coburn Daugherty Papers
Alexander Pericles Farnsley Letters
Frost Family Papers
George Gondy Letter
Green Family Papers
Grigsby Collection
Samuel Haycraft Journal
392

Holyoke Family Papers
Johnston Family Papers
Jones Family Papers
Preston Family Papers – Davie Collection
Preston Family Papers – Joyes Collection
Sanders Family Papers
Alexander Hugh Holmes Stuart Letter
Uncle Billie Letter
Richard Yates Papers
Hagley Museum and Library, Wilmington, Delaware
Henry Du Pont Papers, Winterthur Manuscripts, Group 7
Samuel Francis du Pont Papers, Winterthur Manuscripts, Group 9
Sophie Madeleine Du Pont Papers, Winterthur Manuscripts, Group 9
Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
James Buchanan Papers
Kentucky Department for Libraries and Archives, Frankfort, Kentucky
Governor’s Correspondence, 1859-1861, Governor Beriah Magoffin
Kentucky Historical Society, Frankfort, Kentucky
Pattie A. Curd Papers
George W. Johnson Papers
James Moffett Letters
Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
Papers of Edward Bates
Papers of Thomas F. Bayard
Papers of the Blair Family
Breckinridge Family Papers
Papers of John Jordan Crittenden
Abraham Lincoln Papers
William C. Rives Papers
Maryland Historical Society, Baltimore, Maryland
Allen Bowie Davis Papers
Mrs. Benjamin Gwinn Harris Diary
J. Morrison Harris Papers
Thomas H. Hicks Papers, MS 1263
Thomas H. Hicks Papers, MS 1313
Thomas H. Hicks Papers, MS 2104
Reverdy Johnson Collection
James Alfred Pearce Papers
Levin Richardson Papers

393

Missouri Museum of History, St. Louis, Missouri
James O. Broadhead Papers
Hamilton R. Gamble Papers
Missouri State Archives, Jefferson City, Missouri
Claiborne Fox Jackson Papers, 1861, Office of the Governor, Record Group 3.15
Missouri-Kansas Border War Collection, 1858-1862, Office of the Secretary of State,
Record Group 5
Records of the 1861 Missouri Convention, Office of the Secretary of State, Record Group
5.23
Rush Rees Library, Department of Rare Books, Manuscripts and Archives, University of
Rochester
Papers of William Henry Seward
Southern Historical Collection, Wilson Library, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
James Guthrie Letters
John Judge Papers
Basil Manly Papers
William Porcher Miles Papers
Henry Page Papers
Frank F. Steel Letters
M. Jeff Thompson Papers
State Historical Society of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri
David Rice Atchison Papers
Alexander W. Doniphan Letters, C1926
Alexander W. Doniphan Letter, 1861, C1935
Waldo P. Johnson Letters
Abiel Leonard Papers
John Machir Papers
Missouri Confederate Archives, 1861
Missouri General Assembly, House of Representatives (Confederate), Journal, 1861
William McClung Paxton Papers
James S. Rollins Papers
John Sappington Papers
Thomas Shackelford Papers
M. Jeff Thompson Papers
Samiville Weller Letter, 1860
Woods-Holman Family Papers
Government Documents
Congressional Globe, 36th – 37th Congresses.

394

The Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the Provisional Government of the
State of Kentucky, Together with the Messages of the Governor. Bowling Green,
Kentucky: 1861.
Delaware General Assembly. Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Delaware,
at a Session of the General Assembly, Convened and Held at Dover, on Tuesday, the
First of January, in the Year of Our Lord One Thousand Eight Hundred and Sixty-One,
and of the Independence of the United States the Eighty-Fifth. Wilmington: Henry Eckel
Printer, 1861.
________. Journal of the Senate of the State of Delaware, at a Session of the General Assembly,
Commenced and Held at Dover, on Tuesday, the First Day of January, in the Year of Our
Lord One Thousand Eight Hundred and Sixty-One, and of the Independence of the United
States the Eighty-Fifth. Dover: James Kirk Printer, 1861.
Department of the Interior. Manufactures of the United States in 1860; Compiled from the
Original Returns of the Eighth Census, under the Direction of the Secretary of the
Interior. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1865.
Journal and Proceedings of the Convention of the Border Slave States, Begun and Held in the
City of Frankfort, State of Kentucky, on the 27th Day of May, 1861. Frankfort: Kentucky
Yeoman Office, 1861.
Journal and Proceedings of the Missouri State Convention, Held at Jefferson City and St. Louis,
March 1861. St. Louis: George Knapp and Company, 1861.
Journal of the Called Session of the House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Kentucky,
Begun and Held in the Town of Frankfort, on Monday, the Sixth Day of May, in the Year
of Our Lord 1861, and of the Commonwealth the Sixty-Ninth. Frankfort: John B. Major
Printer, 1861.
Journal of the Called Session of the House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Kentucky,
Begun and Held in the Town of Frankfort, on Thursday the Seventeenth Day of January,
in the Year of Our Lord 1861, and of the Commonwealth the Sixty-Ninth. Frankfort:
Kentucky Yeoman Office, 1861.
Journal of the Called Session of the Senate of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, Begun and Held
in the Town of Frankfort on Monday, the Sixth Day of May, in the Year of Our Lord
1861, and of the Commonwealth the Sixty-Ninth. Frankfort: Jno. B. Major, 1861.
Journal of the Called Session of the Senate of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, Begun and Held
in the Town of Franfort, on Thursday the Seventeenth Day of January, in the Year of Our
Lord 1861, and of the Commonwealth the Sixty-Ninth. Frankfort: Kentucky Yeoman
Office, 1861.

395

Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Missouri, at the First Session of the
Twenty-First General Assembly. Jefferson City: W.G. Cheeney, 1861.
Journal of the [Mississippi] State Convention and Ordinances and Resolutions, Adopted in
January 1861, with an Appendix. Jackson: E. Barksdale State Printer, 1861.
Journal of the Missouri State Convention, Held at Jefferson City, July, 1861. St. Louis: George
Knapp and Company, 1861.
Journal of the Senate, Extra Session of the Rebel Legislature, Called Together by a
Proclamation of C.F. Jackson, Begun and Held at the Town of Neosho, Newton County,
Missouri, on the Twenty-First Day of October, Eighteen Hundred and Sixty-One.
Washington D.C.: Statute Law Book Company, 1916.
Kennedy, Joesph C.G. Agriculture of the United States in 1860; Compiled from the Original
Returns of the Eighth Census. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1864.
________. Population of the United States in 1860: Compiled from the Original Returns of the
Eighth Census. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1864.
Maryland General Assembly.
Printer, 1861.

House and Senate Documents, 1861.

Frederick: E.S. Riley

________. Journal and Proceedings of the House of Delegates, In Extra Session. Frederick:
Elihu S. Riley, 1861.
Maryland Senate. Journal of the Proceedings of the Senate of Maryland, In Extra Session, April
1861. Frederick: Beale H. Richardson, 1861.
Proceedings of the Missouri State Convention, Held at Jefferson City, July, 1861. St. Louis:
George Knapp and Company, 1861.
United States Census, 1830-1860.
US Congress. House. Report of the Select Committee of Thirty-three on the Disturbed
Condition of the Country. 36th Cong., 2nd Sess., Volume I, Number 31.
US Congress. Senate. Report of the Select Committee of Thirteen on the Disturbed Condition of
the Country. 36th Cong., 2nd Sess., Number 288.
War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate
Armies. 128 vols. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1880-1901.
Printed Political Documents and Reference Sources

396

Brown, Dwight H. State of Missouri: Official Manual for Years Nineteen-Thirty-Five and
Nineteen-Thirty-Six. Jefferson City: Midland Printing Company, n.d.
Chittenden, L.E. A Report of the Debates and Proceedings in Secret Sessions of the Conference
Convention for Proposing Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, Held at
Washington, D.C., In February, A.D. 1861. New York: D. Appleton and Company,
1864.
Dubin, Michael J. Party Affiliations in the State Legislatures: A Year by Year Summary, 17962006. Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland and Company, 2007.
________. United States Congressional Elections, 1787-1997: The Official Results of the
Elections of the 1st through the 105th Congresses. Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland
and Company, 1998.
________. United States Gubernatorial Elections, 1776-1860.
McFarland and Company, 2003.

Jefferson, North Carolina:

________. United States Presidential Elections, 1788-1860: The Official Results by County and
State. Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland and Company, 2002.
Dumond, Dwight Lowell, ed. Southern Editorials on Secession. New York: The Century
Company, 1931.
Freehling, William W. and Craig M. Simpson, eds. Showdown in Virginia: The 1861
Convention and the Fate of the Union. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press,
2010.
Hall, Clayton Coleman. Baltimore: Its History and Its People. 3 vols. New York: Lewis
Historical Publishing Company, 1912.
Halstead, Murat. Three Against Lincoln: Murat Halstead Reports the Caucuses of 1860. Edited
by William B. Hesseltine. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1960.
Johnson, Allen, ed. Dictionary of American Biography. 22 vols. New York: Charles Scribner’s
Sons, 1928-1958.
Johnson, Charles W., ed. Proceedings of the First Three Republican National Convention of
1856, 1860, and 1864, including Proceedings of the Antecedent National Convention
Held at Pittsburg, in February, 1856, as Reported by Horace Greeley. Minneapolis:
Harrison and Smith, 1893.
Leopard, Buel and Floyd C. Shoemaker, eds. The Messages and Proclamations of the
Governors of the State of Missouri. 12 vols. Columbia: State Historical Society of
Missouri, 1922-.

397

National Democratic Executive Committee. Proceedings of the Conventions at Charleston and
Baltimore. Washington: National Democratic Executive Committee, 1860.
Parsons, Stanley B., William W. Beach and Michael J. Dubin. United States Congressional
Districts and Data, 1843-1883. New York: Greenwood Press, 1986.
Perkins, Howard Cecil, ed. Northern Editorials on Secession. 2 vols. New York: D. Appleton
and Company, 1942.
Reese, George H., ed. Proceedings of the Virginia State Convention of 1861, February 13 –
May 1. 4 vols. Richmond: Virginia State Library, 1965.
Smith, William R. The History and the Debates of the Convention of the People of Alabama,
Begun and Held in the City of Montgomery, on the Seventh Day of January, 1861, In
Which is Preserved the Speeches of the Secret Sessions, and Many Valuable State
Papers. Montgomery: Atlanta, White, Pfister, and Company, 1861.
Warner, Ezra J. and W. Buck Yearns. Biographical Register of the Confederate Congress.
Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1975.
Newspapers
Albany (New York) Evening Journal
Baltimore American
Baltimore Sun
Columbus Daily Ohio Statesman
DeBow’s Review
Frankfort (Kentucky) Commonwealth
Liberty (Missouri) Weekly Tribune
Louisville Daily Courier
Louisville Daily Journal
Marshall (Missouri) Democrat
New Lisbon, Ohio, Anti-Slavery Bugle
New York Daily Tribune
New York Herald
Philadelphia Inquirer
St. Louis Daily Missouri Republican
Washington D.C. Constitution
Washington D.C. National Republican
Wilmington Delaware Inquirer
Wilmington Delaware Republican
Printed Diaries, Letter Collections, Memoirs, Reminiscences, and Speeches
Adams, Charles Francis, Jr. Charles Francis Adams, 1835-1915: An Autobiography. Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1916.
398

Bates, Edward. The Diary of Edward Bates, 1859-1866.
Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1933.

Edited by Howard K. Beale.

Bingham, George Caleb. “But I Forget That I Am a Painter and Not a Politician: The Letters of
George Caleb Bingham. Edited by Lynn Wolf Gentzler. Columbia: State Historical
Society of Missouri, 2011.
Bond, Priscilla. A Maryland Bride in the Deep South. Edited by Kimberly Harrison. Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2006.
Breckinridge, Robert J. The Civil War: Its Nature and End. Cincinnati: Office of the Danville
Review, 1861.
________. Two Speeches of Rev. Robert J. Breckinridge, D.D., LL.D., on the State of the
Country. Cincinnati: Press of E. Morgan and Company, 1862.
Brown, George William. Baltimore and the Nineteenth of April, 1861: A Study of the War.
1887. Reprint, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001.
Chittenden, L.E. Recollections of President Lincoln and His Administration. New York: Harper
and Brothers, 1891.
Coleman, Mrs. Chapman, ed. The Life of John J. Crittenden, with Selections from His
Correspondence and Speeches. 2 vols. Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott and Company,
1871.
Davis, Jefferson. The Papers of Jefferson Davis. 11 vols. Edited by Lynda Lasswell Crist and
Mary Seaton Dix. Baton Rouge: Louisiana University Press, 1971-.
Duke, Basil W. Reminiscences of General Basil W. Duke, C.S.A. Garden City: Doubleday,
Page, and Company, 1911.
Glenn, William Watkins. Between North and South: A Maryland Journalist Views the Civil
War. Edited by Bayly Ellen Marks and Mark Norton Schatz. Rutherford, New Jersey:
Fairleigh Dickinson Press, 1976.
Gunderson, Robert Gray, ed. “Letters from the Washington Peace Conference of 1861.”
Journal of Southern History 17 (August 1951): 382-392.
Hart, Albert Bushnell, ed. “Letters to Secretary Chase from the South, 1861.” American
Historical Review 4 (January 1899): 331-347.
Howard, Charles Morris. Personal Recollections of Severn Teackle Wallis. Baltimore: The
Daily Record, 1939.

399

Kennedy, John Pendleton. The Border States: Their Power and Duty in the Present Disordered
Condition of the Country. Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott and Co., 1861.
________. The Great Drama: An Appeal to Maryland. Baltimore: J.D. Toy, 1861.
Lincoln, Abraham. The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln. 8 vols. Edited by Roy P. Basler.
Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1953-1955.
Moore, Frank, ed. The Rebellion Record: A Diary of American Events, with Documents,
Narratives, Illustrative Incidents, Poetry, Etc. 11 vols. New York: D. Van Norstrand
Publisher, 1861-1868.
National Democratic Executive Committee. Speeches of Hon. Humphrey Marshall & Hon. B.F.
Hallett, in the City of Washington, on the Nomination of Breckinridge and Lane.
Washington D.C.: National Democratic Executive Committee, 1860.
Phillips, Ulrich Bonnell, ed. The Correspondence of Robert Toombs, Alexander Stephens, and
Howell Cobb. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1913.
Report of the Ceremonies on the Fourth of July, 185, at the Laying of the Corner Stone of a
Nation Monument, to be Erected near Lexington, Kentucky, to the Memory of Henry
Clay; Together with the Oration Delivered on the Occasion, by the Rev. Robert J.
Breckinridge, D.D., L.L.D. Lexington, Kentucky: Clay Monument Association, 1857.
Rowan, Steve, translator. Germans for a Free Missouri: Translations from the St. Louis Radical
Press, 1857-1862. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1983.
Shaler, Nathaniel Southgate. “The Border State Men of the Civil War.” Atlantic Monthly 69
(February 1892): 245-257.
Snead, Thomas L. The Fight for Missouri: From the Election of Lincoln to the Death of Lyon.
New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1886.
A Southern Citizen [Reverdy Johnson]. Remarks on Popular Sovereignty, as Maintained and
Denied Respectively by Judge Douglas, and Attorney-General Black. Baltimore: Murphy
and Company, 1859.
Speed, Thomas. The Union Cause in Kentucky, 1860-1865. New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons,
1911.
Stampp, Kenneth M., ed. “Letters from the Washington Peace Conference of 1861.” Journal of
Southern History 9 (August 1943): 394-403.
Underwood, Josie. Josie Underwood’s Civil War Diary.
Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2009.

400

Edited by Nancy Disher Baird.

Wakelyn, Jon, ed. Southern Pamphlets on Secession, November 1860-April 1861. Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1996.
________, ed. Southern Unionist Pamphlets and the Civil War. Columbia: University of
Missouri Press, 1999.
Wallis, Severn Teackle. Writings of Severn Teackle Wallis. 4 vols. Baltimore: John Murphy
and Company, 1896.
Webb, W.L. Battles and Biographies of Missourians, or the Civil War Period of Our State.
Kansas City: Hudson-Kimberly Publishing Company, 1900.
Online Sources
Biographical Directory of the
www.bioguide.congress.gov.

United

States

Congress,

1774

-

present.

Indexed United States Manuscript Census Records. www.ancestry.com.
Milton S. Eisenhower Library, Johns Hopkins University. “Don Quixote de la Mancha Online
Exhibit, Tour 2, Room 3.” Quixote.mse.jhu.edu/Wallis.html.
National Park Service.
“Lexington Cemetery
www.nps.gov/nr/travel/lexington/lce.htm.

and

Henry

Clay

Monument.”

Supreme Court of the United States. “Members of the Supreme Court of the United States.”
www.supremecourt.gov/about/members.aspx.
United States Census Bureau. “Quick Facts.” www.quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/index.html.
________. “Rank by Population of the 100 Largest Urban Places, Listed Alphabetically by
State:
1790-1990.”
http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0027/tab01.txt.
University of Virginia Geospatial and Statistical Data Center. “University of Virginia Historical
Census Browser.” http://mapserver.lib.virginia.edu/collections/.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Books
Abbott, Richard H. The Republican Party and the South, 1855-1877: The First Southern
Strategy. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986.
Altschuler, Glenn C. and Stuart M. Blumin. Rude Republic: Americans and Their Politics in the
Nineteenth Century. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.
401

Anbinder, Tyler. Nativism and Slavery: The Northern Know Nothings and the Politics of the
1850s. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.
Arenson, Adam. The Great Heart of the Republic: St. Louis and the Cultural Civil War.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011.
Aron, Stephen. American Confluence: The Missouri Frontier from Borderland to Border State.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006.
________. How the West Was Lost: The Transformation of Kentucky from Daniel Boone to
Henry Clay. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996.
Ashworth, John. The Republic in Crisis, 1848-1861. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2012.
Astor, Aaron. Rebels on the Border: Civil War, Emancipation, and the Reconstruction of
Kentucky and Missouri. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2012.
Atkins, Jonathan M. Parties, Politics, and the Sectional Conflict in Tennessee, 1832-1861.
Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1997.
Ayers, Edward L. In the Presence of Mine Enemies: War in the Heart of America, 1859-1863.
New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2003.
Baker, Jean H. Affairs of Party: The Political Culture of Northern Democrats in the MidNineteenth Century. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983.
________. Ambivalent Americans: The Know-Nothing Party in Maryland. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1977.
________. The Politics of Continuity: Maryland Political Parties from 1858 to 1870.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973.
Barnes, L. Diane, Brian Schoen, and Frank Towers, eds. The Old South’s Modern Worlds:
Slavery, Region, and Nation in the Age of Progress. New York: Oxford University Press,
2011.
Barnwell, John. Love of Order: South Carolina’s First Secession Crisis.
University of North Carolina Press, 1982.

Chapel Hill:

Beeman, Richard. Plain, Honest Men: The Making of the American Constitution. New York:
Random House, 2009.
Bensel, Richard Franklin. The American Ballot Box in the Mid-Nineteenth Century. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2004.
402

Berlin, Ira. Generations of Captivity: A History of African-American Slaves. Cambridge:
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003.
Bohner, Charles H. John Pendleton Kennedy: Gentleman from Baltimore. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1961.
Boman, Dennis K. Lincoln’s Resolute Unionist: Hamilton Gamble, Dred Scott Dissenter and
Missouri’s Civil War Governor. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2006.
Bonner, Robert E. Mastering America: Southern Slaveholders and the Crisis of American
Nationhood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
Bowman, Shearer Davis. At the Precipice: Americans North and South during the Secession
Crisis. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010.
Brown, Thomas. Politics and Statesmanship: Essays on the American Whig Party. New York:
Columbia University Press, 1985.
Brugger, Robert J. Maryland: A Middle Temperament, 1634-1980. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1988.
Burke, Diane Mutti. On Slavery’s Border: Missouri’s Small-Slaveholding Households, 18151865. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2010.
Burstein, Andrew and Nancy Isenberg. Madison and Jefferson. New York: Random House,
2010.
Cain, Marvin R. Lincoln’s Attorney General Edward Bates of Missouri. Columbia: University
of Missouri Press, 1965.
Campbell, Stanley W. The Slave Catchers: Enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Law, 1850-1860.
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1968.
Channing, Steven A. Crisis of Fear: Secession in South Carolina. New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1970.
Coclanis, Peter A. The Shadow of a Dream: Economic Life and Death in the South Carolina
Low Country, 1670-1920. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.
Coleman, J. Winston. Slavery Times in Kentucky. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1940.
Cooper, William J., Jr. Jefferson Davis, American. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000.
________. Liberty and Slavery: Southern Politics to 1860. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1983.
403

________. The South and the Politics of Slavery, 1828-1856. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1978.
________. We Have the War Upon Us: The Onset of the Civil War, November 1860 – April
1861. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2012.
Coulter, E. Merton. The Civil War and Readjustment in Kentucky. Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1926.
Crapol, Edward P. John Tyler: The Accidental President. Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 2006.
Craven, Avery. The Coming of the Civil War. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942.
________. The Growth of Southern Nationalism, 1848-1861. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1953.
Crenshaw, Ollinger. The Slave States in the Presidential Election of 1860. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins Press, 1943.
Crofts, Daniel W. Reluctant Confederates: Upper South Unionists in the Secession Crisis.
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989.
Cunningham, Noble E., Jr. In Pursuit of Reason: The Life of Thomas Jefferson. Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1987.
Current, Richard N. Lincoln and the First Shot. New York: Harper and Row, 1963.
Curry, Richard O. A House Divided: A Study of Statehood Politics and the Copperhead
Movement in West Virginia. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1964.
Daniel, Larry J. Shiloh: The Battle that Changed the Civil War. New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1997.
Davis, William C. Breckinridge: Statesman, Soldier, Symbol. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1974.
DeCredico, Mary A. Patriotism for Profit: Georgia’s Urban Entrepreneurs and the Confederate
War Effort. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990.
Degler, Carl N. The Other South: Southern Dissenters in the Nineteenth Century. New York:
Harper and Row, 1974.
Dew, Charles B. Apostles of Disunion: Southern Secession Commissioners and the Causes of
the Civil War. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2001.
404

Deyle, Steven. Carry Me Back: The Domestic Slave Trade in American Life. New York:
Oxford University Press, 2005.
Dollar, Kent T., Larry H. Whiteaker, and W. Calvin Dickinson, eds. Sister States, Enemy States:
The Civil War in Kentucky and Tennessee. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky,
2009.
Donald, David Herbert. Lincoln. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995.
Duberman, Martin. Charles Francis Adams, 1807-1886. Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1960.
Dumond, Dwight L. The Secession Movement, 1860-1861.
Company, 1931.

New York: The Macmillan

Egerton, Douglas R. Year of Meteors: Stephen Douglas, Abraham Lincoln, and the Election
That Brought on the Civil War. New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2010.
Egnal, Marc. Clash of Extremes: The Economic Origins of the Civil War. New York: Hill and
Wang, 2009.
Elkins, Stanley and Eric McKitrick. The Age of Federalism. New York: Oxford University
Press, 1993.
Essah, Patience. A House Divided: Slavery and Emancipation in Delaware, 1638-1865.
Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1996.
Etcheson, Nicole. Bleeding Kansas: Contested Liberty in the Civil War Era.
University Press of Kansas, 2004.

Lawrence:

________. The Emerging Midwest: Upland Southerners and the Political Culture of the Old
Northwest, 1787-1861. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996.
Evitts, William J. A Matter of Allegiances: Maryland from 1850 to 1861. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1974.
Eyal, Yonatan. The Young America Movement and the Transformation of the Democratic Party,
1828-1861. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
Fehrenbacher, Don E. The Dred Scott Case: Its Significance in American Law and Politics.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1978.
________. Prelude to Greatness: Lincoln in the 1850s. Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1962.

405

________. The Slaveholding Republic: An Account of the United States Government’s Relations
to Slavery. Completed and edited by Ward M. McAfee. New York: Oxford University
Press, 2001.
Fellman, Michael. Inside War: The Guerrilla Conflict in Missouri during the American Civil
War. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.
Ferling, John. Adams vs. Jefferson: The Tumultuous Election of 1800. New York: Oxford
University Press, 2004.
Fields, Barbara Jeanne. Slavery and Freedom on the Middle Ground: Maryland during the
Nineteenth Century. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985.
Finkelman, Paul, ed. His Soul Goes Marching On: Responses to John Brown and the Harpers
Ferry Raid. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1995.
Foner, Eric. The Fiery Trial: Abraham Lincoln and American Slavery. New York: W.W.
Norton and Company, 2010.
________. Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party before the
Civil War. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970.
Forbes, Robert Pierce. The Missouri Compromise and Its Aftermath. Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 2007.
Ford, Lacy K., Jr. Deliver Us from Evil: The Slavery Question in the Old South. New York:
Oxford University Press, 2009.
________. Origins of Southern Radicalism: The South Carolina Upcountry, 1800-1860. New
York: Oxford University Press, 1988.
Forgie, George B. Patricide in the House Divided: A Psychological Interpretation of Lincoln
and His Age. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1979.
Franklin, John Hope and Loren Schweninger. Runaway Slaves: Rebels on the Plantation. New
York: Oxford University Press, 1999.
Fredrickson, George M. The Black Image in the White Mind: The Debate on Afro-American
Character and Destiny, 1817-1914. New York: Harper and Row, 1971.
Freehling, Alison Goodyear. Drift Toward Dissolution: The Virginia Slavery Debate of 18311832. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982.
Freehling, William W. Prelude to Civil War: The Nullification Controversy in South Carolina,
1816-1836. New York: Oxford University Press, 1965.

406

________. The Road to Disunion. 2 vols. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990-2007.
________. The South vs. The South: How Anti-Confederate Southerners Shaped the Course of
the Civil War. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.
Gallagher, Gary W. The Union War. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011.
Gallagher, Gary W. and Rachel A. Shelden, eds. A Political Nation: New Directions in MidNineteenth-Century American Political History. Charlottesville: University of Virginia
Press, 2012.
Geiger, Mark. Financial Fraud and Guerrilla Violence in Missouri’s Civil War, 1861-1865.
New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010.
Gerteis, Louis S. Civil War St. Louis. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001.
Gienapp, William E. The Origins of the Republican Party, 1852-1856. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1987.
Goldfield, David R. Urban Growth in the Age of Sectionalism: Virginia, 1847-1861. Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1977.
Goodheart, Adam. 1861: The Civil War Awakening. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2011.
Goodwin, Doris Kearns. Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln. New York:
Simon and Schuster, 2005.
Greenberg, Kenneth S. Masters and Statesmen: The Political Culture of American Slavery.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985.
Grimstead, David. American Mobbing, 1828-1861: Toward Civil War. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1998.
Grivno, Max. Gleanings of Freedom: Free and Slave Labor along the Mason-Dixon Line, 17901860. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2011.
Gudmestad, Robert H. A Troublesome Commerce: The Transformation of the Interstate Slave
Trade. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2003.
________. Steamboats and the Rise of the Cotton Kingdom. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 2011.
Gunderson, Robert Gray. Old Gentleman’s Convention: The Washington Peace Conference of
1861. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1961.

407

Hahn, Steven. A Nation Under Our Feet: Black Political Struggles in the Rural South from
Slavery to the Great Migration. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
2003.
Hancock, Harold Bell. Delaware During the Civil War: A Political History. Wilmington:
Historical Society of Delaware, 1961.
Harris, William C. Lincoln and the Border States: Preserving the Union. Lawrence: University
Press of Kansas, 2011.
________. Lincoln’s Rise to the Presidency. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2007.
Harrison, Lowell H. The Civil War in Kentucky. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky,
1975.
Harrison, Lowell H. and James C. Klotter. A New History of Kentucky. Lexington: University
Press of Kentucky, 1997.
Harrold, Stanley. The Abolitionists and the South, 1831-1861. Lexington: University Press of
Kentucky, 1995.
________. Border War: Fighting over Slavery before the Civil War. Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 2010.
Henig, Gerald S. Henry Winter Davis: Antebellum and Civil War Congressman from Maryland.
New York: Twayne Publishers, 1973.
Holt, Michael F. The Fate of Their Country: Politicians, Slavery Extension, and the Coming of
the Civil War. New York: Hill and Wang, 2004.
________. The Political Crisis of the 1850s. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1978.
Holzer, Harold. Lincoln at Cooper Union: The Speech that Made Abraham Lincoln President.
New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004.
________. Lincoln President-Elect: Abraham Lincoln and the Great Secession Winter, 18601861. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2008.
Howe, Daniel Walker. The Political Culture of the American Whigs. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1979.
Hurt, R. Douglas. Agriculture and Slavery in Missouri’s Little Dixie. Columbia: University of
Missouri Press, 1992.
Johannsen, Robert W. Stephen A. Douglas. New York: Oxford University Press, 1973.

408

________. To the Halls of the Montezumas: The Mexican War in the American Imagination.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1985.
Johnson, Michael P. Toward a Patriarchal Republic: The Secession of Georgia. Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1977.
Johnson, Michael P. and James L. Roark. Black Masters: A Free Family of Color in the Old
South. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1984.
Johnson, Walter. Soul by Soul: Life Inside the Antebellum Slave Market. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1999.
Kaye, Anthony E. Joining Places: Slave Neighborhoods in the Old South.
University of North Carolina Press, 2007.

Chapel Hill:

Kirwan, Albert D. John J. Crittenden: The Struggle for the Union. Lexington: University Press
of Kentucky, 1962.
Klein, Maury. Days of Defiance: Sumter, Secession, and the Coming of the Civil War. New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997.
Klotter, James C. The Breckinridges of Kentucky, 1760-1981. Lexington: University Press of
Kentucky, 1986.
Knoles, George Harmon, ed. The Crisis of the Union, 1860-1861. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1965.
Knupfer, Peter B. The Union As It Is: Constitutional Unionism and Sectional Compromise,
1787-1861. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991.
Lankford, Nelson D. Cry Havoc! The Crooked Road to Civil War, 1861. New York: Viking,
2007.
Launius, Roger D. Alexander William Doniphan: Portrait of a Missouri Moderate. Columbia:
University of Missouri Press, 1997.
Leonard, Elizabeth D. Lincoln’s Forgotten Ally: Judge Advocate General Joseph Holt of
Kentucky. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011.
Levine, Bruce. Half Slave and Half Free: The Roots of the Civil War. New York: Hill and
Wang, 1992.
Link, William A. Roots of Secession: Slavery and Politics in Antebellum Virginia. Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 2003.

409

Litwack, Leon F. North of Slavery: The Negro in the Free States, 1790-1860. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1961.
Lubet, Steven. Fugitive Justice: Runaways, Rescuers, and Slavery on Trial.
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010.

Cambridge:

Marrs, Aaron. Railroads in the Old South: Pursuing Progress in a Slave Society. Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009.
McCandless, Perry. A History of Missouri, Vol. 2, 1820-1860.
Missouri Press, 1972.

Columbia: University of

McClintock, Russell. Lincoln and the Decision for War: The Northern Response to Secession.
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008.
McCormick, Richard P. The Second American Party System: Party Formation in the Jacksonian
Era. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1966.
McCoy, Drew R. The Last of the Fathers: James Madison and the Republican Legacy.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
McGlone, Robert E. John Brown’s War Against Slavery. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2009.
McPherson, James M. Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era.
University Press, 1988.

New York: Oxford

________. Tried by War: Abraham Lincoln as Commander in Chief. New York: The Penguin
Press, 2008.
Mering, John Vollmer. The Whig Party in Missouri. Columbia: University of Missouri Press,
1967.
Morgan, Philip D. Slave Counterpoint: Black Culture in the Eighteenth-Century Chesapeake
and Lowcountry. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998.
Morrison, Michael A. Slavery and the American West: The Eclipse of Manifest Destiny and the
Coming of the Civil War. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997.
Munroe, John A. History of Delaware. 2nd ed. Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1984.
Neely, Jeremy. The Border Between Them: Violence and Reconciliation on the Kansas-Missouri
Line. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2007.
Neely, Mark E., Jr. The Boundaries of American Political Culture in the Civil War Era. Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005.
410

________. Lincoln and the Triumph of the Nation: Constitutional Conflict in the American Civil
War. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011.
Nevins, Allan. The Ordeal of the Union. 8 vols. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 19471971.
Nichols, Roy Franklin.
Company, 1948.

The Disruption of American Democracy.

New York: Macmillan

Oakes, James. The Ruling Race: A History of American Slaveholders. New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1982.
Oates, Stephen B. To Purge This Land with Blood: A Biography of John Brown. New York:
Harper and Row, 1970.
Olsen, Christopher J. Political Culture and Secession in Mississippi: Masculinity, Honor, and
the Antiparty Tradition, 1830-1860. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.
Parrish, William E. Frank Blair: Lincoln’s Conservative. Columbia: University of Missouri
Press, 1998.
________. Turbulent Partnership: Missouri and the Union, 1861-1865. Columbia: University
of Missouri Press, 1963.
Paskoff, Paul F. Troubled Waters: Steamboat Disasters, River Improvements, and American
Public Policy, 1821-1860. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2007.
Phillips, Christopher. Damned Yankee: The Life of General Nathaniel Lyon.
University of Missouri Press, 1990.

Columbia:

________. Missouri’s Confederate: Claiborne Fox Jackson and the Creation of Southern
Identity in the Border West. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2000.
Piston, William Garrett and Richard W. Hatcher III. Wilson’s Creek: The Second Battle of the
Civil War and the Men Who Fought It. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
2000.
Potter, David M. The Impending Crisis, 1848-1861.
Fehrenbacher. New York: Harper and Row, 1976.

Completed and edited by Don E.

________. Lincoln and His Party in the Secession Crisis. 1942. Reprint, Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1995.
________. The South and the Sectional Conflict. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University
Press, 1968.
411

Radcliffe, George L. Governor Thomas H. Hicks of Maryland and the Civil War. Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1902.
Ramage, James A. and Andrea S. Watkins. Kentucky Rising: Democracy, Slavery, and Culture
from the Early Republic to the Civil War. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky,
2011.
Randall, J.G. Lincoln and the South. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1946.
Rash, Nancy. The Painting and Politics of George Caleb Bingham.
University Press, 1991.

New Haven: Yale

Rawley, James A. Turning Points of the Civil War. New Bison Book Edition. Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 1989.
Remini, Robert V. Henry Clay: Statesman for the Union. New York: W.W. Norton and
Company, 1991.
Reynolds, Donald E. Editors Make War: Southern Newspapers in the Secession Crisis.
Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1966.
________. Texas Terror: The Slave Insurrection Panic of 1860 and the Secession of the Lower
South. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2007.
Rhodes, James Ford. History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850 to the
Restoration of Home Rule in the South in 1877. 8 vols. New York: Macmillan
Company, 1906-1919.
Richards, Leonard L. The Slave Power: The Free North and Southern Domination, 1780-1860.
Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2000.
Risjord, Norman K. The Old Republicans: Southern Conservatism in the Age of Jefferson. New
York: Columbia University Press, 1965.
Royster, Charles. A Revolutionary People at War: The Continental Army and American
Character, 1775-1783. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979.
Ryle, Walter Harrington. Missouri: Union or Secession. Nashville: George Peabody College for
Teachers, 1931.
Schermerhorn, Calvin. Money Over Mastery, Family Over Freedom: Slavery in the Antebellum
Upper South. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011.
Schoen, Brian. The Fragile Fabric of Union: Cotton, Federal Politics, and the Global Origins
of the Civil War. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009.
412

Scrugham, Mary. The Peaceable Americans of 1860-1861: A Study in Public Opinion. 1921.
Reprint, New York: Octagon Books, 1976.
Shade, William G. Democratizing the Old Dominion: Virginia and the Second Party System,
1824-1861. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1996.
Shalhope, Robert E. Sterling Price: Portrait of a Southerner. Columbia: University of Missouri
Press, 1971.
Silbey, Joel H. A Respectable Minority: The Democratic Party in the Civil War Era, 1860-1868.
New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1977.
________. The Partisan Imperative: The Dynamics of American Politics before the Civil War.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1985.
________. Storm Over Texas: The Annexation Controversy and the Road to Civil War. New
York: Oxford University Press, 2005.
Sinha, Manisha. The Counterrevolution of Slavery: Politics and Ideology in Antebellum South
Carolina. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000.
Smelser, Marshall. The Democratic Republic, 1801-1815. New York: Harper and Row, 1968.
Smiley, David L. Lion of White Hall: The Life of Cassius M. Clay. Madison: University of
Wisconsin Press, 1962.
Smith, Edward Conrad. The Borderland in the Civil War. New York: MacMillan, 1927.
Smith, Elbert B. Francis Preston Blair. New York: Free Press, 1980.
Smith, William E. The Francis Preston Blair Family in Politics.
MacMillan, 1933.

2 vols.

New York:

Stahr, Walter. Seward: Lincoln’s Indispensable Man. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2012.
Stampp, Kenneth M. America in 1857: A Nation on the Brink. New York: Oxford University
Press, 1990.
________. And the War Came: The North and the Secession Crisis, 1860-1861. Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1950.
Stickles, Arndt M. Simon Bolivar Buckner: Borderland Knight. Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1940.

413

Sutherland, Daniel E. A Savage Conflict: The Decisive Role of Guerrillas in the American Civil
War. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009.
Sutherland, Daniel E., ed. Guerrillas, Unionists, and Violence on the Confederate Home Front.
Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1999.
Swanberg, W.A. First Blood: The Story of Fort Sumter. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons,
1957.
Tadman, Michael. Speculators and Slaves: Masters, Traders, and Slaves in the Old South.
Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989.
Tallant, Harold D. Evil Necessity: Slavery and Political Culture in Antebellum Kentucky.
Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2003.
Thornton, J. Mills, III. Politics and Power in a Slave Society: Alabama, 1800-1860. Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1978.
Towers, Frank. The Urban South and the Coming of the Civil War. Charlottesville: University
of Virginia Press, 2004.
Townsend, William H. Lincoln and the Bluegrass: Slavery and Civil War in Kentucky.
Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1955.
Van Cleve, George William. A Slaveholders’ Union: Slavery, Politics, and the Constitution in
the Early American Republic. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010.
Van Deusen, Glyndon G. William Henry Seward. New York: Oxford University Press, 1967.
Varon, Elizabeth R. Disunion! The Coming of the American Civil War, 1789-1859. Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008.
Voss-Hubbard, Mark. Beyond Party: Cultures of Antipartisanship in Northern Politics before
the Civil War. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002.
Wagandt, Charles Lewis. The Mighty Revolution: Negro Emancipation in Maryland, 18621864. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1964.
Waldstreicher, David. Slavery’s Constitution: From Revolution to Ratification. New York: Hill
and Wang, 2009.
Walther, Eric H. The Fire-Eaters. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1992.
________. William Lowndes Yancey and the Coming of the Civil War. Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press, 2006.

414

Wells, Jonathan Daniel. The Origins of the Southern Middle Class: 1800-1861. Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 2004.
Widmer, Edward. Young America: The Flowering of Democracy in New York City. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1999.
Wilentz, Sean. The Rise of American Democracy: Jefferson to Lincoln. New York: W.W.
Norton and Company, 2005.
Woods, James M. Rebellion and Realignment: Arkansas’s Road to Secession. Fayetteville:
University of Arkansas Press, 1987.
Wooster, Ralph A. The People in Power: Courthouse and Statehouse in the Lower South, 18501860. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1969.
________. Politicians, Planters, and Plain Folk: Courthouse and Statehouse in the Upper
South, 1850-1860. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1975.
________. The Secession Conventions of the South. Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1962.
Wright, Gavin. The Political Economy of the Cotton South: Households, Market, and Wealth in
the Nineteenth Century. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1978.
Wright, William C. The Secession Movement in the Middle Atlantic States. Rutherford, New
Jersey: Fairleigh Dickinson Press, 1973.
Wyatt-Brown, Bertram. Southern Honor: Ethics and Behavior in the Old South. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1982.
Articles
Alexander, Thomas B. “The Civil War as Institutional Fulfillment.” Journal of Southern
History 47 (February 1981): 3-32.
Avillo, Philip J., Jr. “The Oath and the Emergence of Slave State Republican Congressmen,
1861-1867.” Civil War History 22 (June 1976): 164-174.
Calbert, Jack. “The Jackson Purchase and the End of the Neutrality Policy in Kentucky.” Filson
Club History Quarterly 38 (July 1964): 206-223.
Calderhead, William. “How Extensive was the Border State Slave Trade? A New Look.” Civil
War History 18 (March 1972): 42-55.
Carroll, Stephen. “Loyalty or Secession? Missouri Politics and Sentiment before the Civil
War.” Missouri Historical Society Bulletin 19 (1972): 20-31.
415

Copeland, James E. “Where Were the Kentucky Unionists and Secessionists?” Register of the
Kentucky Historical Society 71 (October 1973): 344-363.
Craig, Berry F. “Henry Cornelius Burnett: Champion of Southern Rights.” Register of the
Kentucky Historical Society 77 (Autumn 1979): 266-274.
________. “Kentucky’s Rebel Press: The Jackson Purchase Newspapers in 1861.” Register of
the Kentucky Historical Society 75 (January 1977): 20-27.
Crenshaw, Ollinger. “The Speakership Contest of 1859-1860: John Sherman’s Election a Cause
of Disruption?” Mississippi Valley Historical Review 29 (December 1942): 323-338.
Crofts, Daniel W. “Secession Winter: William Henry Seward and the Decision for War.” New
York History 65 (July 1984): 229-256.
________. “The Union Party of 1861 and the Secession Crisis.” Perspectives in American
History 11 (1977-1978): 327-376.
Dorsett, Lyle W. and Arthur H. Shaffer. “Was the Antebellum South Antiurban?
Suggestion.” Journal of Southern History 38 (February 1972): 93-100.

A

Dues, Michael T. “The Pro-Secessionist Governor of Kentucky: Beriah Magoffin’s Credibility
Gap.” Register of the Kentucky Historical Society: 221-232.
Eidson, William G. “Louisville, Kentucky during the First Year of the Civil War.” Filson Club
History Quarterly 38 (July 1964): 224-238.
Everett, Edward G. “The Baltimore Riots, April, 1861.” Pennsylvania History 24 (October
1957): 331-342.
Fladeland, Betty L. “Compensated Emancipation: A Rejected Alternative.” Journal of Southern
History 42 (May 1976): 169-186.
Gienapp, William E. “Abraham Lincoln and the Border States.” Journal of the Abraham
Lincoln Association 13 (1992): 13-46.
________. “ ‘Politics Seem to Enter into Everything’: Political Culture in the North, 18401860.” In Essays on American Antebellum Politics, 1840-1860, edited by Stephen E.
Maizlish and John J. Kushma, 15-69. College Station: Texas A&M University Press,
1982.
Gilliam, Will D., Jr. “Kansas and Slavery in Two Lexington, Kentucky Newspapers: 1857.”
Register of the Kentucky Historical Society 49 (July 1951): 225-230.

416

________. “Party Regularity in Three Kentucky Elections and Union Volunteering.” Journal of
Southern History 16 (November 1950): 511-518.
________. “Robert J. Breckinridge: Kentucky Unionist.” Register of the Kentucky Historical
Society 69 (October 1971): 362-385.
Goldfield, David R. “The Urban South: A Regional Framework.” American Historical Review
86 (December 1981): 1009-1034.
Grinspan, Jon. “ ‘Young Men for War’: The Wide Awakes and Lincoln’s 1860 Presidential
Campaign.” Journal of American History 96 (September 2009): 357-378.
Gunderson, Robert Gray. “William C. Rives and the Old Gentlemen’s Convention.” Journal of
Southern History 22 (November 1956): 459-476.
Hancock, Harold. “Civil War Comes to Delaware.” Civil War History 2 (December 1956): 2946.
Harlow, Luke E. “Religion, Race, and Robert J. Breckinridge: The Ideology of an Antislavery
Slaveholder, 1830-1860.” Ohio Valley History 6 (Fall 2006): 1-24.
Harrison, Lowell H. “Governor Magoffin and the Secession Crisis.” Register of the Kentucky
Historical Society 72 (April 1974): 91-110.
________. “John C. Breckinridge: Nationalist, Confederate, Kentuckian.” Filson Club History
Quarterly 47 (April 1973): 125-144.
Heck, Frank H. “John C. Breckinridge in the Crisis of 1860-61.” Journal of Southern History
21 (August 1955): 317-330.
Hitchcock, William S. “Southern Moderates and Secession: Senator Robert M.T. Hunter’s Call
for Union.” Journal of American History 59 (March 1973): 871-884.
Huston, James L. “Southerners against Secession: The Arguments of the Constitutional
Unionists in 1850-1851.” Civil War History 46 (December 2000): 281-299.
Hyman, Harold M. “The Narrow Escape from a ‘Compromise of 1860’: Secession and the
Constitution.” In Freedom and Reform: Essays in Honor of Henry Steele Commager,
edited by Harold M. Hyman and Leonard W. Levy, 149-166. New York: Harper and
Row Publishers, 1967.
Johannsen, Robert W. “The Douglas Democracy and the Crisis of Disunion.” Civil War History
9 (September 1963): 229-247.
Kelly, Jack. “John J. Crittenden and the Constitutional Union Party.” Filson Club History
Quarterly 48 (July 1974): 265-276.
417

Kirkpatrick, Arthur Roy. “Missouri in the Early Months of the Civil War.” Missouri Historical
Review 55 (April 1961): 235-266.
________. “Missouri on the Eve of the Civil War.” Missouri Historical Review 55 (January
1961): 98-108.
________. “Missouri’s Secessionist Government, 1861-1865.” Missouri Historical Review 45
(January 1951): 127-137.
Kornblith, Gary J. “Rethinking the Coming of the Civil War: A Counterfactual Exercise.”
Journal of American History 90 (June 2003): 76-105.
Ledbetter, Patsy S. “John J. Crittenden and the Compromise Debacle.” Filson Club History
Quarterly 51 (April 1977): 125-142.
Lee, Jacob F. “Between Two Fires: Cassius M. Clay, Slavery, and Antislavery in the Kentucky
Borderlands.” Ohio Valley History 6 (Fall 2006): 50-70.
Levine, Bruce. “ ‘The Vital Element of the Republican Party’: Antislavery, Nativism, and
Abraham Lincoln.” Journal of the Civil War Era 1 (December 2011): 481-505.
Long, E.B. “The Paducah Affair: Bloodless Action that Altered the Civil War in the Mississippi
Valley.” Register of the Kentucky Historical Society 70 (October 1972): 253-276.
Luthin, Reinhard H. “Organizing the Republican Party in the ‘Border Slave’ Regions: Edward
Bates’s Presidential Candidacy in 1860.” Missouri Historical Review 38 (January 1944):
138-161.
Mathias, Frank F. “Slavery, the Solvent of Kentucky Politics.” Register of the Kentucky
Historical Society 70 (January 1972): 1-16.
May, Robert E. “Psychobiography and Secession: The Southern Radical as Maladjusted
‘Outsider’.” Civil War History 34 (March 1988): 46-69.
McCrary, Peyton, Clark Miller, and Dale Baum. “Class and Party in the Secession Crisis:
Voting Behavior in the Deep South, 1856-1861.” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 8
(Winter 1978): 429-457.
Mering, John V. “The Slave-State Constitutional Unionists and the Politics of Consensus.”
Journal of Southern History 43 (August 1977): 395-410.
Moore, James Tice. “Secession and the States: A Review Essay.” Virginia Magazine of History
and Biography 94 (January 1986): 60-76.

418

Najar, Monica. “ ‘Meddling with Emancipation’: Baptists, Authority, and the Rift over Slavery
in the Upper South.” Journal of the Early Republic 25 (Summer 2005): 157-186.
Phillips, Christopher. “ ‘The Crime against Missouri’: Slavery, Kansas, and the Cant of
Southernness in the Border West.” Civil War History 48 (March 2002): 60-81.
Robertson, James R. “Sectionalism in Kentucky from 1855 to 1865.”
Historical Review 4 (June 1917): 49-63.

Mississippi Valley

Robinson, Michael D. “William Henry Seward and the Onset of the Secession Crisis.” Civil
War History 59 (March 2013): 32-66.
Roed, William. “Secessionist Strength in Missouri.” Missouri Historical Review 72 (July 1978):
412-423.
Shortridge, Wilson Porter. “Kentucky Neutrality in 1861.” Mississippi Valley Historical Review
9 (March 1923): 283-301.
Sowle, Patrick. “Cassius Clay and the Crisis of the Union.” Register of the Kentucky Historical
Society 65 (April 1967): 144-149.
Steiner, Bernard C. “Severn Teackle Wallis: First Paper.” Sewanee Review 15 (January 1907):
58-74.
________. “Severn Teackle Wallis: Second Paper.” Sewanee Review 15 (April 1907): 129-147.
Towers, Frank. “Another Look at Inevitability: The Upper South and the Limits of Compromise
in the Secession Crisis.” Tennessee Historical Quarterly 70 (Summer 2011): 108-125.
Turner, Wallace B. “The Secession Movement in Kentucky.”
Historical Society 66 (July 1968): 259-278.

Register of the Kentucky

Viles, Jonas. “Sections and Sectionalism in a Border State.” Mississippi Valley Historical
Review 21 (June 1934): 3-22.
Waldrep, Christopher. “Rank-and-File Voters and the Coming of the Civil War: Caldwell
County, Kentucky, as Test Case.” Civil War History 35 (March 1989): 59-72.
Wallace, Doris Davis. “The Political Campaign of 1860 in Missouri.” Missouri Historical
Review 70 (January 1976): 162-183.
Woodworth, Steven E. “ ‘The Indeterminate Quantities’: Jefferson Davis, Leonidas Polk, and
the End of Kentucky Neutrality, September 1861.” Civil War History 38 (December
1992): 289-297.

419

Zacharias, Donald W. “John J. Crittenden Crusades for the Union and Neutrality in Kentucky.”
Filson Club History Quarterly 38 (July 1964): 193-205.
Theses and Dissertations
Boyd, John A. “Neutrality and Peace: Kentucky and the Secession Crisis of 1861.” Ph.D. diss.,
University of Kentucky, 1999.
McClanahan, Brion T. “A Lonely Opposition: James A. Bayard, Jr. and the American Civil
War.” Ph.D. diss., University of South Carolina, 2006.
Paine, Christopher M. " 'Kentucky Will be the Last to Give Up the Union': Kentucky Politics,
1844-1861." Ph.D. diss., University of Kentucky, 1998.
Sowle, Patrick Michael. “The Conciliatory Republicans During the Winter of Secession.” Ph.D.
diss., Duke University, 1963.
Volz, Harry August III. "Party, State, and Nation: Kentucky and the Coming of the American
Civil War.” Ph.D. diss., University of Virginia, 1982.

420

Vita

Michael Dudley Robinson was born in Durham, North Carolina, in 1979. He earned a
Bachelor of Science degree in Business Management from North Carolina State University in
2001 and obtained a Master of Arts degree in United States History from the University of North
Carolina – Wilmington in 2007. Robinson will receive the Doctor of Philosophy degree in
United States History from Louisiana State University in 2013. He and his wife Katherine reside
in Baton Rouge, Louisiana.

421

